COGNITIVE SCALE, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 2, 2021

2020002348 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 2, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/729,545 06/03/2015 Matthew Sanchez COGSC-14-025.1 1088
33438 7590 07/02/2021
TERRILE, CANNATTI & CHAMBERS, LLP
P.O. BOX 203518
AUSTIN, TX 78720
EXAMINER
PARK, GRACE A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2157
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/02/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
USPTO@dockettrak.com
celeste@tcciplaw.com
tmunoz@tcciplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

Ex parte MATTHEW SANCHEZ and DILUM RANATUNGA

Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545
Technology Center 2100

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, MARC S. HOFF, and
MICHAEL T. CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judges.

CYGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–14. Appeal Br. 9–13. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Cognitive
Scale, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claimed subject matter generally relates to performing cognitive
inference and learning operations. Spec. ¶ 2. The claimed cognitive
computing approach has “more in common with the structure of the human
brain than with the architecture of contemporary, instruction-driven
computers.” Id. ¶ 28. The claimed subject matter incorporates knowledge
into a cognitive graph, which is “a representation of expert knowledge,
associated with individuals and groups over a period of time, to depict
relationships between people, places, and things using words, ideas, audio
and images.” Id. ¶ 46. Cognitive insights are produced by processing
cognitive graphs through collaborative efforts of a graph query engine and
an insight engine. Id. ¶ 61. The graph query engine performs various
natural language processing to process queries. Id. The insight engine
applies an algorithm to the cognitive graph to generate the cognitive insight.
Id.
Independent claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A system comprising:
a processor;
a data bus coupled to the processor; and
a non-transitory, computer-readable storage medium
embodying computer program code, the non-transitory,
computer-readable storage medium being coupled to the data
bus, the computer program code interacting with a plurality of
computer operations and comprising instructions executable by
the processor and configured for:
receiving streams of data from a plurality of data sources;
processing the streams of data from the plurality of data
sources, the processing the streams of data from the plurality of
data sources performing data enriching and generating a sub-
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

3
graph for incorporation into a cognitive graph, the cognitive
graph comprising a machine-readable formalism for knowledge
representation that provides a common framework allowing
data and knowledge to be shared, the cognitive graph being
stored within a repository of cognitive graphs, the repository of
cognitive graphs comprising a plurality of application cognitive
graphs, the cognitive inference and learning system executing
on a hardware processor of an information processing system,
the cognitive inference and learning system and the information
processing system providing a cognitive computing function,
the cognitive inference and learning system comprising a
cognitive platform, the cognitive platform comprising a
cognitive engine, the cognitive engine comprising an insight
engine and a graph query engine, the insight engine
encapsulating a predetermined algorithm, the predetermined
algorithm being applied to the cognitive graph to generate a
result, the insight engine operating collaboratively with the
graph query engine to generate a cognitive insight, the insight
engine comprising an insight agent;
processing an application cognitive graph of the plurality of
application cognitive graphs, the processing the application
cognitive graph providing a plurality of individual cognitive
insights for a user, the application cognitive graph being
associated with a predetermined cognitive application, the
insight agent using the application cognitive graph as a data
source to provide the plurality of individual insights; and,
generating a composite cognitive insight, the composite
cognitive insight being composed of the plurality of individual
cognitive insights, the generating orchestrating the insight agent
to generate the composite cognitive insight from the plurality of
individual cognitive insights.
Appeal Br. 9–10 (Claims App.). Independent claim 7 recites a non-
transitory, computer-readable storage medium having limitations similar to
that of claim 1. Id. at 11–12. Dependent claims 2–6 and 8–14 each
incorporate the limitations of their respective independent claims. Id. at 10–
13.
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

4
REFERENCES
Name Reference Date
Sukumar et al.
(“Sukumar”)
US 2014/0156591 A1 June 5, 2014
Sharp et al.
(“Sharp”)
US 2014/0181204 A1 June 26, 2014

REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 3, 7, and 9 are provisionally rejected on the ground of
nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claim 1 of U.S.
Application number 14/734,493 and claim 3 of U.S. Application Number
14/734,490.
II. Claims 1–14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being ineligible
subject matter.
III. Claims 1, 3–7, and 9–14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)
as being anticipated by Sukumar.
IV. Claims 2 and 8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
obvious over the combination of Sukumar and Sharp.

OPINION
I. Double Patenting
Appellant has not argued substantive error in the Examiner’s double
patenting rejection of claims 1, 3, 7, and 9 over claim 1 of U.S. Application
number 14/734,493 and claim 3 of U.S. Application Number 14/734,490.
Final Act. 4. However, because the Examiner’s rejection is provisional, we
do not reach it. See Ex parte Moncla, 95 USPQ2d 1884, 1885 (BPAI 2010)
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

5
(holding that it is premature to address a provisional rejection)
(precedential).
II. Subject Matter Eligibility
1. Principles of Law
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
There is, however, an implicit, longstanding exception to patent-
eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (citation omitted). This exception precludes
patenting of “the basic tools of scientific and technological work” from
which all inventions spring. Id. at 216–17 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Invention or discovery under § 101 is distinguished as being the
application of such tools to an end otherwise satisfying the requirements of
the patent statutes. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
The Supreme Court has established a framework for this eligibility
determination. Where a claim is directed towards a law of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract idea, the elements of the claim as a whole must
ensure that the claim, in practice, amounts to significantly more than a patent
on the law of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract idea itself. Alice, 573
U.S. at 217–18. In applying this eligibility analysis, our reviewing court has
stated, “the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier
cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen[,] . . . the
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

6
classic common law methodology for creating law when a single governing
definitional context is not available.” Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom,
Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
To address the growing body of precedent, the USPTO recently
published revised examination guidance on the application of § 101. 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “2019 Guidance”); October 2019 Update: Subject
Matter Eligibility (hereinafter “October 2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df). The 2019 Guidance seeks to improve the clarity of the subject matter
eligibility analysis and improve consistency of this analysis across the
USPTO. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 50. The guidance within these
documents has been incorporated into the June 2020 version of the MPEP,
hereinafter referred to as “USPTO guidance” or by particular section of the
MPEP. “Subject Matter Eligibility,” available at https://www.uspto.gov/
patent/laws-and-regulations/examination-policy/subject-matter-eligibility.
Under USPTO guidance, we first look to whether the claim is directed
to a judicial exception because:
(1) the claim recites a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
idea, the last of which includes certain groupings, identified as
mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity
and mental processes; and
(2) the claim as a whole fails to recite additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

7
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or instead,
simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See MPEP § 2106.05.
2. Analysis
We have reviewed the Examiner’s subject matter eligibility rejection
in the Final Action (Final Act.) in light of Appellant’s contentions in the
Appeal Brief (Appeal Br.) that the Examiner has erred. We have further
considered the discussion in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans.) and in the Reply
Brief (Reply Br.). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention of
Examiner error in rejecting claims 1–14 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We begin
with claim 1.
a. “Recites an Abstract Idea”
The eligibility inquiry begins with determining whether the claim
recites a judicial exception such as an abstract idea, at Step 2A Prong 1 of
USPTO guidance. MPEP § 2106.04(II)(A).
i. Examiner’s Findings
The Examiner has found claim 1 to recite an abstract idea through the
claimed operations of the computer code, amounting to all of claim 1 except
for the features of processor, data bus, and storage medium, identified as
generic computer components, and the operations of “receiving streams of
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

8
data from a plurality of data sources,” “the cognitive graph being stored
within a repository of cognitive graphs, the repository of cognitive graphs
comprising a plurality of application cognitive graphs,” and “generate a
result,” identified as mere data gathering and data output comprising
insignificant extra-solution activity. Final Act. 5; Ans. 6–7.
The Examiner, relying on the Specification, construes “cognitive
insight” as “an insight that is the result of a cognitive process.” Ans. 4
(citing Spec. ¶¶ 4, 36, 38, 40, 41, 51). Further, the Examiner construes the
terms “cognitive platform,” “cognitive engine,” “insight engine,” and
“insight agent” as “modules of the cognitive inference and learning system.”
Id.
The Examiner finds the claimed operations of the computer code to
cover mental operations, for example, “a human can organize data into a
graph representation in his/her mind. Additionally, a human can apply an
algorithm to the organized data to produce one or more cognitive insights,
which essentially refers to understanding things with the mind.” Final Act.
5; see Ans. 4–6.
ii. Appellant’s Arguments
Appellant argues that the claims do not recite an abstract idea. Appeal
Br. 4–5. Appellant argues that the claimed “insight agent” is a “software
entity that uses a cognitive graph as a data source to generate individual
cognitive insights.” Reply Br. 3. Appellant also argues that the functions
being performed cannot be practically performed solely within a human
mind. Id.
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

9
iii. Analysis
We agree that the Examiner-identified “cognitive” operations fall
within the mental activity exception to patent-eligible subject matter. These
operations are characterized by the Examiner as akin to “making a mental
note or annotation,” “mentally imagining or drawing a small, easily
understandable graph that can be incorporated into another graph,”
“applying an algorithm to a graph,” “thinking about something and making
an observation about it,” “looking at a graph and coming up with
observations about the graph and mentally associating the graph with an
application,” and “mak[ing] a new deduction based on other deductions.”
Ans. 4–5. These operations are the types of “observation, evaluation,
judgment, [and] opinion” that are characteristic of ineligible mental
processes. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III). Appellant has not provided
persuasive reasons establishing Examiner error in these findings, instead
providing only a conclusory allegation that such cannot be practically and
solely performed within a human mind. Reply Br. 3. However, the
Specification describes the “cognitive inference and learning system (CILS)
operations” as being implemented “to mimic cognitive processes associated
with the human brain.” Spec. ¶ 109. Appellant has not pointed to any
claimed operations that are performed in a distinct manner from
performance in the human mind so as to persuasively show that the claimed
process could not be practically performed in the human mind. Accordingly,
we agree with the Examiner that the claim recites an ineligible mental
process. Under our controlling guidance, consistent with Court precedent,
claim 1 satisfies Step 2A, Prong 1, such that the claim recites an abstract
idea.
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

10
b. “Directed to an Abstract Idea”
Having determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we next
determine, under Step 2A, Prong 2 of USPTO guidance, whether the claims
are directed to that abstract idea, or whether the claims have additional
elements that integrate the abstract idea into a practical application of that
abstract idea. MPEP § 2106.04.
i. Examiner’s Findings
The Examiner finds the additional elements of processor, data bus,
and storage medium to be recited at a high level of generality such that it
amounts to no more than an instruction to apply the mental operations using
generic computer components, and do not impose meaningful limits on
practicing the mental operations. Final Act. 5–6. The Examiner further
finds operations of “receiving streams of data from a plurality of data
sources,” “the cognitive graph being stored within a repository of cognitive
graphs, the repository of cognitive graphs comprising a plurality of
application cognitive graphs,” and “generate a result,” identified as mere
data gathering and data output comprising insignificant extra-solution
activity. Final Act. 5; Ans. 6–7.
ii. Appellant’s Arguments
Appellant further argues that the claims do not recite matter falling
within the mental organization of human activity grouping because the
claims as a whole are not directed solely to a method of organizing human
activity. Reply Br. 1. Appellant argues that claim 1 provides the practical
application “of generating a cognitive insight which is composed of a
plurality of cognitive insights.” Appeal Br. 5. Appellant further argues that
the combination of limitations is used in a specific manner in that
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

11
the claims include the limitations of a cognitive inference and
learning system which includes a cognitive platform, the
cognitive platform comprising a cognitive engine, the cognitive
engine comprising an insight engine and a graph query engine,
the insight engine encapsulating a predetermined algorithm, the
predetermined algorithm being applied to the cognitive graph to
generate a result, the insight engine operating collaboratively
with the graph query engine to generate a cognitive insight, the
insight engine comprising an insight agent.
Reply Br. 3.
iii. Analysis
USPTO guidance provides considerations, drawn from prior court
precedent, that indicate that an additional element or combination of
elements may have integrated a recited abstract idea into a practical
application. MPEP § 2106.04(d)(I). One such consideration is whether the
abstract idea is applied or used in some meaningful way beyond generally
linking the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment,
such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception. Id. A contrary consideration, advanced by the
Examiner, is whether the additional element(s) amount to a mere instruction
to implement the abstract idea on a computer or to otherwise instruct the
computer to “apply [the abstract idea].” Id. Under this framework, we
analyze the additional elements in claim 1.
Claim 1 contains, in addition to the abstract idea, a computer
processor, data bus, and storage medium. Ans. 6. The Examiner
characterizes these features as generic, and we agree that the Specification is
consistent with that characterization. See Spec. ¶¶ 21–26. The Examiner
further characterizes of “receiving streams of data from a plurality of data
sources,” “the cognitive graph being stored within a repository of cognitive
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

12
graphs, the repository of cognitive graphs comprising a plurality of
application cognitive graphs,” and “generate a result,” identified as mere
data gathering and data output comprising insignificant extra-solution
activity. Final Act. 5; Ans. 6–7. We agree that the Specification is
consistent with that characterization. See Spec. ¶¶ 53, 74–75, 90–92, 101.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the claimed
configuration of “cognitive platform,” “cognitive engine,” “insight engine,”
and “insight agent” in the “claimed cognitive inference and learning system
to generate the composite cognitive insight” is more than merely linking the
identified abstract idea to a generic computer system. Reply Br. 3. The
Examiner construes these terms as “modules of the cognitive inference and
learning system.” Ans. 4. Because the claimed “cognitive platform,”
“cognitive engine,” “insight engine,” and “insight agent” are not described
having a particular structure, such as through § 112(f) claim form, these
terms are claimed by their function only, and therefore do not provide a
particular machine structure so as to constitute additional structural elements
beyond their functioning as part of the identified abstract idea. Appellant
has not contended, nor do we determine, any improvement to the functioning
of a computer or other technology, or application of the abstract idea beyond
linking the use of the abstract idea to a computerized environment. Instead,
we agree with the Examiner’s finding that the claimed subject matter merely
uses the computer as a tool to perform the claimed abstract idea. Final Act.
6; Ans. 6.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that
claim 1 integrates the identified abstract idea into a practical application of
that idea. Based upon our controlling guidance and court precedent, we
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

13
determine that claim 1 is directed towards the recited abstract idea, and that
the recited abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application of that
idea.
c. Significantly More than the Abstract Idea
Having determined that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we next
determine, under Step 2B of the 2019 Guidance, whether the claims amount
to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. A
determination that the claims are significantly more may be indicated where
additional limitations, either alone or in combination, are not well-
understood, routine, conventional activity in the field. Id.
The Examiner finds the additional elements to be limitations that are
generic computer elements providing conventional computer functions.
Final Act. 6; Ans. 4 (citing Spec ¶ 2). Appellant does not present any
arguments that claim 1 is eligible due to considerations under Step 2B. See
Appeal Br. 5; Reply Br. 4 (“Accordingly, the claims should be found to be
eligible under Step 2A of the Revised Guidelines.”).
i. Analysis
With respect to the conventionality of the additional elements, the
courts have found conventional the use of computers to perform generic
tasks involving obtaining and comparing data, and issuing automated
instructions. Alice, 573 U.S. at 224–26. The conventionality of generic
computer components for transmitting data, storing and retrieving data in a
memory, and updating data in a log, is also supported by USPTO guidance.
MPEP § 2105.05(d)(II).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded that claim 1, as a whole, recites
significantly more than the recited abstract idea.
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

14
In view of the foregoing, under USPTO Guidance, informed by our
governing case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown
the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception,
i.e., an abstract idea, without significantly more. We therefore affirm the
Examiner’s subject matter eligibility rejection of claim 1. Because
Appellant argues claims 2–14 on the same grounds as claim 1, we affirm the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–14. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
III. Anticipation Rejection over Sukumar
As noted in Section II, supra, the Examiner, relying on the
Specification, construes “cognitive insight” as “an insight that is the result of
a cognitive process.” Ans. 4 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 4, 36, 38, 40, 41, 51). Further,
the Examiner construes the terms “cognitive platform,” “cognitive engine,”
“insight engine,” and “insight agent” as “modules of the cognitive inference
and learning system.” Id.
The Examiner finds each limitation of claim 1 to be disclosed by
Sukumar. Final Act. 6–8. The Examiner makes specific findings as to how
each of the limitations in the claim are disclosed, in the claimed manner, by
Sukumar. Id.; Ans. 7–9. For example, the Examiner finds the claimed
“cognitive inference and learning system executing on a hardware processor
of an information processing system” to be disclosed by Sukumar’s
described unified data integration system. Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 11 (citing
Sukumar ¶ 54). The Examiner further finds the claimed functions of the
cognitive inference and learning system to be disclosed by Sukumar,
including providing a cognitive computing function (Sukumar’s unified data
integration system analyzes data, Sukumar paragraph 22), comprising a
cognitive platform comprising a cognitive engine (the system performs data
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

15
analysis, Sukumar paragraph 22) and a graph query engine (the system
performs metadata searching, Sukumar paragraphs 19 and 22), the insight
engine operating collaboratively with the graph query engine to generate a
cognitive insight, the cognitive engine comprising an insight engine, the
insight engine comprising an insight agent (Sukumar’s unified data
integration system generates schema-level hypotheses that make content
connections between previously unknown data sources either automatically,
based on pre-programmed rules, or through machine learning, paragraph
22). Id. The Examiner further explains:
Paragraph 22 discloses that the unified data integration
system analyzes data to generate link hypotheses based on pre-
programmed rules or through machine learning. Paragraph 54
discloses that the unified data integration system may be
formed from combinations of structure and functions and
implemented in or interfaced with many ways and in many
different combinations of hardware, software, or both. In other
words, the unified data integration system (i.e., cognitive
inference and learning system) may be implemented using
hardware (i.e., cognitive platform) that executes software for
analyzing data (i.e., cognitive engine) and generating link
hypotheses (i.e., insight engine). Therefore, Sukumar clearly
teaches “a cognitive inference and learning system comprising a
cognitive platform, the cognitive platform comprising a
cognitive engine, the cognitive engine comprising an insight
engine, the insight engine comprising an insight agent.”
Ans. 11.
Appellant argues that Sukumar does not disclose processing an
application cognitive graph in the claimed manner, and does not disclose
generating a composite cognitive insight in the claimed manner, and does
not disclose a cognitive inference and learning system as claimed. Appeal
Br. 6–7; Reply Br. 4–5. Appellant acknowledges the Examiner’s specific
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

16
citations to portions of Sukumar as teaching each limitation, but alleges
without further explanation that these portions do not disclose the claim
limitations. Appeal Br. 7; Reply Br. 4–5.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner has
provided specific findings, for which Appellant provides no more than
conclusory assertions of error. We have reviewed the specific findings in
view of the assertions of error, and we are not persuaded that the Examiner
has erred by failing to show Sukumar to disclose each of the claim
limitations in the claimed configuration. Therefore, we affirm the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claim 1. Because Appellant argues
claims 3–7 and 9–14 on the same grounds as claim 1, we affirm the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3–7, and 9–14. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
IV. Obviousness Rejection over Sukumar and Sharp
Claims 2 and 8 further recite:
the plurality of individual cognitive insights used when
composing the composite cognitive insight are related to a
particular composite cognitive insight session, the cognitive
insight session comprising a plurality of queries over a period
of time, the plurality of queries being stored within a cognitive
session graph associated with the session.
The Examiner finds each additional limitation of claims 2 and 8 to be
taught by Sukumar in view of Sharp. Final Act. 6–8. The Examiner makes
specific findings as to how each of the limitations in the claim are disclosed,
in the claimed manner, by Sukumar. Id.; Ans. 7–9. For example, the
Examiner finds “the plurality of individual cognitive insights used when
composing the composite cognitive insight are related to a particular
composite cognitive insight session” to be taught by Sukumar’s description
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

17
of limiting results to a specific field or a particular search. Final Act. 10
(citing Sukumar ¶¶ 19, 20). The Examiner finds “the cognitive insight
session comprising a plurality of queries over a period of time” to be taught
by Sukumar’s description of results being “based on the queries and the
analytical artifacts created when processing the data” and Sharp’s
description of a 24 hour window for tracking queries. Id. (citing Sukumar
¶ 22; Sharp ¶ 70). The Examiner finds “the plurality of queries being stored
within a cognitive session graph associated with the session” to be taught by
Sharp’s description of keeping track of queries and associating them with
different metrics, such as popularity and click-through. Id. at 11 (citing
Sharp ¶ 70).
Appellant argues that Sukumar does not disclose processing an
application cognitive graph in the claimed manner, and does not disclose the
additional claimed features of claims 2 and 8. Appeal Br. 7–8. Appellant
acknowledges the Examiner’s specific citations to portions of Sukumar and
Sharp as teaching each limitation, but alleges without further explanation
that these portions do not disclose the claim limitations.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner has
provided specific findings, for which Appellant provides no more than
conclusory assertions of error. We have reviewed the specific findings in
view of the assertions of error, and we are not persuaded that the Examiner
has erred by failing to show the combination of Sukumar and Sharp to teach
or suggest each of the claim limitations in the claimed configuration.
Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 2 and
8.
Appeal 2020-002348
Application 14/729,545

18
CONCLUSION
For the above-described reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 1–14 as being ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We
further affirm the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims 1, 3–7, and 9–
14, and the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims 2 and 8.

DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 7, 9 Provisional
Nonstatutory Double
Patenting2

1–14 101 Eligibility 1–14
1, 3–7, 9–
14
102 Sukumar 1, 3–7, 9–14
2, 8 103 Sukumar, Sharp 2, 8
Overall
Outcome
1–14
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

2 As explained above, we do not reach the Examiner’s provisional rejection
of claims 1, 3, 7, and 9 for nonstatutory double patenting.