Cinderella A. Madison, Petitioner,v.Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 10, 2004
03A40105 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 10, 2004)

03A40105

08-10-2004

Cinderella A. Madison, Petitioner, v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense, Agency.


Cinderella A. Madison v. Department of Defense

03A40105

August 10, 2004

.

Cinderella A. Madison,

Petitioner,

v.

Donald H. Rumsfeld,

Secretary,

Department of Defense,

Agency.

Petition No. 03A40105

MSPB No. DA-0752-02-0095-I-2

DECISION

On August 4, 2004, petitioner filed a timely petition with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission asking for review of a Final Order

issued by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) concerning her claim

of discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

Petitioner, a Senior Instructor, GS-11, at the agency's Defense Language

Institute English Language Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas,

alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of disability

(endolymphatic hydrops<1>) when she was removed from employment effective

October 5, 2001 for medical inability to perform the essential functions

of her position.

Petitioner timely re-filed a mixed case appeal with the MSPB following

a dismissal without prejudice. After a hearing, the MSPB Administrative

Judge (AJ) reversed the removal action, finding that the agency had not

established a high probability of hazard that petitioner's condition

would result in injury to her if petitioner were to continue working in

her position. The MSPB AJ further found, however, that petitioner had

not established the affirmative defense of disability discrimination.

More specifically, the MSPB AJ found that petitioner had not established

that she was an �individual with a disability.� The Board denied

petitioner's petition for review.

EEOC regulations provide that the Commission has jurisdiction over

mixed case appeals on which the MSPB has issued a decision that makes

determinations on allegations of discrimination. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.303

et seq. The Commission must determine whether the decision of the

MSPB with respect to the allegation of discrimination constitutes a

correct interpretation of any applicable law, rule, regulation or policy

directive, and is supported by the evidence in the record as a whole.

29 C.F.R. � 1614.305(c).

Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner has established

coverage under the Rehabilitation Act, her claim of discrimination

based on disability still fails. The record reflects that petitioner

provided the agency with two letters from her physician, the second of

which stated, in relevant part:

[I]t is absolutely imperative that this lady be placed in a work

place environment in which she is not exposed to changing chemicals.

An example would be if she is in an office and they come in to paint

this office or around the area, she is probably going to get sick.

Petitioner nonetheless maintained that she could tolerate brief exposures

to such chemicals.

The record contains a questionnaire from the agency for petitioner's

physician requesting specific information regarding, among other matters,

proximity and concentration issues relative to fumes and odors. More

specifically, the agency advised that most of its facilities shared common

heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, and requested

to know what impact traveling fumes might have on petitioner's condition;

in other words, whether and to what extent petitioner's condition

would be affected by fumes traveling through a building's HVAC system.

Despite two requests, however, petitioner declined to provide the agency

with any information beyond the original two letters from her physician.

Under the Rehabilitation Act, the agency was permitted to request

additional medical information necessary to determine what accommodation

was required. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation

and Undue Hardship, at Q. 6. By failing to provide the reasonable

documentation that the agency requested, petitioner was responsible

for the breakdown in the interactive process; therefore, the agency

cannot be held liable for denial of reasonable accommodation. See Lavery

v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01A14788 (February 26,

2003); Jiminez v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03A20052 (June

25, 2002); Sacco v. Department of Justice, EEOC Petition No. 03A10104 (May

16, 2002); Ross v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01982708

(August 2, 2001).

The agency was entitled to rely upon the statement of petitioner's

personal physician that she should be placed in a work environment

where she would not be exposed to chemicals. See Billy J. Nale

v. v. Department of the Army, EEOC Petition No. 03970162 (December 29,

1997); see also Thomas H. Hebda v. Department of the Interior, EEOC

Appeal No. 01986569 (July 13, 2001), req. to reopen den., EEOC Request

No. 05A20084 (October 3, 2002) (agency may rely on medical reports by

petitioner's/complainant's personal physician). Petitioner twice was

afforded the opportunity to submit additional information to address the

agency's questions regarding the level of exposure that might, in fact,

be acceptable. When she refused to do so, the agency determined, based

on the information then in its possession, that petitioner's medical

restrictions could not be accommodated.

Based upon a thorough review of the record and for the foregoing reasons,

it is the decision of the Commission to CONCUR with the final decision

of the MSPB finding no discrimination. The Commission finds that the

MSPB's decision constitutes a correct interpretation of the laws, rules,

regulations, and policies governing this matter and is supported by the

evidence in the record as a whole.

PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (W0900)

This decision of the Commission is final, and there is no further right of

administrative appeal from the Commission's decision. You have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court,

based on the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, within

thirty (30) calendar days of the date that you receive this decision.

If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the

complaint the person who is the official agency head or department head,

identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

�Agency� or �department� means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above (�Right

to File a Civil Action�).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 10, 2004

__________________

Date

1�Endolymphatic hydrops� is defined in the record as an inner ear

condition in which fluctuating blood vessel control at the base of the

brain results in tinnitus and, at times, vertigo, dizziness, fluctuating

hearing loss, and pressure in the ears. The symptoms are triggered

by exposure to out-gassing of chemicals such as latex paint, flooring

adhesives, cleaning supplies, and certain office supplies.