Claudia A.,1 Complainant,v.Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Eastern Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 27, 2018
0120171585 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 27, 2018)

0120171585

09-27-2018

Claudia A.,1 Complainant, v. Megan J. Brennan, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Eastern Area), Agency.


U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

Claudia A.,1

Complainant,

v.

Megan J. Brennan,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Eastern Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120181585

Hearing No. 430-2018-00089X

Agency No. 4K230004517

DECISION

On April 9, 2018, Complainant filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(a), from the Agency's March 8, 2018, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Final Agency Decision (FAD).

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether Complainant established that she was discriminated against based on race (African-American), sex (female), color (Black), disability (unspecified), age (57), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity when she was denied leave, observed what she believed to be inappropriate treatment of co-workers, and her Postmaster walked away from her while they were discussing a work schedule.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Distribution Window Clerk, PS-06 at the Agency's Dillwyn Post Office facility in Dillwyn, Virginia. On March 10, 2017, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the bases of race (African-American), sex (female), color (Black), disability (unspecified), age (57), and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when:

1. In August 2016, during the vacation scheduling, Complainant's request to take leave during the week of Thanksgiving was denied;

2. On December 21, 2016, the Postmaster treated a black and white customer differently;

3. On an unspecific date, the Postmaster has referred to female carriers as "her girls," and compared carrier performance by age;

4. On an unspecified date, the Postmaster made a comment to the effect that men are like toys; and

5. On December 23, 2016, while attempting to discuss the work schedule with the Postmaster, she walked away from Complainant.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ assigned to the case determined sua sponte that the complaint did not warrant a hearing and over Complainant's objections, issued a decision without a hearing on March 1, 2018. The Agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Complainant's representative contends that the AJ erred in finding that there were no genuine issues for a hearing. Complainant's representative contends that the conduct Complainant was subjected to rose to the level of harassment. He provided a brief averring that the Postmaster harasses and intimidates various individuals, including his client, and that she engages in reprisal regarding his client and others.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ's legal and factual conclusions, and the Agency's final order adopting them, de novo. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a) (stating that a "decision on an appeal from an Agency's final action shall be based on a de novo review . . ."); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9, � VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015) (providing that an administrative judge's determination to issue a decision without a hearing, and the decision itself, will both be reviewed de novo). This essentially means that we should look at this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ's, and Agency's, factual conclusions and legal analysis - including on the ultimate fact of whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated. See id. at Chapter 9, � VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").

We must first determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty v. Dep't of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally, an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given (1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing, (2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, (3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment "where the [party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing. Cf. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a motion for a decision without a hearing).

When opposing summary judgment, a party must respond with specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact and that the other party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If a party opposes summary judgment, she may not rely on mere allegations, speculation, conclusory statements or denials. The party should cite to specific evidence contained in the report of investigation (ROI) which creates a factual dispute regarding a material issue in the case. If not already contained in the ROI, the party should include any relevant documentary evidence or witness statements, interrogatory answers, admissions or other supporting materials and provide a clear and specific statement of their relevance.

Upon review of the record, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact presented here. The record has been adequately developed, Complainant was given ample notice of the AJ's intent to issue a decision without a hearing, she was given a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts, she was given the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and she was given the chance to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. We find that, even assuming all facts in favor of Complainant, a reasonable fact-finder could not find in her favor, as explained below. Therefore, we find that the AJ's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate.

Harassment

In order to establish a claim of hostile environment harassment, Complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on her statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an environment, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).

In assessing whether Complainant has set forth an actionable claim of harassment, the conduct at issue must be viewed in the context of the totality of the circumstances, considering, inter alia, the nature and frequency of offensive encounters and the span of time over which the encounters occurred. See 29 C.F.R. � 1604.11(b); EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, N-915-050, No. 137 (March 19, 1990); Cobb v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05970077 (Mar. 13, 1997). Generally, "simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment." Kozak v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 01A63021 (Aug. 23, 2006); Battle v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 0120083387 (Feb. 4, 2010). Such conduct "must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, [such] that a reasonable person would find [the work environment to be] hostile or abusive, and ... that the victim in fact did perceive to be so." Id.

The AJ found based on the information in the ROI and Complainant's submissions that Complainant was unable to establish that: 1) she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct; 2) the Postmaster's conduct was based on Complainant's statutorily protected classes; or 3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive. Thus, he concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact to decide in a hearing. We agree with the AJ's findings. Assuming, arguendo, that the events occurred as Complainant described, she has not shown that the conduct occurred because of her protected classes, or that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to result in a hostile work environment. To the extent that Complainant argues that her supervisor acted unprofessionally, either towards her or others, the Commission notes that Title VII is not a civility code. Rather, it forbids "only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0617)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant's request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The agency's request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC's Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)

If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden's signature

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

___9/27/18_______________

Date

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.

---------------

------------------------------------------------------------

---------------

------------------------------------------------------------

2

0120181585