Cintas Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 30, 2009

353 N.L.R.B. 752 (N.L.R.B. 2009)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
353 NLRB No. 81
752
Cintas Corporation and UNITE HERE. Cases 4–CA–
34160, 4–CA–34161, and 4–CA–34345
January 30, 2009
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBER SCHAUMBER
On September 20, 2006, Administrative Law Judge Ira
Sandron issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel and Charging Party filed answering briefs, and
the Respondent filed a reply. The General Counsel filed
cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respon-
dent filed an answering brief. The Charging Party also
filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, the Re-
spondent filed an answering brief, and the Charging
Party filed a reply.
The National Labor Relations Board1 has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
briefs2 and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings,3
findings,4 and conclusions, as modified, and to adopt the
recommended Order as modified and set forth in full
below.

1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Chairman Liebman and Member Schaumber constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue
decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.
See Sec. 3(b) of the Act.
2 The Respondent filed a request for oral argument as well as a mo-
tion to supplement the record. The General Counsel and the Charging
Party filed oppositions to the motion to supplement. In addition, the
Charging Party filed a motion to strike from the Respondent’s reply
brief any references to the Respondent’s motion to supplement. The
Respondent filed an opposition to the Charging Party’s motion to
strike. As stated in fn. 3 below, we affirm the judge’s ruling that evi-
dence of the Charging Party’s nationwide organizing campaign is not
relevant to the issues in this case. As the Respondent’s motion to sup-
plement and its request for oral argument pertain only to the nationwide
campaign, we deny both the motion and the request.
In addition, the Respondent filed a citation of supplemental authority
to Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007). The General Counsel filed
a response opposing that filing. We have accepted the Respondent’s
submission pursuant to Reliant Energy, 339 NLRB 66 (2003).
3 For the reasons discussed by the judge, we affirm his ruling to ex-
clude evidence of the Union’s nationwide, multiyear campaign against
the Respondent. In doing so, we find it unnecessary to rely on the
judge’s observations regarding the burden that would be imposed by
expanded litigation.
4 The Respondent and the Charging Party have excepted to some of
the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not
to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless
the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that
they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950),
enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully reviewed the
record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
The Respondent operates numerous facilities through-
out the United States and Canada in providing corporate-
identity uniforms and related services to its customers.
This case involves allegations of unfair labor practices at
facilities in Charlotte, North Carolina, and Branford,
Connecticut. The judge found that the Respondent
committed several violations of the Act, all but one of
which occurred at the Charlotte facility.5 For the reasons
discussed by the judge, we adopt his findings that the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) by issuing warnings
to Charlotte facility employees Candy Galdamez, Ana
Callas, Raquel Cruz, Rosa Cruz, and Emelinda Rivera
for wearing union stickers and/or hats.6 We also adopt
his findings that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
by telling Galdamez not to display a union hat in her
work area and impliedly threatening to discharge her if
she again wore a union hat or a union sticker.
Contrary to the Respondent, Register Guard, supra,
which issued after the judge’s decision, does not require
a different result with respect to the findings of unlawful
disparate treatment. The Respondent clearly discrimi-
nated against protected activity in its actions regarding
the wearing of union stickers and hats. It allowed em-
ployees to wear nonunion adornments to their uniforms
while prohibiting only union-related adornments; thus, its
restriction on the use of uniforms to display adornments
was not “nondiscriminatory,” as required under Register
Guard. Id. at 1114. With regard to hats, the Respondent
permitted some employees to wear head scarves and it
simply asked employees to remove noncompany hats
other than prounion hats, without disciplinary conse-
quences. Further, the Respondent permitted employees
to keep numerous personal belongings in their work ar-
eas. In contrast, the Respondent verbally warned Gal-
damez for wearing a union hat and for placing it in her
work area, and it later impliedly threatened to discharge

5 No exceptions were filed to the judge’s findings that the Respon-
dent did not violate the Act: (1) by actions in connection with handbill-
ing that occurred at its Charlotte facility on the morning of January 13,
2003; (2) when Charlotte General Manager Robbie Poole met with
employee Ana Callas on January 30, 2004; (3) by Charlotte Production
Supervisor Steven Coleridge’s February 20, 2004 statement to em-
ployee Raquel Cruz regarding a union flyer; (4) by soliciting Branford
employees to sign a June 15, 2005 letter to the Connecticut Department
of Environment Protection (DEP); and (5) by the circulation of a July
2005 Branford employee letter to the DEP.
6 We reject the Respondent’s argument that Sec. 10(b) of the Act
barred allegations based on the warnings to Callas, the Cruzes, and
Rivera. The warnings are encompassed by a timely-filed charge alleg-
ing the specific conduct and naming Galdamez. Further, the judge
granted the General Counsel’s motion at hearing to amend the com-
plaint to identify the three additional employees prior to litigation of
this issue. The Respondent raised the same defense with respect to all.
There is no basis for finding that the Respondent was prejudiced by the
judge’s ruling.
CINTAS CORPORATION 753
her if she wore the hat again. Consequently, the Respon-
dent engaged in “disparate treatment of activities or
communications of a similar character because of their
union or other Section 7-protected status.” Id. at 1118.7
We affirm the judge’s finding that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by directing Rosa Cruz to
put a union flier inside her wallet or pocketbook, take it
home, and not show it to anybody. The Respondent
claims that Cruz violated a no-distribution policy by giv-
ing the flyer to another employee at her workstation dur-
ing working time, but there is no evidence that Coleridge
told Cruz that she had violated such a policy or that she
would have reasonably understood that Coleridge was
invoking the policy. In any event, the direction to Cruz
to conceal the flier and to take it home was an overbroad
and disparate prohibition of the possession and display of
union literature anywhere on the Respondent’s premises.
We also affirm the judge’s finding that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by confiscating union fliers in
the Charlotte facility employee break room. We agree
with the judge that the Respondent did not effectively
repudiate its unlawful confiscation, but we find it unnec-
essary to pass on the judge’s statement that the Respon-
dent failed to state that it would not interfere with em-
ployees’ Section 7 rights in the future.8
Contrary to the judge, we find that the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 4 erred when setting aside a settlement
agreement with respect to an allegation that on January
13, 2003, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by calling the Charlotte police. This allegation was
one of many in charges filed by the Union against the
Respondent in numerous regional offices during 2003.
The General Counsel appointed the Regional Director for
Region 4 to coordinate the handling of all charges filed
by the Union against the Respondent. On January 7,
2004, the Respondent signed a settlement agreement spe-

7 We do not rely on the judge’s statement that the Respondent could
rely on “special circumstances” to justify directing Galdamez to re-
move her hat. The facial legality of a policy against the wearing of
noncompany hats and the direction that Galdamez remove her hat were
not at issue. The General Counsel only alleges disparate treatment of
employees for wearing union hats and keeping them at their work-
station. We also find no need to address the General Counsel’s argu-
ment that the Respondent failed to demonstrate “special circumstances”
to justify a policy prohibiting the wearing of union insignia on em-
ployee uniforms. The finding of an additional violation would be cu-
mulative and would not materially affect the remedy for the Respon-
dent’s unlawful disparate treatment of employees wearing union insig-
nia.
8 While not necessarily agreeing with all of the factors required for
an effective repudiation under Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237
NLRB 138 (1978), Member Schaumber agrees that the Respondent
failed to effectively repudiate this violation because the scope of the
repudiation was not coextensive with the scope of the violation. See,
e.g., Chinese Daily News, 346 NLRB 906, 906 fn. 4 (2006).
cifically covering, inter alia, the allegation that it unlaw-
fully summoned police to its Charlotte facility. On Janu-
ary 20, the Regional Director for Region 4 approved the
settlement agreement, but the Union declined to sign.
Accordingly, the Union preserved the right to appeal the
agreement to the General Counsel.
On March 2, 2004, the Union filed new unfair labor
practice charges about events at the Charlotte facility
with Board Region 11. On March 26, this Regional Of-
fice sent a letter to the Respondent discussing the new
allegations. Meanwhile, the Union’s appeal period for
seeking review of the settlement agreement ended on
March 31. On April 5, while investigation into the new
Charlotte facility charge was ongoing, the Regional Di-
rector for Region 4 directed the Respondent to comply
with the settlement agreement. The Respondent then did
so by posting a notice to Charlotte facility employees
that specifically stated, among other things, that it would
not summon police to remove union organizers engaged
in protected leafleting outside the Respondent’s property.
Subsequently, however, the Regional Director for Re-
gion 4 set aside the settlement agreement on the ground
that the allegations at issue in the March 2 charge in-
volved “postsettlement” violations that were sufficiently
serious to so warrant. The judge found that the Regional
Director acted properly in this regard. For the following
reasons, we disagree.
A settlement agreement may be set aside, and unfair
labor practices found based on presettlement conduct, if,
as relevant here, “postsettlement” unfair labor practices
are committed. See, e.g., Scripps Memorial Hospital
Encinitas, 347 NLRB 52, 53 (2006). The question here
is whether the conduct at issue in the new March 2
charge is properly characterized as postsettlement. Con-
sistent with precedent, we find that the conduct was,
rather, presettlement.
In Ventura Coastal Corp., 264 NLRB 291 (1982), the
Board adopted a judge’s finding that certain activity was
“presettlement” conduct disposed of by a settlement
agreement, even though the conduct was brought to the
Region’s attention after the settlement agreement had
been approved and the period for filing an appeal had
passed. Id. at 298. After the Regional Director approved
the settlement agreement, the appeal period passed, and
the Region transmitted notices for the respondent to post,
the charging party wrote a letter to the Region and com-
plained about certain aspects of the respondent’s compli-
ance, including the failure to post notices in Spanish. Id.
The charging party also stated that it would shortly be
filing additional unfair labor practice charges, which it
later did. Id. Despite this information, the Regional Di-
rector sent bilingual notices to the respondent, and the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD754
respondent complied by posting them. Id. The Board
affirmed the judge’s finding that “before any ‘fail-safe’
point had been reached in the settlement process,” the
Regional Director had an actual indication from the
charging party that additional charges would be filed,
and there was “no reason why the Regional Director
could not have withdrawn his approval of the settlement
at that point.” Id. Accord: Leeward Nursing Home, 278
NLRB 1058, 1085 (1986) (settlement was approved Oc-
tober 28, charge was filed on November 4, and as it was
“unlikely that [r]espondent had taken any substantial
action in compliance with the settlement by that Novem-
ber 4 date, . . . the settlement process had not passed any
‘fail-safe’ point as of November 4, . . . and there appears
to be no reason why the Regional Director could not
have withdrawn his approval of the settlement at this
point, pending investigation” into the new charges).
In the present case, as in Ventura Coastal Corp. and
Leeward Nursing Home, the settlement process had not
reached any “fail-safe” point by April 5, 2004, after expi-
ration of the Union’s appeal period, when the Respon-
dent was directed to take the necessary steps to comply.
By that time, the General Counsel’s agents were already
investigating the new unfair labor practice allegations
that the Regional Director later relied on to set aside the
settlement agreement. If the Regional Director believed
that the new allegations might warrant such action, the
Regional Director could have withdrawn approval of the
settlement at that point, pending further investigation of
the new allegations. Instead, the Regional Director di-
rected the Respondent to comply with the settlement
agreement and set aside the agreement only after the Re-
spondent had fully complied with it.
For these reasons, we find that the Regional Director
erred by setting aside the settlement agreement. Accord-
ingly, we reverse the judge and dismiss the complaint
allegation that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
by summoning police to the Charlotte facility in response
to leafleting on January 13, 2003.
As part of the Union’s campaign at the Respondent’s
Branford facility, the Union solicited employees to sign
letters that it sent to Terminix and TruGreen, two of the
Respondent’s major customers, contending that the Re-
spondent was not providing proper training and informa-
tion about toxic materials. In late July 2005, Branford
Plant Manager Eric Pepe called employee Berta Campos
to his office. Speaking through an interpreter, Pepe
asked Campos whether her purported signature on one
letter to Terminix and Trugreen was authentic. Pepe had
received information that signatures on this letter were
forged. Although Campos signed other such letters, she
replied that her signature on this particular letter ap-
peared to have been forged. Either at the same meeting
or shortly thereafter, Pepe asked Campos to sign an affi-
davit summarizing what she had told him, and she did so.
In relevant part, the affidavit stated that Campos had
“never sent any letter like [the purportedly forged letter]
to any customer of Cintas.” As the meeting ended, Pepe
told Campos to “be careful, that her signature [was] be-
ing used on documents without her authorization.”
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) by interrogating Campos about the genuineness
of her signature on a union-initiated document relating to
employees’ health and safety. However, he concluded
that Pepe did not unlawfully interrogate her about her
union activity “per se” or solicit her to sign a letter dis-
puting union claims or to renounce information requests.
The Respondent contends that Pepe focused exclu-
sively on the forgery of Campos’ signature on a single
letter, which Campos admitted she did not sign, and even
if this letter constituted protected concerted activity,
Campos herself did not engage in that activity. Accord-
ingly, the Respondent argues, nothing that transpired
between Pepe and Campos could have reasonably tended
to interfere with her statutory rights. For its part, the
Union excepts to the judge’s failure to find that Pepe’s
request that Campos sign the affidavit was unlawful.
We need not pass on whether Pepe’s inquiry about the
authenticity of Campos’ signature on the particular letter
they discussed constituted unlawful interrogation.9 The
affidavit thereafter proffered to Campos was not limited
to a declaration that she did not sign this letter. Instead,
it stated that Campos had not signed any letter to any
customer of the Respondent. The broad language of the
affidavit therefore constituted interrogation into whether
Campos had participated in any other concerted letter
writing activity, including protected activity, in support
of the Union’s campaign. See, e.g., Gaetano & Associ-
ates, 344 NLRB 531, 540 (2005), enfd. mem. 183
Fed.Appx. 17 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (em-
ployer solicitation to sign document stating that they
were not union members constituted unlawful interroga-
tion because it tended to force employees to declare
whether or not they were sympathetic to a union). Cam-
pos testified that she had signed other letters, but even if
she had not, the Respondent’s request that she sign the
affidavit would reasonably be interpreted as an attempt to
elicit information about her union sympathies and pro-
tected activity beyond the scope of her forged signature
on one letter. Accordingly, we reverse the judge and find

9 We also need not pass on the whether Pepe’s statement to “be care-
ful” was an unlawful threat, as such a finding would be cumulative of
other threats found in this case and would not materially affect the
remedy.
CINTAS CORPORATION 755
that the Respondent thereby engaged in an unlawful in-
terrogation in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative Law Judge as
modified and set forth in full below and orders that the
Respondent, Cintas Corporation, Cincinnati, Ohio, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interrogating employees regarding their protected
activities.
(b) Issuing written or verbal warnings to employees
because they have demonstrated support for the Union.
(c) Implying to employees that they will be discharged
if they demonstrate support for the Union.
(d) Confiscating union flyers from employees on non-
worktime in a nonwork area and telling them they cannot
read such flyers there.
(e) Engaging in discriminatory disparate treatment by
telling employees that they cannot have union flyers in
their work areas and must take them home.
(f) Engaging in discriminatory disparate treatment by
telling employees they cannot display union hats in their
work areas.
(g) Engaging in discriminatory disparate treatment by
telling employees they must remove union stickers from
the shirts of their uniforms.
(h) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days of the Board’s Order, remove from
its files any references to the February 16, 2004 verbal
warning and the March 1, 2004 written warning issued to
Candy Galdamez; and the March 1, 2004 verbal warn-
ings issued to Ana Callas, Maria Raquel Cruz, Rosa
Cruz, and Emelinda Rodriguez, and within 3 days there-
after, notify them in writing that this has been done and
that the warnings will not be used in any way against
them.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A,” in
English and Spanish, at its Charlotte, North Carolina
facility, and post copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix B,” in English and Spanish, at its Branford,
Connecticut facility.10 Copies of the notices, on forms

10 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
provided by the Regional Director for Region 4 after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respon-
dent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during
the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facilities involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notices to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent any time since February 9, 2004.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 4 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT issue you verbal or written warnings be-
cause you have demonstrated support for UNITE HERE
(the Union).
WE WILL NOT imply to you that you will be discharged
for demonstrating your support for the Union.
WE WILL NOT confiscate union flyers from you on your
nonwork time in a nonwork area and tell you not to read
such flyers there.
WE WILL NOT engage in discriminatory disparate treat-
ment by telling you not to have union flyers in your work
area and that you must take them home.
WE WILL NOT engage in discriminatory disparate treat-
ment by telling you not to display union hats in your
work area.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD756
WE WILL NOT tell you to remove union stickers from
the shirt of your uniform.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL within 14 days of the Board’s Order, remove
from our files any references to the February 16, 2004
verbal warning and the March 1, 2004 written warning
issued to Candy Galdamez; and the March 1, 2004 verbal
warnings issued to Ana Callas, Maria Raquel Cruz, Rosa
Cruz, and Emelinda Rodriguez, and within 3 days there-
after, notify them in writing that this has been done and
that the warnings will not be used in any way against
them.
CINTAS CORPORATION
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate you concerning your pro-
tected activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
CINTAS CORPORATION
Terri A. Craig, Rosetta B. Lane, and Lisa Shearin, Esqs., for
the General Counsel.
Joel H. Kaplan, Brian M. Stolzenbach, and Armanda Sonne-
born, Esqs. (Seyfarth Shaw LLP), of Chicago, Illinois, for
the Respondent.
Judiann Chartier and Brent Garren, Esqs., of New York, New
York, for the Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IRA SANDRON, Administrative Law Judge. The amended con-
solidated complaint1 stems from unfair labor practice (ULP)
charges filed by UNITE HERE (the Union) against Cintas Cor-
poration (Respondent or the Company) for conduct that oc-
curred at its Branford, Connecticut (Branford) and Charlotte,
North Carolina (Charlotte) facilities. Violations of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)
are alleged.
Pursuant to notice, I conducted a trial in Hartford, Connecti-
cut, on March 13–15, 2006, and at Concord, North Carolina, on
March 27–31, and May 1–3, 2006, at which the parties had full
opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, and to introduce evidence.2
The General Counsel, the Union, and Respondent filed help-
ful posthearing briefs that I have duly considered. Respondent
filed a motion to strike certain statements from the Union’s
posthearing brief, to which the Union filed a response and a
motion to strike certain statements from Respondent’s posthear-
ing brief. Respondent, in turn, filed a response in opposition to
the Union’s motion to strike. They are received as Respon-
dent’s Exhibit 51, Union’s Exhibits 11(a) and (b), and Respon-
dent’s Exhibit 52, respectively.
Respondent contends that certain statements in the Union’s
brief misrepresent the facts. However, such statements are in
the nature of legal argument as to the conclusions to be drawn
from certain facts of record, and striking legal argument serves
no purpose.
Respondent also contends that that the last sentence of the
first paragraph on page 6 of the Union’s posthearing brief
should be stricken as a misstatement of fact. The Union con-
cedes this was an error and does not oppose striking that sen-
tence. I therefore grant Respondent’s motion to strike it.
Respondent further asserts that the Union’s references in its
brief to Union’s Exhibit 6(b) should be stricken because that
document was only marked for identification and never offered
or admitted in evidence. The Union calls this another error and,
again, does not oppose striking such references. Accordingly, I
also grant this part of Respondent’s motion.
Respondent’s response to the Union’s motion to strike does
not address the Union’s argument that references in Respon-
dent’s brief to rejected exhibits (R. Exhs. 20–22) should be
stricken. It does defend references in its brief to a website arti-
cle concerning a defamation suit brought by an unrelated com-
pany against the Union. I grant the Union’s motion to strike
references to both rejected exhibits and the defamation suit. In
sum, only documents of record are appropriately cited in
posthearing briefs to the trial judge. See Section 102.45(b) of
the Board’s Rules; King Soopers, Inc., 344 NLRB 842 fn. 1
(2005).

1 GC Exh. 1(www), filed after the close of hearing. Respondent’s
answer is received in evidence as GC Exh. 1(xxx).
2 Respondent filed a motion to correct the transcript, dated August 3,
2006, which is received in evidence as R. Exh. 50. The Union’s re-
sponse, dated August 8, 2006, is received in evidence as U. Exh. 10. To
the extent that Respondent’s motion is unopposed, it is granted. On the
few proposed corrections to which the Union objects, I am unable to
recall exactly what was said on the record and therefore cannot resolve
the disagreement.
CINTAS CORPORATION 757
Issues
Since about January 2003, the Union has been engaged in an
ongoing organizing campaign to represent Respondent’s em-
ployees at numerous locations. Respondent argued from the
outset of this proceeding that the Union’s activity on a nation-
wide basis has been unprotected and that it filed ULPs for har-
assment and other illegitimate purposes, therefore rendering
unprotected the union activities of particular employees at
Branford and Charlotte. Accordingly, Respondent urged, I
should expand the scope of inquiry at trial beyond the specific
allegations to include evidence of the Union’s conduct and
motives throughout it’s over 3-year organizing drive.
On the contrary, I deemed it appropriate to limit the scope of
the issues litigated to the events specified in the complaint.3 As
I stated on the record, the question of whether particular em-
ployees’ activities were protected must be determined from
their activities and motives, not what the Union intended and
did at the national level. To have imputed the latter to the em-
ployees, in the absence of evidence of specific knowledge,
would have perverted common law principles of agency and
run contrary to the purposes of the Act. Respondent provided
no evidence or offers of proof that any of the employees who
were the subjects of alleged ULPs at either Branford or Char-
lotte were privy to the Union’s nationwide strategies.
Aside from the nexus issue, accepting Respondent’s conten-
tion would have required an analysis of hundreds of ULP
charges the Union has filed, many of which have been settled.4
Meaningfully evaluating them in an effort to decide the Union’s
motives would have been an impossible undertaking. More-
over, the result would have been a trial lasting for an indeter-
minate number of months that would have imposed a crushing
burden on the other parties, as well as on the Agency’s hearing
process.
The specific issues before me are as follows:
Branford—20055
1. Did Daniel Bonelli, general manager, or Eric Pepe, plant
manager, coerce employees by soliciting them at a group meet-
ing in mid-June to sign a letter against the Union’s position
opposing Respondent’s water discharge permit application?
Did that letter constitute a threat of plant relocation because of
the Union’s/employees’ actions in opposition to the permit?
2. Did Respondent, prior to July 26, assist employee Mi-
lagros Rupert in preparing a letter against the Union’s position
on the permit and in soliciting employees to sign it? If so, did
Respondent thereby threaten to relocate the plant because of the
Union’s/employees’ actions opposing the application?
3. Did Pepe, in about late July (a) interrogate Berta Campos
concerning her union activities; (b) solicit her to sign a letter

3 The Board, on July 11, 2006, denied Respondent’s request for spe-
cial permission to appeal my rulings, without prejudice to its right to
renew its contentions in any exceptions it might file to my decision.
4 The Union has filed approximately 140 charges nationwide, of
which at least 60 have been settled.
5 All dates hereinafter for Branford occurred in 2005, unless other-
wise indicated. The stated allegations and dates are based on my
evaluation of the evidence, not necessarily what is in the complaint.
The same holds true for the Charlotte allegations.
prepared by Respondent disputing union claims; (c) ask her to
sign a letter renouncing her demand for material safety data
sheets (MSDS) from Respondent’s customers; and (d) warn her
to “be careful” about engaging in union activities?
Charlotte
2003 Allegations
1. On the morning of January 13, 2003, when nonemployee
union organizers were attempting to distribute union leaflets to
Respondent’s employees, did Respondent’s agents engage in
unlawful surveillance or otherwise interfere with employees’
interactions with those organizers?
2. That afternoon, did Stephen Coleridge, production super-
visor, summon the police to interfere with organizers who were
attempting to distribute union leaflets to employees?
3. Was the informal settlement agreement (SA) reached in
Case 11–CA–19841, approved on January 20, 2004, properly
set aside with regard to settlement of the above allegations
because of Respondent’s further violations of the Act at Char-
lotte in 2004?
2004 Allegations
1. Relating to dress code policy
1. Did Coleridge, on about February 9 (a) announce to
Maria Raquel Cruz a/k/a Raquel Cruz (Cruz) a policy prohibit-
ing employees from wearing union buttons, stickers, or pins on
the shirts of their uniforms; and (b) require her to remove a
union sticker from her shirt?
2. Did Coleridge, on February 16 (a) advise Candy Gal-
damez of a policy prohibiting employees from wearing any-
thing in addition to Respondent’s standard uniform; (b) tell her
she could not wear a union hat inside the facility, including at
her workstation; (c) tell her to remove the hat; and (d) issue her
a verbal warning for wearing it?
3. Did Coleridge, on March 1 (a) announce to Galdamez and
Ana Callas a policy prohibiting employees from wearing union
stickers on their uniforms; and (b) require them and Cruz to
remove union stickers from the shirts of their uniforms?
4. Did Mark Stoy, plant manager, on March 1, implicitly
threaten Galdamez with discharge if she again wore a union hat
or a union sticker?
5. Did Respondent, on March 1, issue verbal warnings to
Callas, Cruz, Rosa Cruz, and Emelinda Rivera because they
wore union stickers? On the same day, did Respondent issue
Galdamez a written warning for the same reason?
2. Relating to solicitation and distribution
1. Did Coleridge, on about February 10, prohibit Cruz from
showing a union leaflet to other employees?
2. Did Coleridge, on about February 20, when employees
were in the break room (a) announce a policy prohibiting them
from distributing or possessing union leaflets during nonwork-
time in nonwork areas; and (b) enforce the policy by confiscat-
ing union flyers from them?
3. The 8(a)(1) statements
1. Did Robbie Poole, general manager, on January 30 (a) in-
terrogate Callas concerning her union activity; (b) inform her
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD758
that Respondent had a rule prohibiting such activity; and (c)
warn her not to violate the rule?
2. Did Poole, at a group meeting on February 19 (a) threaten
employees that Respondent would close the facility, that the
employees would lose their jobs, and that other employers
would not hire them if they selected the Union as their collec-
tive-bargaining representative; and (b) tell employees that their
selecting the Union as their collective-bargaining representative
would be futile because Respondent would never allow the
Union to represent them?
3. Did Stoy, on about February 23 (a) instruct Cruz not to
speak at its meetings with employees concerning information
she received about the Union; and (b) solicit her to report such
information to him privately?
Facts
Based on the entire record, including the pleadings, testi-
mony of witnesses, and my observations of their demeanor,
documents, and stipulations of the parties, I find the facts as
follows.
Regarding credibility, I have found the testimony of many
witnesses reliable on some points but not on others. The Board
has stated that witnesses may be found partially credible be-
cause the mere fact that a witness is discredited in one instance
does not automatically mean that the witness must be discred-
ited in all respects. Golden Hours Convalescent Hospitals, 182
NLRB 796, 799 (1970). Rather, it is appropriate to weigh the
witness’ testimony for consistency throughout with the evi-
dence as a whole. Id. at 798–799; see also MEMC Electronic
Materials, 342 NLRB 1172, 1200 fn. 13 (2004), quoting
Americare Pine Lodge Nursing, 325 NLRB 98 fn. 1 (1997)
(noting that when examining testimony, a trier of fact is not
required “to accept the entirety of a witness’ testimony, but
may believe some and not all of what a witness says”); Excel
Container, 325 NLRB 17 fn. 1 (1997) (stating that it is quite
common in all kinds of judicial decisions to believe some, and
not all, of a witness’ testimony). When there was conflicting
testimony and an absence of definitive extrinsic evidence, my
credibility resolutions sometimes turned on a determination of
which witness’ version of events seemed more plausible.
Respondent, a Washington corporation, headquartered in
Cincinnati, Ohio, operates numerous facilities throughout the
United States and Canada and is engaged in providing corpo-
rate identity uniforms and related services. Since about January
2003, the Union has been engaged in an ongoing nationwide
organizing campaign seeking to represent Respondent’s em-
ployees. Respondent’s counsel stipulated to Respondent’s ani-
mus during the timeframe relevant to the allegations in the
complaint.6
The majorities of employees at both Branford and Charlotte
are of Hispanic origin and have Spanish as their primary lan-
guage. Respondent uses the term “partner” for an employee.
Facts—Branford
At its Branford facility, Respondent employs approximately

6 Tr. 12 (Charlotte). Hereinafter, transcript references for the Bran-
ford portions of the decision refer to the Branford transcripts; for the
Charlotte portions, the Charlotte transcripts.
80 production workers, who clean uniforms that Respondent
rents to customers. Two such employees testified: Berta Cam-
pos, for the General Counsel; Milagros Rupert, for Respondent.
Plant Manager Pepe and Brian Cardozo, a supervisor, were also
witnesses.
On April 22, 2004, Respondent signed a settlement agree-
ment encompassing the following conduct at Branford: engag-
ing in unlawful surveillance of union organizers, soliciting
employees to revoke their union authorization cards, congratu-
lating those who circulated antiunion petitions in the presence
of other employees who refused to sign them, interrogating
employees concerning their union sympathies, threatening em-
ployees with discharge if they discussed their work evaluations
with other employees, and discharging employees because they
supported the Union.7 The General Counsel has not contended
that Respondent violated the terms of this agreement, which
was never revoked, and no underlying facts were presented as
background evidence here.
1. Respondent’s water permit application
Many of the Branford allegations stem from Respondent’s
application to the Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) for a permit to expand its water discharge
capacity at this facility.
A number of organizations, labor or environmental, ex-
pressed positions opposing the permit. The Union was one of
them, voicing objections by letter dated March 3, to DEP.8 Its
thrust was environmental, as would logically be expected when
addressing an environmental agency, but there also were re-
peated references to Cintas employees. For example, on page 1:
“[W]e believe the draft permit still fails to adequately address
spill prevention and control, training of workers and supervi-
sors on pre-treatment requirements and the handling of shop
rags;” and, on page 5: “The training should include methods of
protecting the environment as well as protection of em-
ployee[sic], who are the first line of defense for the environ-
ment and the community.”
In its March notice of intervention,9 the Union continued to
address matters pertaining to Cintas employees; on page 2: “It
is demonstrable that in-plant safety and health concerns are
intimately related to a laundry’s environmental impacts . . . ;”
and on page 3, “the Union contended that the training proce-
dures that Respondent proposed were (1) inadequate, in that
they were insufficiently detailed and there was no indication
that training would be available in the Spanish language, and
(2) incomplete in that they failed to mandate training for all
employees in spill prevention and response.”
DEP granted the Union’s petition to intervene. In subsequent
filings, the Union continued to raise, among its issues, employ-
ees’ training in the area of chemical spills and environmental
hazards.10 DEP issued a final decision on the permit on No-
vember 29, based on an agreement between DEP staff, Respon-
dent, and the Union as intervenor.11

7 U. Exh. 4.
8 U. Exh. 7.
9 R. Exh. 9.
10 See R. Exhs. 11 & 12.
11 U. Exh. 5.
CINTAS CORPORATION 759
During the course of DEP proceedings, the Union solicited
employees to sign a petition opposing the permit.12 This was
never in fact filed with the DEP, as reflected by a certification
from DEP that the only correspondence it received purported
from Cintas employees was a letter supporting the permit, re-
ceived July 26 (the July letter).13
It is undisputed that on one occasion, management held a
meeting of employees in the cafeteria, solicited them to sign
and send to the DEP hearing officer a letter in support of Re-
spondent’s application for the permit, and said that employees
could sign it if they liked.
Campos gave the date of the meeting as July 26, identifying
the July letter as the document that was circulated that day.
However, DEP stamped this undated letter as received on July
26, and I credit Rupert’s testimony that she prepared it and
solicited other employees to sign it outside the context of a
management meeting. Consistent with Rupert’s testimony was
Cardozo’s testimony that a proposed letter bearing a date of
June 15 (the June letter),14 was the one management showed to
employees at the cafeteria meeting, the date of which he could
not recall. In the absence of reliable evidence as to the precise
date, I find the best estimate is in about mid-June.
Although Campos testified that Cardozo was the one who so-
licited employees to sign the letter, I find more likely Cardozo’s
testimony that either Pepe or Bonelli, managers over him in the
chain of command, conducted the meeting and that his role was
to translate what they said into Spanish.
Based on the above, I find that Respondent, through Bonelli
and/or Pepe, in about mid-June, solicited employees to sign a
letter supporting Respondent’s water permit application.
This letter mentioned nothing about the Union or its opposi-
tion to the permit application. Included in the letter was this
language:
[F]urther restrictions on our water use and discharge could
cause our company to relocate to an area that has more rea-
sonable permit standards. A relocation of our facility would
be an economic hardship that neither I nor any of the other
partners here at Cintas would want.
As with the employee petition opposing the permit, this letter
was never filed with DEP.
The July letter that was filed with DEP was signed by a
number of employees, including Campos. Voicing support for
the permit application, it stated that the Union was “on the
wrong side” of the issue. Rupert testified that, solely on her
own initiative and with the aid of a nonemployee, she drafted,
produced, and distributed this letter and learned where to send
it, without any management assistance or involvement. Further,
she asserted that after getting some signatures, she gave it to
her sister, also an employee, to distribute to other coworkers
and never saw it again before it was mailed to DEP from Re-
spondent’s facility. Who actually sent it from there remains a
mystery.

12 GC Exh. 3, an undated petition from five individuals, including
Campos, identifying themselves as “Cintas worker[s].”
13 GC Exhs. 6 & 10.
14 U. Exh. 6(a).
Rupert’s testimony was somewhat implausible on its face.
Nevertheless, she testified consistently and without hesitation
that the above occurred, and nothing in her testimony contra-
dicted this. Nor was there anything in her demeanor suggesting
that she was not being truthful. Although implausible, her tes-
timony was not implausible to the point of being improbable
beyond the pale of believability. No witnesses contradicted her,
and Pepe and Cardozo denied any role in this letter. Indeed,
Campos testified that she told Respondent’s attorneys that she
understood that Rupert had written the July letter and that no
company representatives had been involved in its preparation or
distribution. Mere suspicion that Respondent’s management
may have been involved cannot serve as a substitute for evi-
dence.
Accordingly, I credit Rupert, Pepe, and Cardozo and find
that Respondent’s agents were not involved in the preparation
of the July letter or its distribution to employees. Accordingly, I
need not address its contents.
2. Letters to Respondent’s customers/MSDS sheets
MSDS contains information about chemicals, pesticides,
herbicides, or other toxins that might be found on customer
uniforms that Respondent cleans. By letter dated January 7,15
several employees, including Campos, requested that Respon-
dent provide them with MSDS for major customers Terminix
and Trugreen Chemlawn (Trugreen).
On July 1, Pepe called Campos into his office. As per her
earlier request, he gave her MSDS for Terminix and Trugreen.
He asked her to sign an acknowledgment that she had received
them, and she did so.16
During the water permit water application process, the Union
also solicited employees to sign letters to Terminix and Tru-
Green, contending Respondent was providing improper train-
ing, denying requests that MSDS’ be provided, and not furnish-
ing other information on toxic chemicals on uniforms.17
Pepe, Cardozo, and Campos all testified about a meeting
when Pepe called Campos into his office and had Cardozo act
as interpreter. The topic was whether Campos had in fact
signed one of those letters on which her signature appeared, or
whether it was forged. The genesis of the meeting was that
Pepe had received information from corporate headquarters that
employee signatures were forged on some of the letters being
circulated by the Union.
According to Pepe and Cardozo, they had only one meeting
with Campos on the subject, and on that day, July 26, she
signed an affidavit.18 Campos, however, said there were two
meetings, the first in mid-June or early July, and that at the later
meeting she was presented with the proposed affidavit and
asked to sign it.
Pepe testified that at the meeting, Campos signed a “form af-

15 U. Exh. 3. I take administrative notice that “Enero” is Spanish for
January.
16 GC Exh. 2; R. Exh. 7.
17 See GC Exhs. 4, 5(c), which are identical in text but different in
the number and placement of signatures, including where Campos’
name is located.
18 GC Exhs. 5(a) and (b) (Spanish original and English translation,
with the date of July 26 on the former).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD760
fidavit.” This suggests that the detailed July 26 affidavit was
prepared later. Further, the language of the July 26 affidavit
strongly implies there was a previous meeting. Whether there
were two meetings or one, I would expect the affidavit to have
been presented to Campos fairly close in time to the conversa-
tion regarding her signature. Accordingly, I find that in about
late July is the best approximation for when the meeting in
question occurred.
At trial, Campos was frequently equivocal and tentative and,
at times, totally contradictory, in testifying about what she
signed and did not sign, and what exactly she told Pepe. I real-
ize that during the course of her testimony, she was shown
numerous documents, many of which were photocopies with
her purported signature. Granted, also, Campos may have been
intimidated by management’s presence and the court process,
as argued by the General Counsel. Regardless, I can not find
that she was a wholly reliable witness.
In one critical respect, her testimony fully comported with
that of Pepe and Cardozo—and with her affidavit to Respon-
dent: she unequivocally told Pepe that her signature on a Ter-
minix/Trugreen letter (GC Exh. 5(c)) was forged.19
After Campos said this, Pepe asked if she would sign an af-
fidavit confirming in writing what she had said. He told her it
would be completely voluntary, and there would no repercus-
sions regardless of what she decided to do. She signed such an
affidavit within a short time. Therein, Campos stated that when
Pepe had shown her the letter:
[M]y immediate response was one of surprise and confusion.
I was also very concerned because I did not know what they
were talking about and because I had never sent any letter like
this to any customer of Cintas. At that point, I was shown a
copy of the letter attached hereto, which is made to look like it
was signed by me and has my name listed. I never signed this
letter and I did not authorize anyone to sign this letter on my
behalf. What’s more, it is clear that it is not my signature be-
cause among other things my name is incorrectly written. I
am very upset that someone would forge my signature on this
letter and I will provide whatever assistance I can to help un-
cover who did this terrible thing.
I credit Pepe’s and Cardozo’s consistent testimony that, at
the end of the meeting, Pepe told Campos to be careful because
her signature was being used on documents without her au-
thorization. I note that Campos’ version was not necessarily at
odds with theirs; she testified, that, “[t]hey just said to be care-
ful, but I don’t know why.”20 Her reaction to the remark was
“just normal. I went back to work. I didn’t pay any attention to
it.”21
Conclusions
Starting with the allegations pertaining to the water permit
application, I have found no evidence of management’s in-
volvement in the July 2005 letter, and therefore no violation

19 Tr. 136, 152–153, 171.
20 Tr. 106. See also her testimony at Tr. 111, where she stated that
Cardozo made the comment. I believe it more likely that he was trans-
lating for Pepe, who conducted the meeting.
21 Tr. 197.
can be attributed to Respondent based on its language, or oth-
erwise.
As to the June 15, 2005 letter that Respondent solicited em-
ployees to sign in support of the permit application, the follow-
ing language is alleged to have been unlawfully threatening:
[F]urther restrictions on our water use and discharge could
cause our company to relocate to an area that has more rea-
sonable permit standards. A relocation of our facility would
be an economic hardship that neither I nor any of the other
partners here at Cintas would want.
Initially, I reject Respondent’s contention that the Union’s
opposition had nothing to do with protected activity under the
Act but rather was related to environmental concerns. Since the
sole focus of DEP was on environmental issues, the Union’s
couching its opposition to the permit on environmental grounds
was only natural. In any event, throughout the process, the Un-
ion voiced objections to the permit in part on the need for better
employee training and protections in dealing with hazardous
wastes. This clearly impacted on employees’ health and safety
and, therefore, on their terms and conditions of employment.
Returning to the letter’s contents, NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 393 U.S. 575, 618 (1969), is the benchmark case in the
area of employer’s statements to employees about the conse-
quences of unionization. To be found lawful and noncoercive,
predictions of adverse effects must be based on objective facts
or reference demonstrably probable consequences beyond the
employer’s control. Id.; Dallas & Mavis Specialized Carrier
Co., 346 NLRB 110 (2006).
The language of the paragraph in question clearly conveyed
that the operative body that could cause a need for relocation
“to an area that has more reasonable permit standards” was the
DEP, if that agency made the decision to deny the permit.
Logically, had the agency denied the permit, it would have
been a decision contrary to Respondent’s desire for such and,
hence, beyond Respondent’s control.
Moreover, in order to establish a violation, the General
Counsel must demonstrate a connection between the Union’s
presence and the outside factors that could result in adverse
consequences to employees. Chinese Daily News, 346 NLRB
906, 908 (2006). Neither the Union nor its opposition to the
permit was mentioned in the letter. Even if that opposition was
implicitly referenced, it is difficult to see how employees could
conclude that the denial of the permit by DEP would be based
on their union activities or the Union’s organizing efforts.
In sum, the June 15, 2005 letter merely raised the prospect of
plant relocation if the State agency decided to deny Respon-
dent’s application for an expansion of its water treatment ca-
pacity. I conclude that this could not have reasonably been
construed as a threat of reprisal against employees for engaging
in union activity and, hence, was not coercive of their Section 7
rights. Ergo, I similarly conclude that Respondent’s circulation
of the letter could not reasonably have been seen by employees
as directed against the Union or their union activities.
I now turn to Pepe’s meeting with Campos in about late July
2005, when he questioned her about her signature on a union-
initiated letter to a customer of Respondent. Contrary to Re-
spondent’s position, I conclude that such letters had a sufficient
CINTAS CORPORATION 761
nexus to employees’ health and safety issues to afford protec-
tion under Section 7 of the Act to employees involved in them.
The employees did not lose that protection because of the
fact that the letters were sent to major customers of Respondent
and accused Respondent of not providing its employees with
proper training, denying their requests that MSDS be provided,
and not furnishing other information on toxic chemicals. The
letters limited their criticisms of Respondent to those narrow
subjects and did not “disparage” the Respondent’s products or
integrity in general. I note that even had the letters raised ques-
tions about services or products Respondent provided to cus-
tomers, they would still be found protected. See Professional
Porter & Window Cleaning Co., 263 NLRB 136, 138–139
(1982), enfd. sub nom. NLRB v. Professional Porter, 742 F.2d
1438 (2d Cir. 1983) (employee letter to employer’s main cus-
tomer attacked quality of service employer provided to cus-
tomer); Aviation Service Co. of New Jersey, 248 NLRB 229
(1980), enfd. 636 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1980) (letter disseminated
to employer’s customers raised questions about the safety of
employer’s maintenance procedures).
Similarly, inaccuracies or misstatements in the letters did not
ipso facto render them unprotected. Sprint/United Management
Co., 339 NLRB 1012, 1017 (2003); Professional Porter &
Window Cleaning, supra at 139. Rather, it must be shown that
any such inaccuracies or misstatements rose to the egregious-
ness of “disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue.” See TNT
Logistics North America, Inc., 347 NLRB 568 (2006) (claim
that management solicited employees to falsify logs was bo-
gus); Senior Citizens Coordinating Council of Riverbay Com-
munity, Inc., 330 NLRB 1100, 1107 fn. 17 (2000); Delta Health
Center, 310 NLRB 26, 43 (1993), enfd. mem. 5 F.3d 1494 (5th
Cir. 1993). Nothing contained in the letters fit into any of those
categories.
For the above reasons, I conclude that Respondent’s interro-
gation concerned Campos’ protected activity.
Interrogations of employees are not per se violative of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1); instead, the Board uses a totality-of-circumstances
test to determine whether an interrogation is coercive of em-
ployees’ rights under the Act. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB
1176, 1177 (1984), enfd. sub nom Hotel Employees Local 11 v.
NLRB, 760 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1985). See also Central Valley
Meat Co., 346 NLRB 1078 (2006). Factors considered include
any background ULPs, the nature of the information sought, the
level of the questioner (how high in the supervisory chain), the
place and method of interrogation, and whether the employee is
an open and active union supporter. Sunnyvale Medical Clinic,
277 NLRB 1217, 1218 (1985).
In Foamex, Inc., 315 NLRB 858 (1994), the Board, reversing
the judge, found coercive a manager’s interrogation of individ-
ual employees concerning their signatures on a prounion letter,
in the context of numerous ULPs. Aside from those reasons for
finding the interrogations violated the Act, the Board stated that
“ascertaining the authenticity of the employees’ signatures” did
not constitute a legitimate reason justifying interrogation con-
cerning their protected activities.” Id. The Board noted that the
employer had other means of finding out the information, such
as comparing the signatures on the letter with those that were in
the employees’ personnel records. Respondent could have done
that in this case rather than interrogate Campos.
Following Foamex, I find that Respondent did not have a
valid purpose for the interrogation, and it possessed alternative
ways of obtaining the information that were less intrusive in
Campos’ Section 7 rights. Additionally, the plant manager con-
ducted the interrogation in his office, with no one else but an-
other supervisor present. These factors lead me to conclude
that, under all the circumstances, Respondent’s interrogation
was coercive. According, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
by interrogating Campos about the genuineness of her signature
appearing on a union-initiated document relating to employees’
health and safety.
However, I do not conclude that Pepe interrogated Campos
about her union activity per se, or “solicited” her to sign a letter
disputing union claims or to “renounce” her demand for
MSDS’ from Respondent’s customers. He merely questioned
her about whether the signature on the letter was hers.
Finally, I do not conclude that Pepe’s remark at the conclu-
sion of the meeting, that she “be careful” because her signature
was being used on documents without her authorization, was
coercive. On the contrary, it was a reasonable caution based on
her expressed anguish at having had her name forged.
Facts—Charlotte
1. Handbilling on January 13, 2003
A brief description of the physical layout of the plant and its
surroundings is helpful in putting in context what occurred. The
facility, located on Harris Technology Boulevard, is the last
building before the street dead ends. On the other side of the
street is a business park entered into by a driveway on the
boulevard, which is 40-feet wide from curb-to-curb. Two drive-
ways or entrances lead into the facility, which have been identi-
fied as entrance A, the furthest from the dead end, and entrance
B. See General Counsel’s Exhibit 18, an aerial view, and Gen-
eral Counsel’s Exhibit 19, an annotated diagram.
I am cognizant of the hiatus of over 3 years between the
events in question and when witnesses testified about them
before me, in March and May 2006. Diminution of recall, espe-
cially when it comes to precise times and specific details, is
inevitable, and discrepancies in testimony between witnesses
called by a party may lessen their reliability as witnesses but
does not necessarily mean lack of candor.
Three witnesses testified for the General Counsel: nonem-
ployee handbillers Mary Ann Logan (who was in charge),
Gwendolyn Miller, and Eulacey Stephenson. Similarly, Re-
spondent called three witnesses on these allegations: Mark
Stoy, general manager; Mike Roberts, service manager under
Stoy; and Stephen Coleridge, a supervisor.
The evidence contains two documents that were prepared
close in time to January 13: Logan’s action report, prepared
within days of the handbilling, and Respondent’s counsel’s
position letter dated March 14, 2003.22 Because of their much
greater proximity in time to the events vis-à-vis the testimony, I
am inclined to afford them some weight, even realizing their
following limitations. Logan’s notes were hearsay as far as
what occurred in the afternoon, and statements in a position

22 U. Exh. 8; GC Exh. 30, respectively.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD762
letter, although binding on a respondent, are not quite up to the
level of evidence of statements to which a witness has sworn in
an affidavit. Further, both documents carried the potential of
being self-serving.
A. Morning Events
Witness testimony, the action report, and the position state-
ment all agree that the five female nonemployee handbillers
first positioned themselves at a facility entranceway at about 5
a.m., and I so find that to be their time of arrival. It was dark
outside, and the street lights were still on. No cars were parked
along the street at that hour, nor were any employees coming in
or out of the facility.
The women shortly thereafter split up, with Logan and
Miller going to entrance B. About 10–15 minutes later, Roberts
came out of the building and walked up to within 10 or less feet
of them. There is no dispute over the gist of the ensuing con-
versation. He asked what they were doing there, and Logan
replied they were handbilling. Roberts told them not to go on
company property, and Logan responded they were not on it.
He left.
Thereafter, Logan and Miller stood at either side of entrance
B and held out flyers as trucks left or cars entered. In order to
give the vehicle’s passenger a flyer, one of them had to cross
into the driveway. The same held true of the handbillers at en-
trance A. At least 20 cars entered and at least 15 trucks left,
most at entrance B. Between the five handbillers, they gave out
only two flyers total. They left at between about 6:30 and 6:45
a.m., when it was getting lighter outside.
A no-trespassing/no-solicitation sign inside the premises was
66–69 feet from where Logan and Miller engaged in handbill-
ing activities at entrance B (the distance to entrance A was
much greater). At various times that morning, Stoy, Roberts,
Coleridge, and another individual who is no longer employed
came out of the building and stood by that sign.
Consistent with Logan’s action report, Logan, Miller, and
Stephenson, all testified that as vehicles later entered or de-
parted through the entrances, management representatives at
various times stood by that sign and either beckoned incoming
vehicles to enter or outgoing trucks to leave.
Respondent’s witnesses and position statement did not dis-
pute that testimony. According to the latter, in view of the
darkness and reports of near accidents, Stoy and later Roberts
“assisted directing traffic” for about 30–45 minutes, to ensure
that employees slowed down and entered or departed the park-
ing lot safely.23 Stoy testified there was much incoming and
outgoing vehicles at one point, leading him to decide that
someone needed to “direct traffic,” a role he said was per-
formed by Roberts.
Roberts, however, did not support Stoy’s claim that the vol-
ume of traffic of entering and departing vehicles created a prob-
lem. On the contrary, he testified that he gestured to “less than
a handful” of exiting trucks to stop, did not gesture to any in-
coming cars, and that at that time of the morning, there was
“not much traffic.”24

23 No witness testified about any near accidents.
24 Tr. 1278, 1296.
In agreement with Roberts but not Stoy, Coleridge recalled
no time when a car was coming in at the same time a truck was
leaving. He further testified that the amount of time an outgoing
truck or incoming car would be delayed by the taking of a flyer
was less than a minute, comporting with Miller’s testimony that
trucks left about 1 to 3 minutes apart. Finally, he testified that
he did not consider the handbillers to constitute a major traffic
impediment problem in the morning.
The testimony of Roberts and Coleridge supports the testi-
mony of Logan, Miller, and Stephenson that at no time was a
truck leaving at the same time as a car was entering, and that
their presence created no traffic problems, and I so find. I note
that this determination is logically consistent with the fact that
only two vehicles stopped to get flyers.
Based on the above, I find that it was the dark outside during
at least most of the time the morning handbilling occurred;
handing vehicle drivers flyers required a handbiller to cross into
the driveway; Stoy and Roberts, from a distance of at least 66
feet from the handbillers, directed incoming cars to enter and
outgoing trucks to leave; and the handbillers at no time created
any kind of traffic problem.
B. Afternoon Events
The following facts are undisputed. The handbillers returned
to the facility at about 1 p.m., soon after which Logan left for
an appointment. Cars were parked on both sides of the street,
but there is no evidence that the handbillers interfered with any
moving traffic or damaged property in any way. At about 1:15
p.m., Respondent, through Coleridge, called the police to speak
to them. An unidentified police officer arrived at the facility
and spoke with them at entrance B, after which he reported to
Coleridge what he had told them. They left after that, as per
Logan’s earlier directive that they do so if the police came. No
officer testified, and there is no police report or other documen-
tation in the record.
Coleridge testified that, on his own, he called the police de-
partment at 1:15 p.m. and said there were handbillers outside
the facility on the boulevard and traffic coming down the street,
and he thought it was unsafe for them.25 I find it difficult to
believe that a supervisor would have taken it upon himself to
call the police without first checking with, and obtaining the
approval of, higher management authority present at the facility
that day, to wit, Stoy. Moreover, his professed concern for the
safety of the handbillers rings false. In the morning, they stood
by the entrances in the dark and there was a potential safety
hazard, yet no representative of Cintas called the police de-
partment. Further, there is absolutely no evidence that vehicular
traffic posed any kind of safety threat to the handbillers in the
15-minute interval between their arrival and his phone call.
Coleridge denied ever telling the police to instruct the hand-
billers to leave the facility. He also testified that he did not
speak to the police officer who arrived on the scene until after
the latter had spoken to the handbillers. However, I find to the
contrary, based on Miller’s credited testimony that a representa-

25 The position statement added “property risks” to “potential safety
concerns” as his reasons for summoning the police, but Coleridge said
nothing about the former.
CINTAS CORPORATION 763
tive of the Company came out when the officer arrived and
talked with him, as well as the statement in Respondent’s posi-
tion letter that, “[w]hen the police arrived, Mr. Coleridge ex-
plained the situation.”26
Miller and Stephenson gave differing accounts of what the
office told them. Miller testified in considerably greater detail
than Stephenson, both in regard to what he said and in general.
Miller also appeared to be quite candid. For example, when
asked on cross-examination about the police officer’s de-
meanor, she replied that she did not find him intimidating. Ac-
cordingly, I credit Miller’s version that the officer came over
and told them they could get a citation if they blocked traffic,
but it would be fine if they stayed on the concrete and handed
out flyers.
Coleridge testified that after the officer spoke with the hand-
billers, he reported back to Coleridge that he had instructed
them to leave. As it is hearsay, I will not consider the statement
evidence of the truth of the matter asserted therein. Respon-
dent’s position letter states that officers reported back that they
had asked the handbillers to leave because they were obstruct-
ing traffic.
Coleridge’s testimony concerning what the officer reported
back to him, as well as the position letter, constitute circum-
stantial evidence that Coleridge had requested police action;
otherwise, there would have been no reason for the officer to
report back to Coleridge what he told them.
Based on the above, I do not credit Coleridge on his interac-
tion with the officer or his professed reasons for summoning
the police. Accordingly, there is no reliable evidence on exactly
what, if anything, he requested they do.
Conclusions
With regard to what occurred in the morning, management
may lawfully simply observe the handbilling activities of non-
employees at its premises. See Partylite Worldwide, Inc., 344
NLRB 916 (2005); Milco, Inc., 159 NLRB 812, 814 (1966),
enfd. 388 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1968). However, surveillance can
be deemed coercive, depending on the totality of facts and cir-
cumstances. Partywide Worldwide, above; Brown Transporta-
tion Co., 294 NLRB 969, 971–972 (1989).
Respondent raises the following justifications for its agents
beckoning to vehicles: traffic issues and safety concerns, more
specifically the safety of the handbillers.
Having found that the handbillers created no traffic prob-
lems, I reject that first claim. The second contention has more
merit. It was dark outside during most of the time the handbill-
ers stood by the entrances that morning, and giving a flyer to a
vehicle’s driver, whether departing truck or entering car, re-
quired a handbiller to cross into the driveway. I conclude that
management had a reasonable concern that a handbiller could
be injured by an incoming car or outgoing truck, with the po-
tential for personal injury and a lawsuit being filed against Re-
spondent.
As far as unlawful surveillance and interference with em-
ployees, as alleged by the General Counsel, I find it significant
that the management representatives were at least 66 feet away

26 GC Exh. 30 at 3.
from the closest handbiller and entering vehicles. See Brown
Transportation, supra. This was not a situation in which the
representatives hovered near the handbillers or otherwise en-
gaged in any kind of menacing behavior. Contrast, Partylite
Worldwide, supra. Indeed, in the only conversation the hand-
billers had with a Cintas representative, Roberts merely told
them to stay off company property.
Further, in these circumstances, especially when it was dark
outside, I doubt that employees entering the facility would have
been able to see management’s gestures when they turned into
the entrance and saw the handbillers. Accordingly, I cannot
conclude that such gestures would have discouraged entering
employees from taking flyers had they otherwise wished to do
so.
As to the outgoing drivers, none of them testified. Manage-
ment’s mere act of gesturing them to leave did not amount to
telling them not to take a flyer or otherwise coerce them, espe-
cially when a driver could have stopped to take one and been
delayed only briefly before continuing to drive out into the
street.
Accordingly, I conclude that management’s conduct in the
morning amounted to neither unlawful surveillance nor inter-
ference with interaction between the nonemployee handbillers
and employees.
As to the afternoon’s events, it was light outside when Col-
eridge called the police, and the record reveals no legitimate
safety or property concerns. Nor has Respondent shown there
were any other conditions outside that created a bona fide rea-
son for summoning the police to talk to the handbillers. In the
absence of such, the inference is, and I find, that Respondent,
through Coleridge, took that action simply to intimate or harass
them. This amounted to an effort to interfere with lawful union
activity. See Venetian Casino Resort, LLD, 345 NLRB 1061
(2005); Gainesville Mfg. Co., 271 NLRB 1186, 1188 (1984). In
fact, this was exactly the effect, since they left the facility im-
mediately after their conversation with the policeman, as per
Logan’s prior directive.
Therefore, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) when Col-
eridge summoned the police to interfere with nonemployees
engaged in handbilling for the Union.
2. 2004 Allegations
Credibility resolution is the key to deciding most of these al-
legations. I have already addressed the principle that witnesses
may be found believable on some matters but not others.
The following employee witnesses testified on behalf of the
General Counsel: Ana Callas, Raquel Cruz, Candy Galdamez,
and Maria Martinez. All are production employees.
I find that Galdamez was the most reliable. Although defen-
sive in demeanor, she exhibited good recall, was consistent in
her answers on both direct and cross-examination, and readily
responded to questions posed to her.
Callas and Cruz, the most active union supporters from this
record, were not wholly credible. Callas was frequently eva-
sive, especially on cross-examination, and she tended to stray
from the question when answering, leading me to suspect that
she was trying to think out her answers rather than answering
spontaneously based on recall. She was also impeached by her
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD764
NLRB affidavits on a couple of matters, as well as inconsistent
at times in her testimony.
For example, Callas’ testimony was contradictory and con-
fusing as to whether she had been told that she could not wear
noncompany hats, caps, pins, or badges prior to March 1, 2004,
when she wore a union sticker at work. She testified that the
statement in her March 25, 2004 affidavit that she was told this
in early February 2004 was a “mistake” on her part,27 because
she did not wear anything after receiving such a directive. Yet,
she later testified that on February 4, 2004, she started taking
notes of events occurring at the plant and that she had these
notes at the time she gave both her affidavits but did not need
them because she had memorized relevant dates. I would ex-
pect in that circumstance that she would not have made such a
“mistake” in her March 25, 2004 affidavit.
She also testified that she gave her notes to the Union, which
was not able to locate them during the trial. I would also nor-
mally expect that such notes would have been retained in light
of the likelihood that they might be needed in later litigation.
Indeed, Charlotte was but one of Respondent’s facilities in-
volved in the Union’s nationwide organizing campaign.
On another matter, Callas first testified on cross-examination
that management in 2004 announced a prohibition against non-
company hats or caps, pins, buttons, and badges at a meeting,
not individually. After Respondent’s counsel read a statement
in her second affidavit that employees were told individually,
she was equivocal and evasive as to what was said to her on an
individual basis.
Cruz, similarly, was impeached by statements made in an af-
fidavit, portions of her testimony were contradictory (especially
regarding the February 23, 2004 meeting and what Stoy said to
her after its conclusion), and she seemed to confuse separate
management meetings. Cruz also took notes of what was taking
place at the plant but averred that she destroyed them after June
or July 2004. My comments regarding Callas’ notes apply
equally. Further, on one matter, she stated she was refreshed by
what she said in an affidavit, but on others, said that she was
not; and, on certain subjects, Cruz testified readily but on others
was much more hesitant.
Martinez appeared to be candid, but the reliability of her tes-
timony was diminished by her limited recall, limited language
skills (she testified that she does not speak or understand Eng-
lish and is essentially illiterate in her native language of Span-
ish), and her clear distress at having to testify; at one point, she
broke into tears. I note in this regard that she frequently darted
glances at management representatives, as if intimidated by
their presence.
Turning to Respondent’s witnesses, Robbie Poole, Mark
Stoy, Stephen Coleridge, Mike Roberts, Nelson Santiago, and
Francisco Colon testified as representatives of Respondent, and
Rosa Franco was called as an employee witness.
General Manager Poole was not a fully credible witness. He
appeared ill at ease, a demeanor I would not normally expect
from someone in a high-level management position. Further, he
did not always seem forthright. On the matter of what jewelry

27 Tr. 359. See R. Exh. 17. She gave a second affidavit on June 16,
2004. R. Exh. 18.
female employees can wear, his testimony was shifting and
evasive and contradicted by Stoy. He first testified on cross-
examination that earrings are “not okay,” then that, “I don’t
recall the policy covering that,” and, finally, “I do know that
women wear earrings in the uniform policy, yes.”28 His failure
to give a straight answer to a simple question undermined his
credibility, as did his other testimony about employees wearing
jewelry, as described below.
I also find it odd that he did not generate or keep any records
of the small-group meetings he held with employees in Febru-
ary 2004 concerning the Company’s unionized Detroit facility.
Again, Respondent was in the midst of a nationwide union
organizing campaign, with future litigation a real possibility,
and I would expect some documentation would have been
maintained.
Nor was Supervisor Coleridge fully reliable. As noted ear-
lier, I have not credited his testimony regarding his interaction
with the police on January 13, 2003. Moreover, his recall of
events in 2004 was quite limited in scope.
As far as the 2004 events, Plant Manager Stoy was generally
consistent, detailed, and not always in agreement with the tes-
timony of his superior, Poole. He was for the most part credi-
ble, although he equivocated at times on the issue of female
employees wearing scarves and, as previously noted, some of
his testimony regarding the traffic situation on the morning of
January 13, 2003, was not supported by other company repre-
sentatives.
Employment Practices Manager Franco Colon testified
solely about management’s January 30 meeting with Callas, at
which he served as a translator. His testimony was consistent
with Poole’s and Stoy’s, and I credit it.
Sales Representative Roberts, who served as a Spanish lan-
guage interpreter at several management meetings with em-
ployees in 2004, testified credibly that his sole role was to
translate for management and that he did not say anything to
employees beyond that. I so find. The same holds true of the
role of Administrative Assistant Santiago. I do not believe that
either of them made substantive statements to employees at
meetings other than to serve as conduits. As such, both were
agents, not only apparent but actual, for Respondent, and I so
find (Respondent’s answer denied Santiago’s agency status).
Franco is a production employee. She appeared candid, her
testimony about what she told Stoy was consistent with his
account, she testified she is on friendly terms with Callas, and
she has no stake in the proceedings. These factors lead me to
find her a credible witness.
The Charlotte facility, a rental division of Cintas, launders,
sells, and distributes, corporate uniforms. The production side
of the plant has industrial equipment and processes garments.
In the relevant timeframe, there were approximately 55 produc-
tion employees on the first shift (6 a.m.–2:30 p.m.) and 35 on
the second shift (2:30–11 p.m.), as well as 45 sales and service
representatives (SSRs) or truck drivers, whose working hours
varied depending on the locations of customers. Production
employees were afforded a one-half-hour lunchbreak, and two
15-minute breaks. For first shift, the first break was from 9–

28 Tr. 1046–1048.
CINTAS CORPORATION 765
9:15 a.m., and the second break, from 1–1:15 p.m. Almost all
first-shift employees used the breakroom aka lunchroom for
their first break, and some also used it for the afternoon break.
Respondent at all times material has had a progressive disci-
pline system: counseling or verbal warning, formal (written)
warning, probation, suspension, and discharge.29 Verbal warn-
ings are the lowest form of discipline placed in an employee’s
personnel file and do not require an employee to sign any ac-
knowledgement.
A. Allegations Relating to Dress Code
At all times material, Respondent has provided and replaced,
free of charge, uniforms for production employees, consisting
of dark navy blue pants and a light blue V-neck short-sleeved
shirt. The employee’s name is on a patch on the right side of
the shirt; on the left side is a patch with the company logo. In
cold weather, employees can wear long-sleeved white or navy
blue T-shirts under the uniform shirt. Respondent provides no
cleaning allowance, but employees can get uniforms cleaned at
the plant for no charge.
The two categories of items specifically involved in this case
are: (1) headwear, including hats/caps and other scarves; (2)
items worn on clothing, including jewelry pins and stickers.
All policies in place at Charlotte are issued by corporate
headquarters, none being unique to the facility. In 2004, there
were two written sources for dress code policies: the corporate-
wide policy, and rental division policies. All of the employees
who engaged in union activities were production employees, so
only the policies and practices relating to production partners
are germane to this decision.
The rental division uniform/dress code policy dated July 27,
2000,30 incorporated an “Exhibit B,” which specified that all
visible garments worn by partners must be navy except for
normal white T-shirts. The only specific mention of headwear
in the policy was that SSRs or drivers must wear specified caps.
The corporate uniform/dress code dated November 26, 2003,31
stated that all production partners were required to wear the
official company uniform while on the job. As to jewelry, fe-
males were permitted to wear earrings “in their ears only.”
There was no mention of headwear.
The Company issues two types of hats with the Cintas logo,
one heavier duty for cold weather.32 There was conflicting tes-
timony as to when they first became available to production
employees and whether it was before or after Respondent be-
came aware of the union organizing campaign at the facility, in
late 2003 or early 2004. In any event, for at least several years,
production employees have been offered a choice of ordering
one Cintas hat or the other.
In both of Callas’ affidavits,33 she stated that prior to start of
the Union’s organizing campaign in November 2003, employ-

29 See GC Exh. 29.
30 GC Exh. 14. A superseding rental division uniform/dress code
policy, dated November 17, 2005, continued to incorporate exh.B. See
GC Exh. 16.
31 GC Exh. 15(a).
32 See GC Exhs. 17(a) and (b), the first a baseball style hat; the sec-
ond, a winter toboggan-type cap.
33 R. Exhs. 17 and 18.
ees could wear noncompany baseball caps, knit caps, and lapel
pins, but after that, they were told they could no longer wear
noncompany hats or caps, pins, buttons, or badges. On the other
hand, Cruz, in her March 24, 2004 affidavit stated that, “In the
past, whenever anyone tried to wear a button, sticker or pin, the
company made them take it off. The company has a policy,
which they have had for some time, that employees can’t wear
or display anything on their work clothes.”34 It is not clear
whether they were including the wearing of jewelry. Neverthe-
less, on cross-examination, Cruz stated that although prior to
2004, the Company stated employees had to comply with the
dress policy at all times, this was not enforced.
As far as head covering, Galdamez testified that prior to Feb-
ruary 2004, Emelinda Rivera and another employee wore ban-
danas in work areas two or three times a week. Rivera contin-
ued to do so after that time and was warned about it. The last
time Galdamez observed her wearing a bandana was about 5
months ago. Galdamez further testified that Rivera and another
employee also wore non-Cintas hats before February 2004.
Rivera has continued to wear such hats and been told many
times by supervisors to remove it. To her knowledge, whenever
a supervisor observes a production employee wearing a non-
Cintas hat, the supervisor tells the employee to remove it.
Stoy’s testimony supported Galdamez’. Thus, he testified
that Rivera has worn a “colorful” floral print scarf and, al-
though he claimed that he has seen this “maybe three times at
most,” during the entire time he has been at the facility, he
earlier testified that “[A] lot of times we’ll make her tuck it into
her shirt if it dangles. . . .”35 Implicit in this testimony is that
Rivera continues to frequently wear a scarf. She has never been
disciplined.
Stoy further testified that although employees are not re-
quired to wear hats, they must wear one of the two Cintas hats
if they do wear one, and are asked to remove non-Cintas hats.
This was consistent with Callas’ testimony that, when she wore
a non-Cintas hat about 1-1/2 years ago, a supervisor told her to
take it off and went to get her a Cintas hat. She did not receive
any discipline. It also comported with Galdamez’ testimony,
above.
As to jewelry, the official policy, set out in General Coun-
sel’s Exhibit 15(a), is that female employees can wear jewelry
only in their ears. However, I credit the consistent testimony of
Callas, Cruz, and Galdamez that employees Patricia (Lay or
Light) and her daughter Amanda has for years regularly worn
holiday and other types of pins on their uniform shirts.
In contrast, Poole testified that the first time he observed
these employees wearing pins was after the first week of this
trial, although he has seen them once or twice a day during his
tenure at the facility (he arrived in January 2004). He further
testified that he told them to remove the pins. This testimony
strikes me as contrived, self-serving, and unbelievable in the
absence of any explanation of why they suddenly would have
started wearing such items, and I do not credit it.
Further, Poole’s testimony that loose jewelry, including

34 R. Exh. 23 at 2. She gave another affidavit on May 11, 2004, R.
Exh. 24.
35 Tr. 1222, 1195 (emphasis added).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD766
bracelets, is prohibited, was contradicted by Stoy. Stoy testified
that, despite the official policy that female employees can wear
only earrings, they are also allowed to wear necklaces, rings,
and bracelets; in fact, he stated that female employees can wear
as much as jewelry as they wish, provided no safety issue is
presented.
I now turn to discipline of other employees for violations of
the dress code, including wearing non-Cintas hats or stickers of
any kind. There is no evidence that prior to February 9, 2004,
any employees received verbal warnings for such.36 Respondent
prior to that date issued only one written warning for any kind
of dress code violation, to Cruz in November 2001 for not
wearing a white shirt under her uniform.37
Stoy testified that there have been times when employees
wore Dallas Cowboys or skull-and-crossbones hats to work, but
that he was not aware of any verbal or written warnings issued
to them. He also testified that he has occasion to tell employees
about once a month, on the average, to remove inappropriate
items but has never issued a verbal or written warning to any of
them.
Based on the above, I find that female employees may wear
“colorful” scarves/ bandanas, provided there is no safety issue;
employees are asked to remove non-Cintas hats; although em-
ployees on a regular basis are asked to remove items from their
person, they do not receive any kind of discipline; and only
three employees have been disciplined for violations of the
dress code since at least as far back as November 2001, none of
which involved the wearing of hats or personal, nonclothing
items.
In light of these findings, I need not address the matter of
“casual days,” about which the testimony of no two witnesses
was the same. In any event, Respondent was free to set aside
certain days when adherence to its normal dress standards was
relaxed, and there is no allegation that Respondent made any
changes in casual days in violation of the Act.
Nor, in view of my findings above, need I address any facts
relating to arguments that Respondent’s actions against the
employees in question was justified by the image the Company
wished to present to customers and prospective customers who
visited the plant. In practice, Respondent clearly did not strictly
follow its own official dress policy, and it allowed other em-
ployees to wear “colorful” scarves and jewelry pins.
Finally, I need not rely in making any findings or conclu-
sions in this area on Respondent’s Exhibit 40, which I condi-
tionally admitted over the objections of the General Counsel
and the Union that it should have been rejected because it was
not produced in compliance with subpoena. The General Coun-
sel’s and Union’s motions to strike Stoy’s related testimony is
thus moot.
February 9, 2004
On this date, eight or so employees, including Callas and
Cruz, wore union stickers to work. Callas testified that the

36 See GC Exh. 56, from Respondent’s position statement of May
21, 2004. Verbal warnings were issued to two employees on April 13,
2004, for wearing jackets not in compliance with the dress code. GC
Exhs. 45 and 46.
37 Id.; GC Exh. 44.
stickers were for $1-an-hour raise, in English or Spanish.38 On
the other hand, Cruz testified that the stickers had the words
“Uniform Justice” in English or Spanish. However, in her May
11, 2004 affidavit, she stated that the sticker had a dollar sign.39
When asked about this discrepancy on cross-examination, she
testified that the dollar sign was not on the sticker and that it
could have been a “mistake” in the affidavit.40 Coleridge and
Stoy also testified that the stickers were for $1-an-hour raise,
and I credit them and Callas and so find.
In any event, Cruz testified that she wore a sticker above the
Cintas logo on the left side of the uniform blouse. Coleridge,
her supervisor, passed by and told her to remove it and throw it
away. She took it off and put it on her forehead. He told her to
take it off, and she put it on her arm.
Coleridge denied this incident took place. As stated earlier,
neither he nor Cruz were fully credible witnesses on all matters
on which they testified. Nevertheless, I do not believe that,
despite her confusion over which sticker she work, Cruz manu-
factured the incident. Her recall of what took place was suffi-
ciently detailed, and I credit her that it did occur. I note that she
described conduct on her part that was belligerent and could
have been construed as insubordination, inconsistent with a
deliberate effort to make herself look good and Coleridge bad
and thereby malign Respondent.
Accordingly, I find that Coleridge told Cruz to remove a un-
ion sticker from her uniform on February 9, 2004. There is no
evidence that management or supervisors said anything to any
of the other employees who wore stickers that day. In fact, Stoy
testified that he observed employees wearing $1-raise stickers
on that occasion but did not direct supervisors to do anything.
On February 11, Calles and Cruz brought to management a
petition from employees requesting a $1-an-hour raise.41 It was
forwarded to corporate headquarters.
February 16, 2004
I credit Galdamez’ account—not specifically denied by Col-
eridge—of what took place between them on February 16, as
follows.
On that date, Galdamez wore a UNITE hat after she came to
work.42 She was hanging shirts when Coleridge told her she had
to take the hat off and put it away because it was not in compli-
ance with company policy. She placed it in her purse. She was
not told anything about receiving a verbal warning for wearing
it.
Coleridge did not testify about his exact words to Galdamez.
Consistent with Galdamez’ version, Stoy testified that Col-
eridge informed him that he (Coleridge) had told Galdamez that
wearing the hat in a work area violated the Company’s no-
solicitation rule and that he was going to issue her a verbal
warning for wearing the hat and placing it in her work area. I
credit this testimony inasmuch as the statement accorded with
Coleridge’s other statements and conduct during this same
period. The warning Galdamez later received set forth a differ-

38 See GC Exhs. 33–35.
39 R. Exh. 24.
40 Tr. 694.
41 R. Exh. 43.
42 See GC Exh. 49.
CINTAS CORPORATION 767
ent reason: “wearing a winter hat, black in color.”43
Stoy conceded that employees, who are not provided lockers,
are free at their workstations to keep personal belongs, includ-
ing such items as lunchboxes, purses, jackets, and books, as
long as they do not interfere with work. Coleridge similarly
testified that Respondent does not impose restrictions on per-
sonal items employees can bring to work. I credit their testi-
mony and so find.
As opposed to the allegation in the complaint, Galdamez did
not testify about any contact with Stoy that day. Nor did her
testimony reflect the allegation that Coleridge said she could
wear nothing in addition to the Company’s standard uniform.
With the possible exception of Galdamez, Respondent has
never issued any warnings to employees for violating the no
solicitation rule. Nor has Respondent, from 2001 to the present,
issued any warnings to employees for having any prohibited
items in their work areas.
March 1, 2004
On March 1, a number of employees wore union (uniform
justice) stickers to work,44 including Callas, Cruz, Rosa Cruz,
Galdamez, and Rivera. All but Galdamez, who received a writ-
ten warning, were written up for verbal counselings or warn-
ings.45 Stoy and Coleridge offered differing testimony as to
who made the decision to issue them: Stoy testified that he and
Coleridge together made the decision, but Coleridge testified
that the decision was his alone. Either way, Stoy was aware of
the warnings at or near the time they were issued. Stoy offered
no explanation on the record as to why he deemed warnings
were warranted on March 1, whereas he had seen no reason the
previous month to issue warnings to the employees whom he
observed wearing $1-an-hour raise stickers.
Callas, Cruz, and Galdamez all testified about conversations
they had with management on the subject that morning. The
testimony of Coleridge and Stoy was not inconsistent with their
testimony, which I credit.
Callas was in her work area when Coleridge told her to take
off the sticker, saying she could not wear it in the plant. She
asked why. He responded that the rules of the Company did not
permit wearing it; that employees could only wear the company
uniform. Callas did not remove the sticker. Coleridge returned
about 15 minutes later and said that Stoy wanted to see her in
the office.
She accompanied Coleridge there. Stoy told her he was call-
ing her in because she could not wear the sticker; Cintas policy
was that employees could wear only a uniform. She asked what
was wrong with wearing the sticker, and he replied that she
could not wear something that was not the color of the uniform
and could wear only a white or navy blue undershirt. She took
the sticker off, put it on a flyer, and gave it to him. He said
nothing about her receiving a verbal warning. She was not
aware of such until only a few weeks before trial.
Cruz wore a union sticker on the right side of her uniform

43 GC Exh. 39.
44 See GC Exhs. 31 and 32. Respondent has not contended that these
stickers caused any damage to the uniform shirts, which are of a Da-
cron-type of material.
45 GC Exhs. 40–43.
shirt, over her name. As she was working, Coleridge came over
and asked her to take it off. She placed it on her arm. He told
her the uniform was not to put stickers on. He said nothing
about her getting a verbal warning. She was not aware of re-
ceiving such until being prepared for trial.
Galdamez wore a sticker on the left side of her shirt, not
covering any letters on the uniform. Coleridge approached her
in her work area and asked her to take the sticker off. She
placed it on her forehead, and he told her to remove it. She
replied that it was her body and not part of company policy, but
she took it off and put it in her pocket.
Later that morning, Coleridge called Galdamez to the office,
where Stoy was also present. Stoy stated this was her second
warning, because she had been warned the first time about
wearing the union hat, and a third warning could result in her
being fired. She was shown a memo of a February 16, 2004
verbal warning, along with a written warning on March 1,
2004, for “wearing stickers on the front and back of uniform
blouse.”46
As noted above, contrary to Stoy, Coleridge testified that he
made the decision to discipline the employees on March 1, after
determining that wearing the union stickers violated company
policy. He further testified that he told all of them (other than
Galdamez) they had received a verbal warning within a day or
so of March 1. However, I do not believe that Callas and Cruz
were untruthful in testifying that management never told them
they had received verbal warnings, an important event I am
certain they would have recalled had it happened. Stoy testified
that employees are normally advised orally they have received
verbal warnings, but he did not aver personal knowledge that
the employees in question were so told.
Conclusions
Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
The framework for analyzing alleged violations of Section
8(a)(3) is Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d
899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). Under
Wright Line, the General Counsel must make a prima facie
showing sufficient to support an inference that the employee’s
protected conduct motivated an employer’s adverse action. The
General Counsel must show, either by direct or circumstantial
evidence, that the employee engaged in protected conduct, the
employer knew or suspected the employee engaged in such
conduct, the employer harbored animus, and the employer took
action because of this animus.
Under Wright Line, if the General Counsel establishes a
prima facie case of discriminatory conduct, it meets its initial
burden to persuade, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
protected activity was a motivating factor in the employer’s
action. The burden of persuasion then shifts to the employer to
show that it would have taken the same adverse action even in
absence of such activity. NLRB v. Transportation Management
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399−403 (1983); Kamtech, Inc. v. NLRB,
314 F.3d 800, 811 (6th Cir. 2002); Serrano Painting, 332
NLRB 1363, 1366 (2000); Best Plumbing Supply, 310 NLRB
143 (1993). To meet this burden, “an employer cannot simply

46 GC Exh. 39.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD768
present a legitimate reason for its action but must persuade by a
preponderance of the evidence that the same action would have
taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.”
Serrano Painting, supra at 1366, citing Roure Bertrand Dupont,
Inc., 271 NLRB 443 (1984).
Here, animus has been conceded, the employees in question
wore union stickers, management was aware of such activity,
and management issued warnings to the employees. Accord-
ingly, the General Counsel has made out a prima facie case
under Wright Line.
Respondent contends that its actions were based on valid ap-
plication of its dress code policy, designed to foster the image
of the Company as a provider of uniforms services to customers
and potential customers who visit the facility.
Had Respondent’s conduct been consistent with established
practice, this argument might pass muster. On the contrary,
Respondent, then and now, has allowed female employees to
wear jewelry pins on their uniforms, and “colorful scarves.”
Moreover, employees who wear non-Cintas hats and other
items deemed in violation of the dress code policy are asked to
remove them but are not disciplined. Significantly, when Stoy
observed employees wearing union stickers on February 9, he
did not conclude that such conduct warranted any kind of su-
pervisory action for violation of the dress code, and he did not
instruct supervisors to either issue discipline or even direct
them to remove the stickers.
An employer may not prohibit the wearing of union insignia,
absent special circumstances. Airport 2000 Concessions, LLC,
346 NLRB 958, 960 (2006). It cannot rely on a promulgated
dress code policy to establish such special circumstances when
it has permitted employees to wear other kinds of pins and but-
tons and disparately applied the policy to target union support-
ers. Ibid; Waterbury Hotel Management, LLC, 333 NLRB 482,
545–546 (2001), enfd. 314 F.3d 645 (DC Cir. 2003). Selec-
tively applying a policy to discipline employees who engage in
protected activity is also prohibited. Carpenter Technologies
Corp., 346 NLRB 766 (2006).
Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) by issuing verbal warnings to Calles, Cruz, Rosa
Cruz, and Rivera, and a written warning to Galdamez, on
March 1, 2004, because they wore union stickers.
As to the union hat Galdamez wore on February 16, 2004,
Respondent acted in conformity with established practice when
Coleridge asked her to remove it. However, Respondent has
never issued any other employee a warning for wearing a non-
Cintas hat, even though the record reflects that they have been
worn on occasion. Therefore, I conclude that her verbal warn-
ing also violated 8(a)(3) and (1).
Related 8(a)(1) Violations
For reasons stated above, I conclude that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) by telling Cruz on February 9 and March
1, 2004, to remove her union sticker, and telling the same to
Callas and Galdamez on March 1, 2004.
As to Galdamez, Coleridge acted in accordance with the
Company’s dress code policy on February 16, when he told her
to remove the non-Cintas union hat. Here, Respondent can rely
on the “special circumstance” exception described above.
However, Coleridge went beyond telling her to take off the
hat; he told her to put it away so that it was not in public view.
This was contrary to the practice of allowing employees to keep
all kinds of personal items out at their work areas, as long as
there was no safety issue. Therefore, the hat was targeted for
disparate treatment because it reflected Galdamez’ support for
the Union. I thus conclude that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) on February 16, 2004, when Coleridge told Galdamez
that she could not display a union hat in her work area. In view
of this conclusion, I need not address whether Coleridge also
violated Section 8(a)(1) by articulating an overly broad no-
solicitation rule.
Stoy told Galdamez on March 1, that she could be dis-
charged if she received “another warning.” The first two warn-
ings were based on her having worn a union hat on February 16
and a union sticker on March 1. I have found both warnings
unlawful. But for them, Stoy would not have had occasion to
warn her of the consequences of a third warning under the pro-
gressive discipline system.
Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) on March 1, 2004, when Stoy implicitly threatened
Galdamez with discharge if she again displayed a union sticker
or wore a union hat.
B. Solicitation/Distribution
The actual language contained in Respondent’s no-
solicitation/distribution rule is not at issue. Rather, the alleged
violations go toward conduct alleged to violate employees’
rights to distribute under the Act.
February 10, 2004
Cruz testified that she brought a union flyer to work. Col-
eridge observed her with it in her work area, and he asked her
to put it inside her wallet (or pocketbook), take it home, and not
show it to anybody. Coleridge testified that he did tell Cruz to
put a flyer in her wallet but that this occurred in the breakroom
(see below).
As with the February 9, 2004 incident involving Cruz and
Coleridge, I credit Cruz’ account because I do not believe she
manufactured it, and I think that what occurred would stand out
more in her memory. I again note that Coleridge’s testimony on
many 2004 events was quite circumscribed.
February 20, 2004
Callas testified without controversion that prior to February
20, 2004, employees were free to read books, magazines, and
newspapers in the breakroom, testimony corroborated by Mar-
tinez, and I so find. Moreover, Stoy conceded that employees
have shown Avon catalogues and sold Avon products in the
breakroom.
On the morning of February 20, Callas went into the break-
room, where she set out about 20 each of two different union
flyers, which were English on one side and Spanish on the
other.47 One flyer spoke about how Cintas was spending against
the Union, and the other about some plants (including Cintas
Detroit) that already had a union and were providing free medi-
cal insurance and better salaries.

47 GC Exhs. 50 and 51.
CINTAS CORPORATION 769
When first-shift production employees went into the break-
room on their morning (9 a.m.) break, the flyers were there.
Coleridge and Andy Coffaro, a supervisor, reported to Poole
that flyers were being handed out in the breakroom, and he
directed them to confiscate them because they violated the no-
solicitation policy. It undisputed that Coleridge, with Coffaro,
returned to the breakroom, and did so.
Based on the credited, similar testimony of Callas and Cruz,
which Coleridge did not specifically rebut, I find the following.
When Coleridge tried to take the flyer Cruz had, she resisted
and said she wanted to read it. He then told Cruz to put it in her
purse and to read it at home because no one could read it in the
plant. Martinez was in the room but did not hear Coleridge say
anything. There was no testimony that Coffaro took any flyers
from employees or spoke to them.
Poole testified that he later sua sponte reviewed the no-
solicitation/distribution policy and concluded he had made an
error. He offered no explanation of what prompted him to de-
cide to review the policy after the fact, and I suspect he sought
guidance from corporate headquarters or the Company’s attor-
neys. In any event, Respondent has admitted that confiscating
the flyers from employees who were on nonworktime in a
nonwork area was a mistake.
Respondent contends, though, that after realizing a mistake
had been made, it “cured” any violation of the Act by retrac-
tion. Any such retraction was verbal since Respondent did not
post anything in writing.
Coleridge was not involved in any such activity. According
to Poole, he raised the matter at three or four general produc-
tion meetings on the same day, within 2 weeks of February 20.
He stated that the leaflets had been improperly gathered and
that the Union was allowed to leaflet in nonwork areas. He also
apologized, and said it would not happen again. Respondent
provided no documentation corroborating his testimony.
Callas recalled that the same week of the incident, Stoy met
with small groups of 8–10 employees in the conference room.
He apologized for what had occurred and said it would not
happen again. Stoy, however, did not testify about holding any
such meetings.
On the other hand, Callas, Galdamez, and Martinez did not
recall attending any meetings in which the February 20 break-
room incident was mentioned.
Conclusions
In the February 10, 2004 incident, Respondent, through Col-
eridge, treated Cruz’ flyer differently than it has treated em-
ployees’ other personal items, which they are allowed to keep
in the vicinity of their work areas. By telling her to put it away,
not show it to anyone, and take it home, he coerced her in the
exercise of her Section 7 rights, both because of this disparate
treatment and also because she had the right to distribute it to
other employees on nonworktime in nonwork areas. See Biggs
Foods, 347 NLRB 425 (2006); Gayfers Department Store, 324
NLRB 1246 (1997). Therefore, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1).
Respondent admittedly violated the Act through Coleridge’s
conduct on February 20, in taking union flyers from employees
during nonwork time in a nonwork area. I also conclude that his
statements that employees could not read the flyers there or in
the plant were overly restrictive of their rights to distribute or
possess such flyers in nonwork areas during nonwork time. See
Biggs Foods, above; MTD Products, Inc., 310 NLRB 733
(1993); Our Way, Inc., 268 NLRB 204 (1983).
I do not, however, agree with the General Counsel that his
statements amounted to announcing a “policy.” In this regard,
they were made specifically to Cruz, when she resisted his ef-
fort to take away her flyer, and not addressed to the employees
there as a group. Significantly, Martinez did not hear Coleridge
say anything. Having concluded that he did not announce a
“policy,” it follows that his actions did not constitute enforce-
ment of that policy.
The remaining issue here is whether Respondent “cured” the
above violation by subsequent conduct, more precisely, by
valid retraction.
By meeting certain requirements, an employer can avoid li-
ability for commission of a ULP by a retraction. Passavant
Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978), remains the
lead case in this area, although recent decisions reflect that
some Board Members do not necessarily agree with all of its
precepts. See, e.g., Chinese Daily News, 346 NLRB 906 fn. 4.
Under Passavant, the repudiation must be timely, unambigu-
ous, and specific in nature to the illegal conduct; it must contain
assurances to employees that, in the future, the employer will
not interfere with their Section 7 rights; there must be adequate
publication to the employees involved; and the employer can-
not engage in other proscribed conduct.
Here, at least two employees who were present in the break-
room when the flyers were confiscated—Cruz and Martinez—
never heard any kind of retraction. Thus, the scope of the repu-
diation was not coextensive with the scope of the violation. See
Chinese Daily News, ibid. Moreover, even crediting Poole, he
did not include a statement that in the future, Respondent would
not interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights. Most signifi-
cantly, I have determined that during this period of time, Re-
spondent committed other ULPs, including issuance of warn-
ings in violation of 8(a)(3) to Callas and Cruz, who were pre-
sent when Coleridge unlawfully took the flyers. Any assurances
Poole might have made to employees concerning their Section
7 rights to distribute union literature were vitiated by Respon-
dent’s other unlawful conduct.
Accordingly, whether Passavant is strictly applied or a total-
ity-of-circumstances approach is used, I conclude that Respon-
dent did not effectively repudiate its unlawful conduct on Feb-
ruary 20, 2004, and that the violations I have determined re-
mained viable.
C. Other 8(a)(1) Statements
January 30, 2004
The event in question was a meeting between Callas, Poole,
Stoy, and Colon, who served as the interpreter. Callas gave its
date as February 4, 2004, but Stoy’s notes show a January 30,
2004 date, and Stoy, Poole, and Colon all provided documents
establishing that they were not at the facility on February 4.48
Callas was unable to produce the notes she took at the time or

48 GC Exh. 48; R. Exhs. 28–30, 32, 45 and 46.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD770
to provide any other documents. Accordingly, I find that the
meeting occurred on January 30, 2004, as averred by Respon-
dent’s witnesses.
This meeting concerned Callas’ conduct in December 2003,
when, on 2 or 3 days, she solicited addresses and phone num-
bers from coworkers, saying that she wanted to send them
Christmas cards. Callas testified that she did this at breaks and
lunch times and that she later provided to the Union such in-
formation only from coworkers who authorized her to do so.
However, as described below, on at least one occasion she
did it on worktime and provided the Union with the address of
a coworker who did not authorize her to disclose it.
Crediting employee Rosa Franco, I find the following. In late
2003, Franco (a second-shift employee) had punched in and
was at her workstation when Callas (a first-shift employee)
approached her. Franco could not recall whether it was before
or after 2:30 p.m., because she normally punched in 1–7 min-
utes before the start of her shift at 2:30 p.m. Either way, how-
ever, one of them was on worktime because there was no gap
between shifts (if before 2:30 p.m., Callas was still on her shift;
if after 2:30 p.m., Franco had started hers). Callas said she
wanted Franco’s address to send her a Christmas card, and
Franco furnished it.
Later, a union representative came to Franco’s home. On a
date uncertain thereafter, Franco went to Stoy’s office. Through
an interpreter, she told him that a union representative had ar-
rived at her home; she did not know why but suspected that
Callas had provided the Union with her address because Callas
had asked for her address to send her a Christmas card. Franco
also told him that she did not want the Union bothering her.
In addition to Franco’s complaint, Stoy heard from a super-
visor that another employee, Wendy Aguilar (who is no longer
employed at the facility) had similarly complained. He reported
these complaints to Poole, who initiated the January 30 meet-
ing.
There is no dispute over certain statements that were made at
the meeting. Poole started off by referencing Callas’ status as a
long-term employee and her good performance. He then told
her that some of her coworkers had complained that after col-
lecting their addresses, presumably for Christmas cards, she
had shared that information with the Union, and this violated
the confidentiality of employees. She responded that she had
gathered the information to send Christmas cards and not to
disclose to the Union. I note that Callas testified that she told
him that she had known her coworkers “for a while,”49 and it
was just natural that they exchanged Christmas cards. Were this
so, I would expect she already would have had their addresses.
Both Callas and Franco had worked there for approximately 5
years at the time.
It is further undisputed that Poole talked about Callas solicit-
ing the addresses. Callas testified that Poole stated she could
not engage in such activity “in the plant” but could not recall if
he said anything about worktime or work hours. On the other
hand, Poole and Colon, as well as Stoy’s memorandum of the
meeting, state that he did so. This comported with Franco’s
description of when Callas solicited her address. Accordingly, I

49 Tr. 253.
find that Poole, as he testified, referenced the Company’s no-
solicitation policy and said she could not solicit on worktime.
This diminishes the reliability of Callas’ testimony about what
was said at the meeting and affects my evaluation of the follow-
ing.
Callas also testified that Poole asked her if she had gathered
the signatures to give to the Union, and she said no. She went
on to testify that he then said that “he just wanted to make
sure.”50 Poole denied asking her that. I credit Poole, both be-
cause of the above and because I find his testimony more plau-
sible. From the start of the meeting, he told her that employees
had complained that she had provided their addresses to the
Union, so he had no logical reason to question her on the sub-
ject. Nor would he have had any reason to want to “make sure”
she had not given signatures to the Union. Accordingly, as a
factual matter, I find that Poole did not interrogate Callas con-
cerning her union activities.
Management Speeches to Employees in February 2004
Of all facets of this case, testimony on the subject of man-
agement speeches to employees in February 2004, even as how
many meetings there were and what was said at particular
meetings, was subject to the most variation and confusion.
General Counsel’s witnesses (Callas, Cruz, and Martinez)
each testified about attending one meeting management held
with all first-shift production employees in February 2004.
However, Respondent provided documentation supporting its
witness’ testimony that management held two separate meet-
ings with all first-shift production employees that month, the
first on February 9 (the “union spies” speech); the second on
about February 19 (the “Pillowtex” speech). Callas and Cruz
did not have their contemporaneous notes of meetings in Feb-
ruary 2004. Accordingly, I credit Respondent’s witnesses and
find that management held two separate large-group meetings.
The allegations of the complaint relate only to statements made
at the second of these.
The date of the first meeting is based on the consistent testi-
mony of witnesses, as well as Stoy’s credited testimony that
management sent a fax to corporate headquarters that day, after
union leaflets had been distributed outside the facility.51 As to
the date of the second meeting, I credit Poole that the meeting
took place about a week after February 12, when he received
“talking points” for it from corporate headquarters.
Management later that month also held several smaller-group
meetings on the same day, concerning Respondent’s unionized
Detroit facility. Cruz attended one of them. She gave the date as
February 23. Respondent’s witnesses did not provide a specific
date for such meeting, and I credit Cruz.
For the February 9 union spy’s speech, Poole used talking
points that corporate headquarters had provided to him as refer-
ence points. He testified that he followed them and so in-
structed translator Roberts, who testified similarly. Stoy was
also present. This was after management became aware that a
petition for a $1-an-hour raise was being circulated among the
employees. At this meeting, neither he nor any other member of

50 Tr. 254.
51 R. Exh. 42.
CINTAS CORPORATION 771
management mentioned Pillowtex. The talking points, entitled
“Beware of Union Spies,” accused “a few people at some Cin-
tas locations” of being union spies, secreting collecting infor-
mation and giving it to the Union.52 The talking points went on
to propagandize against unionization.
Poole conducted the second meeting after Calles and Cruz
presented management with the first petition for a $1-an-hour
raise. Stoy and Roberts, again translating, were also present.
Poole once more used speaking points provided by headquar-
ters53 and instructed Roberts to do the same.
Stoy could not recall Poole’s exact words but testified that
Poole mentioned unprofitable companies and bankruptcy;
stated that Pillowtex (a large company in the Charlotte area)
had filed for bankruptcy in July 2003, resulting in job loss to
thousands; and told employees that the Company would con-
tinue to give them reviews and pay increases according to per-
formance. Poole testified that he stated that 8000 people had
lost their jobs when Pillowtex went bankrupt.
Their testimony was consistent with the speaking points,
which started off referring to the letter from employees request-
ing a pay raise of $1 an hour and then went on to talk about
what happens to companies like Pillowtex and the 8000 em-
ployees who lost their jobs when the company went bankrupt,
to discuss what Cintas offered in the way of profit sharing, and
to assure employees that its wages were competitive in the
marketplace. Nothing was said about unions or unionization,
other than at one point, “Did you know, for instance, that our
starting wages are 65 cents an hour higher than a competitor’s
unionized facility right here in town?” [Emphasis in original.]
The speaking points concluded with, “If you have any ques-
tions, you can ask them now? Or, of course, my door is always
open and you can ask me anything in private, if you have a
particular question.”
The General Counsel’s witnesses provided differing ac-
counts of one large-group meeting they recalled attending that
month, and some of what they said was not reconcilable even
between themselves.
Martinez testified about a meeting, on February 9, where
Stoy spoke and Roberts translated, but she apparently mixed
the union spies and Pillowtex meetings. Stoy stated that some-
one had called the Union, and he wanted to know who that
person was. He did not want the Union to get in because he did
not want to fall into bankruptcy; if the Company went into
bankruptcy, the employees would be without jobs and later on
would not be able to get a job, and it would be a bad record for
them. Martinez did not remember anyone asking questions.
On cross-examination, Martinez testified that Stoy said he
could not give the $1-an-hour increase the Union was seeking
because the Company wanted to be profitable; if it were not
profitable, it could go bankrupt like Pillowtex (this was the only
time she heard Pillowtex mentioned in management meetings).
He explained employee profit sharing. On cross-examination,
she reiterated that Stoy said that if the Union came, the Com-

52 There is no allegation that this speech created the impression of
surveillance. I note that it followed very closely in time Poole’s meet-
ing with Callas on January 30.
53 R. Exh. 31.
pany was going to go bankrupt and that he said she was going
find out who called the Union, and he was not going to allow
the Union to get in because it was telling employees lies. How-
ever, she then testified that Stoy said Respondent could go
bankrupt and we would not be able to get jobs elsewhere. Af-
terward, though, she again testified that Stoy said Respondent
would go bankrupt. Callas was at this meeting.
Cruz also testified about a February 9, 2004 meeting. As
with Martinez, she testified that Stoy made certain statements.
One of them was that he was figuring out that someone had
called the Union and someone was collecting signatures. He
said that employees did not need the Union, that the Union was
going to offer false promises, and that the Company was going
into bankruptcy, that the plant was going to be closed, and that
employees were going to lose their jobs. According to Cruz,
Callas stated that her brother had left because of an emergency
but that the Company did not take him back. Cruz did not recall
Callas saying anything else. On cross-examination, she also
testified that Stoy and Poole, through Roberts, stated that em-
ployees were giving personal information to the Union and they
understood that the Union had been making promises to people
to turn over such information. In contradiction to Martinez,
Cruz said there was no mention of Pillowtex or the $1-an-hour
raise petition at this meeting.
Callas gave February 9 as the date of the meeting she at-
tended, but it apparently was the second (Pillowtex meeting)
rather than the first, based on what she related was said. After
Coleridge spoke about work-related matters, Stoy stated that
Cintas did not want the Union, it wanted all its employees to be
completely satisfied, and that’s why it was not going to allow
the Union to get in. Because of the Union, other companies had
gone through bankruptcy and a lot of workers had been without
work. The Union was looking for employees’ money and giv-
ing false promises, offering checks and trips if employees
signed cards. He specifically mentioned Pillowtex was going
bankrupt and over 7000 employees were going to be without a
job because of the Union. Poole stated he would have an “open
door” communications policy. Nothing was said about “Union
spies” (consistent with the conclusion that there were two sepa-
rate large-group meetings). Callas further testified that she
raised certain questions, none having to do with her brother.
Stoy denied making any of the statements attributed to him
alleged to have violated Section 8(a)(1). I note that none of the
General Counsel’s witnesses testified that Stoy (or Poole) said
it would be futile for employees to select the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative.
From the above, it is evident that the testimony of General
Counsel’s witnesses was not fully consistent and, on important
certain points, contradictory. It is not entirely clear whether
they were even referring to the same meeting. Their credibility
on the meetings is therefore questionable, even taking into ac-
count the lapse of time and the fact that rarely, if ever, are any
two versions of a meeting exactly the same. I take note that all
three of these witnesses had given affidavits to the NLRB close
in time to the events and that all three prepared for trial with the
General Counsel, thereby affording them the opportunity to
refresh their recollections by reviewing those statements.
In the absence of uniform testimony from General Counsel’s
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD772
witnesses, I credit the testimony of Respondent’s witnesses that
Poole stuck to the speaking points provided by corporate head-
quarters when he spoke at both large-group meetings.54 If the
corporate headquarters considered the presentations important
enough that it provided directives of what should be said, I
doubt that he (even less so, Stoy or Roberts) would have devi-
ated far from, or elaborated much, on the “script.” Because of
language and translation issues, the employees who testified
might have read certain meanings into management’s state-
ments. I note in this regard Martinez’ interchange of the words
“would go” and “could go” into bankruptcy.
On February 23, Poole conducted several meetings with
smaller groups of employees because an employee had said
there was a Cintas location (Detroit) where employees were
getting free medical benefits. Poole used no speaking points
and kept no notes of these meetings.
The General Counsel does not allege that anything Poole
said at these meetings contravened the Act. Rather, it contends
that statements Stoy allegedly made to Cruz after the conclu-
sion of the formal meeting violated Section 8(a)(1). Although
Coleridge is also named in the relevant paragraph of the com-
plaint, Cruz’ testimony attributed no statements to him.
Poole, Stoy, and Santiago Nelson, who served as a translator,
were present at the small-group meeting that Cruz attended,
along with about 15 to 20 other employees. Cruz testified that
she stated at this meeting that she had a friend at National
Linen, a unionized company, and employees there were getting
free medical insurance, and it was good to have a union. At or
shortly after the conclusion of the meeting, Stoy asked her
where her friend worked (inconsistent with her testimony that
she had already spoken the name of the company during the
meeting, I credit Stoy and Nelson that she did not name Na-
tional Linen during the meeting itself). He wrote it down and
said he would find out if it were true and would call her. He
told her not to tell anybody and that his office was always open
and she could talk to him privately. On direct examination,
Cruz said nothing about Stoy mentioning the Union in any way.
Only on redirect examination, after being refreshed by her
affidavit, did Cruz testify that he told her that if she found out
new information about the Union, not to talk to him in the
meetings but to tell him privately in his office. Then, on re-
cross-examination, she averred that he said that if she had any
questions about the Union, to go to him directly and not go and
talk to anyone else. Thus, Cruz’ version of what he said about
the Union, if anything, varied throughout the course of her
testimony.
Stoy testified that Cruz voluntarily stayed after the meeting,
and he then asked her for the name of the company, saying he
would investigate and get back to her. He denied telling her if
she had any questions about the Union to go directly to him, not
to talk to anyone else about the Union, or to report privately to

54 I find it more plausible that Poole, not Stoy, conducted the meet-
ings. I consider it unlikely that Stoy would have directed them when
Poole, his superior, was present and had called them. Since the employ-
ees who testified were much more familiar with Stoy than Poole (who
had arrived at the plant only the previous month), they may have natu-
rally assumed that Roberts was translating for Stoy rather than Poole.
him.
Because Cruz was inconsistent in relating what Stoy said
about the Union, I cannot find that he tied any remarks he made
to the Union or her union activity.
Conclusions
Poole’s meeting with Callas on January 30 was based on a
bona fide complaint from at least one of her coworkers that she
had solicited addresses to provide to the Union, and this oc-
curred on work time. Poole did not tell Callas that there was a
company rule prohibiting union activity and that she could not
violate it. Rather, aside from any issue of “confidentiality,” he
referenced company policy that she could solicit only on non-
work time. His doing so was not a violation of the Act. See
Lutheran Heritage Village—Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 650 at fn.
5 (2004); Stodard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962).
As to meeting on about February 19, I have found manage-
ment’s account of what was said more credible than the incon-
sistent testimony of General Counsel’s witnesses. I therefore
conclude that the General Counsel has not sustained its burden
of showing that Respondent committed any violations of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) at that meeting. Respondent was engaging in le-
gitimate antiunion propaganda. At most, management hinted or
implied that if the Union were selected, company profits might
be affected, and this could impact employees’ job security. In
the absence of other coercive circumstances, mere statements of
possible consequences of unionization do not constitute threats
in violation of Section 8(a)(1). See Benjamin Coal Co., 294
NLRB 572, 573 fn. 1 (1989); Uarco, Inc., 286 NLRB 55, 58
(1987).
Similarly, since I have found that Cruz was not a credible
witness in relating what Stoy said to her after the February 23
meeting, the conclusion follows that the General Counsel has
failed to establish the violations Stoy allegedly committed.
3. Setting aside of the 2004 settlement agreement
Documents pertaining to this settlement agreement (SA) are
contained in the formal papers. At times relevant, Region 4
served as the coordinating Region for the General Counsel in
handling charges the Union filed against Respondent for al-
leged misconduct at various locations, including Charlotte.
The Regional Director for Region 4 (RD) reached agreement
with Respondent on a global SA. As to Charlotte, it encom-
passed management’s conduct toward nonemployees who
handbilled for the Union on January 13, 2003. A representative
of Cintas signed the SA on January 7, 2004, and the RD ap-
proved it on January 20, 2004. The Union later declined to
exercise its right to appeal from the RD’s decision to approve
the SA, and the RD, by letter dated April 5, 2004, advised Re-
spondent to “now take the necessary steps to affect compliance
with the settlement agreement.” It is undisputed that Respon-
dent subsequently fully complied with the terms of the SA,
including notice posting.
Respondent seeks dismissal of paragraphs 9–11 (and deriva-
tive 23) of the complaint, relating to the alleged violations that
were the subject of the SA. Respondent does not, however,
contend that the remaining portions of the complaint concern-
ing the Charlotte facility (pars. 12–22) should be dismissed
because of the SA.
CINTAS CORPORATION 773
During the pendency of the settlement process, the Union
filed charges with Region 11, concerning the Charlotte facility
on March 2, 2004. These charges were amended to include
additional allegations, on April 16 and August 31, 2004, and
February 9, 2005.
Based on those charges, I have found that Respondent com-
mitted the following violations in 2004:
1. On February 9, Coleridge told Cruz she could not wear a
union sticker on her uniform.
2. On February 10, Coleridge told Cruz she could not have a
union flyer in her work area and had to take it home.
3. On February 16, Coleridge told Galdamez she could not
display a union hat in her work area.
4. On February 16, Respondent issued Galdamez a verbal
warning for wearing that hat.
5. On February 20, Coleridge confiscated union flyers from
employees on nonworktime in a nonwork area and told them
they could not read such flyers there.
6. On March 1, Coleridge and/or Stoy told Callas, Cruz, and
Galdamez that they had to remove union stickers from their
uniforms.
7. On March 1, Respondent issued verbal warnings to Cal-
las, Cruz, Rosa Cruz, and Emelinda Rivera for wearing union
stickers on their uniforms.
8. On March 1, Respondent issued a written warning to Gal-
damez for wearing a union sticker on her uniform.
9. On March 1, Stoy implied to Galdamez that she would be
discharged if she again wore a union hat or a union sticker.
Conclusions
A SA may be set aside and ULPs found on presettlement
conduct if there has been a failure to comply with the provi-
sions of the SA or if postsettlement ULPs are committed.
Scripps Memorial Hospital Encinitas, 347 NLRB 52, 53
(2006); Nations Rents, Inc., 339 NLRB 830, 831 (2003); Twin
City Concrete, Inc., 317 NLRB 1313 (1995). The General
Counsel relies on the latter ground.
Some of the violations I have found are based on allegations
in the amended charges filed on and after April 16, 2004, fol-
lowing the RD’s April 5, 2004 letter to Respondent regarding
commencement of compliance. Pigeonholing violations as
“presettlement” or “postsettlement” is an illusive task in light of
the hiatus between when Respondent signed the SA and when it
was directed to begin compliance, and the on-going nature of
the Union’s filing of charges in 2004 and 2005.
These violations were not isolated or minor. They were in-
tensive considering that they all occurred within less than a
month’s time (February 9–March 1), they affected a number of
employees, and they resulted in the imposition of discipline on
five of them, including a written warning to one. See Fooda-
rama, 260 NLRB 298, 299 fn. 2 (1982); Porto Mills, Inc., 149
NLRB 1454, 1470 (1964). Moreover, the first were committed
just over a month after Respondent signed the SA and even
before Respondent commenced compliance with the terms of
the SA.
Whether to give effect to, or to revoke, a SA, must be deter-
mined by an evaluation of all of the circumstances presented in
a case, and not by the application of rigid rules. Nations Rents,
id.; Deister Concentrator Co., 253 NLRB 358, 359 (1980).
Considering all of the above circumstances, I conclude that the
RD properly set aside the terms of the SA and that such result
best effectuates the purposes of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By the following conduct at its Branford, Connecticut fa-
cility, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(a) Interrogated an employee concerning whether her signa-
ture appearing on a union-initiated letter relating to employees’
health and safety was genuine.
4. By the following conduct at its Charlotte, North Carolina
facility, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices af-
fecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act and violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act:
(a) Summoned the police to interfere with nonemployees en-
gaged in handbilling for the Union.
(b) Told employees to remove union stickers from the shirts
of their uniforms.
(c) Told an employee she could not have a union flyer in her
work area and must take it home.
(d) Told an employee she could not display a union hat in
her work area.
(e) Confiscated union flyers from employees on nonwork-
time in a nonwork area and told them they could not read such
flyers there.
(f) Implied to an employee that she would be discharged if
she again wore a union hat or a union sticker.
5. By the following conduct at its Charlotte, North Carolina
facility, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices af-
fecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act and violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act:
(a) Issued to Candy Galdamez a verbal warning for wearing
a union hat, and a written warning for wearing a union sticker
on the shirt of her uniform.
(b) Issued to Ana Callas, Raquel Cruz, Rosa Cruz, and
Emelinda Rivera verbal warnings for wearing union stickers on
the shirts of their uniforms.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Both the General Counsel and the Union seek extraordinary
remedies. The General Counsel urges that Respondent at Char-
lotte be required to read the notice to all employees and to grant
the Union and its representative’s access to bulletin boards and
other posting areas in Respondent’s facilities. The Union re-
quests, at both Charlotte and Branford, not only these extraor-
dinary remedies but also that Respondent be ordered to provide
to the Union a list of the names and addresses of employees, to
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD774
be updated periodically, as well as imposition of a broad cease-
and-desist order. I stated earlier my reasons for rejecting Re-
spondent’s effort to expand the scope of the trial to union activ-
ity occurring at facilities other than Branford and Charlotte. For
those same reasons, I deem it inappropriate, in evaluating the
Union’s request for extraordinary remedies, to consider conduct
of Respondent not specifically litigated before me.
Extraordinary remedies may be appropriate when a respon-
dent’s ULP’s are “so numerous, pervasive, and outrageous”
that such remedies are necessary to “dissipate fully the coercive
effects of the unfair labor practices found.” Federated Logistics
& Operations, 340 NLRB 255, 256 (2003), quoting Fieldcrest
Cannon, Inc., 318 NLRB 470, 473 (1995). This may include a
public reading of the notice or supplying updated names and
addresses of employees to a union. Federated Logistics, ibid. A
broad cease-and-desist order may be appropriate where a re-
spondent has shown a proclivity to violate the Act. Hickman
Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).
As to Branford, I have found only one violation of Section
8(a)(1), and the prior SA at that facility was never revoked. I
therefore see no justification for special remedies at Branford.
Turning to Charlotte, I have found but a single violation in
2003—Coleridge’s summoning the police to interfere with
nonemployee handbillers. In contrast, the 2004 ULPs were
substantial. Nevertheless, they all occurred in a narrow time-
frame, a 3-week period from February 9–March 1—hardly
demonstrating an ongoing pattern of interfering with employ-
ees’ organizational rights under the Act. Contrast, Florida Steel
Corp., 244 NLRB 395 (1979). Moreover, most involved only
supervisor Coleridge, rather than higher-level management, a
factor militating against extraordinary remedies. Contrast, Fed-
erated Logistics, above at 257. Although Poole directed the
confiscation of union flyers from the breakroom, he did make
efforts to undo that unlawful conduct, albeit they did not
amount to retraction as a matter of law. As to Stoy, any role he
played in the unlawful disciplinary actions issued to employees
who demonstrated union support, and his one 8(a)(1) violation,
were based on actions initiated by Coleridge. Finally, aside
from the incident involving confiscation of union flyers in the
breakroom, only 5 production employees out of approximately
90 were subjected to ULPs. Therefore, the ULPs did not “per-
vade” the unit. Contrast Federated Logistics, id.
In these circumstances, I conclude that the ULPs at Charlotte
were not “so numerous, pervasive, and outrageous” as to re-
quire the imposition of extraordinary remedies, and I therefore
deny the General Counsel’s and Union’s requests for such.
The General Counsel also seeks expungement from Respon-
dent’s records of any references to the verbal warning issued to
Candy Galdamez on February 16, 2004; to the written warning
issued to her on March 1, 2004; and to the verbal warnings
issued to Ana Callas, Maria Raquel Cruz, Rosa Cruz, and
Emelinda Rivera on March 1, 2004. This is a standard remedy.
Finding it appropriate, I will so order.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]