Chickasha Mobile Homes, Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsOct 19, 1971193 N.L.R.B. 807 (N.L.R.B. 1971) Copy Citation CHICKASHA MOBILE HOMES, INC. 807 Chickasha Mobile Homes, Inc. and United Brother- hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO . Cases 16-CA-4254 and 16-CA-4310 October 19, 1971 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND KENNEDY On August 3, 1971, Trial Examiner Herzel H. E. Plaine issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision with a brief in support thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.' The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this proceeding, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that Respondent, Chickasha Mobile Homes, Inc., Chicka- sha, Oklahoma, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order. I We find no merit in Respondent's contention that the Trial Examiner was biased and prejudiced TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION HERZEL H. E. PLAINE, Trial Examiner: The Employer (Respondent) is charged with having discharged two of its employees in early 1971 because of their sympathy for or assistance to the Charging Party (Union), and with having engaged in coercive interrogation, and creating the impression of surveillance, of employees concerning their union activities or interest, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). The matter was tried on a consolidated complaint, issued April 6, 1971, based on a charge filed February 3, 1971, in Case 16-CA-4254, and on a charge filed March 29, 1971, amended April 6,197 1, in Case 16-CA-4310. Respondent admits the discharges but contends that both were for causes unrelated to union activity or sympathy, and denies engaging in any other unlawful antiunion activity. In this connection, Respondent also denies the supervisory or agency status of several of the persons charged with acting on its behalf. The cases were tried in Chickasha, Oklahoma, April 20-21, 1971. Counsel for the General Counsel and for the Respondent have filed briefs.' Upon the entire record of the case , including my observation of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent is a Delaware corporation, with facilities in several States, engaged in the manufacture of mobile homes at its plant in Chickasha, Oklahoma, and their distribution from said plant. In the 12 months prior to issuance of the consolidated complaint, Respondent received at its Okla- homa plant goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside Oklahoma, and shipped from its Oklahoma plant products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside Oklahoma. Respondent is, as it concedes, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is, as the parties admit, a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Business Operation In its business of manufacturing and selling mobile homes (also referred to as coaches), Respondent operates plants at Chickasha, Oklahoma; Watertown, South Dako- ta; and Vidalia, Georgia, and an accounting office at Kansas City, Missouri. At the Chickasha plant, where the events of these cases transpired in the period of January-March 1971, there were about 160 employees engaged in production and in the receiving and handling of production materials . The bulk, or about 150 employees, were on the production assembly line, which was divided into 10 groups or departments, such as floor installation, sidewall installation, and so on.2 In charge of production at the Chickasha plant was Prod- I After the time for filing briefs had expired, counsel for Respondent filed a supplemental brief, without leave , purporting to provide some information and argument derived from a representation proceeding, involving the Respondent and the Union , subsequent to the trial of this case . The representative of the Union filed an answering letter Notwithstanding the irregularity of this procedure, I have considered both documents 2 On March 22, 1971, there was a layoff of 16 production employees and a discharge of 9, for a total reduction in force of 25 employees By the time of the trial , I month later , the production force was back to about 140 employees , according to Production Manager Ed Green 193 NLRB No. 124 808 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD uction Manager Ed Green, assisted by two foremen, Hogstead and Scott, and a leadman (total 10) immediately in charge of each of the 10 production line departments. The plant was producing five coaches per day but cut back to four per day with the reduction in force of March 22, 1971 (fn. 2, supra), according to the coordinator to the president , Keith Finley. In the receiving department, concerned with the receiving and handling of material, according to Coordinator Finley, there were about six full-time employees, plus temporary or part-time help engaged from time to time. Plant Manager Denzil Hankins was in charge of the receiving department assisted by Supervisor of Receiving and Material Handling Lester Rogers and by receiving clerk Billy Moore. The plant manager (Hankins), according to Coordinator Finley, is in charge of the purchase of materials, supervises the office clericals and the receiving department, and, while not directly responsible for plant production, is sufficiently in charge to settle disputes between the production and receiving departments. In overall charge of company operations at all three plants, but physically located at the Chickasha plant, is General Manager Ronnie Racznski. He is assisted by General Production Manager Frank Moore (to whom the three plant production managers respond) and by Director of Purchasing Ed Fry (to whom the plant managers respond). Also located at Chickasha, but part of manage- ment for all three plants, is Keith Finley, the coordinator to the president of the Company and an officer of the Company. The supervisory status of each of the several managers, the coordinator, and the two production foremen is conceded, but Respondent disputes the supervisory status of Supervisor of Receiving and Material Handling Lester Rogers and receiving clerk Billy Moore (not to be confused with General Production Manager Frank Moore). B. Supervisory Status of Supervisor Lester Rogers and Receiving Clerk Billy Moore I Facts concerning Rogers In March 1970, Lester Rogers came from the production department to the receiving department, where he served as the receiving clerk. In August 1970 he was given a new job and title, which he presently holds, supervisor of receiving and material handling. At the same time Billy Moore, a former employee who had returned to the Company in July 1970, was moved into Rogers' previous job as receiving clerk. Coordinator Finley provided information concerning the jobs of both Supervisor Rogers and Receiving Clerk Billy Moore. Rogers was made supervisor of receiving and material handling, said Finley, to free Rogers from the time-consuming task of directing the workload of the receiving department, so that he could become the "eyes and ears" of the plant manager in the shop, where the plant manager could not spend much time. Through receiving clerk Billy Moore, who has taken Supervisor Rogers' old job, said Finley, Rogers had the responsibility of the receiving department, and in addition has responsibility for counting materials for the plant manager, and for the cleanliness of the plant . In the latter regard , in addition to the group of four or five full-time employees who serve directly under the receiving clerk, Supervisor Rogers has been assigned a trashman directly responsible to him for cleanup work. From the whole testimony, it appeared that Supervisor Rogers' function and supervision was not limited to overseeing the receiving clerk and employees of the receiving department and the trashman , but also extended to employees on the production line, at least in regard to materials handling and plant cleanliness . For example, Rogers testified to having reprimanded employee Gillis, of the sidewall department on the production line, for improper handling of scrap materials , in Rogers ' opinion; and employee Gillis acknowledged the occasion , claiming he gave an explanation satisfactory to Rogers. Employee Gillis also testified to bringing to Supervisor Rogers' attention , on several occasions , the inclusion of inferior lumber in the lumber Gillis was receiving , and asking Rogers to help correct the situation. On authority to hire and fire, while Coordinator Finley was of more definitive contrary information provided by others. Rogers himself provided some of it, though reluctantly and with less frankness at the start than his oath as a witness required . Thus, he initially denied any authority to hire or fire employees. Nevertheless, under prodding, he admitted that he had authority, and had exercised it, to hire and fire part -time employees . Employee Leon Henry, who was in layoff status about to be recalled to work, testified that he had seen two occasions when Supervisor Rogers terminated employees by handing them their paychecks ; and Rogers himself finally admitted there were four such occasions, but limited , he said, to terminating part -time employees. Concerning full-time employees , Supervisor Rogers disclaimed any capacity or interest in the hiring, or in effectively recommending hiring, but then conceded that if the plant manager and he , Rogers, were satisfied with an applicant, the plant manager would hire him. Later, Rogers sought to back away from this concession by stating that his sole interest was in being satisfied that the new hire was not too young for insurance coverage. He rather quickly ate those words by admitting he had to be satisfied that the applicant was one who would cooperate with receiving clerk Billy Moore. Moreover, there was testimony that would indicate that the line Supervisor Rogers drew for himself between full- time and part-time employees was probably not there. Employee Robert Leake, who had operated a forklift as a full-time employee in the receiving department before his discharge in January 1971, testified that Rogers hired him in October 1970, and neither Rogers nor any one else testified that this was not the case. Supervisor Rogers also testified that he was in charge of checking timecards at the end of each week, and that he made or initialed changes on timecards where , for example, an employee had checked out and Rogers had called the employee back to help unload a truck. Again Rogers sought to back away from saying he had any authority, in this case to approve timecard changes, but admitted that the office accepted his timecard markings. CHICKASHA MOBILE HOMES, INC 809 2. Facts concerning Billy Moore As already noted in the case of Rogers, Coordinator Finley testified that the receiving clerk has the time- consuming task of directing the workload of the receiving department This means, explained Supervisor Rogers, that receiving clerk Billy Moore is responsible, through each of his four or five regular men and any part-time helpers, for seeing that (1) goods are taken from railway car, truck, and bus station and placed in the right locations by sizes and quantities in the warehouse, or in outdoor storage, or at points in the production line; (2) materials are not damaged in their unloading and moving; and (3) materials are kept straight and accessible as inventory moves in and then out to the production line. The forklift operators look to receiving clerk Moore for instruction on where and how to place things, unless they already know where certain goods go, said Rogers. Small items are kept in cages, with at least one man working there regularly. Additionally, Moore is responsible to keep tabs on all goods coming in and to keep Supervisor Rogers currently informed of all incoming merchandise and their whereabouts in the plant. Receiving clerk Moore works directly with everyone in the receiving department, except the trashman who comes directly to Supervisor Rogers for instructions, said Rogers, and if Moore directs employees of the receiving department to do something they do it. Employees Henry and Leake also provided corroborative testimony on this score, indicating that they got their orders and immediate direction from receiving clerk Moore, that Moore got his directions from Supervisor Rogers, and that Rogers was answerable to Plant Manager Hankins. Receiving clerk Moore, though called to testify by Respondent, gave no testimony on his role or lack of it in the hiring and firing process. Employee Leon Henry, who had worked for Respondent several times over a period of years, testified that on his last hiring in August 1970, Moore had hired him, and that he had since observed Moore hiring some part-time help and terminating their employment.3 Equally indicative that receiving clerk Moore had an effective part in the hiring and firing process of the receiving department, was Supervisor Rogers' testimony that no full-time employee was discharged until Moore and he had talked about the employee in question and agreed that the employee was not measuring up. When that happened, said Rogers, the plant manager followed the recommendation forthwith, except that if it involved a person the plant manager did not know he might make a spot check first.4 Conclusion In my view, both Supervisor Lester Rogers and receiving clerk Billy Moore were and are supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. 3 Respondent suggests that because the signature of then Plant Manager Woods (predecessor of Hankins) appears on employee Henry's job application form (G C Exh 7), Henry was mistaken as to who hired him, but the presence of the plant manager's signature on the form would hardly disprove Henry's testimony that it was Moore who was responsible for hiring him in view of the absence of a denial by Moore, and the testimony of Supervisor Rogers that it was customary to take a recruit to the plant manager's office for filling the application form, an interview, and getting a Supervisor Rogers had total plant responsibility for receiving materials and material handling. His function left the plant manager largely free to pursue his major purchasing function and relieved him from, and placed upon Rogers, responsibility for day-to-day attention to in- plant receipt, storage, and use of materials, the disposal of waste materials, and inventory control. Rogers had not only oversight of the receiving department (which he formerly headed as receiving clerk) and waste disposal, but also, as the "eyes and ears" of the plant manager, had a roving authority throughout the plant, including the production line, to see to the proper handling and disposal of materials by employees. He had authority to hire and fire employees, and used it; and even assuming a limitation of concurrence by the plant manager in some cases, Supervi- sor Rogers had authority to effectively recommend hire or discharge in those cases. Receiving clerk Moore, directly answerable to Supervisor Rogers, had day-to-day charge of the receiving department. In that capacity he supervised the group of employees who unloaded goods from railcars, trucks, and bus station pickups, stored them in the plant, and delivered the materials to the production line departments. He gave the receiving department employees their assignments and orders on a daily basis, or as the occasion arose, and they obeyed his orders. Moore was responsible to see that the receiving department employees unloaded and stored the materials safely and without damage and that they placed and maintained materials in orderly fashion so that inventory could readily move in and out. He was responsible for keeping Supervisor Rogers informed on new inventory and its whereabouts in the plant. Receiving clerk Moore had, and exercised, authority to hire and fire employees. Even assuming a limitation in some cases of the need for concurrence by Supervisor Rogers, it was clear that Moore could effectively recom- mend the hiring or firing. The men of the receiving department regarded receiving clerk Moore as their boss, and Supervisor Rogers as his boss and their boss as well. By all the tests of statute and cases, both Moore and Rogers were the supervisors in lower echelon management who provided responsible direction, frequently requiring independent judgment, to the employees within their respective jurisdictions. Furr's Inc. v. N.LR.B., 381 F.2d 562, 565-566 (C.A. 10, 1967), cert. demed 389 U.S. 840; Betts Baking Co. v. N.LR B., 380 F.2d 199, 202 (C.A. 10, 1967); Pacific Intermountain Express v. N.L.R B., 412 F.2d 1, l-4 (C.A. 10, 1969). Respondent's counsel put store on the fact that Coordinator Finley was of the opinion that both Supervisor Rogers and receiving clerk Moore exercised about the same type of authority as a leadman in the production department; and that in a representation proceeding after the trial of this case closed (noted in Respondent's physical examination 4 Significantly, in the case of the alleged discriminatory discharge of employee Leake from the receiving department, considered infra, this procedure was bypassed , and neither receiving clerk Moore , nor Supervisor Rogers , nor Plant Manager Hankins was consulted according to the testimony of Purchasing Director Fry (and Supervisor Rogers speaking for himself) 810 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD supplemental brief), the Respondent and the Union entered into a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election which included leadmen among the persons within the appropriate collective-bargaining unit; therefore, counsel argued, Respondent's leadmen are not supervisors, and Rogers and Moore are not supervisors because they are no more than leadmen. There are several problems with this kind of logic. First, the status of leadmen was not in issue in this case. Even if it had been, a stipulation or determination of that status in a representation case would not be binding in an unfair labor practice case involving alleged violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3), as here, Amalgamated Clothing Workers [Sagamore Shirt Co.] v. N.L R.B., 365 F.2d 898, 904-906 (C.A.D.C. 1966). Second, it was not established that Rogers and Moore are leadmen . There was only the expression of opinion that they looked like production leadmen to one (Coordinator Finley) who did not describe the functions of a production leadman. Third, there seems to be an assumption by counsel for Respondent that being known as a "leadman" precludes supervisory status under the Act. To the contrary see, for example, International Association of Machinists v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72, 80 (1940); N.L.R.B v. Schill Steel Products, Inc., 340 F.2d 568, 571-572 (C.A. 5, 1965). Moreover, the one bit of testimony provided in the present case regarding the production leadmen (given by Plant Production Manager Green in explaining his discharge of leadman Turner) would appear to indicate that the leadman has the approximately 15 employees in his department "under his supervision," that he checks the quality of their work, and has the authority and obligation to see that their work is done properly. On a fuller showing in a proper case, the leadman might well prove to be a statutory supervisor. In any event, under the proof in this case the status of the production leadmen was not relevant to the determination of status of the supervisor of receiving and material handling, and the receiving clerk. By their proven authority and functions both of these, Rogers and Moore, were and are statutory supervisors for whose conduct the employer may be charged under the Act, N.L R.B. v. Merrill, 388 F.2d 514, 517 (C.A. 10, 1968). C. Discriminatory Discharge of Employee Robert Leake The Circumstances Robert Leake came to work for Respondent on October 15, 1970. He had been hired by receiving clerk Billy Moore and was assigned to operate the "production" forklift. The receiving department operated two forklifts, one designated the "receiving" forklift, because it engaged more or less exclusively in the unloading of railcars and trucks and moving the incoming merchandise to storage, and the second called the "production" forklift because it primarily carried materials from storage to the production line departments, although it also assisted when needed in the unloading and storage of incoming merchandise. Employee Leake operated the production forklift without any complaints by management, indeed was complimented by Plant Manager Denzil Hankins at a meeting of the receiving department on doing a good job. Hankins expressed the hope that he would get more money for Leake and his coworkers of the receiving department. On approximately January 22, 1971, employee Leake engaged in a conversation during coffee break at the receiving desk with Supervisor Rogers, receiving clerk Moore, and employee Leon Henry. The conversation turned to the Union and the organizing campaign it had begun in November 1970. Leake said he did about as much talking as any of the four and was asked, as both he and Henry testified, whether he was going to join the Union. Employee Leake said he would join if it would do any good. Employee Henry said he would vote for the Union if he knew the plant would benefit. According to Leake and Henry, receiving clerk Moore did not say he was going for the Union but allowed that if the plant went Union he would go along with it, if it would help him; and Supervisor Rogers said nothing. One week later, on January 29, 1971, without any advance notice or warning, employee Leake was handed a final paycheck by receiving clerk Moore and told that he was forthwith discharged. Moore explained to employee Leake that the word to discharge Leake had come from Director of Purchasing Ed Fry and in fact it had, as Fry admitted. Purchasing Director Fry testified that he instructed receiving clerk Moore to tell employee Leake that hisjob was terminated because it was being transferred from the receiving department to the production depart- ment, that Plant Production Manager Ed Green preferred to pick his own man, and therefore Moore had no place for Leake in the receiving department. Moore repeated this to Leake but, under questioning by Leake, told him that Purchasing Director Fry said that Leake was fired because he was trying to promote a union at the plant. Leake asked if he could see Fry or Hankins, but was told by Moore that they would not see him. At trial, receiving clerk Moore denied telling Leake anything more than what he had been told to say by Purchasing Director Fry concerning the transfer of the job, but there was evidence that Moore was now attempting to repudiate what he had actually said. Moore had also told employee Henry, following the discharge of Leake, that Fry said Leake talked too much union and they couldn't have it and to get rid of him. Moore did not dispute Henry's testimony, but Henry did note that Moore began to back away from this attribution of antiunion motivation after the Union filed its charge with the Board concerning Leake. More significantly, employee Leake himself pursued the matter with receiving clerk Moore and obtained a written statement from him shortly after the discharge (G.C. Exh. 2) confirming that Purchasing Director Fry had instructed Moore to fire Leake because he was believed to be a union man, but to tell him only that his job had been transferred CHICKASHA MOBILE HOMES, INC. 811 to the production department and there was therefore no place for him in the receiving department.5 The artificiality of the explanation for employee Leake's discharge offered by Respondent's management tends to corroborate what receiving clerk Moore told employee Leake and the discriminatory nature of his discharge. Coordinator Finley testified that years ago the prod- uction forklift had been under the jurisdiction of the production department and the production manager. In 1967, management decided to put the production forklift under the jurisdiction of the receiving department (which already had a receiving forklift) The production forklift was to perform the same function for production as hitherto, and there were no changes in duties for the operator. All that changed was putting the operator under the plant manager 's line of responsibility instead of the production manager 's line of responsibility. A similar arrangement was effectuated at Respondent's other plants, in addition to Chickasha. While there was some unhappiness with the arrangement in the production departments, according to Coordinator Finley, because production felt it did not have immediate control of the forklift, nevertheless the arrangement continued for approximately 4 years, until employee Leake was fired January 29, 1971. A memorandum dated January 28, 1971 (Resp. Exh. 2), indicated that effective February 1, 1971, supervision of the production forklift operator was being "temporarily" reassigned from "Material Handling to Production" on an "experimental" basis. This meant, said Coordinator Finley, that the change affected only the production forklift operator at the Chickasha plant, and not the other plants, and then only on a temporary basis as an experiment . However, instead of transfering operator Leake as part of the experiment, he was fired; and Finley said he didn't know why a hitherto satisfactory employee was dropped other than that the production supervisor had the authority to pick whom he wanted to operate the forklift. Purchasing Director Fry explained further. It appeared that he, General Manager Racznski, and General Prod- uction Manager Frank Moore (the three men constitute general management of all of Respondent's plants) decided on the temporary and experimental transfer of jurisdiction over the production forklift at the Chickasha plant, without advance consultation of Chickasha Plant Manager Hankins or Chickasha Production Manager Green. The basis for the shift was an alleged conflict between the two departments, production and receiving, over the use of the production forklift because, said Fry, the man in charge of the receiving department had the options in use of the forklift. The conflict did not arise because of any conduct on the part of the forklift operator, Leake, nonetheless Fry instructed receiving clerk Billy Moore to notify employee Leake that he was dismissed. Neither Plant Manager Hankins nor Plant Production 5 At trial , receiving clerk Moore denied that the note so stating, G C Exh 2, was written by him However comparing the handwriting specimen taken from Moore at trial, G C Exh 10, plus the specimens from Respondent 's files, Resp Exh 8 (a) through ( i), it does not require the help of a handwriting expert to tell that G C Exh 2 was written by Moore Moore's handwriting has a distinctive , easily recognizable style right down to the signature Notwithstanding Respondent counsel's assertion that G C Manager Green were notified until the transfer of the forklift and firing of Leake occurred on January 29, 1971, testified Purchasing Director Fry. Employee Leake was replaced by employee Darrell Kirkes whom Plant Prod- uction Manager Green allegedly selected, but who also was not consulted, said Fry. Employee Kirkes had previously operated the production forklift in the receiving depart- ment for about a year, according to Fry, and was working for Green on some sidewall installation when selected to replace employee Leake on the forklift. When Green (who sought to claim responsibility for the firing and replace- ment of Leake) was asked if he had not considered retaining employee Leake for the job he had been on, Green answered, no, "once you're in receiving you're kind of strictly receiving" - a rather incredible answer in view of the receiving department work history of replacement employee Kirkes. Conclusion The direct evidence established that employee Leake was discharged because Respondent believed him to be a union sympathizer. He admittedly did no organizing for the Union, but within a week after disclosing to his supervisors that he could see some good in the employees affiliating with the Union he was fired. He was told by his supervisor, Billy Moore, that he was fired for talking in favor of the Union. This direct evidence of the discriminatory motivation for employee Leake's discharge is buttressed by the inferences, drawn from the employer's claimed reason seeking to repudiate the discriminatory reason . The claim boiled down to an assertion that, because the receiving and production departments were allegedly in conflict over how best to use the employee's time , the admittedly unoffending employee was discharged when his job was transferred from the receiving department to the production department. The preposterousness of the claim became even more evident when it appeared that the decision to transfer the job and not transfer the occupant (Leake) was made by Respon- dent's top management without consulting the plant manager and plant production manager, who supposedly had the conflict but for all that appears were not aware of it; that the transfer of the job (minus the occupant) was only a temporary experiment applicable to the one job and not to the similar jobs in Respondent's other plants; that the transfer entailed no change in job duties; and that employee Leake's replacement had also occupied the identical job, also in the receiving department. The unseemly haste in getting rid of employee Leake on January 29, 3 days before the effective date of the job transfer, February 1 (as called for in the office memoran- dum, (Resp. Exh. 2), without any prior notice or discussion with him, additionally suggests Respondent's sole concern and preoccupation with Leake' s union sympathies. Exh 2 is signed Billy B Moore, it is clearly signed Billy R Moore (emphasis supplied ) when one observes in G C exhs 2 and 10 and Resp. Exhs 8a, 8f, and 8g , where Moore has used his middle initial in signing, the letter R, that could be taken for an R or B if it were all by itself, is indeed Moore's style of R in his signature quite different from the unmistakeable B in Billy 812 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent 's alleged reason for the discharge of employee Leake was a pretext to cover a discriminatory discharge in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co v N L.R B., 354 F.2d 707, 709 (C.A. 5, 1966). D. Coercive Interrogation , Impression of Surveillance The discharge of employee Leake on January 29, 1971, because he talked too much about the Union, was apparently the first overt notice to the employees that Respondent was hostile to the Union coming into its plant and would use strong, even illegal, methods if needed to stifle any organizing. As already indicated, the word was spread to other employees, as when employee Leon Henry was told by his supervisor, receiving clerk Billy Moore, following Leake's discharge, that on Purchasing Director Fry's directions Leake was discharged because he talked too much union and the employer couldn't have that. Another and later example that the word was out among the employees involved employee Kirkes, who replaced employee Leake in operating the production forklift In a coffee break conversation in the receiving department, that also included employee Henry and Supervisors Lester Rogers and Billy Moore, the subject of the Union came up, and employee Kirkes said, "We had better not be talking about the union, we'd wind up like Bob Leake " Supervisor Rogers commented that Leake was not fired because of the Union, whereupon, said employee Henry, Billy Moore chimed in to agree, causing Henry to "raise an eyebrow" in view of what he had been previously told The Union held its first meeting of employees in February 1971, although organizing had begun earlier in late 1970, according to Union Representative Salyer. Employees Hoyt Underwood (employed at the time of the trial), and Leon Henry (in layoff subject to recall, at time of trial), both of the receiving department, were among those who attended the union meeting. Next day at the morning gathering at the receiving desk, Supervisor Lester Rogers (who had been a listener at the January conversation concerning the Union, participated in by employees Leake, Henry, and others) asked Henry and Underwood if they had gone to the union meeting and how it went. Henry said he had attended and Underwood said it was a good meeting. Henry had told Rogers he was going to the meeting but Underwood had not Had the incident been isolated, the inquiry by Supervisor Rogers might arguably be regarded as not violating the Act. However, considered in the context of the hostile atmosphere to self-organization (triggered by the discharge of Leake) that had begun to make employees wary, such inquiry by a supervisor was bound to have a coercive and restraining effect on the employees. In the circumstances, I find that Supervisor Rogers created the impression of 6 Respondent's memorandum, Resp Exh 3, issued later to all supervisors at the Chickasha plant (March 18, 1971), purported to counsel the supervisors against any such openly illegal conduct toward employees, including advice against spying on union meetings or activities or asking employees questions about the Union The memorandum advised the supervisors of the Company's opposition to unionization of the plant and to tell the employees so if they asked It also directed the supervisors to report any union activity during working hours surveillance , and coercively interrogated the employees, concerning the employees ' union meeting and their attendance , in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.6 Hendrix Mfg. Co v. N.L. R.B., 321 F .2d 100 , 104 (C.A. 5, 1963). E Discriminatory Discharge of Employee Gillis The Circumstances In March 1971, Respondent concluded it was necessary to cut down production at the Chickasha plant from five coaches per day to four coaches per day, and accordingly, on March 22, 1971, reduced the production force by 25 employees. Of the 25 employees, 16 were laid off (with the expectation they would be called back in the future) and 9 were discharged (permanently) (see Resp. Exh. 1). Since the time of the cutback the laid-off employees have been restored to their jobs, taking jobs vacated in the usual turnover, according to Coordinator Finley. One of those discharged was employee Thomas Gillis. Gillis had been with Respondent 12 years, and had been among the first of the employees hired at the Chickasha plant in 1959. For most of his time of employment his function related to the sawing of wood. He worked in the sidewall department, where he was the senior employee of 14 employees at the time of his discharge on March 22, 1971 While the plant had undergone three layoffs during his 12 years of employment, employee Gillis had never been laid off before. He had been included in every wage increase, and was at the top rate of pay when discharged. In February 1971, employee Gillis began attending the union meetings. He talked about joining to others, gave out some union authorization cards, and got back two signed cards which he turned over to the leadman of the sidewall department, Bob Miller. Employee Gillis apparently made no effort to conceal his interest in the Union. He talked to fellow employees in the plant lavatory, and he hung a union keynng visibly on the handle of his saw. (The keyring, G.C. Exh. 3, had attached a 2-inch leather pendant with the inscription, "Vote for and support your union," on one side, and the seal and full name of the Carpenters Union, on the other.) Gillis said he knew Production Manager Ed Green and Foreman Reuben Hogstead saw the keyring because he saw them looking at it. Green denied seeing it. Hogstead did not testify. In any event, management was aware of employee Gillis' interest in and activities for the Union. In March 1971, former production manager of the Chickasha plant and then in charge of design and improvements, Robert (Bob) Clark, came to Gillis and warned him about talking about the Union on company time. Clark told Gillis, "Do it on your own time, the office knows what's going on." 7 The decision to cut 25 employees from the approximately r This testimony was uncontradicted The evidence concerning Clark indicated that he still retained the supervisory status he obviously had had as plant production manager In March 1971 he had three employees working directly for him in design, improvement, and repair, and apparently had the run of the plant in selecting employees to do spot jobs for him Employee Gillis was one of those he had asked to perform work occasionally By any test, Clark was a management spokesman, see Belts Baking Co v N L R B, 380 F 2d 199, 202-203 (C A 10, 1967), N L R B v (Continued) CHICKASHA MOBILE HOMES , INC. 813 140 or 150 employees in production was a top management decision in which he participated, said Coordinator Finley; but the decision as to who the 25 should be, and whether laid off or discharged, was delegated to Plant Production Manager Ed Green, according to Finley. Actually Plant Production Manager Green was new at the job, less than 9 months at the Chickasha plant, and conceded that he had to depend largely on the 2 foremen and 10 leadmen for his information. In the case of employee Gillis, the complaints or causes for deciding that he was a borderline or marginal employee, as Green phrased it, who should be permanently discharged and not merely laid off, turned out to be relatively new, somewhat coincident in time with the period of Gillis' interest in the Union. The major complaint was difficult to attribute to employee Gillis alone, if at all, nevertheless it was assessed to him entirely by Respondent as indicative that he was an inferior worker. The Company had received field com- plaints that coach floors were cracking and buckling at the seams. Production Manager Green conceded that there were a number of possible contributory causes that were being investigated in order to correct the deficiency at the time of the March 1971 cutback in force. One cause was believed to be an insufficiency of glue in aiding plywood seam strips to adhere to floor joists. The strips were both glued and stapled. Employee Gillis was among the men who took part in the gluing and stapling of the strips, and he recalled being cautioned by Foreman Hogstead in March 1971 to be sure to apply glue liberally. Gillis testified that he complied. Nevertheless Gillis has been charged with a failure to glue properly. In February 1971, Foreman Hogstead also cautioned him, according to Gillis, to be careful about the size of dado cuts in the 2- by 6-inch joists. The widths of the so- called 6-inch lumber coming into the production line were not uniform and were varying downward by small fractions of an inch (as both Gillis and Green indicated) and the dado cuts had to be proportionately varied to avoid being too deep. Gillis said that Foreman Hogstead and he agreed that he use a slightly smaller cut to allow for the thinner lumber According to Production Manager Green, employ- ee Gillis is charged with not properly making dado cuts. According to Production Manager Green, on one occasion Foreman Hogstead reported employee Gillis away from his work station Gillis testified that his work required some moving about the production line, and testified that he had never been cautioned or reprimanded by anyone about wandering around the plant.8 Neverthe- less he was charged by Green with "strolling around the plant away from his work area." The other two complaints about employee Gillis (there were five in all listed in Resp. Exh. 4, page 2, compiled by Production Manager Green and Coordinator Finley) relate to his complaints to management about putting him into close quarters hampering his operation, when he was Des Moines Foods, Inc, 296 F 2d 285, 287, 288 (C A 8, 1961) N It should be noted that Foreman Hogstead, the alleged first-hand source for this and other complaints about employee Gillis was not called to testify 9 After an afterthought, Green added a complaint, not listed in Resp moved into a new location; and having to spend his production time in picking out and discarding warped, green, or otherwise inferior lumber, when he felt this was something that Supervisor (of material handling) Rogers should have been doing. The evidence indicated that Gillis had more space than he needed in his original location but, in the move, lost a great deal of space, and had a promise from Foreman Hogstead and Green to get back a little more; also, that Green agreed that there was poor lumber coming through with the good, and that Gillis would have to discard the poor lumber and stack it outside when he detected it; nevertheless Green chose to treat these complaints as a failure by Gillis to "fully cooperate."9 Conclusion On March 22, 1971, Plant Production Manager Green handed employee Gillis his final paycheck and notice of discharge. He told Gillis that he was being let go because his work was not satisfactory. Green did not specify in what respect his work was unsatisfactory, and Gillis said to Green that he had never complained of his work before. Green replied, "I have to do my job, this comes from the office, they are not satisfied." At trial, however, Green sought to assume full responsibility for the discharge of Gillis. Plant Production Manager Green had also sought to assume responsibility for the earlier discharge of employee Leake, hitherto considered, where it was patent that the decision had been made above and for him. Even if Leake's case had been Green's decision, his assertion, in the circumstances of that case, that he didn't consider retaining Leake, because "once you're in receiving you're kind of strictly receiving," and then turning the job over to one who had done the job in receiving, impugned Green's credibili- ty. I am inclined to believe that Green was likewise stretching the truth in making a case of poor performance against employee Gillis, by generally stating only part of the whole story in each of his bill of particulars. Indicative was the readiness in Green's testimony, to blame Gillis for defective flooring while the several possible causes in the whole assembly process were still under investigation, and it was not at all clear that Gillis had failed to do his part of the operation. The fact that the alleged faults found with employee Gillis cropped up for the first time, in his 12 years of employment, more or less coincident with his becoming active for the Union, suggests that but for his union activity he would not have been the subject of complaint or involved in the March 1971 cutback in employment. He had been untouched in three previous cutbacks in the course of his employment, a fact that in itself suggests that he was, and was regarded as, a satisfactory employee. Of course, employee Gillis' union activity did not immunize him from discharge for other cause. But the question here is " `not whether there existed a valid ground Exh 4, by Supervisor Rogers that employee Gillis had not been using his dumpster properly for scrap material Gillis testified (and Rogers agreed) that the problem concerned very long pieces of scrap lumber These required his time and work in order to break up, if he had to put it in the dumpster Gillis said he pointed out to Rogers it would be easier all around if the forklift picked up this scrap, and that Rogers agreed 814 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for discharge, but whether the stated ground was the real one.' J.P Stevens and Co. v. N.L.R B, 380 F.2d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 1967)." N.L.R.B. v. Ulbrich Stainless Steels, Inc., 393 F.2d 871, 872 (C.A. 2, 1968). In my view Respondent's stated ground was designed to conceal the unlawful motive, Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. N.L R.B., 362 F.2d 466, 470 (C.A. 9, 1966). Respondent was hostile to unionization of its plant, knew of employee Gillis' open sympathy and activity for the Union, as Chief Designer Clark stated and the display by Gillis of the union keynng indicated,10 and discharged him The fact that some of the layoffs, made at the same time, were economically justified, is no defense for the selection of an employee for layoff or discharge on the basis of union adherence or affiliation, N.L R.B. v. Bedford Nugent Corp., 379 F.2d 528 (C.A. 7, 1967). And, assuming that a valid ground for discharge existed, it does not constitute a defense to the unfair labor practice charge where the discharge was not predicated solely on that ground but was based, even partly, on a desire to discourage union activity, Belts Baking Co. v. N.L R.B., supra, 380 F.2d 199, 203 (C.A. 10, 1967); N.L.R.B. v. Nachman Corp, 337 F.2d 421, 423-424 (C.A 7, 1964). The discharge of employee Gillis was a violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By discnminatorily discharging employees Leake and Gillis, because of their union sympathy or activity and in order to discourage the support by employees for the Union, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 2. By interrogating employees and creating the impres- sion of surveillance concerning union meetings and their attendance, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. The described unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY It will be recommended that the Respondent : ( 1) cease and desist from its unfair labor practices; (2) offer to reinstate employees Robert Leake and Thomas Gillis with backpay from the time of discharge , the backpay to be computed on a quarterly basis as set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 ( 1950), approved in N L.R.B. v. Seven - Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 ( 1953), with interest at 6 percent per annum as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co ., 138 NLRB 716 (1962), approved in Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. N.L. R.B., 331 F .2d 720 (C.A. 6, 1964), cert . denied 379 U.S. 888; and (3) post the notices provided for herein. Because the Respondent by its conduct violated funda- mental employee rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, is In view of the close watch kept on employee Gillis in February and March 1971, as the list of complaints against him would appear to show, it is hardly likely that the union keyring attached to his saw escaped the notice of his supervisors ii In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Order herein shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the and because there appears from the manner of the commission of this conduct an attitude of opposition to the purposes of the Act and a proclivity to commit other unfair labor practices , it will be recommended that the Respon- dent cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4, 1941); N.L.R.B. v. Bama Company, 353 F.2d 323-324 (C.A. 5, 1965); P. R. Mallory and Co. v. N.L.R. B., 400 F.2d 956, 959-960 (C.A. 7, 1968), cert . denied 394 U.S. 918. Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law, and the entire record , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, there is hereby issued the following recommended: 11 ORDER Respondent, Chickasha Mobile Homes, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging employees because of their union sympathies, or for engaging in union activities, or for recruiting other employees to become members of the Union or to engage in union activities. (b) Interrogating employees or creating the impression of surveillance of employees about union meetings and their attendance at union meetings. (c) Discouraging membership of its employees in a union or other labor organization, by discharging employees or otherwise discriminating against them as to their hire, tenure, and conditions of employment, or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to employees Robert Leake and Thomas Gillis immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if the jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole, in the manner set forth in the section of this decision entitled "The Remedy," for any loss of earnings each may have suffered as a result of his discharge. Notify each, if serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of his right to full reinstate- ment upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces. (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to ascertain the backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post in its establishment at Chickasha, Oklahoma, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 12 Immediately upon receipt of copies of said notice, on forms Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. i2 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by ajudgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." CHICKASHA MOBILE HOMES, INC. to be provided by the Regional Director for Region 16 (Fort Worth, Texas), the Respondent shall cause the copies to be signed by one of its authorized representatives and posted, the posted copies to be maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director of Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith.13 13 In the event that the recommended Order is adopted by the Board after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director of Region 16, in writing, within twenty days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board having found, after a trial, that we violated the National Labor Relations Act: WE WILL NOT fire you because of your union sympathies, or because you engage in union activities, or because you recruit other employees to become members of the Union or to engage in union activities. WE WILL NOT question you about union meetings or your attendance at union meetings. WE WILL NOT, in any other manner, discriminate against you to discourage your membership in a labor 815 union or interfere with your right to join, assist, or be represented by, a labor union, or interfere with any of your other rights of self-organization and mutual aid guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. Since the Board found that we fired Robert Leake on January 29, 1971, because of his union sympathy, and fired Thomas Gillis on March 22, 1971, because of his union activity, WE WILL offer each his oldjob back and give each backpay. If either of them is in the Armed Forces of the United States, we will notify him of his right to reinstatement upon application after discharge from the Armed Forces. Each of you is free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, a member of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor union. Dated By CHICKASHA MOBILE HOMES, INC. (Employer) (Representative ) (Title) This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions, may be directed to the Board's Office, Federal Office Building, Room 8-A-24, 819 Taylor Street, Fort Worth, Texas 76102, Telephone 817-334-2921. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation