Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Feb 27, 2020

15079266 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 27, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/079,266 03/24/2016 David Boberski 4672-11002GUS 1053
12684 7590 02/27/2020
Lempia Summerfield Katz LLC/CME
20 South Clark Street
Suite 600
Chicago, IL 60603
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, LIZ P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/27/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket-us@lsk-iplaw.com
mail@lsk-iplaw.com
pair_lsk@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DAVID BOBERSKI, EDWARD M. GOGOL, JOHN WILEY,
RICHARD CO, STEVE YOUNGREN, and JOHN LABUSZEWSKI
____________

Appeal 2018-004237
Application 15/079,266
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, ANTON W. FETTING, and
JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judges.

FISCHETTI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1–31. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
A hearing was held on February 3, 2020.

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Chicago
Mercantile Exchange Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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THE INVENTION
Appellant describes “[a] system for moving money between accounts
of traders by a central counterparty to facilitate payments.” Spec. Abstract.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on
appeal.
A computer implemented method of facilitating a
payment between traders based on a first position in a first
instrument held by a first trader to which a second trader is a
counterparty, the method comprising:
determining, by a payment processor based on the first
position, the amount of a payment to be made from one of the
first or second trader to the other of the first or second trader in
advance of settlement thereof;
assigning, automatically by the payment processor based
on the first position in the first instrument held by the first
trader to which the second trader is a counterparty, a second
position to the first trader in a futures contract characterized by
a settlement date, a quantity and a price, the second position
being characterized by a value based on the quantity and the
price of the futures contract as of the assigning, and a third
position to the second trader, counter to the second position, in
the futures contract, the first and second traders not being
identified to each other;
valuing, by a settlement processor upon occurrence of the
settlement date, the futures contract at a spot value different
from the price of the futures contract, the spot value being
based on the determined payment amount; and
modifying, by a margin processor, a first account record
associated with the first trader and a second account record
associated with the second trader, both stored in an account
database stored in a memory coupled with the processor, to
reflect a credit to the account of the first trader and a debit from
the account of the second trader in the amount of the difference
between the value of the second position and the spot value
when the difference represents a loss for the second trader or to
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reflect a debit from the account of the first trader and a credit to
the account of the second trader in the amount of the difference
between the value of the second position and the spot value
when the difference represents a loss for the first trader.

THE REJECTION
Claims 1–31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a
judicial exception without significantly more.

FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings as set forth on pages 3–9 in the
Final Office Action2 and on pages 3–11 in the Examiner’s Answer3,
concerning only the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION
We will affirm the rejection of claims 1–31 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Appellant argues claims 1–31 as a group. We select claim 1 as
the representative claim for this group, and so the remaining claims stand or
fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2015).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include

2 All references to the Final Office Action refer to the Final Office Action
mailed on March 27, 2017.
3 All references to the Examiner’s Answer refer to the Examiner’s Answer
mailed on January 12, 2018.
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implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept
of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
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statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
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(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that
“the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in
light of the [S]pecification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is
directed to excluded subject matter.’” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.,
822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v.
Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether
the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology
or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers
are invoked merely as a tool. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335–36.
In so doing, as indicated above, we apply a “directed to” two prong
test: 1) evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and 2) if the
claim recites a judicial exception, evaluate whether the claim “appl[ies],
rel[ies] on, or use[s] the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
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meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance at
53; see also MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
The Specification states:
A futures contract is a legally binding agreement to buy or sell
a commodity at a specified price at a predetermined future time.
An option is the right, but not the obligation, to sell or buy the
underlying instrument (in this case, a futures contract) at a
specified price within a specified time. Each futures contract is
standardized and specifies commodity, quality, quantity,
delivery date and settlement. Cash Settlement is a method of
settling a futures contracts by cash rather than by physical
delivery of the underlying asset whereby the parties settle by
paying/receiving the loss/gain related to the contract in cash
when the contract expires.
Spec. ¶ 2.
The Specification then goes on to state:
As an intermediary, the Exchange bears a certain amount
of risk in each transaction that takes place. To that end, risk
management mechanisms protect the Exchange via the Clearing
House. The Clearing House establishes clearing level
performance bonds (margins) for all Exchange products and
establishes minimum performance bond requirements for
customers of Exchange products. A performance bond, also
referred to as a margin, is the funds that must be deposited by a
customer with his or her broker, by a broker with a clearing
member or by a clearing member with the Clearing House, for
the purpose of insuring the broker or Clearing House against
loss on open futures or options contracts. . . . The initial margin
is the total amount of margin per contract required by the
broker when a futures position is opened. A drop in funds
below this level requires a deposit back to the initial margin
levels, i.e. a performance bond call. If a customer’s equity in
any futures position drops to or under the maintenance level
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because of adverse price action, the broker must issue a
performance bond/margin call to restore the customer’s equity.
Spec. ¶ 4.
The preamble says it is for “facilitating a payment between traders
based on a first position in a first instrument held by a first trader to which a
second trader is a counterparty.” Appeal Br. 18, Claim 1. Understood in
light of the Specification, claim 1 recites in pertinent part, the abstractions
of:
determining, . . . based on the first position, the amount of a
payment to be made from one of the first or second trader to the
other of the first or second trader in advance of settlement
thereof; assigning, . . . based on the first position in the first
instrument held by the first trader to which the second trader is
a counterparty, a second position to the first trader in a futures
contract characterized by a settlement date, a quantity and a
price, the second position being characterized by a value based
on the quantity and the price of the futures contract as of the
assigning, and a third position to the second trader, counter to
the second position, in the futures contract, the first and second
traders not being identified to each other; valuing, . . . upon
occurrence of the settlement date, the futures contract at a spot
value different from the price of the futures contract, the spot
value being based on the determined payment amount; and
modifying, . . ., a first account record associated with the first
trader and a second account record associated with the second
trader, . . ., to reflect a credit to the account of the first trader
and a debit from the account of the second trader in the amount
of the difference between the value of the second position and
the spot value when the difference represents a loss for the
second trader or to reflect a debit from the account of the first
trader and a credit to the account of the second trader in the
amount of the difference between the value of the second
position and the spot value when the difference represents a
loss for the first trader.

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Accordingly, the Examiner found that the claims recite “facilitating a
payment between traders based on a first position in a first instrument held
by a first trader to which a second trader is a counterparty.” Final Act. 3.
Thus, all this intrinsic evidence shows that claim 1 recites a method of
anonymized data and transaction processing facilitating necessary crediting
and debiting of accounts to indirectly effect a transfer there between by
leveraging existing risk management techniques. For example, claim 1
recites, “assigning… based on the first position in the first instrument held
by the first trader to which the second trader is a counterparty, a second
position to the first trader in a futures contract characterized by a settlement
date, a quantity and a price, the second position being characterized by a
value based on the quantity and the price of the futures contract as of the
assigning, and a third position to the second trader, counter to the second
position, in the futures contract, the first and second traders not being
identified to each other; valuing, upon occurrence of the settlement date, the
futures contract at a spot value different from the price of the futures
contract, the spot value being based on the determined payment amount.”
Covering the value of an item between trade and settlement dates is an
important economic practice because it encourages trading between parties
and counterparties by appropriating any value change in that period to the
proper party. This is consistent with the Examiner’s determination.
Turning to the second prong of the “directed to” test, claim 1 only
generically requires “a payment processor,” “a settlement processor,” and “a
margin processor.” These components are described in the Specification at a
high level of generality. See Spec. ¶¶ 30, 31, 33–36, Fig. 1, 2. We fail to
see how the generic recitations of these most basic computer components
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and/or of a system so integrates the judicial exception as to “impose[] a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Guidance at
53. We find no indication in the Specification, nor does Appellant direct us
to any indication, that the operations recited in independent claim 1 invoke
any assertedly inventive programming, require any specialized computer
hardware or other inventive computer components, i.e., a particular machine,
or that the claimed invention is implemented using other than generic
computer components to perform generic computer functions. See DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[A]fter Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer
limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”).
Claim 1 does not improve another technology, because neither creating a
queue or generating a recommendation involves technology. Guidance at
55; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a). Because no more than a generic computer
is required, the claim also does not define, or rely on, a “particular machine.”
MPEP § 2106.05(b). Further, the method does not transform matter. MPEP
§ 2106.05(c). Instead, the claim merely assimilates, creates, generates,
evaluates, replaces, and makes determinations about data. As such, the
method has no other meaningful limitations (MPEP § 2106.05(e)), and thus
merely recites instructions to execute the abstract idea on a computer (MPEP
§ 2106.05(f)).
Thus, we find that the claims recite the judicial exception of a
fundamental economic practice.
That the claims do not preempt all forms of the abstraction or may be
limited to futures contracts, does not make them any less abstract. See OIP
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Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“And that the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be
limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them
any less abstract.”).
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, because we find that
the claims are directed to abstract ideas/judicial exceptions, the claims must
include an “inventive concept” in order to be patent-eligible, i.e., there must
be an element or combination of elements sufficient to ensure that the claim
in practice amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
Concerning this step, the Examiner found the following:
[T]he Examiner submits that the claims do not amount to
“significantly more” than the judicial exception because
Although a computer system acts as the intermediary in the
claimed method, the claims do no more than implement the
abstract idea on a generic computer. All of these computer
functions . . . are “well understood, routine, conventional
activities” previously known to the industry. The computer is
employed for its most basic functions and does not impose
meaningful limits on the scope of the claims. Generic computer
implementation of the abstract idea in a generic manner with a
high level of generality does not qualify as significantly more
than the abstract idea. Therefore the claims do not purport to
improve the functioning of the computer itself, or to improve
any other technology or technical field. Use of an unspecified
computer does not transform an abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention. Thus, the claim does not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea itself.
Final Act. 3–4.
We agree with the Examiner. “[T]he relevant question is whether the
claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the
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abstract idea . . . on a generic computer.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. They do
not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is purely conventional. Using a
computer to determine, assign, calculate values, and modify the data as a
result amounts to electronic data query and retrieval—one of the most basic
functions of a computer. All of these computer functions are well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354
(Fed. Cir. 2016); see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent
Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower
construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ . . . those
functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special
programming.”). In short, each step does no more than require a generic
computer to perform generic computer functions. The claims do not, for
example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. In
addition, as we stated above, the claims do not affect an improvement in any
other technology or technical field. The Specification spells out different
generic equipment and parameters that might be applied using this concept
and the particular steps such conventional processing would entail based on
the concept of information access under different scenarios. See, e.g., Spec.
¶¶ 30, 31, 33–36, Fig. 1, 2. Thus, the claims at issue amount to nothing
significantly more than instructions to apply the abstract idea using some
unspecified, generic computer. Under our precedents, that is not enough to
transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. See Alice, 573
U.S. at 225–26.
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Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of
Appellant’s claims add nothing that is not already present when the steps are
considered separately. The sequence of data reception-analysis (determine,
assign, calculate values, and modify the data as a result) and storing is
equally generic and conventional or otherwise held to be abstract. See
Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(sequence of receiving, selecting, offering for exchange, display, allowing
access, and receiving payment recited an abstraction), Inventor Holdings,
LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(holding that sequence of data retrieval, analysis, modification, generation,
display, and transmission was abstract), Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast
Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding
sequence of processing, routing, controlling, and monitoring was abstract).
The ordering of the steps is, therefore, ordinary and conventional.
We have reviewed all the arguments Appellant has submitted
concerning the patent eligibility of the claims before us that stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Appeal Br. 5–16, Reply Brief 2–9). We find that
our analysis above substantially covers the substance of all the arguments,
which have been made. But, for purposes of completeness, we will address
various arguments in order to make individual rebuttals of same.
Appellant argues,
the claimed invention improves upon the technical field of
anonymized data and transaction processing by providing a
system which efficiently facilitates the necessary crediting and
debiting of accounts to indirectly effect a transfer there between
and which leverages existing risk management
systems/techniques, in a novel and specific manner, to do so.
Appeal Br. 7.
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We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument because the alleged
improvement lies in the abstract idea itself, not to any technological
improvement– facilitating the necessary crediting and debiting of accounts.
See BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287–88 (Fed. Cir.
2018). Even if the advance over the prior art is to “efficiently facilitate
necessary crediting and debiting of accounts to indirectly effect a transfer
therebetween,” that purported advance is an abstract idea itself, i.e.,
performing an accounting practice, a fundamental economic process or
practice similar to hedging against financial risk in Bilski, 561 U.S. at 609,
and collecting and analyzing investment data in SAP America, Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167–68 (Fed. Cir. 2018), using
conventional technology. Also, although the claims purport to efficiently
facilitate the necessary crediting and debiting of accounts to indirectly effect
a transfer, our reviewing court has held that speed and accuracy increases
stemming from the ordinary capabilities of a general purpose computer “do[]
not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter.”
Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Appellant argues, the claimed steps recite
a specific implementation which has NOT been used before and
therefore is not well understood, routine or conventional in the
art. In particular, as noted below, the claimed invention operates
in a manner which upends the known margin computation
process by valuing the claimed second position based on a
previously determined payment amount so as to cause the
margining system to move that amount, as opposed to valuing
the position based on a current market value so as to determine
a change, e.g. gain or loss, thereto.
Appeal Br. 10.
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Although the second step in the Mayo/Alice framework is termed a
search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation of
novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.”’ Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–218 (alteration in original). A
novel and non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is,
nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90; see also Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89 (“The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a
process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of
possibly patentable subject matter.”). The question in step two of the Alice
framework is not whether an additional feature is novel, but whether the
implementation of the abstract idea involves “more than performance of
‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to
the industry.’” Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed Cir. 2014) (alteration in
original) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 225). Here, the record reflects no
evidence by Appellant to the contrary.
Appellant argues:
As in Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc.[4], the
presently claimed invention is directed to a specific
improvement to the way computers operate as the claimed
system and method for facilitating payment imparts a specific

4 Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., 675 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir.
2017).

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functionality to a trading system directed to a specific
implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts,
i.e. to move a pre-defined value between accounts in an
anonymized transaction processing system using a risk
management system.
Appeal Br. 14–15.
We disagree with Appellant. In Trading Technologies, that court
found
the challenged patents do not simply claim displaying
information on a graphical user interface. The claims require a
specific, structured graphical user interface paired with a
prescribed functionality directly related to the graphical user
interface’s structure that is addressed to and resolves a
specifically identified problem in the prior state of the art.

Trading Techs., 675 F. App’x at 1004. By contrast, claim 1 before us here
recites no such computer related specific features. At best, it only
generically recites, a payment processor, a settlement processor, and a
margin processor. We find no indication in the Specification, nor does
Appellant direct us to any indication, that the operations recited in
independent claim 1 invoke any inventive programming, require any
specialized computer hardware or other inventive computer components,
i.e., a particular machine, or that the claimed invention is implemented using
other than generic computer components to perform generic computer
functions. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256 (“[A]fter Alice, there can
remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make
an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible.”). The claim simply recites
functional results to be achieved by any means. See, e.g., Content
Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 (“[T]he claims of the asserted patents are
drawn to the abstract idea of 1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data
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within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a
memory.”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d
1332, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Claims to manipulating documents
determined to be “at their core, directed to the abstract idea of collecting,
displaying, and manipulating data.”); Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital
One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Tailoring
information presented to a user based on particular information determined
to be directed to an abstract idea.)
The question is whether the claims as a whole “focus on a specific
means or method that improves the relevant technology” or are “directed to
a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic
processes and machinery.” McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In this case, claim 1 as a whole is
focused on satisfying certain contingencies for managing data related to a
financial transaction and not a particular way of programming or designing
the software or a computer circuit. In other words, nothing in claim 1
purports to improve computer functioning or “effect an improvement in any
other technology or technical field.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225.
Appellant further argues:
Just as DDR’s unique URL structure allowed the generic
computers of DDR to do something different, i.e. prevent user’s
from being transported away from the host’s web page to a
third party’s web page, so too does Appellants’ unique claimed
automatically created second and third positions which cause
the payment processor to operate in a nongeneric manner, i.e. to
credit/debit the accounts of the traders based on a predefined
fixed amount, different from the conventional operation to
credit or debit the accounts of the traders based on a variable
present market value of an underlying asset.
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Reply Br. 5.
We fail to see the similarities asserted by Appellant (Reply Br. 5–6)
between the claims on appeal here and those adjudicated in DDR Holdings.
In DDR Holdings, the Court evaluated the eligibility of claims
“address[ing] the problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to
the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol,
would be instantly transported away from a host’s website after
‘clicking’ on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings,
773 F.3d at 1257. There, the Court found that the claims were patent
eligible because they transformed the manner in which a hyperlink
typically functions to resolve a problem that had no “pre-Internet
analog.” Id. at 1258. In our view, Appellant wrongly seeks equivalents
between its claimed created second and third positions and the smart
hyperlink in DDR Holdings. The DDR Holdings court was clear as to the
internet–centric and computer based nature of the improvement with which
they were dealing, stating:
In particular, the ′399 patent’s claims address the
problem of retaining website visitors that, if adhering to the
routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink
protocol, would be instantly transported away from a host's
website after “clicking” on an advertisement and activating a
hyperlink. For example, asserted claim 19 recites a system that,
among other things, 1) stores “visually perceptible elements”
corresponding to numerous host websites in a database, with
each of the host websites displaying at least one link associated
with a product or service of a third-party merchant, 2) on
activation of this link by a website visitor, automatically
identifies the host, and 3) instructs an Internet web server of an
“out-source provider” to construct and serve to the visitor a
new, hybrid web page that merges content associated with the
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products of the third-party merchant with the stored “visually
perceptible elements” from the identified host website.
DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. By contrast, Appellant asserts that
the claimed “automatically created second and third positions which
cause the payment processor to operate in a nongeneric manner, i.e. to
credit/debit the accounts of the traders based on a predefined fixed
amount,” is equivalent to the unique DDR hyperlink. Reply Br. 5.
But, this is nothing more than general purpose programming assigning
values to accounting variables devoid of any of the specifically
claimed programming and devices, such as recited in claim 19 in the
‘399 patent as listed above as items 1–3 by the DDR Holdings court.
Simply programming a general-purpose computer or generic circuitry
to perform an abstract idea does not provide an “inventive concept”
such that the claim amounts to significantly more than that abstract
idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221–27 (applying an abstract idea, such
as an algorithm, on a general purpose computer is not enough to
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.); EON Corp. IP Holdings LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785
F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A general purpose computer is
flexible—it can do anything it is programmed to do.”).
We also disagree with Appellant that under the holding in Enfish our
decision would be different. Appeal Br. 15–16. By contrast, we are
unpersuaded by the Appellant’s argument that its claims are directed to an
improvement in computer technology like that of claim 17 in Enfish and
therefore are patent eligible. In Enfish, the invention at issue was directed at
a wholly new type of logical model for a computer database: a self-
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referential table that allowed the computer to store many different types of
data in a single table and index that data by column and row information.
Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1330–32. In finding the claims “not directed to an
abstract idea,” but “to a specific improvement to the way computers
operate,” the Federal Circuit noted that “the claims are not simply directed to
any form of storing tabular data, but instead are specifically directed to a
self-referential table for a computer database.” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336–37.
We find nothing in the claims before us arising to this level of technical
improvement in the generically claimed “a payment processor,” “a
settlement processor” and “a margin processor” which arises to the level of
technical proficiency as found in Enfish. Instead, we find the claims are
focused on “economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its
ordinary capacity.” Enfish, 822 F.3d 1336.
Likewise unpersuasive are Appellant’s analogies of the appealed
claims to those in Amdocs (Israel) Limited v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d
1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal Br. 16–17. In Amdocs, the court adopted the
district court’s interpretation of the claim term “enhance,” stating, it
approved “reading the ‘in a distributed fashion’ and the ‘close to the source’
of network information requirements into the term ‘enhance.’” Id. at 1300.
The court then went on to find the claim’s “enhancing” limitation
necessarily required that the generic components operate in an
unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer
functionality. Id. at 1300–01.
In this way, the claims of Amdocs are inconsistent with those before
us on appeal here in that in the latter, there are no specific technologic
modifications required to solve a problem or improve the functioning of a
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known system generally to produce patent-eligible subject matter. See, e.g.,
DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d 1245; McRO, Inc., 837 F.3d at 1315. No such
problem or evidence showing how the claims solve a stated technical
problem has been identified here, and we are not persuaded that the claims
are not directed to an abstract idea.
Appellant’s other arguments, including those directed to now-
superseded USPTO guidance, have been considered, but are not persuasive
of error. See Guidance at 51 (“Eligibility-related guidance issued prior to
the Ninth Edition, R–08.2017, of the MPEP (published Jan. 2018) should
not be relied upon.”).
For the reasons identified above, we determine there are no
deficiencies in the Examiner’s rejection based on patent ineligibility of the
rejected claims. Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection
of claims 1–31.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
We conclude the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–31 under
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Examiner’s decision is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(a)(1).

DECISION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1– 31 101 Eligibility 1–31

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED