Clarkwood Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 13, 1977

233 N.L.R.B. 1172 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Clarkwood Corporation and Local 25B and Local 43B,
Graphic Arts International Union. Case 22-CA-
7189
December 13, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND MURPHY
On July 8, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Lowell
Goerlich issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a
brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's
Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge, to modify his remedy so that interest is to be
computed in the manner prescribed in Florida Steel
Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977),2 and to adopt his
recommended Order, as modified herein.
We agree with the Administrative Law Judge, for
the reasons stated in his Decision, that Respondent,
by failing and refusing to sign the agreement reached
with the Charging Party on May 25, 1976, violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. However, we
disagree with his finding that Respondent also acted
unlawfully by unilaterally removing two pay tele-
phones and depriving employees of some restroom
and locker facilities.
The telephones had been used by the employees
without restriction since 1968. On July 9, 1976,
Respondent posted a notice on the bulletin board to
all employees that the telephone company would
shortly be removing all pay telephones on the
premises, except those pay telephones in the building
lobby. On August 9, Respondent also posted a notice
on a door to a room in the bindery department which
had lockers, cabinets, and restroom facilities, re-
questing female employees to move their personal
belongings to the main ladies room and noting that
the room would not be available for their use after
August 14, 1976. The telephones were removed and
I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to
credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence
convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products,
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
233 NLRB No. 167
the restroom was closed about the middle of August.
Shortly after these notices were posted, employees
notified the Union's officials who, in turn, contacted
Respondent and protested its contemplated actions.
However, at no time did employee representatives
request Respondent to bargain about removing the
phones or closing the restroom.
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that
Respondent was not disposed to bargain about
removing the phones or closing the restroom; that
the notices were tantamount to a fait accompli; and
that, under the circumstances, it could not be
concluded that the Union had waived its right to
bargain about Respondent's decision to institute
these changes. Accordingly, he found that Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by unilateral-
ly undertaking these changes. We disagree.
In Medicenter, Mid-South Hospital,3 the Adminis-
trative Law Judge, whose decision was affirmed by
the Board, noted that, "[w]hen an employer notifies a
union of proposed changes in terms and conditions
of employment, it is incumbent upon the union to act
with due diligence in requesting bargaining." In the
present proceeding, the Union, as noted supra, upon
receiving notice of the contemplated changes, con-
tacted Respondent and objected to the changes, but
the record shows that the Union never did request
Respondent to negotiate about its decision to make
the changes, though they had not yet been imple-
mented. In American Buslines, Inc.,4 the Board held
that a union which receives timely notice of a change
in conditions of employment must take advantage of
that notice if it is to preserve its bargaining rights and
not be content in merely protesting an employer's
contemplated action. Such lack of diligence by a
union amounts to a waiver of its right to bargain and
that is precisely what occurred here with respect to
both the pay phone and restroom changes. Accord-
ingly, in view of the above, we shall order that the
complaint, insofar as it alleges that Respondent acted
unlawfully when it removed some telephones and
closed a restroom, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as
modified below and hereby orders that the Respon-
The Administrative Law Judge indicated that the final negotiating
session was held on May 25, 1977. The record shows that the date was May
25, 1976.
2 See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
3 221 NLRB 670,678-679 (1976), and cases cited therein.
4 164 NLRB 1055, 1056(1967).
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CLARKWOOD CORPORATION
dent, Clarkwood Corporation, Totowa, New Jersey,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the said recommended Order,
as so modified.
1. Delete paragraphs l(b) and 2(c) from the
Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL, upon request, forthwith sign a written
contract with Local 25B and Local 43B, Graphic
Arts International Union, effective May 25, 1976,
incorporating therein the following clause: "Su-
pervision will not do any more work than before
the strike." A copy of the contract is posted with
this notice.
WE WILL give retroactive effect to the terms
and conditions of the contract and WE WILL make
whole our employees for any losses they may
have suffered by reason of our failure to sign the
contract.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
CLARKWOOD
CORPORATION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LOWELL GOERLICH, Administrative Law Judge: The
charge filed by Local 25B, Graphic Arts International
Union and Local 43B, Graphic Arts International Union,
referred to herein as Local 25B, Local 43B, or, collectively,
the Union, on September 16, 1976, was served by registered
mail on Clarkwood Corporation, Respondent herein, on
the same date. The first amended charge filed on
November 8, 1976, was served by registered mail on
Respondent on the same date. A complaint and notice of
hearing was issued on November 16, 1976. The complaint
charged that Respondent, since May 28, 1976, has refused
and continues to refuse to sign a written agreement
embodying rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment agreed upon
I The facts found herein are based on the record as a whole and the
observation of the witnesses. The credibility resolutions herein have been
derived from a review of the entire testimonial record and exhibits, with due
regard for the logic of probability, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the
teachings of N. L. R. B. v. Walton Manufacturing Company & Loganville Pants
Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). As to those witnesses testifying in
between Respondent and the above-named Unions in
violation of Section 8(aXl) and (5) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, herein referred to as the Act. It
is further alleged that Respondent, in July and August
1976, unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of
employment of its employees' by restricting their access to
telephone and toilet facilities in violation of Section 8(aX1)
and (5) of the Act.
Respondent filed a timely answer denying that it had
engaged in any of the unfair labor practices alleged.
The case came on for hearing at Newark, New Jersey, on
April 27 and 29, 1977. Each party was afforded a full
opportunity to be heard, to call, examine, and cross-
examine witnesses, to argue orally on the record, to submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions, and to file
briefs.
FINDINGS OF FACT,
1
CONCLUSIONS, AND REASONS
THEREFOR
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein,
a corporation duly organized under, and existing by virtue
of, the laws of the State of New Jersey.
At all times material herein Respondent has maintained
its principal office at 690 Union Boulevard, Totowa, New
Jersey, herein called the Totowa plant, and is now, and at
all times material herein has been continuously, engaged at
said plant in the business of providing and performing
printing services and related services.
Respondent's Totowa plant is its only facility involved in
this proceeding.
In the course and conduct of Respondent's business
operations during the calendar year 1975, said operations
being representative of its operations at all times material
herein, Respondent provided and performed printing
services and related services at said Totowa plant valued in
excess of $50,000, of which printed materials valued in
excess of $50,000 were shipped from said Totowa plant in
interstate commerce directly to States of the United States
other than the State of New Jersey.
Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein,
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II1. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Locals 25B and 43B, Graphic Arts International Union,
are, and have been at all times material herein, labor
organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
contradiction to the findings herein, their testimony has been discredited,
either as having been in conflict with the testimony of credible witnesses or
because it was in and of itself incredible and unworthy of belief. All
testimony has been reviewed and weighed in the light of the entire record.
No testimony has been pretermitted.
1173
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Supervision Clause
The Unions had negotiated jointly with Respondent
"from at least 1958." The last executed contract expired
March 28, 1976. Thereafter, Respondent's employees
engaged in a strike on or about May 7, 1976. Approximate-
ly six to eight members of each Local continued to work
during the strike.
On May 25, 1976, the union negotiators met with
Richard Lyons, Respondent's lawyer and personnel rela-
tions director, and Alfred J. Rieker, president of Respon-
dent, in Union Attorney Caesar Guazzo's office. Mack
Miller, a mediator, was present. The parties, shaking hands
all around, concluded the bargaining session around
midnight with the understanding that a settlement had
been reached.
Walter Diersing, president of Local 25B, Mary Gehebe,
president of Local 43B, and Jacob Newmeyer, union
business representative, committed their understanding of
the settlement agreement to writing and submitted it to the
union members for ratification on May 27, 1976. This
presentation was ratified by the Union and the strike was
terminated. The presentation contained the clause, herein
referred to as the supervision clause, "Supervision will not
do any more work than before the strike." 2
This ratified settlement agreement was then delivered to
Lyons by the union committee on May 27, 1976. At the
same time Lyons was advised that the "people were ready
to go back to work." It was then decided "how many were
coming in. .... Mr. Lyons seemed to be in a hurry. He had
to leave for the temple. That is what he said. He didn't have
much time." 3 In any event, Lyons did not, at the time, fully
review the ratified settlement agreement presented to him
by the Union nor did he sign it on behalf of Respondent.
Nevertheless, the employees returned to work. Sometime
later, Lyons informed the Union that he would not sign a
contract which contained the above-quoted clause in
reference to supervision.
The parties stipulated that a document marked "G.C.
Exhibit 2," dated May 28, 1976, entitled "Memorandum of
Agreement Between Negotiating Committees of Graphic
Arts International Union Local #25-B, Local #45-B and
Clarkwood Corporation, for the Renewal of a Contract
Between Them Dated March 29, 1974," constitutes the
contract between the parties (herein referred to as the
stipulated contract), except that a dispute exists as to
whether the contract should have included this clause
which appears in the settlement agreement ratified by the
Unions: "Supervision will not do any more work than
before the strike." The General Counsel and the Unions
claim that, as to this clause, there was a meeting of the
minds and that Respondent should be ordered to incorpo-
rate the clause in a signed written agreement. Respondent
2 This clause had been of special concern to the Unions because of
reports that during the strike the working foremen who violated the picket
lines were performing more unit work than they did before the strike. If this
condition continued the Unions feared all the strikers would not be recalled.
3 Sally Guertin's credited testimony.
4 The Respondent had filed a charge alleging that the Unions had
engaged in a strike without having served the appropriate wntten notices
required by Sec. 8(d) of the Act.
vigorously opposes this contention. The parties stipulated
that resolution of this dispute was the "only issue" before
me.
From the credible record it is clear, as noted supra, that
the Unions were concerned lest those persons who violated
their picket line would, after the strike, perform more work
than they did as working foremen or supervisors before the
strike. On the other hand, Respondent was concerned lest
the Union discipline those employees who violated the
picket line. As to the latter concern, the "stipulated
contract" contains this language: "The company agrees to
drop all charges presently before the National Labor
Relations Board 4 for amnesty for Bindery Personnel
crossing the picket line."
This clause also appears in the settlement agreement
ratified by the Union (herein called the amnesty clause).
Both the amnesty clause and the supervision clause were
subjects of discussion at the final negotiation session on
May 25, 1977. Diersing, Gehebe, Bargaining Committee
Member Sally Guertin, Chairlady Mary Navitski, and
Union's attorney, Caesar Guazzo, witnesses called by the
General Counsel, testified that Respondent acknowledged
acceptance of the supervision clause at the May 25 session.
Shop Steward George L. Roman, called by Respondent,
testified as follows:
Mr. Newmeyer stated that we will give them
amnesty with two conditions.
The first condition was that all charges will be
dropped and the second condition was that all working
foremen and assistants would not go back to work
working like they were before the strike, which was
agreed upon by Mr. Lyons and Mr. Reiker.
Diersing's notes, copied immediately after the meeting
from notes taken at the May 25 meeting, reveal these
words, "Foreman and Foreladies no more work than
before strike same duties." Guazzo's notes which were
prepared immediately after the meeting together with
Diersing5 contained this language: "Union will grant
amnesty for picket line crossing of working supers
[supervisors] and Co. will withdraw ULP charge. U. un. &
supers [supervisors] will do no more b.u. [bargaining unit]
work than before strike."
While Lyons' notes, which purport to be Miller's reading
of the settlement, reveal the words "Amnesty" and "Drop
NLRB charges," 6 they do not refer to the supervision
clause at all. Lyons agrees that the supervisory question
was raised but after the agreement had been reached. He
quoted Guertin as saying, "[W]e are not going back to
work so long as those supervisors work," and that Gehebe,
addressing Reiker, said, "[W]hat are you going to do about
those supervisors[?]" Lyons told Reiker not to make a
statement, that he would respond. According to Lyons he
said, ". . . we have concluded a contract and an agree-
5 Guazzo instructed Diersing to deliver the notes to Newmeyer for
drafting.
6 It is significant to note in evaluating Lyons' credibility that Lyons
testified that the question of amnesty and the withdrawal of the Respon-
dent's unfair labor practice charges "never came up for discussion on the
25th with the union representatives," although these matters appear in his
notes which purport to be Miller's recap of what occurred.
1174
CLARKWOOD CORPORATION
ment, and I do not intend to enter into any discussions
with respect to any restrictions on our foremen. Our
foremen are going to do exactly what they did before, nothing
less and nothing more,7 and they will not be restricted in any
way." (Emphasis supplied.)
I have concluded from the credible record that Respon-
dent and the Unions did reach a meeting of the minds in
regard to the supervision clause. In this regard I have noted
the testimony of Roman, in whom it would appear that
Respondent harbored some belief as to his credibility by
calling him as its witness, and I have noted the absence of
any questions put to Reiker (although called as a
Respondent witness) on the subject of the supervision
clause. I have weighed the appropriate adverse inference
arising from the failure of the General Counsel to call
Newmeyer. I am convinced of the reliability of Guazzo's
notes on the subject of the supervision clause. Accordingly,
I find that the Respondent, by failing and refusing to
embody in a written signed agreement the aforesaid
supervision clause, violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) and
8(d)8 of the Act.
B. Removal of the Pay Telephone
Shortly after the strike ended, at Lyons' direction the
Respondent removed two pay telephones in the vicinity of
the bindery department at the shipping and receiving
platform. The bindery employees had been using these
telephones on a daily basis since 1968. While there had
been a rule on the subject of telephone use published some
time in 1970,9 the use of the pay telephones had never been
restricted; nor had any employee ever been disciplined for
using the telephone. According to Lyons, a notice was
posted on July 9, 1976, as follows:
TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Shortly New Jersey Bell Telephone will be removing all
of the pay telephones located on our premises with the
exception of the pay telephones located in the building.
In the event that you find it necessary to make an
emergency telephone call during working hours, you
may do so by utilizing the lobby pay telephone after
receiving permission of your foreman to leave your
department.
You are reminded that company telephones to be used
only for company business and no other purpose.
The management
Thereafter, according to Lyons, the telephones were
removed in the second week of August. Lyons said that he
I This admitted commitment by Lyons varies little from the gist of the
supervision clause.
In Sec. 8(d) of the Act it is stated:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is . . . the
execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party ...
See also H. J. Heinz Company, 311 U.S. 514(1941).
9 The rule was as follows: "No employee will be allowed visitors or
ordered the removal of the phones because "from the
period commencing in '73 and for all time thereafter to the
present, [he] would observe people on the telephones
during working hours and people waiting by the telephones
during working hours."
When the phones were removed Chairlady Navitski
contacted her foreman and Lyons and was told "some
people were abusing the use of it." Diersing also contacted
Lyons who informed him that "people were abusing the
privilege of utilizing the telephones and they were leaving
their work stations and using the telephones during the
normal working hours, and the company decided they were
taking the phones out of the bindery proper." Diersing
responded that he could not agree. Lyons said that
employees could use the telephone in the main hall in the
lobby, if permission was granted by their supervisor.'o
Gehebe also protested the removal of the telephones in a
telephone call to Lyons. The phones were not replaced, nor
did Respondent negotiate about the removal of the phones
before or after the removal. Indeed, the credible evidence
does not reflect that at any time Respondent was of the
disposition to bargain about the removal of the pay
phones. In its response to the Unions it treated its notice as
tantamount to afait accompli. Under these circumstances it
may not be concluded that the Unions waived their right to
bargain about the matter.
The use of the two pay telephones by the employees was
a condition of employment which had existed since 1968.
Respondent's unilateral change in this condition of
employment was a violation of Section 8(aX5) of the Act.
N.L.R.B. v. Benne Katz, etc., d/bla Williamsburg Steel
Products Co., 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Bralco Metals, Inc., 214
NLRB 143, 147, 155 (1974).
C. Deprivation of Certain Toilet and Locker
Facilities
Sometime in August 1976, a notice appeared on a ladies
restroom door as follows:
All persons using this room are requested to move
their personal belongings to the main ladies room
before Saturday, August 17, 1976.
As of Saturday, August 14th, this room will no
longer be available for your use.
The management
The restroom" or toilet had been used by about eight
female employees in the bindery department for around 8
years. Chairlady Natviski was told by her foreman and
Lyons that part of the area was needed for storage. Lyons
told her the female employees could use the toilets "out
personal telephone calls during working hours. When necessary, messages
will be taken by the office and delivered to employees" (Resp. Exh. 4).
'0 The credible record does not establish that the lobby telephone was an
adequate substitute for the deprivation of the two pay phones in the vicinity
of the bindery department.
" This restroom was divided into a room containing lockers, cartons.
and cabinets, another room containing a cot, and a third room containing
two toilets and sinks. The door through which the bindery employees
entered and where the notice was posted opened into the room containing
the lockers, cartons, and cabinets.
1175
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
front." Gehebe also contacted Lyons and was told that the
space was needed for storage.
Originally a "Factory Toilet, Women" was built for the
exclusive use of the female employees of the bindery
department. It was used by all female employees except
those mentioned above. The toilet area in dispute was
originally built to accommodate an executive office area
which was anticipated. Knockout panels were built in it for
this purpose.
In 1974 the executive offices were constructed and the
knockout panels were removed to accommodate the
executive offices with toilet facilities.
After the above notice was posted, all female bindery
employees utilized the toilet facilities which were designat-
ed for them in the original plans.
As in the case of the removal of the pay telephones, the
credible evidence does not reflect that at any time
Respondent was of a disposition to bargain about the
deprivation of the toilet and locker facilities. In its response
to the Unions it treated its notice as tantamount to afait
accompli. As in the case of the pay phone removal, under
these circumstances it may not be concluded that the
Unions waived their right to bargain about the matter.
Obviously, the long use of the toilets since 1968 had
ripened into a condition of employment which could not be
tampered with by Respondent without negotiating in
respect thereto with the employees' lawful representative.
Hence, Respondent's unilateral change in this condition of
employment was a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
Pennco, Inc., 212 NLRB 677 (1974).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and it will
effectuate the purposes of the Act for jurisdiction to be
exercised herein.
2. The Unions are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following unit constitutes an appropriate unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:
All skilled bindery workers No. 1, skilled bindery
workers No. 2, apprentice bindery workers No. 1,
general production workers No. 1, general production
workers No. 2, bindery helpers No. I and bindery
helpers No. 2 employees employed at Respondent's
Totowa plant but excluding all office clerical employ-
ees, professional employees, guards, all supervisors as
defined in the Act and all other employees.12
4. The Unions have been at all times material herein
the exclusive representative of the employees in the
aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
I1 The appropriate unit and the unit described in the contract are the
same.
13 This relief is particularly directed toward losses which may have
occurred by reason of any employee having been denied wages or other
benefits by reason of supervision performing more work than it did before
the strike.
5. By unlawfully failing and refusing to sign a written
contract embodying the terms and conditions of the oral
agreement reached with the Union, in toto, on March 25,
1967, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act.
6. By unilaterally removing two pay telephones used by
the bindery employees and depriving bindery female
employees of certain toilet and locker facilities, Respon-
dent violated Section 8(aXl) and (5) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
THE REMEDY
It is recommended that Respondent cease and desist
from its unfair labor practices and take certain affirmative
action necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act. It is
further recommended that the Respondent sign the
stipulated contract, including the supervision clause,
retroactive as of May 25, 1976, and that it make whole its
employees for any loss of wages or other employment
benefits 13 they may have suffered as the result of
Respondent's failure to sign the contract. The loss of
earnings under the recommended Order shall be computed
in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90
NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716 (1962).
Since the credible evidence does not establish that the
present telephone facilities for the bindery department
employees provide comparable service to that which
existed before the two pay telephones were removed, it is
recommended that the status quo ante be restored and that
two pay telephones be installed with the same employee
privileges abiding as existed prior to their removal.
In respect to the toilet facilities, since adequate compara-
ble facilities have been afforded, it is not recommended
that the status quo ante be restored.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and the entire record in this proceed-
ing, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue
the following recommended:
ORDER 14
Respondent, Clarkwood Corporation, Totowa, New
Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing and refusing to sign the agreement reached
with the Unions on May 25, 1976 (the stipulated contract),
with the incorporation therein of the clause: "Supervision
will not do any more work than before the strike."
(b) Unilaterally changing working conditions of its
employees in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act.
14 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
1176
CLARKWOOD CORPORATION
2. Take the following affirmative action which will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Forthwith, sign the agreement reached with the
Union on May 25, 1976 (the stipulated contract), with the
incorporation therein of the clause: "Supervision will not
do any more work than before the strike."
(b) Upon execution of the aforesaid agreement, give
retroactive effect to the provisions thereof and make whole
its employees for any losses they may have suffered by
reason of the Respondent's failure to sign the agreement in
the manner set forth in the section herein entitled "The
Remedy."
(c) Install or have installed two pay telephones at the
shipping and receiving platform for the use of bindery
department employees with the same employee privileges
abiding as existed prior to their removal.
15 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
(d) Post at its Totowa, New Jersey, establishment copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 22, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 22, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
1177