01A11835
10-26-2001
Christine M. Valdez, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Western Area), Agency.
Christine M. Valdez v. United States Postal Service
01A11835
October 26, 2001
.
Christine M. Valdez,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Western Area),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A11835
Agency Nos. 4E-800-0157-98; 4E-800-0200-98; 4E-800-0311-98
Hearing Nos. 320-99-8066X; 320-99-8200X; 320-99-8013X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency action
concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.<1>
The appeal is accepted for the Commission's de novo review pursuant to
29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, we reverse the agency's
final order and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.
The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was
employed as a Distribution Clerk at the agency's Englewood Main Post
Office in Englewood, Colorado. Complainant filed three formal complaints
alleging that the agency discriminated against her on the bases of race
(Caucasian), disabilities (carpal tunnel syndrome and severe dysmenorrhea)
and in reprisal for prior protected activity (arising under the above
referenced Acts) when:
1. On February 6, 1998, the agency required her to submit medical
documentation;
2. On March 6, 1998, a supervisor ran a mail hamper into her back and
consequently complainant received an investigative interview and a Letter
of Warning; and
3. On March 27, 1998, after receiving a release from her physician,
the agency did not allow complainant to return to work.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a
copy of the investigative file and requested a hearing before an EEOC
Administrative Judge. The Administrative Judge issued a decision without
a hearing finding no discrimination.
The Administrative Judge concluded that complainant failed to establish
either a prima facie case of race or reprisal discrimination, noting
that complainant failed to produce evidence that the agency treated her
less favorably than similarly situated non-Caucasians or that there was
a causal connection between her prior protected activity and the agency's
allegedly adverse actions. The Administrative Judge also concluded that
because complainant presented insufficient evidence that her impairments
substantially limited one or more major life activities as defined by
the Rehabilitation Act, complainant failed to establish a prima facie
case of disability discrimination.
Without analysis, the Administrative Judge further concluded that the
agency proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions
which complainant failed to prove were a pretext to mask intentional
discrimination.
The agency's final action adopted the Administrative Judge's decision.
On appeal, complainant contends, among other things, that summary judgment
was inappropriate because there were genuine issues of material fact and
because the Administrative Judge weighed the evidence and determined the
truth of the matters before him. Complainant also contends that the
Administrative Judge adopted, nearly verbatim, facts contained in the
agency's affidavits while never acknowledging complainant's contradictory
version of what transpired. The agency stands on the record, which
complainant noted was missing documents which she had submitted to the
Denver District Office, and requests that we affirm its final order.
The Commission's regulations allow an Administrative Judge to issue a
decision without a hearing when he finds that there is no genuine issue of
material fact. This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment
procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The United States Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is
appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal
and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine
issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment a court does not
sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non moving party must
be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences
must be drawn in the non moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of
fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder
could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105
(1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect
the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing
conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate. In the context
of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an Administrative Judge
may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that
the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as
a "trial by affidavit." Redmand v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st
Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted that when a party submits an
affidavit and credibility is at issue, "there is a need for strident
cross-examination and summary judgment on such evidence is improper."
Pedersen v. Department of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940339 (February
24, 1995).
After a careful review of the record, we find that the Administrative
Judge erred when he concluded that there was no genuine issue of material
fact in this case. In finding no discrimination, complainant correctly
points out that the Administrative Judge relied on the representations of
management officials as provided in their affidavits. Specifically, the
Administrative Judge found that the agency requested medical documentation
in February 1998
because complainant's supervisor believed she was abusing her leave.
We note that the Administrative Judge did not address the fact that
complainant had provided appropriate medical documentation three
weeks earlier. Complainant contends that she was not abusing her
leave and that her supervisor was trying to harass her because of an
agreement complainant and the agency entered into in 1991 which permitted
complainant to take one day off a month due to her severe dysmenorrhea.
Accordingly, there was a genuine dispute concerning whether complainant
was abusing her leave. We find this factual determination to be material
since it was the agency's explanation for requesting further medical
documentation.
Concerning the mail hamper incident, there is a genuine dispute
between the parties as to whether complainant continued to yell and use
profanities when she was in her supervisor's office after the incident,
but the Administrative Judge, without acknowledging complainant's
version of what happened in spite of complainant's evidence undermining
her supervisor's credibility, adopted the agency's version. We find a
factual determination to be material since the mail hamper events resulted
in complainant receiving a Letter of Warning after the Postmaster, the
Station Manager and the Union Steward conducted some sort of inquiry,
which complainant alleges was an �investigative interview� in order to
determine what had transpired.
Finally, we find that there is a genuine dispute between the parties as to
whether complainant was out on leave in March 1998 due to a job-related
or non job-related illness. The agency concluded that the illness was
not job related and thus required clearance for complainant to return
to work while complainant alleged that she was experiencing problems
as a result of carpal tunnel syndrome. Although the Administrative
Judge found that complainant failed to present medical documentation of
her carpal tunnel syndrome, he also concluded that the clearance was
required because the agency needed to understand what restrictions,
if any, complainant should be placed under as a result of her mental
condition and carpal tunnel syndrome. We find a factual determination
regarding the nature of complainant's illness to be material because
the required clearance delayed complainant's return to work.
We note that the hearing process is intended to be an extension of the
investigative process, designed to �ensure that the parties have a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement the record and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.� See EEOC Management Directive (MD)
110, November 9, 1999, at 6-1; see also 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.109(d) and (e).
�Truncation of this process, while material facts are still in dispute
and the credibility of witnesses is still ripe for challenge, improperly
deprives complainant of a full and fair investigation of her claims.�
Mi S. Bang v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01961575
(March 26, 1998). See also Peavley v. United States Postal Service,
EEOC Request No. 05950628 (October 31, 1996); Chronister v. United States
Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05940578 (April 23, 1995). In summary,
there are simply too many unresolved issues which require an assessment
as to the credibility of the various management officials, co-workers,
and complainant, herself. Therefore, summary judgment should not have
been granted as to the claims raised in the instant complaints.
Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
arguments on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence
not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission reverses the
agency's final action and remands the matter to the agency in accordance
with this decision and the ORDER below.
ORDER
The agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the Denver District Office
the request for a hearing and a copy of the complaint files within fifteen
(15) calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency
shall provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the
address set forth below that the complaint files have been transmitted
to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall hold
a hearing and issue a decision on the complaints in accordance with 29
C.F.R. � 1614.109, and the agency shall take final action in accordance
with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to
the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's
order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement
of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the
right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's
order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.
See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).
Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on
the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled
"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.
A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying
complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date
that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in
the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department
head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
October 26, 2001
__________________
Date
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
__________________
Date
______________________________
1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination
by federal employees or applicants for employment.