Cleveland Pressed Products Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 27, 1973

203 N.L.R.B. 290 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

290 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Cleveland Pressed Products Corporation and Interna-
tional Union , Allied Industrial Workers of America,
AFL-CIO. Cases 8-CA-6999 and 8-CA-7245
April 27, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
On February 15, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
Melvin J. Welles issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Respondent, Cleveland Pressed Products
Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the said recommended Order.
' We note the Administrative Law Judge 's inadvertent use of the word
"defense" rather than "offense" in the last paragraph of his decision before
"Conclusions of Law "
The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to overrule
an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions were incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544.
enfd 188 F .2d 362 (C.A. 3) We have carefully examined the record and find
no basis for reversing his findings.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MELVIN J. WELLES, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was heard at Cleveland, Ohio, on November 13, 14, and 15,
1972, pursuant to charges filed May 12, and September 15,
1972, and complaints issued June 26, 1972, and October 17,
1972, which were consolidated on the latter date. The com-
plaints allege violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
Respondent denies any violations of the Act. Respondent
and the General Counsel have filed briefs.
Upon the entire record in the case ,' including my obser-
vation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER AND THE
LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Company, an Ohio corporation engaged in Cleve-
land, Ohio, in the production of metal stampings, annually
ships over $50,000 worth of its products directly to points
outside the State of Ohio, and is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act. The Charging Party, herein called the Union, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction-The Issues
The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) by discriminatorily discharging employees
Bogard and Camarda, and by assigning more difficult and
arduous work to employees Masaveg and Camarda in repri-
sal for their union activities, and 8(a)(1) by interrogating
employees about their union activities, and by threatening
reprisals and discharges because of them. Apart from two
alleged threats by Les Gicei, Respondent's plant manager,
all the other actions complained of were those of W. E.
(Bill) Kramer, vice president and general manager of the
Company, and its head for all practical purposes.2
B. The Discharge of Ulysses Bogard
Ulysses Bogard , who had been hired in February and was
still a probationary employee in April, had mentioned to
Booker Evans, Jr., son of the Union's International Repre-
sentative Booker Evans, Sr., that there was no union at the
plant. The next day, or the day thereafter, Booker Evans,
Sr., came to the plant and passed out union cards and
leaflets outside the plant entrance. Bogard introduced him-
self to Evans, and then got into Evans' car. The following
day, according to Bogard, Plant Manager Les Gicei and
Supervisor Casper "were asking questions around the plant
.. . about the union," and asked Bogard about the Union.
Bogard said nothing, he "just smiled at them." Casper was
not asked about any such "conversation." Gicei testified
that he had no conversation about the Union with employ-
ees about the time the leaflets were passed out, but subse-
quently had a number of conversations with employees
about the Union. As Bogard's testimony in this respect was
so vague that it is impossible to tell what was said, assuming
some talk took place between Casper and Bogard or Gicei
and Bogard, I can find no violation of the Act based on this
testimony.
Bogard was subsequently, at a union meeting, elected vice
' A stipulation to correct errors in the transcript was filed by the parties.
The corrections are hereby ordered made.
2 The president of the Company , W. E. Kramer's father , has been inactive
for some time because of illness
203 NLRB No. 58
CLEVELAND PRESSED PRODUCTS CORP.
president of the "negotiating committee." About April 9,
1972, Bogard told Les Gicei that he wanted to see Bill
Kramer. According to Bogard, he did not tell Gicei why he
wished to see Kramer. Gicei testified that Bogard told him
he wanted to see Kramer about the union situation (after
Bogard began talking to Gicei about the Union, and Gicei
responded that the one to talk to was Kramer), and Kramer
testified that Gicei told him Bogard wanted to see him about
"something personal, pertaining to the union." Again, ac-
cording to Bogard, the meeting which ensued began with
Kramer asking Bogard who had contacted the Union, and,
when Bogard said he had, asking Bogard why he had done
so, and commenting that they did not need a union around
the plant, and that Board had a lot of nerve coming up there
(to Kramer's office) to talk about it. Kramer and Gicei both
testified (Kramer in more detail) that Bogard brought up the
subject of the Union, and, in effect, disclaimed wanting a
union in the shop, saying that he liked the people in the
plant. Bogard's testimony that he asked for a meeting with
Kramer, without telling Gicei what it was about, and that,
without any preliminary discussion of why Bogard wanted
the meeting, Kramer began by asking who contacted the
Union, does not hang together. Kramer's version of what
Bogard told him is much more in keeping with Bogard's
having requested to see Kramer, than would be the latter
seeking to find out if Bogard was the instigator of the
Union, without even asking Bogard why he had requested
the meeting. I credit Kramer and Gicei in this respect, and
therefore find no violation of the Act in this conversation
between Kramer and Bogard.
I also credit Kramer's denial that he said to some uniden-
tified people, while near Bogard's machine in the plant,
"That's the one that's causing all the noise around here.
He's the one that contacted the Union." Bogard, who
seemed confused in his testimony respecting the meeting
with Kramer earlier, also indicated some confusion in his
testimony about events immediately preceding his dis-
charge (see below), and I therefore do not credit his testimo-
ny where in conflict with that of other witnesses.
Bogard was discharged on May 3, 1972. Bogard had been
having trouble with his teeth, and the previous Friday, April
28, according to Bogard, he told Supervisior Casper he
would not be in on Monday, May 1, because he was going
to see a dentist. He testified further that he called in after
he left the plant and told a girl in the office he would not
be in on Monday. He assertedly called the plant again on
Monday, spoke to a girl there, and told her that the dentist
he had gone to see on Monday was not there, so he was
going to see another dentist on Tuesday, and would not be
at work.3
On Wednesday morning, when Bogard came to work, his
card was not in the rack, and he asked Casper about it.
Casper told him that Gicei wanted to talk to him. Subse-
3 Bogard testified, with respect to his attempts to see a dentist , that he
called a Dr Koal on Friday when he arrived at home, was told he could not
see Koal Saturday, nor could Koal give him an appointment for Monday.
that he nevertheless went to Koal's office Monday, where he saw a notice on
the door that Koal would not be back until Thursday On Tuesday he again
went to Koal 's office, but Koal was not there , so he went to another dentist
in the same building, a Dr Kerber , who treated a tooth which had a cavity
"to stop it from hurting"
291
quently, Kramer met with Bogard in Kramer's office. Ac-
cording to Bogard, Kramer told him he was fired. Bogard
asked why, and Kramer told him it was for having been off
all this time. When Bogard said he had called in, Kramer
called Gicei into the office, and Gicei said there had been
no message from Bogard. Kramer added that if Bogard had
called in, it would have been on the tape recorder. When
Bogard asked Kramer to play back the tape, Kramer re-
fused to do so, saying "No one can listen to this."
Testimony of Respondent's witnesses controverts that of
Bogard almost every step of the way. Thus, Casper testified
that Bogard did not tell him on Friday that he would be out
Monday. Linda Mullins, an office girl, testified that no calls
came in from Bogard on Friday or Monday to the effect
that he would not be in on Monday or Tuesday, that on
Tuesday afternoon, about 3:45 p.m. (after plant closing
time), Bogard called to say "he had some teeth pulled and
that he had had some shock with the gas and he thought it
would be dangerous to come in and that he would come in
tomorrow."
Before turning to Kramer's testimony concerning the
meeting at which he terminated Bogard , I note the confu-
sion and discrepancies in Bogard's own version. Thus, al-
though he claimed he told Casper on Friday he would not
be in on Monday, he attempted to see a dentist on Saturday,
and could not have known on Friday that this attempt
would prove unfruitful. His alleged call to the office on his
way home from work hardly comports with his having al-
ready told Casper he would not be in. In these circumstanc-
es, I credit Casper's testimony that Bogard did not tell him
he would not be in on Monday, and Linda Mullins that no
call came in from Bogard on Friday or Monday, only the
call (to which Bogard did not refer in his testimony) on
Tuesday afternoon .4
At the Wednesday "confrontation," according to Kram-
er, he asked Bogard for an explanation of why he had not
called in. When Bogard told him about having gone to a
dentist and getting his teeth pulled, Kramer asked Bogard
if he had proof, or a doctor's slip. Bogard replied "Well,
what in the hell do I need that for? Everybody knows my
teeth are bad. You know my teeth are bad." Kramer an-
swered that he did not know, that if he (Bogard) had had
his teeth pulled, "Let me see and let's be done with it and
go back to work." Bogard said Kramer was not qualified to
look in his mouth. During the conversation, Bogard told
Kramer that he had advised Charley or Les (Casper or
Gicei), Kramer did not remember which Bogard said, and
that he had called in on Monday, spoken to a girl, but
"possibly nobody answered the phone." Bogard then com-
plained that Kramer was referring to him by his last name,
and sitting, while Bogard referred to Kramer as "Mr. Kram-
er," and remained standing and that Kramer was "doing
this to get him because he got caught in the wrong car, and
that he was black and I was white...." Kramer testified
that Bogard "was caught in a lie and he couldn't get out. It
was that simple. He tried to convince me that no one was
° It is true , as the General Counsel argues, that another girl in the office,
Henrietta Nance , might have received a call, but Mullins' testimony about
the way messages were recorded and passed on satisfies me, in conjunction
with Bogard 's own confusing testimony , that no calls were made by him on
Friday or Monday.
292 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in the office that day and of course the final proof rested on
his opening his mouth and showing me his teeth. It was that
simple and he broke the rule. . . . It got to the point where
I couldn't look the other way; I had to dismiss him."
I credit, essentially, Kramer's version of the interview,
and find that it occurred substantially as he testified, which
actually is not very much different from what Bogard testi-
fied. As noted above, Bogard was a probationary employee.
His attendance record, as shown by his attendance record
in evidence, was not good. Despite his union activities,
which were actually not that extensive, Respondent could
well have discharged him before his probationary period
ran out without raising more than the suspicion that could
come to mind as to the discharge of any union adherent
during a union campaign, even absent the incident immedi-
ately preceding the discharge. Kramer's testimony indicates
that he had not decided to discharge Bogard before he met
with him on May 3, but made that determination as a result
of the meeting, being convinced by then that Bogard had no
legitimate excuse for not calling in, that Bogard was lying,
and, as Kramer put it, giving him "no other choice." Per-
haps the firing seems somewhat out of line with the offense,
particularly since a failure to call in is not an automatic
ground for discharge, but it does appear that Bogard took
a somewhat belligerent attitude, in effect refusing to con-
firm his own statement, and that in fact he had not called
in, although claiming to have done so. Although these latter
conclusions rest, of course, on crediting Kramer's version of
the meeting,5 and despite the fact that Kramer was admit-
tedly antiunion, in weighing counsel's affirmative case as to
Bogard against Respondent's defense, I cannot find that the
General Counsel has proved a violation by a preponderance
of the evidence.
C. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(1)
I have already found that Respondent did not violate the
Act, as alleged in the complaint, at the April meeting with
Kramer that Bogard requested, or with respect to the al-
leged interrogation of Bogard by Gicei. Kramer conceded
that he asked Masaveg whether he was going to a union
meeting. He also admitted having berated Masaveg, after
the union meeting was held, because he had heard a rumor
that Masaveg "was president or in charge of organizing
it." He accused Masaveg of "stabbing him in the back," and
called him an obscene name. Kramer denied that he told
5 There were some discrepancies between an affidavit Kramer gave to a
Board agent and his testimony on the stand Thus, Kramer stated in his
affidavit that "even if Bogard had called in it is doubtful I would have
kept him on as a regular employee," but denied on the stand that he probably
would not have kept Bogard absent the latter's failure to call in As the
statement given to the Board agent would , in my opinion, have strengthened
Respondent 's case, I do not regard this discrepancy as significant The confu-
sion and discrepancies in Bogard's testimony were, as I have already indi-
cated, of much greater magnitude
6 It is clear on the record that Kramer had a penchant for using obscene
epithets Although the complaint alleged, in part that the use of "abusive
language" to various employees was coercive, I see no necessity for delineat-
ing such usage by Kramer, or anyone else, except in one instance where the
language is of the essence of the threat I'o the extent that threats were made
they may take on added flavor from the colorful language accompanying
them, but they stand or fall as violations of the Act without regard to this
kind of language I do find, and it will go without saying in this Decision,
Masaveg that he would get even with him no matter what
it cost (or if it cost $50,000), or that he would "beat him to
the bone," as testified to, in general, by both Masaveg and
Camarda.? Kramer was obviously extremely upset at
Masaveg's "betrayal," and the statements attributed to him
by Masaveg and Camarda fit the picture of an emotionally
upset person, who was admittedly "cussing out" his "betray-
er." For this reason , and based on my observation of Ca-
marda and Masaveg, whose testimony I credit generally, I
conclude that Kramer did make the alleged threat to Masa-
veg, and thereby Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by
Kramer's asking Masaveg whether he was going to the
meeting , and by similarly asking Camarda whether he was
going to the meeting.8
I also credit Camarda, over Kramer's denial, that Kramer
told Camarda, about a week after the election, that he "can
get fired for being the president of the union," and find that
Respondent, by this threat, violated Section 8(a)(l) of the
Act.
Louis Nims, who had left the Company dust before the
hearing in this case , testified credibly to a conversation he
had with Kramer in April, shortly after the union campaign
began. Kramer had earlier lent Nims some money, when the
latter's car was stolen. Nims complained to Gicei that
Kramer had given him "a hard time" when he got the ad-
vance. Kramer subsequently came to Nims, admittedly up-
set at the accusation that he had given Nims a hard time,
and Nims told Kramer that he meant what he had said,
whereupon Kramer told Nims-in Kramer's word-"In the
future, go to your union hall and get the money." Nims
testified that Kramer said he should "go to the Allied Indus-
trial Workers" the next time he needed any money," but
added, and I credit him, that Kramer went on to say "You
guys think you are going to fuck me but you're the ones that
are going to get fucked." I find that by this threat, Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I do not base any
violation on the other portions of this dialogue, however, as
I am satisfied that Kramer was upset at what he thought was
his generosity being characterized by Nims as "giving him
a hard time."
Employee Walter Karpinski testified that he overheard
Les Gicei tell employee David Butler that he should have
fired him when he had the chance. Gicei in effect conceded
making this statement , but denied that it was made because
of Butler's union activities or because Butler was wearing a
union button. I cannot attribute an invidious purpose to the
remark solely because, as the General Counsel contends,
Butler happened to be wearing a union button at the time,
particularly in view of the fact that almost everyone in the
plant was wearing a union button at the time, and do not
find a violation based on this remark.
I find no merit in the General Counsel's contention that
Respondent, by instituting a Saturday sign-in sheet, violat-
ed the Act. The testimony of Kramer and Gicei to the effect
that Kramer , in virtually every conversation with Camarda and Masaveg,
used obscenities. and will not bother resolving whether or not he used a
specific one-which he disclaimed was p .irt of his normal vocabulary
7 Early in Camarda's testimony he attributes a "stab in the back" state-
ment to Les Gicei It is clear that this was in error, as subsequent testimony
makes evident , and that he meant Kramer , not Gicei
8 Based on Camarda's testimony, which was not denied by Kramer
CLEVELAND PRESSED PRODUCTS CORP.
that the notice regarding Saturday signing in was put up to
avoid favoritism or discrimination, "so nobody could say
they weren't asked to work on a Saturday," and not to
require employees to work who did not want to, was in
effect confirmed by Bogard. Camarda did testify that some-
one (it is not clear, as I read the testimony, whether he
meant Kramer or Gicei), told him if he did not come in on
a particular Saturday he would lose his job. This does not
establish a change in the system, however. It most likely
represented a need for a maintenance man that Saturday,
or perhaps even personal animosity toward Camarda, but
does not support a conclusion that the sign-in system itself
was a change from a voluntary policy regarding Saturday
work to requiring employees to work then.
D. Camarda and Masaveg
The complaint alleges that Camarda and Masaveg were
assigned more arduous work, were "split up" as a team, and
in general were given assignments that were not in the na-
ture of the regular maintenance work they had been doing,
in retaliation for their having been the two major supporters
of the Union. Camarda's ultimate discharge, claims the
General Counsel, culminated this campaign of harassment,
and was effected because Camarda was chairman of the
Union's negotiating committee.
In his brief, the General Counsel virtually concedes that,
as to Masaveg, there is little or no support for the allegation
of discriminatory reassignment . The brief states that "Ca-
marda bore the brunt of the discrimination," that Camarda
"suffered the worst treatment," and goes on to point out
various instances of Camarda's receiving such treatment. As
to Masaveg, the General Counsel points only to vague testi-
mony of two witnesses, one (Nims) testifying that both Ca-
marda and Masaveg spent time washing machines that was
not done before the election, and the other (Thompson) that
he noticed a change in assignments to both men, but then
referring only to a particular job assigned to Camarda. As
the "washing" job was in fact not assigned to Masaveg,
there remains assignments following the election.
As to Camarda, it does appear that some of his work
assignments after the election were more difficult than any-
thing he had been assigned to do before the election, partic-
ularly the assessment which immediately preceded his
discharge. However, it is not clear that any of the new
assignments was "make-work"; they rather appear to be
work that did have to be done by someone, and to be
"maintenance" work, or at least work of such a nature as
to go to maintenance men rather than any other category
in Respondent's employ. In connection with the last assign-
ment, discussed more fully immediately hereafter, it appears
that the Company did very little to make the assignment
easier for Camarda to perform, and its motivation in not
providing him with better tools for it may well have been
Camarda's position in the Union, but this in and of itself is
too thin a reed upon which to base a violation, with the basic
assignment, as I have indicated, being necessary work, and
work which would normally go to a maintenance man.
Camarda's discharge, however, is a different matter. The
job he was assigned to do in late August was putting 26 posts
in place, and digging holes in thick concrete, placing a pipe
293
in each hole, and filling the pipe with concrete. Although
Camarda had indicated at the start of this project, which
Kramer discussed with him, that he thought an outside
contractor should do it, he nevertheless embarked on the
work. During the course of doing it, on and off for 2 weeks,
he complained that the jackhammer he was given to do the
job was inadequate, that its bit did not break up the con-
crete, but only drilled a straight hole in it. Although he
complained, and although the work of drilling the hole was
going slowly, no one from management saw fit to provide
better equipment (perhaps none was immediately avail-
able), and, according to both Kramer and Gicei, Camarda
had been doing a good job, and neither Kramer nor Gicei
had criticized Camarda for being slow to complete it .9 After
Camarda's discharge, the three posts that still had to be
done were put in by a new employee, using the same tools.
Les Gicei, when asked how long it took the new man to
complete the work, said "I didn't pay much attention-it
was just as long as the holes got done."
On the morning of September 14, Camarda came to work,
although he was not feeling well, because he had to take a
rider, Masaveg, to the plant. He decided to try to perform
the work, but felt miserable, getting all wet because it was
raining,10 and came inside, where he helped Masaveg in
work the latter was doing. He mentioned to Casper that he
was sick and wanted to go home, but Casper said he would
have to see Gicei, who was not around at the time.11
At that point, Kramer came on the scene. The testimony
of Camarda and Kramer as to what ensued at that time is
somewhat divergent, although not quite so differing as
might appear at first blush. Camarda's version is that Kram-
er told Camarda to come with him, after approaching him
while he was working with Masaveg inside, and started
questioning him why he was not working on drilling the
holes. Camarda said he was sick, that although he could put
in a routine 8-hour day on maintenance work in the shop,
he was too sick to go outside and drill with the jackhammer
that day. Kramer started to berate Camarda, called him a
"f- liar," and a " . . . baby making excuses that you are
sick," etc. Camarda told Kramer that he wanted to go home,
and would do the drilling the next day. Kramer then said,
"You know you think you have something going with the
Union in this shop. I have news for you. You will never
have a union in this shop." He added that Camarda would
never have anything to say in this shop, that he would never
sign a private contract for a "stupid a.. hole," and continued
with "This is my shop. I will run this ... shop my way. I
am the law. I am the . . . law in this place and you get that
straight." At that point, Kramer called Gicei over and told
him, in effect, to discharge Camarda.
According to Kramer, he came to work and saw that
Camarda was not outside digging the holes, and then saw
It is plain that this was not Camarda's sole assignment during the 2 weeks
prior to his discharge . As Kramer testified , "many times . Camarda wasn't
on the job and I would go in and find out he was assigned to something else
temporarily and he would return
iU Supervisor Casper's testimony that it was not "raining at the time," in
its context, refers to a later time, when Camarda was inside helping Masaveg,
and Kramer looked for Camarda outside
11 Casper did not specifically deny this conversation To the extent that his
brief testimony may be taken as a denial. I credit Camarda.
294 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Camarda working with Masaveg and another employee.12
He then told Camarda to go outside and do the drilling.
Kamara came back later and got Casper to get Camarda off
the machine and out to continue drilling Kramer remined
Camarda he had to get the job done, and Camarda "advised
me "that he had a triple, compound fracture of the head and
he wasn't going to do it." After some discussion about it
being a contractor's job, and the difficulty of the job, Ca-
marda flatly refused to do it. Kramer then called Gicei, and
asked Camarda to repeat to Gicei what he had said. Gicei
asked Camarda "why don't you go and complete the job?"
Camarda replied "No, I am not. I am going to go down-
town." After some talk about a notice on the bulletin board
dealing with negotiations with the Union (the record is not
clear on this), Camarda made some reference to the effect
that his "committee" will determine this, and Kramer re-
plied "Frank, you don't have a committee here. I run the
shop."
Gicei testified that Kramer did say he wanted him (Gicei)
to hear what Carnarda had to say-that Camarda had re-
fused to drill the holes, and that Camarda said "if he has to
drill the holes he is going home sick," and Kramer finally
told him to ring Camarda out, that he was through. Gicei
said "I don't recall," when asked "Did you ask Mr. Camar-
da to drill the holes to avoid his departure from the plant?"
As I indicated earlier, the testimony of Camarda and
Kramer was not so markedly different as to the events of
that morning . The only really significant difference, as I
view it, is whether Camarda was refusing to do any further
drilling work, or merely saying, as he testified he did, that
he would be happy to continue the next day, but felt he was
too sick to do that arduous work that day. Gicei's testimony
is much more confirmatory of Camarda's than of Kramer's
in that respect, for "He said if he has to drill the holes he
is going home sick" suggests a refusal to continue that day,
not forever. The history of the drilling job also strongly
suggests that Camarda was not refusing ever to do the dull-
ing work, but was only begging off that day, for he had been
doing the work for 2 weeks, despite his grousing about the
work not really being maintenance work, and about not
having the proper tools to work with. With 23 of the 26 pipes
already completed, it would be extremely odd for Camarda
suddenly to decide he would not complete the job.
The testimony demostrates, as I have stated, that there
was no great rush to complete the drilling-it had to be
done, but no deadline was placed on it, and neither Kramer
nor Gicei was concerned enough to supply Camarda with
tools that would hasten its completion. Furthermore, Ca-
marda was not standing by idly, but was helping with nor-
mal maintenance work at the time, and, indeed, had not
spent the entire 2 weeks drilling, but had been doing normal
maintenance work along with the pipe insertion job. In
these circumstances, Kramer's failure to accept Camarda's
explanation that he was too sick to work on the drill outside
could hardly have stemmed from any urgency about the
12 Kramer testified he did not believe Camarda was working, he merely
saw him "holding the end of a pipe, doing nothing." On cross-examination.
Kramer did admit that he did not "know for a fact " that Camarda was not
doing anything-and that he asked Camarda what he was doing , and Camar-
da replied "Helping Leroy [ Masaveg] "
work itself. Possibly Kramer was upset that Camarda did
not, sick or not, immediately obey Kramer's telling him to
go back outside. But the real reason for Kramer's action, in
my view, was Camarda's continuing leadership in the
Union. I recognize, of course, an employer's right to dis-
charge an employee for failing to obey even an unreasona-
ble order or request. But it is plainly relevant, in determining
whether a discharge is effected because of the refusal to
obey or because of union-related considerations, to examine
the reasonableness and fairness of the action taken. The fact
that Kramer, in the course of the final interview with Ca-
marda, referred to the Union a number of times, stated he
would never have a union in the shop and that he would run
it his way,13 further demonstrates to me that Kramer's refus-
al to permit Camarda to work indoors on September 14 was
motivated by Camarda's status in the Union. I do not find
convincing Respondent 's argument that Camarda had giv-
en the Company good cause for discharging him a number
of times before the actual discharge, and probably would
have disciplined Camarda severely, or discharged him, but
for the pendency of the election or its having just been
completed, on the occasion of Camarda's derelictions. I
need not resolve the conflicts in the testimony as to whether
Camarda did misconduct himself earlier, for assuming
Respondent' s assertion that he did to be true, then the actu-
al discharge was for an obviously lesser defense than the
previous derelictions . In all these circumstances , I conclude
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
by discharging Frank Camarda.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By discharging Frank Camarda because of his union
activity, the Company engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By interrogating its employees about their union activ-
ities, and by threatening them with reprisals because of their
union activities, the Company engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections
8(a)(1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
I shall recommend that Respondent cease and desist from
its unfair labor practices, that it offer reinstatement to
Frank Camarda, with backpay, computed as provided in
F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumb-
ing & Heating Company, 138 NLRB 716.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:14
ii Based on Camarda's credible testimony , in part corroborated by witness
Napoleon Thompson Kramer himself , as noted above, admitted to saying.
"Frank , you don' t have a committee here I run this shop"
14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board , the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102 48
of the Rules and Regulations , he adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes
CLEVELAND PRESSED PRODUCTS CORP.
ORDER
Respondent, Cleveland Pressed Products Corporation,
Cleveland, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating its employees about their union activi-
ties.
(b) Threatening its employees with reprisals because of
their union activities.
(c) Discouraging membership in International Union,
Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization, by discharging or in any other
manner discriminating against employees in regard to their
hire or tenure of employment or condition of employment.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Frank Camarda immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole
for any loss of earnings he may have suffered, in the manner
set forth in the section hereof entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all records necessary to analyze
the amount of backpay due under the terms of this recom-
mended Order.
(c) Post at its plant in Cleveland, Ohio, and any other
locations where notices to its employees are customarily
posted, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 15
Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 8, shall be signed by an authorized
representative of the Company and posted immediately
upon receipt thereof and maintained for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
at all locations where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
15 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
295
(d) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT question employees about their union
activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees because of their
union activities.
WE WILL offer reemployment to Frank Camarda and
WE WILL pay him for losses he suffered as a result of our
having discharged him in September 1972.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against any employee because of his activity on behalf
of Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
their right to join or assist that Union or any other
union.
Dated By
CLEVELAND PRESSED PRODUCTS
CORPORATION
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning
this notice or compliance with its provisions may be direct-
ed to the Board's Office, 1695 Federal Office Building, 1240
East Ninth Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44199, Telephone 216-
522-3715.