01A33477_r
02-03-2004
Christine M. O'Brien, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Christine M. O'Brien v. United States Postal Service
01A33477
February 3, 2004
.
Christine M. O'Brien,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A33477
Agency No. HO-000-0158-02
DECISION
The record reveals that on April 11, 2003, complainant and the agency
entered into a settlement agreement regarding complainant's EEO complaint.
The settlement provided, in pertinent part, that in exchange for
complainant voluntarily withdrawing her complaint and agreeing not to
seek re-employment with the agency now or at any time in the future,
the agency agreed that it would pay complainant a lump sum payment of
$2,000 as soon as practicable.
The record contains a letter dated April 28, 2003, wherein complainant
informed the agency that she considered the settlement agreement null
and void, as well as breached, because the agency representative told
her during settlement negotiations that her monetary award had to be
considered taxable income. Complainant stated that according to the
Internal Revenue Service, her monetary award is not taxable because
it is an award of compensatory damages for violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. Complainant further stated that she would
not have signed the settlement agreement if the agency representative
had not insisted that all awards must be submitted as taxable income.
Complainant claimed that she was not afforded time during the mediation
process to review the law and then make up her mind.
By agency decision dated April 29, 2003, the agency determined that it
had not breached the settlement agreement. According to the agency,
it is procedure that a 1099 is issued whenever monies are paid out.
The agency further stated that the paperwork had been prepared and
submitted for payment of the monies to complainant.
On appeal, complainant claims that during mediation, the agency attorney
threatened to dissolve the mediation if she didn't agree that the monetary
award would be taxable and reported as income to the Internal Revenue
Service. According to complainant, she was given inaccurate information
by the agency attorney. Complainant contends that she should not have had
to agree to claim her settlement award as income since she was provided
with a compensatory damages award for a non-punitive, non-physical injury,
and a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
In response, the agency asserts that it promptly issued complainant the
payment provided by the settlement agreement. The agency states that
the check was delivered to complainant on April 30, 2003.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
If the complainant believes that the agency has failed to comply with
the terms of a settlement agreement or final action, the complainant
shall notify the EEO Director, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance
within 30 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of the
alleged noncompliance. The complainant may request that the terms of
the agreement be specifically implemented, or, alternatively, that the
complaint be reinstated for further processing from the point processing
ceased.
The Commission has consistently held that settlement agreements are
contracts between the complainant and the agency, and it is the intent of
the parties as expressed in the contract, not some unexpressed intention,
that controls the contract's construction. Eggleston v. Department
of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05900795 (August 23, 1990).
In ascertaining the intent of the parties with regard to the terms of a
settlement agreement, the Commission has generally relied on the plain
meaning rule. See Hyon v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request
No. 05910787 (December 2, 1991). This rule states that if the writing
appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be
determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to
extrinsic evidence of any nature. See Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Building
Eng'g Servs. Co., 730 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1984).
In the instant case, we find no bad faith in the negotiation of the
settlement agreement. The record indicates that the agency's policy
toward payment awards is to submit the information to the Internal Revenue
Service for consideration as taxable income. The agency attorney's
adherence to that policy during mediation did not constitute an effort
to mislead complainant. Furthermore, we find that complainant has not
established that she entered into the settlement agreement under duress.
Assuming arguendo, that the agency attorney threatened to dissolve the
mediation if complainant did not agree to the agency's terms, we find
that such a statement does not rise to the level of coercion. Therefore,
we find that complainant entered into a valid settlement agreement. As
to the issue of whether a breach of the settlement agreement occurred,
we find that the agency promptly complied with the agreement by providing
complainant with a check in the amount of $2,000.00 within three weeks
of the execution of the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the agency's
decision finding that it did not breach the settlement agreement was
proper and is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
February 3, 2004
__________________
Date