CKS Tool & Engineering, Inc. of Bad Axe

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 29, 2000

332 N.L.R.B. 1578 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1578
CKS Tool & Engineering, Inc. of Bad Axe and Randy
Wierzbicki. Case 7–CA–40332
December 29, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND HURTGEN
On November 17, 1998, Administrative Law Judge
Thomas R. Wilks issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the
General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended
Order as modified.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, CKS
Tool & Engineering, Inc. of Bad Axe, Bad Axe, Minne-
sota, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order as modified.

1 In excepting to the judge’s finding that alleged discriminatee
Randy Wierzbicki’s comments to Plant Manager Tom Carriveau at the
Sept. 11, 1998 meeting were concerted, the Respondent relies, inter
alia, on Manimark Corp. v. NLRB, 7 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1993), where
the court, in reversing the Board’s finding that the employer had unlaw-
fully discharged an employee, found the employee’s conduct at issue
was not concerted. Since the facts in Manimark Corp. v. NLRB, supra,
are readily distinguishable from those of the present case, we find the
Respondent’s reliance on that case misplaced.
In Manimark, the court concluded that the evidence was “too thin”
to support a finding that Fields, the alleged discriminatee, “was acting
on behalf of anyone other than himself” in his meeting with Morris, the
employer’s vice president and general manager. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court found it ‘significant’ that Morris summoned Fields to
his office to discuss a compensation matter that affected only Fields,
i.e., “a purely personal complaint.” Id. at 550. The court further found
that in his meeting with Morris, Fields had only added as an “after-
thought” that he and others had complained about certain issues. Id.
Finally, the court found that Fields’ failure to notify his fellow employ-
ees after the meeting that he had raised these issues with Morris, as well
as his refusal to follow through on Morris’ suggestion that Fields ar-
range a group meeting to discuss the employees’ concerns, further
evidenced that Fields was not engaged in concerted activity when he
listed these concerns for Morris. Id. at 550–551. By contrast, the judge
found, and we agree, that the concerted nature of Wierzbicki’s conduct
is found in his raising of group concerns about productivity in a group
meeting called by the Respondent to discuss productivity and effi-
ciency. Finally, in finding the Respondent’s exception without merit,
we note that in NLRB v. Talsol Corp., 155 F.3d 785 (6th Cir. 1998), the
court distinguished Manimark, supra, and found an employee’s conduct
in raising group concerns at a group meeting called by management,
conduct substantially similar to Wierzbicki’s conduct at issue here,
constituted concerted activity. Id. at 796–797.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order in accordance
with our decision in Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144 (1996),
as modified in Excel Container, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997).
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a).
“(a) Discharging employees because of their con-
certed activities protected by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act.”
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a) and
reletter the subsequent paragraphs.
“(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Randy Wierzbicki full reinstatement to his former job or,
if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other
rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
“(b) Make Randy Wierzbicki whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of this decision.”
3. Add the following as paragraph 2(d) and reletter the
subsequent paragraphs.
“(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make
available to the Board or its agents for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of back-
pay due under the terms of this Order.”
4. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT discharge employees because of their
concerted activities protected by the National Labor Re-
lations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
332 NLRB No. 162
CKS TOOL & ENGINEERING, INC. OF BAD AXE 1579
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the
Board’s Order, offer Randy Wierzbicki full reinstatement
to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a sub-
stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his
seniority or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed.
WE WILL make Randy Wierzbicki whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him, less interim earnings, plus
interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the
Board’s Order, remove from our files any reference to
the unlawful discharge of Randy Wierzbicki and WE
WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify him in writing
that this has been done and that the discharge will not be
used against him in any way.
CKS TOOL & ENGINEERING, INC. OF BAD AXE
Amy J. Roemer, Esq., for the Acting General Counsel.
Brian M. Smith, Esq. (Brian M. Smith & Associates, P.C.), of
Troy, Michigan, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS R. WILKS, Administrative Law Judge. The trial
of this case was held before me on July 14, 1997, at Bad Axe,
Michigan, pursuant to an unfair labor practice charge filed on
October 20, 1997, by Randy Wierzbicki, an individual, against
CKS Tool & Engineering, Inc. of Bad Axe, and a complaint
issued by the Regional Director on January 30, 1998. The com-
plaint alleges that the Respondent terminated Randy Wierzbicki
on September 11, 1997, because he had engaged in alleged
concerted activities protected by the Act. The Respondent filed
a timely answer which denied the unfair labor practices and
which raised as a defense that Wierzbicki had resigned
voluntarily on September 11, 1997, or alternatively was
discharged on September 12 for just cause because he had acted
individually, not concertedly, in a “threatening, hostile manner
to management employees” at a confrontation during an em-
ployee meeting conducted by the Respondent. The Respondent
contends that Wierzbicki, after the aforesaid misconduct, re-
fused to return to his workstation and left the plant without
permission. The issues raised by the pleadings and the proofs
are whether the Charging Party engaged in concerted protected
activity at the employee meeting and, if so, whether he lost any
protection afforded under the Act for such activity by insubor-
dinate and abusive conduct directed toward the plant manager
at and after the meeting on September 11, and again on Sep-
tember 12, 1997.
At the trial, the parties were given full opportunity to adduce
relevant testimonial and documentary evidence and to argue
orally. They were also afforded opportunity to submit posttrial
briefs, which were received on September 15 and 18, 1998.
The briefs submitted by the parties fully delineate the facts
and issues and, in form, approximate proposed findings of facts
and conclusions. Portions of those briefs have been incorpo-
rated, sometimes modified, particularly as to undisputed factual
narration. However, all factual findings are based on my inde-
pendent evaluation of the record. Based on the entire record,
the briefs, and my observation and evaluation of the witnesses’
demeanor, I make the following findings.
I. JURISDICTION
At all material times, the Respondent with an office and
place of business in Bad Axe, Michigan, (the Respondent’s Bad
Axe facility), has been engaged in the manufacture, nonretail
sale and distribution of toolholders, various machine tools and
assembly parts, and hot and cold forging. During the 12-month
period immediately preceding the filing of the charge, a repre-
sentative period, the Respondent, in conducting its business
operations, derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and
has purchased goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000
from suppliers located outside the State of Michigan and caused
said goods and supplies to be shipped directly from points lo-
cated outside the State of Michigan to its Bad Axe facility.
It is admitted, and I find, that at all material times, the Re-
spondent has been engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
The Respondent operates a tooling and engineering facility
in Bad Axe, Michigan, a largely rural area in the northern cen-
ter of what is colloquially termed the Michigan “thumb.” The
Respondent employs approximately 200 employees in various
departments at its Bad Axe facility, including shipping, grind-
ing, lathe, EDM, mill, saw, CAM, and heat treat. Thomas Car-
riveaux has been the plant manager since 1990. At all times
material, Mark Essenmacher was the mill department supervi-
sor and Chad Gembarski was the second-shift foreman. All are
admitted supervisors and agents of the Respondent within the
meaning of the Act. Michael Ornowski is currently employed
by the Respondent as a sales and process engineer but on Sep-
tember 11, 1997, he held the position of mill department pro-
grammer. At that time, Gregg Irwin held the position of train-
ing coordinator.
The Respondent is an “ISO 9000” manufacturer, a classifica-
tion instituted by the automotive manufacturing industry that
certifies that the manufacturer meets certain standards set in-
dustry-wide. Pursuant to that program, the Respondent holds
weekly meetings in its departments to discuss issues that arise
on the production floor. These meetings are mandatory and in
addition to attendance by the hourly department employees, the
supervisor of the department and the supporting CAD-CAM
people also attend. The grind department meets on Tuesdays,
the lathe department on Wednesdays, and the mill department
on Thursdays. The meetings generally last for 30 minutes and
are held in the employee lunchroom, which is away from the
production floor. Meetings in the mill department with about
10-day shift and 6 or 7 second-shift employees are normally
conducted by Essenmacher and sometimes Irwin. Carriveaux
testified that he only attended these meetings when “extenuat-
ing circumstances” warranted it, e.g., announcements of new
production procedures. On Thursday, September 11, 1997,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1580
both Essenmacher and Irwin were absent from the plant. Ac-
cordingly, it became Ornowski’s duty to conduct the mill de-
partment meeting with the assistance of Carriveaux. Ornowski
had little past experience in such duties and had never before
conducted a full meeting. General Counsel witness Ronald
Landenberg, a Respondent employee since 1993, had regularly
attended these meetings. According to his uncontradicted and
credible testimony, these meetings did not normally take the
polite format of a classroom exercise at which employees sat
sedately, auditing the supervisor’s presentation, and speaking
only upon being recognized by the raising of hands. He testi-
fied without contradiction that it was not uncommon for em-
ployees to speak spontaneously without waiting for recognition
from the speaker. The exception, he testified, was when the
plant manager addressed them. On those occasions, the em-
ployees usually remained passively quiet.
Randy Wierzbicki was hired by the Respondent in April
1995 and was employed on the second shift as a mill operator
on September 11, 1997. Carriveaux testified that according to
undated, unspecified reports from unnamed supervisors,
Wierzbicki had become argumentative and “disruptive” in an
unspecified manner during meetings conducted by them on
unspecified occasions. No supervisor testified in corroboration
of Carriveaux, but neither was his testimony rebutted. How-
ever, he admitted that Wierzbicki had never been reprimanded
for inappropriate conduct at such meetings in the past and that
his personnel file is silent about such conduct. I must conclude,
therefore, that based on Landenberg’s and Carriveaux’s testi-
mony, vigorous argumentation at such meetings between su-
pervisors and employees, particularly Wierzbicki, had become
the tolerated practice. It is also undisputed that vulgar “shop
talk” laced with the four-letter “F” word is common in the facil-
ity and frequently used during arguments between employees
and supervisors.
Carriveaux testified that with respect to the meetings on or
about September 11, 1997, he decided to attend because he had
become concerned about an increase in scrap rate and a “prob-
lem at that point with profitability.” He described his function
as to make “kind of a personal plea from me to get some peo-
ple, to identify their problems and fix them.” Thus, he intended
to elicit employee interaction at the meeting.
B. The September 11, 1997 Confrontation
The second shift commenced at 3:30 p.m. and ended at 11
p.m. Wierzbicki testified that prior to the scheduled 3:30 p.m.
meeting of afternoon shift employees on Thursday, September
11, rumors had been afloat in the plant which disclosed that
Carriveaux had attended earlier meetings that week for other
department employees to “hash out our problems” regarding
the causes for production scrap and ways to improve produc-
tion. He testified that prior to the mill department meeting, he
had discussed with his coworkers the fact that production em-
ployees were going to get a “talking to” regarding the scrap rate
as a profitability issue, and yet the Respondent could afford to
send nonproduction persons to tool shows. In cross-
examination, he admitted that he did not initiate these discus-
sions nor did he go and seek out the employees’ opinions.
Landenberg corroborated Wierzbicki by testifying that prior to
the September 11 second-shift mill department meeting, the
employees did discuss among themselves the anticipated topic
of an improved production demand and that they jointly com-
plained that the Respondent’s managers had always demanded
increased production from its employees as a cure to profitabil-
ity problems while simultaneously maintaining unnecessary
nonproduction personnel and positions. Thus, prior to the
meeting, Wierzbicki had been exposed to and joined in em-
ployee group discussions, wherein common employee resent-
ment was jointly expressed toward Carriveaux’s anticipated
demand for improved employee production as a solution to
company profitability problems.
The meeting commenced at 3:30 p.m. under Ornowski’s
lead. Ornowski did not testify in detail about what he said for
about 10 minutes until about 3:40 p.m., when Carriveaux ap-
peared and assumed leadership and commenced to speak. After
only a few minutes, if that long, he was confronted from the
floor by Wierzbicki. Five witnesses testified as to Wierzbicki’s
conduct. The General Counsel presented the detailed testimony
of Wierzbicki and Landenberg. The Respondent presented the
somewhat detailed testimony of Carriveaux and the supposedly
corroborative but generalized testimony of the subsequently
promoted Ornowski, and even more generalized and conclu-
sionary testimony of mill department employee Stan Wessels.
In his testimony, Carriveaux attempted to paint a picture of
an intimidated and frightened 5 foot–9 inch short plant manager
who was verbally abused and physically overshadowed by a
menacing, huge, 6 foot–3 inch tall, 250-pound, heavy, robust,
resonant voiced employee who constantly interrupted Car-
riveaux’s presentation with language salted with the “F” word
by shouting his individual protest of nonresponsibility for scrap
and production problems accompanied by body language sug-
gestive of possible workplace violence, i.e., stiff-standing body
posture, clenched fists, and flushed, angry face. However, even
under Carriveaux’s version of the facts, Wierzbicki did not
explicitly insult Carriveaux’s character or integrity, did not
resort to denigrating name-calling, and did not explicitly
threaten physical violence.
Wierzbicki characterized his behavior as respectful to the ex-
tent that he only spoke initially and thereafter when Carriveaux
recognized his hand-raised request to do so and sat and spoke
quietly and politely during the entire encounter until he was
ordered to leave by Carriveaux at which point he then began
using loud, vulgar language as he stood up and departed, but
remaining in self-control at all times without clenched fists or
other threatening gestures. Wierzbicki testified that he spoke
not with the individual “I” in addressing Carriveaux, but that
rather he utilized the first-person plural “we,” e.g., “we machin-
ists, we are human beings,” “we make mistakes” because of
errors in blueprints, etc.
There is also a dispute as to who left the meeting first. Ac-
cording to Wierzbicki, Carriveaux left first. According to
Wierzbicki, he and Carriveaux had a second confrontation at
the timeclock, which is located on the path to Wierzbicki’s
workstation where Wierzbicki was headed. According to
Wierzbicki, Carriveaux had reached the timeclock before him
and was standing there waiting when Wierzbicki encountered
CKS TOOL & ENGINEERING, INC. OF BAD AXE 1581
him and asked his employment status but was told only to keep
going out the front door.
Carriveaux testified that not only did Wierzbicki leave the
meeting first, which he was ordered to do, to return to his work
station, but that he proceeded to the timeclock which is unseen
from the meeting room which is the lunchroom but from which
point the timeclock’s activation mechanism was audible. Ac-
cording to Carriveaux, Wierzbicki hit the lunchroom table at
which he was sitting 6 to 8 feet across from Carriveaux and
stomped rapidly out of the room, after which Carriveaux, still
in the room until he left at 3:52 p.m., heard the timeclock cycle.
Carriveaux testified that he remained in the room for about 3 to
5 minutes and finished his remarks and departed at 3:52 p.m.
He testified that he departed and encountered Wierzbicki at the
timeclock, body stiff with anger and fists clenched but not
above waist level, hovering over him and demanding to know if
he still had a job. Carriveaux testified that he was alarmed by
this menacing demeanor and responded:

Randy, I am worried that something could develop here. It
would be better just to leave the building right now.

Thereafter, Carriveaux engaged in a somewhat unclear and
shifting explanation as to when he actually decided to discharge
Wierzbicki. Leading examination did not enhance his credibil-
ity nor did it encourage a convincing demeanor. At first, he
testified that he made the discharge decision on September 11
upon consideration that Wierzbicki had violated the Respon-
dent’s employee work rule by engaging in insubordination and
by abandoning his work by punching out. As to the latter con-
tention, if Wierzbicki had indeed been ordered only to leave the
lunchroom and not the building and had in fact punched out
contrary to instructions to go back to work, then the question
arises, why did he wait for Carriveaux at the timeclock and
inquire as to his status and not actually leave the building until
Carriveaux ordered him to do so? Such conduct at least implies
that at the very least, Carriveaux’s order to leave the lunchroom
was ambiguous. Yet, Carriveaux testified that he “figured” that
Wierzbicki had quit.
In continuation of his testimony regarding the timing of the
discharge decision, Carriveaux next testified that on September
11 after Wierzbicki departed, he had only 80 percent to 90 per-
cent decided to discharge Wierzbicki. Then he went on to tes-
tify even more confusingly that he probably would not have
fired Wierzbicki had not the latter confronted him the next day
by entering his office, thrusting his face into Carriveaux’s face
with his hands on Carriveaux’s desktop demanding, “Do I still
have a job?”—strange conduct indeed for someone whom Car-
riveaux figured had voluntarily quit. According to Car-
riveaux’s testimony, at that point, he now decided to discharge
Wierzbicki because Wierzbicki’s hostile menacing attitude on
September 12 gave him “no choice” but to do so. They then
had some minor argumentation over Wierzbicki’s right to per-
sonally retrieve his personal tools from the shop over Car-
riveaux’s refusal for fear of “work place violence.”
In cross-examination as to his prior testimony that the dis-
charge decision had been formulated on September 11, he testi-
fied:

[JUDGE] Q. Before he came in the next day, from your tes-
timony, it’s not clear that you had actually made a decision to
discharge him?
[CARRIVEAUX] A. I hadn’t. In my mind—I hoped that
when he left that meeting he was just going to go back to his
department and go to work, but instead he was—he had
punched out and he was standing there waiting from me.
And then the next day, you know, when he came in and just
put his face in mine again, I just [didn’t] know what other op-
tions I had.

[JUDGE] Q. So it wasn’t until that point, the next day, that
you decided to discharge him?
[CARRIVEAUX] A. Yes.
Finally, in cross-examination, he testified:

[ROEMER] Q. Isn’t it true that you discharged him because
of the meeting.
[CARRIVEAUX] A. No, it is not true.

In redirect examination, Carriveaux provided more surprising
testimony.

[SMITH] Q. Okay, Tom, Mr. Carriveaux, you previously
testified, correct me if I’m wrong—was he insubordinate to
you at the meeting?
[CARRIVEAUX] A. Not at the meeting.

[SMITH] Q. I mean the employee meeting.
[CARRIVEAUX] A. Well—

[SMITH] Q. I’m talking about the meeting on the 11th of
September, when he was loud—[was] he loud at the meeting?
I don’t want to rehash this whole thing, but you went through
a ten minute situation with him, what did you consider his
conduct to amount to at that meeting?

Despite this grossly suggestive examination by the Respon-
dent’s counsel, Carriveaux hesitantly and unconvincingly re-
sponded:
[CARRIVEAUX] A. Well, very loud and it scared me. It
would—I think it would technically be insubordinate to do
that to your—

Counsel for the Respondent thereupon directed the witness’
attention to company work rules regarding leaving work with-
out permission, and he then elicited testimony that well, yes,
Wierzbicki did violate that rule. This whole line of leading
questioning and responses did absolutely nothing to enhance
Carriveaux’s credibility.
In recross-examination, Carriveaux confirmed that he indeed
had not discharged Wierzbicki on September 11 but had hoped
that Wierzbicki would return to work “calm and ask—and that
we could get back together.” This is a very curious response
because if Wierzbicki had not been terminated, what is the
meaning of Carriveaux’s implicit testimony that there was a
need to “get back together,” i.e., to repair the ruptured em-
ployment relationship. Carriveaux would have been more con-
vincing and would have made much more sense had he testified
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1582
that he had discharged Wierzbicki on September 11 but that he
would have rescinded that discharge upon evidence of Wierz-
bicki’s contrition and request for reemployment.
Wierzbicki testified that he would have proceeded to his
workstation after being ejected from the meeting had not Car-
riveaux ordered him to leave the building during the timeclock
confrontation and that he had punched out only after having
been so ordered. He testified that he arrived at the facility the
next day, September 12, at 3:15 p.m. to discuss the status of the
work being done before punching in at the timeclock. He then
testified as follows. He proceeded to retrieve his safety goggles
when he saw supervisor Essenmacher and asked him “what was
up,” because he was not completely certain of his employment
status, and Essenmacher told him that he was no longer em-
ployed by the Respondent. Upon being asked to see Carriveaux
and obtain a reason for the termination, Essenmacher proceeded
to make an in-plant telephone call wherein he asked to speak to
Carriveaux. After a telephone conversation wherein he relayed
the request, Essenmacher escorted Wierzbicki to the front of-
fice area where Wierzbicki was told to wait until Carriveaux
was ready to see him. There he waited for 1–1/2 hours until
Carriveaux appeared and instructed him to enter his office.
According to Wierzbicki, he was not out of control nor en-
raged. He testified that he was fearful that his job was in jeop-
ardy at a time when he not only had to support a wife but also a
newborn child. He denied leaning on Carriveaux’s desk and
denied clenching his fists. According to Wierzbicki, he asked,
“What’s up, what’s going on?” At that point, Carriveaux
looked up from his desk and told Wierzbicki that it was time he
looked for another job. When asked for the reason, Carriveaux
refused to give him one. When Wierzbicki stated that he would
need to talk to the Michigan Employment Security Commis-
sion, Carriveaux only responded, “I will meet you there.” At
that point, there was a dispute as to whether Wierzbicki could
personally retrieve his toolbox, which he did contrary to Car-
riveaux’s order not to enter the work area.
As to who left the September 11 meeting first and what Car-
riveaux told the employees, if anything, about the employment
status of Wierzbicki, there is a conflict between the testimony
of the other witnesses. Ornowski and Wessels testified that
Carriveaux ordered Wierzbicki to “leave the meeting,” that he
did so, and that Carriveaux followed him out a few minutes
later after one of them heard the timeclock activate seconds
after seeing Wierzbicki pass the lunchroom window to the cor-
ridor leading to the timeclock. Ornowski testified that Car-
riveaux returned 3 to 5 minutes later and put the now disrupted
meeting back to order as the employees sat “gossiping” among
themselves. He failed to testify precisely to what Carriveaux
said when he returned. Wessels testified that when Carriveaux
returned, he apologized for the disruption. He also did not
testify as to precisely what Carriveaux said.
Landenberg testified that Carriveaux had walked to the door
and it was not until Wierzbicki made a comment to Ornowski
that Carriveaux, at the door, told Wierzbicki “why don’t you
get up right now and get out of here.” According to him,
Wierzbicki arose from a sitting position at the table and de-
parted, shortly after which Carriveaux followed him. Wessels
and Ornowski both testified that Wierzbicki was sitting at the
table, not standing, when ordered to leave. They testified that
Wierzbicki either banged or slapped the tabletop as he stood up
to leave. Landenberg testified that it was the first time that
Wierzbicki stood during the entire meeting. He testified that at
no time did Wierzbicki, who was always in his view, clench his
fists, and he had no recollection that Wierzbicki slapped or hit
the table as he stood up. Neither Wessels nor Ornowski explic-
itly contradicted Landenberg’s testimony that Wierzbicki had
not stood up until after he was ordered to leave.
Carriveaux testified that he became frightened when a red-
faced Wierzbicki stood 6 feet away from him with clenched
fists, standing and banging on the table while using profanity.
The implication is that, in part, this is what caused him to order
Wierzbicki to leave, i.e., standing and banging the table. How-
ever, later in his testimony, he testified that when he asked
Wierzbicki to leave the meeting, “that’s when he stood up and
hit the table like that and went stomping out.” Clearly then, the
testimony of Wierzbicki and Landenberg that Wierzbicki did
not stand at any time during the meeting until ordered to leave
is credible and, thus, Wierzbicki did not, prior to that moment,
stand menacingly with clenched fists in confrontation with
Carriveaux. Instead, he sat across a lunchroom table 6 to 8 feet
across from Carriveaux in which position his extra height and
alleged body-stiffened position were mitigated. Further, the
evidence now reveals that if he banged the table, it was after he
was ordered to leave.
Landenberg testified that when Carriveaux returned to the
meeting, he told the employees, “Randy Wierzbicki will no
longer be with us.” If this statement was meant to be limited to
Wierzbicki’s nonattendance at the meeting, it would have been
totally superfluous as he had already been obviously ejected.
That it referred to Wierzbicki’s employment status conflicts
with Carriveaux’s ultimate testimony that he did not discharge
Wierzbicki until September 12 after a confrontation in his of-
fice. The Respondent, however, did not choose to adduce the
testimony of its supervisor, Essenmacher. Thus, in light of
Landenberg’s testimony, which is not explicitly contradicted by
Wessels and Ornowski, and in light of Wierzbicki’s uncontra-
dicted testimony, Essenmacher informed Wierzbicki he had
been discharged prior to his shift start on September 12 and that
is the reason for the confrontation which followed. I must dis-
credit Carriveaux’s testimony as to the date he decided to dis-
charge Wierzbicki and find this testimonial credibility as to the
confrontation of September 11 and 12 severely impaired.
I conclude that regardless of Wierzbicki’s conduct on Sep-
tember 12, he had already been discharged for his conduct at
and/or shortly after the meeting on September 11. Furthermore,
a resolution of credibility as to what his conduct at the meeting
had been on September 11 will also resolve credibility between
Carriveaux and Wierzbicki as to Wierzbicki’s conduct after the
meeting.
To some degree, I find both Wierzbicki and Carriveaux to be
less than candid witnesses. Wierzbicki’s self-portrayal of hav-
ing engaged in an almost classroom-courteous manner prior to
being ordered to leave was contradicted by General Counsel
witness Landenberg, who had testified that Wierzbicki had
engaged Carriveaux in an “F” word-laced verbal confrontation
after interrupting Carriveaux’s initial representation. Car-
CKS TOOL & ENGINEERING, INC. OF BAD AXE 1583
riveaux’s testimonial credibility impairment, as noted above, is
severe. The proffered corroboration of Ornowski and Wessels
is conclusionary and generalized. Wessels contradicted Car-
riveaux with respect to the alleged individual nature of Wierz-
bicki’s complaints. Contrary to Carriveaux, he testified that
Wierzbicki stated in response to an unspecified Carriveaux
remark, “What do you mean we’re not human?” Wierzbicki’s
overall testimonial demeanor was subdued, dispassionate, and
spontaneous. Carriveaux was extremely hesitant throughout,
often delaying and calculating his responses before giving
them. He lacked fluency and conviction. The most credible
witness, however, was Landenberg. He testified as to detailed
facts. He was cooperative and responsive in direct and cross-
examination. Where unsure of his recollection, he would say
so. His testimony was fluent, spontaneous, and convincing. As
a present employee of the Respondent, he had nothing to gain
except his employer’s displeasure for testifying as a General
Counsel witness. However, not all of his testimony was fully
supportive of Wierzbicki’s testimony. I found him to be the
most objective and credible witness and rely essentially on his
testimony, as well as uncontradicted testimony of other wit-
nesses, which is not mutually inconsistent, in making the fol-
lowing findings as to what conduct Wierzbicki engaged in on
September 11, 1997.
Carriveaux had joined the meeting at 3:40 p.m. and had
taken the floor from Ornowski. He commenced to explain that
the Respondent’s profitability and production were being im-
pacted by a high scrap rate and instructed that the employees
should try to increase production from 50 parts a day to 60
parts, which could be accomplished if they all gave an extra
effort. He then stated that the employees needed to care about
their jobs and that the machinists were making “silly, stupid”
mistakes and that there was a need for them to work as a team
and watch their machines at all times. At about this time,
Wierzbicki spontaneously interjected the following loud com-
ment from his seated position, “Don’t you think we give a f - - -
about our work? Are you saying Tom, we don’t give a f - - -
about our jobs?” and also “God damn it, don’t you think were
are human beings; we are human beings, we are machinists and
we make mistakes.” He alluded to errors caused by the CAD
room and errors in blueprints and improper tooling, which
caused machinists’ errors. Carriveaux coolly and evenly re-
sponded that the employees could accomplish improved pro-
duction if they increased their work efforts and that he was not
asserting that they did not care about their work, but that the
Respondent needed an 8-percent increase in production because
it was hurting financially from poor production. He then stated
that the employees would work as a team and whoever will not
be working as a team and “whoever will cause dissension will
no longer be working here.” Wierzbicki retorted, “What are you
saying then, that I’m going to be fired just because I’m saying
you don’t think we give a f - - -?” Carriveaux answered:
“What I am saying is anyone causing dissension and not willing
to work as a team in the shop will no longer be employed here.”
Another employee started to say something but Carriveaux
stopped him, saying “this is getting out of hand gentlemen; we
are not going there. Let’s stop it right now.” The other em-
ployee stopped talking. Wierzbicki asked Carriveaux whether
he had ever made any mistakes. Carriveaux answered “yes.”
Wierzbicki again said “we are all human beings, we make mis-
takes.” Carriveaux told Wierzbicki that he had ruined the meet-
ing. Whether from his original position or whether he had
moved to the doorway, Carriveaux told Wierzbicki, “Why
don’t you get up right now and get out of here.” Inasmuch as
Landenberg could not effectively corroborate Wierzbicki that
Carriveaux departed first, I credit the Respondent’s witnesses
that Wierzbicki departed first, as it is the more probable se-
quence of events that the offended manager who ordered an
employee to depart would not himself depart before that em-
ployee.
With respect to testimony as to hearing the timeclock cycle
outside in the hallway, I find such to be unconvincing given the
distance involved and the ensuing hubbub of “gossip” among
the audience. Wessels admittedly did not hear it. In any event,
no one actually saw Wierzbicki punch out before Carriveaux
confronted him. I find that if Wierzbicki had intended to vol-
untarily quit or insubordinately walk out of the building without
permission, he would not have waited for Carriveaux at the
timeclock to inquire as to his work status as Carriveaux admit-
ted that he did so. Even if he had punched out, Wierzbicki did
not leave until he asked Carriveaux whether he still had a job.
It is Carriveaux’s testimony that his exact response was:
“Randy, I didn’t say that.” He testified in explanation for this
ambiguous response, “Because there’s no way that I was going
to say that—in the heat of the moment.” The implication for
this unfulfilled explanation is that he was afraid to tell Wierz-
bicki he had been fired, because if he had not fired him then, a
statement of reassurance of nondischarge certainly would de-
fuse—not inflame—emotions.
I discredit Carriveaux’s testimony, contradicted even by
Wessels, that Wierzbicki voiced only his individual complaint
and simply argued that problems were not his individual fault.
I discredit also his half-hearted, uncertain denials, i.e., “I don’t
think so,” regarding Wierzbicki’s statement “we are all human
beings [and] we all make mistakes.” I discredit the initial im-
plication in his testimony that Wierzbicki had engaged in an
upright standing, menacing posture and find that in any event,
he was separated from Wierzbicki by a distance of 6 to 8 feet
and by a lunchroom dining table. I find it difficult to believe
that Carriveaux was exposed to any actual menacing conduct
by Wierzbicki before he was ordered to leave the lunchroom,
and I discredit his testimony that he was put in fear by any con-
duct of Wierzbicki up to that point. There is no evidence that
any employee or manager present had made any movement to
intercede physically or otherwise to come to the assistance of a
plant manager, thus indicating the lack of any palpable menac-
ing conduct.
I credit Landenberg that there was nothing in Wierzbicki’s
body language or posture to warrant perception of a fear that he
was out of control or was acting in a threatening manner. I
conclude that he angrily got up and slapped or banged the top
of the lunchroom table after he was told to leave. Wessels and
Ornowski testified that Wierzbicki loudly interrupted Car-
riveaux and very loudly engaged in a one-on-one confrontation
with him to the point of yelling or “almost” yelling his com-
ments and that the meeting did not proceed as Ornowski and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1584
Carriveaux intended and that it appeared that Wierzbicki was
taking control of it. Neither of them, however, testified to any
menacing behavior by Wierzbicki nor as to clenching of fists. I
find that Wierzbicki had not engaged in any physically intimi-
dating conduct to cause any reasonable fear of harm prior to
being ordered to leave. Inasmuch as he simply got up and de-
parted very quickly by all accounts, I find that he did nothing to
arouse any reasonable fear of assault in the lunchroom even if
he did strike the tabletop with his hand.
However, I do conclude, as testified to by Landenberg, that
Wierzbicki was angry and visibly upset during the confronta-
tion whereas Carriveaux remained calm and responded to
Wierzbicki in a quieter voice until he ordered him out. Because
of what Landenberg perceived to be a disrespectfully loud and
profane confrontation with the plant manager, he thought to
himself that “this meeting’s gotten way out of hand,” and he
testified that it appeared that Wierzbicki “took control of the
whole meeting.”
Because of the lack of credibility that I have found regarding
Carriveaux’s testimony regarding the substance of the preced-
ing confrontation and his lack of credibility as to the date of the
discharge and the confrontation of September 12, I must dis-
credit his testimony regarding the timeclock confrontation.
I further find that it was not reasonable for Carriveaux to feel
intimidated because of Wierzbicki’s loud and profane language.
It is undisputed that employees have argued vigorously and
profanely with supervisors. It is undisputed that such vigorous
arguments have occurred at past such meetings, had been toler-
ated, and that Carriveaux was aware of that past practice. It is
undisputed that vulgar and profane language is prevalent in
shoptalk. It is undisputed that Wierzbicki normally has a ro-
bust, resonant voice and has had a reputation for tolerated ar-
gumentation at plant meetings. It is undisputed that Carriveaux
intended to elicit employee response at the meeting. It is
admitted that Carriveaux rose from the ranks and had been
exposed to production shop vulgarity for 11 years as a
nonsupervisory employee. I conclude that nothing in
Wierzbicki’s language, voluble tone, or body movements
provided any reasonable basis for Carriveaux to fear violence.
However, it is also undisputed that his meeting agenda was
sidetracked and he was subjected to the rough language
interruptions of Wierzbicki. Yet, Wierzbicki left the room
when ordered to do so and could have been ordered to leave at
any point Carriveaux wanted to regain any control he felt was
being lost to the employee. Initially, Wierzbicki was not
ordered to stop talking and, thus, did not disobey any direct
order to engage in a discourse.
C. Analysis
Wierzbicki had previously engaged in a tolerated practice of
employee meeting disputation, albeit such experience involving
a plant manager was unprecedented. Yet, the semi-formal ar-
rangement of sitting around lunchroom tables did not explicitly
discourage such disputation.
I have concluded Carriveaux’s proffered discharge justifica-
tion of insubordination, failing to follow an order, or abandon-
ing work, to be contrived and trumped up. The evidence re-
veals that aside from the manner of disputation, there is no
basis for such allegation. Carriveaux testified that his meeting
was disrupted by Wierzbicki; yet, he could have asserted
managerial authority by forcefully refusing to engage in a one-
to-one disputation at the very beginning. Carriveaux’s prof-
fered justifications are found above to be shifting and false. I
must infer then that the false reasons were contrived to mask
another potentially unlawful motivation. Shattuck Denn Min-
ing Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966); Abbey’s
Transportation Services Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.2d 575, 579 (2nd
Cir. 1988); Rain Ware, Inc., 732 F.2d 1349, 1354 (7th Cir.
1984). I conclude that the real basis for the discharge, which
occurred on September 11, can be found in the dialogue be-
tween Carriveaux and Wierzbicki. As soon as Wierzbicki de-
fended the work ethic of his fellow employees, which he per-
ceived was being impugned by Carriveaux, i.e., the premise
being that employees were not working hard enough, and as
soon as Wierzbicki reacted adversely to Carriveaux’s demand
for less scrap and increased production which he asserted could
be achieved by great team effort, Carriveaux revealingly per-
ceived such criticism as dissension, punishable by discharge.
He did so because Wierzbicki’s protest implied that the lack of
teamwork was not causing a lower production. Thus, Wierz-
bicki immediately perceived Carriveaux’s response to contain
an implicit threat—if you disagree, you will be a dissenter sub-
ject to discharge. I conclude that it was not Wierzbicki’s man-
ner of protest that upset Carriveaux at the meeting but rather the
substance of it, the very fact that it was made.
The next issue to be resolved is whether the aforesaid con-
duct by Wierzbicki found to have motivated his discharge is
concerted, or individual activity as is argued by the Respon-
dent.
The Respondent argues as follows:

It is urged that the Board’s long stated principle as ar-
ticulated in Kotzin Co., 271 NLRB No. 196, [1200], 117
LRRM 1099 (1984), applies to this case. The Kotzin case
was one of the first to apply the Board’s new test in de-
termining whether given conduct was protected concerted
activity. The new test, which overruled Alleluia Cushion
Co., 221 NLRB 999, 91 LRRM 1131 (1975), was adopted
in Meyers Industries, 268 NLRB 493 (1984), 115 LRRM
1025 (1984). The new test was and continues to be:

The activities of a single employee will not be found to
be “concerted” within the meaning of the Act unless they
are engaged in with or on the authority of other employees
and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.
(Emphasis added.)

The Alleluia standard calls for a more liberal definition
of concerted activity. The Board considered employee
conduct to be concerted if it involved an issue of common
concern to other employees. This test of “implied con-
sent” of fellow employees was rejected by the Board in
1984 in the Meyers Industries case. Under the Meyers
standard, the employee must be acting on the authority of
other employees in order for the conduct to be concerted.
In short, it is no longer sufficient for the General Counsel
to simply set out the subject matter that is of alleged con-
cern to a group of employees. General Counsel in the case
herein produced no evidence that Wierzbicki was acting
CKS TOOL & ENGINEERING, INC. OF BAD AXE 1585
with the authority of other employees on September 11
and 12, 1997.
The facts found here, however, disclose that Wierzbicki par-
ticipated in and was at least exposed to joint employee, pre-
meeting discussion during which a common consensus was
reached of resentment toward the Respondent’s blame for loss
of profitability on the quality and quantity of production work-
ers’ efforts and its demand for increased productivity and re-
duction of scrap. Wierzbicki uttered this protest at the meeting
as a protest on behalf of his coworkers and phrased it as such.
Even had he not engaged in the premeeting discussions, clearly
his protest, as phrased, constituted an appeal to the audience of
coworkers to support the protest and, as such, constituted a first
step toward concerted activities for the employees’ mutual
benefit.
The counsel for the Acting General Counsel appropriately
argues:

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, herein
the Act, gives employees the right “. . . to engage in self
organization, . . . and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection.” The Board has repeatedly held that
“the guarantees of section 7 of the Act extend to concerted
activity which in its inception involves only a speaker and
a listener, for such activity is an indispensable preliminary
step to employee self organization.” Whittaker Corp., 289
NLRB 933 (1988), citing Meyers Industries, 268 NLRB
493, 494 (1984) (Meyers I) remanded under the sub. nom.
Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied
474 U.S. 948 (1985), reaffd. 281 NLRB 882 (1986)
(Meyers II), enfd. [affd.] sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d
1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 128 LRRM 2664
(1988); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407
F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969). In Whittaker, the Board
also held that “in a group meeting context, a concerted ob-
jective may be inferred from the circumstances.” Supra, at
934.

The Whittaker decision is aptly cited as a case also involving
an employee meeting at which the employer’s announcement of
a suspension of an annual wage increase was protested by an
employee who, it was found, was unlawfully terminated for that
concerted protected activity.
Also cited by the counsel for the Acting General Counsel in
agreement is Imaging and Sensing Technology Corp., 302
NLRB 531 (1991), which involved similar circumstances. The
Board in Whittaker cited another factually similar case involv-
ing an employee who protested a demand for increased produc-
tivity at a group meeting and in consequence was discharged
unlawfully. Enterprise Products, 264 NLRB 946 (1982). The
administrative law judge whose decision was adopted by the
Board stated as follows in Grimmway Enterprises, 315 NLRB
1276, 1279 (1995):

There is, of course, no question that raising questions
of common concern at meetings with company officials is
usually a concerted act, particularly when the first person
plural is used by the employee. See Colders Furniture,
292 NLRB 941 (1989), enfd. 907 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1990).
That is true even where the employee has not actually
been appointed the group spokesman. The Board will
usually regard that step as an essential preliminary to the
inducement of group action. See Whittaker Corp., 289
NLRB 933 (1988). Whittaker, like Colders Furniture, is
also a first person plural case where the employee spoke
up at company meeting. See also Autumn Manor, 268
NLRB 239, 244 (1983). Those cases protect what might
otherwise be regarded as ambiguous conduct by the em-
ployee.
I conclude that Wierzbicki was discharged for what consti-
tuted concerted activity, which would be protected by the Act
unless that protection was forfeited because of misconduct
during the course of that activity.

In Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814 (1979), the Board
stated:

. . .the Board and the courts have recognized . . . that even
an employee who is engaged in concerted protected activ-
ity can by opprobrious conduct, lose the protection of the
Act.

The decision as to whether the employee has crossed
the line depends on several factors: (1) the place of the
discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the
nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the
outburst was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s un-
fair labor practice. [Footnote omitted.]

And in NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584, 587
(7th Cir. 1965), the court stated:

As other cases have made clear, flagrant conduct of an
employee, even though occurring during the course of
Section 7 activity, may justify disciplinary action against
the employer. On the other hand, not every impropriety
committed during such activity places the employees be-
yond the protective shield of the Act. The employee’s
right to engage in concerted activity may permit some
leeway for impulsive behavior, which must be balanced
against the employer’s right to maintain order and respect.
N.L.R.B. v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811 (7th Cir.
1946). Initially, the responsibility to draw the line be-
tween these conflicting rights rests with the Board, and its
determination, unless illogical or arbitrary, ought not to be
disturbed.

In Consumers Power Co., 282 NLRB 130, 132 (1986), the
Board observed:

. . . where an employee is discharged for conduct that
is part of the res gestae of protected activities, the relevant
question is whether the conduct is so egregious as to take
it outside the protection of the Act, or of such character as
to render the employee unfit for service.

In Health Care & Retirement Corp., 306 NLRB 63, 65
(1992), citing, inter alia, Consumer, supra, the Board summa-
rized the state of applicable laws as follows:

The Board has long held that in the context of protected con-
certed activity by employees, a certain degree of leeway is al-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1586
lowed in terms of the manner in which they conduct them-
selves. The Board and courts have found, nonetheless, that an
employee’s flagrant, opprobrious conduct, even though occur-
ring during the course of Section 7 action, may sometimes
lose the protection of the Act and justify disciplinary action on
the part of an employer. Not every impropriety, however,
places the employee beyond the protection of the Act. For
example, the Board and the courts have found foul language
or epithets directed to a member of management insufficient
to require forfeiting employee protection under Section 7.

Finally, protection is not denied to an employee regardless of
the inaccuracy or lack of merit of the employee’s statements
absent deliberate falsity or maliciousness, even where the accu-
satory language used is stinging and harsh. Delta Health Cen-
ter, Inc., 310 NLRB 26 (1993).
In this case, the Respondent’s position that Wierzbicki lost
the protection of the Act, because he engaged in demeaning,
disruptive, disrespectful conduct toward the plant manager in
full view of other employees, is undermined by the testimony
of Carriveaux. That shifting testimony revealed that Car-
riveaux felt constrained to contrive false allegations of post-
meeting insubordination because he himself believed that
Wierzbicki’s conduct at the meeting was insufficient to warrant
discharge. Thus, he rejected the Respondent’s counsel’s lead-
ing examination when he characterized that conduct as merely
“technically insubordinate.” Even that acquiescence with the
leading question was reluctant. In the course of his shifting
testimony, Carriveaux revealed that he did not view the Sep-
tember 11 confrontation as serious enough to render Wierzbicki
unfit for further service, as he supposedly would have contin-
ued to employ him had it not been for postmeeting insubordina-
tion, which in fact did not occur.
I conclude that in the circumstances of this case, Wierz-
bicki’s disrespectful conduct was not so egregious as to take
him outside the protection of the Act.
I find that Wierzbicki’s protected activity was the sole moti-
vation for the discharge and that the proffered reasons of insub-
ordination were pretextuous. I therefore necessarily conclude
that the Respondent did not meet its burden of proving that it
would have discharged Wierzbicki in any event, regardless of
the unlawful motivation factor. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083
(1980).
I, therefore, find that by the discharge of its employee,
Randy Wierzbicki, on September 12, 1997, the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in the complaint
and engaged in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in an unfair labor
practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I recommend
that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of
the Act. Having found that the Respondent unlawfully dis-
charged Randy Wierzbicki, I recommend that it be ordered to
offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his former posi-
tion or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially
equivalent position without prejudice to his seniority or any
other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and to make him
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits computed on a
quarterly basis from the date of discharge to the date of proper
offer of reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as pre-
scribed in F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus
interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended1
ORDER
The Respondent, CKS Tool & Engineering, Bad Axe,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging employees because of their concerted activi-
ties protected by the National Labor Relations Board.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Randy
Wierzbicki full reinstatement to his former position or, if that
position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position,
without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimi-
nation against him, in the manner set forth in the remedy sec-
tion of this decision.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful discharge of Randy
Wierzbicki, and within 3 days thereafter notify him in writing
that this has been done and that the discharge will not be used
against him in any way.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Bad Axe, Michigan facility, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”2 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 13, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent immediately on receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceed-
ings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to

1 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
2 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
CKS TOOL & ENGINEERING, INC. OF BAD AXE 1587
all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since September 12, 1997.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 17, 1998
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

WE WILL NOT discharge employees because of their con-
certed activities protected by the National Labor Relations
Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
Randy Wierzbicki full reinstatement to his former position or,
if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the dis-
crimination against him, in the manner set forth in the Remedy
section of this Decision.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, re-
move from our files any reference to the unlawful discharge of
Randy Wierzbicki, and within 3 days thereafter notify him in
writing that this has been done and that the discharge will not
be used against him in any way.
CKS TOOL & ENGINEERING, INC. OF BAD AXE