Clyde F. Crossguns, Complainant,v.Gale A. Norton, Secretary, Department of the Interior, (Bureau of Indian Affairs), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 5, 2001
01982284 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 5, 2001)

01982284

04-05-2001

Clyde F. Crossguns, Complainant, v. Gale A. Norton, Secretary, Department of the Interior, (Bureau of Indian Affairs), Agency.


Clyde F. Crossguns v. Department of the Interior (Bureau of Indian

Affairs)

01982284

April 5, 2001

.

Clyde F. Crossguns,

Complainant,

v.

Gale A. Norton,

Secretary,

Department of the Interior,

(Bureau of Indian Affairs),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01982284

Agency No. BIA-97-004

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleged that he was discriminated

against on the bases of race (American Indian), national origin

(Blackfeet tribe), and reprisal (prior EEO activity) when:

1. On July 18, 1996, his supervisor (S-1) threatened to terminate him

from his position as a temporary intermittent/seasonal

employee for reporting unsafe working conditions to the

Safety Officer; and

2. On August 1, 1996, complainant was informed by memorandum that he

would be terminated effective August 3, 1996.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a Foreman II at the agency's Highway Project #49, Blackfeet

Road Development, Blackfeet Agency, Billings, Montana. Believing he

was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and

subsequently filed a formal complaint on September 4, 1996. At the

conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of his right to

request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively,

to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant requested that

the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant had failed to establish

a prima facie case of discrimination on any basis, but that even if he

had, the agency was still able to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for terminating him. These were a lack of workload demand for

the Foreman II position as such, and insubordinate behavior and poor

job performance on the part of the complainant.

On appeal, complainant again contends that he was discriminated

against when S-1 threatened and then terminated him for reporting an

unsafe working condition to the agency Safety Officer. As evidence,

he mentions a previously submitted tape recording of a conversation

between himself and S-1 in which the latter disparages the work of the

Safety Officer. Complainant contends that this supports his claim

that S-1 was not concerned with the safety of his employees and did not

welcome safety officers to the job site. Complainant also asserts that

S-1's statements about complainant's poor performance and insubordination

were fabrications.

In response, the agency requests that we affirm its FAD and notes the

following: First, complainant could not establish a prima facie case of

reprisal since he had not engaged in any prior protected EEO activity.

Second, even though complainant could not establish a prima facie case of

race or national origin discrimination either, the agency still provided

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination, namely, his

insubordination, lack of performance on the job, and lack of workload

demand, reasons which complainant was unable to show were pretextual.

In this regard, the agency pointed to statements by witnesses that

complainant performed jobs without management authorization, and lacked

necessary work experience as a Foreman II.

Applying the standards set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for

Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd,

545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to reprisal

cases), the Commission agrees with the agency that complainant failed

to establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination because he

had not engaged in any prior protected EEO activity. We also agree that

complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of race and national

origin discrimination as well. In reaching this conclusion, we note

that complainant presented no evidence that similarly situated persons

outside his protected classes committed similar infractions, yet were not

terminated from their temporary positions, nor any other evidence from

which an inference of discrimination could be drawn. The Commission

further finds that complainant failed to present evidence that more

likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons for complainant's

termination were a pretext for discrimination.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

other contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

April 5, 2001

Date