Chesterfield Chrome Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 19, 1973

203 N.L.R.B. 36 (N.L.R.B. 1973)

36 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Chesterfield Chrome Co . and International Union, Al-
lied Industrial Workers of America , AFL-CIO.
Cases 7-CA-9645 and 7-RC-11214
April 19, 1973
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING AND
PENELLO
On December 13, 1972, Administrative Law Judge
Lloyd Buchanan issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep-
tions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel
filed an answering brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' con-
clusions, and recommendations 2 of the Administra-
tive Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
The Administrative Law Judge found that
Respondent's interrogations of active employees Ru-
volvo, Thomas, and Paul, together with interrogation
of laid-off employee Townsend, violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. In Townsend's case, the Adminis-
trative Law Judge appears to have premised his con-
clusion on a finding that at the time of the
interrogations, which occurred during her layoff,
Townsend had a reasonable expectancy of reemploy-
ment. The Administrative Law Judge's finding was
based on evidence that Townsend was not told that
her layoff would be permanent, she attended union
meetings during her layoff, she did not work else-
where and collected unemployment compensation,
and, upon her subsequent reemployment, she retained
her accrued seniority. Respondent excepts, contend-
ing that the evidence instead shows that Townsend, at
the time, was without a reasonable expectancy of
reemployment, relying on the decision in Thomas En-
1 The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge It is the Board 's established policy not to overrule
an Administrative Law Judge 's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions were incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc, 91 NLRB 544,
enfd . 188 F 2d 362 (C A. 3). We have carefully examined the record and find
no basis for reversing his findings
2 We do not adopt or pass upon the Administrative Law Judge's rec-
ommendations concerning the Respondent 's objection to conduct affecting
the result of the consent election in Case 7-RC-11,214 in which the parties
agreed that such questions be left to final determination by the Regional
Director We adopt only that portion of his recommended Order severing
that case and transferring it to the Regional Director
gine Corp., 196 NLRB 706, where the Board held that
certain laid-off employees were ineligible to vote in an
election . We believe this issue worthy of comment.
Assuming, without deciding that Townsend, as Re-
spondent contends, does not meet our tests for eligi-
bility to vote in an election, it does not follow that an
employer may, with impunity, utilize such a laid-off
employee as a target for interrogation or other con-
duct designed as part of a pattern of unlawful interfer-
ence with the organizational rights of its work force.
Here, Townsend had been recently employed by the
Employer and had been offered a different position
with the Employer at the time of her layoff. She re-
mained in close contact with former fellow employees
as well as representatives of the Employer and partici-
pated in union activities. Her effective and continued
contact with Respondent's other employees is appar-
ent. Thus, both to the extent that any improper con-
duct threatened to interfere with her potential
reemployment, and to the extent that her continuing
contact with active employees made it likely that acts
of unlawful interference toward her would be well
known to the active employees, we conclude that the
factual and legal effect of Respondent's conduct is as
much within the prohibited area of 8(a)(1) as it would
be if directed to one in active employment status.
Were we to rule otherwise, we might be opening the
door to coercive conduct with respect to laid-off em-
ployees and thus invite subversion of the policies of
the Act. This potential subversion, however, lies in
quite a different area of exploration from the question
of whether the laid-off employee has a sufficiently
direct and immediate interest in the outcome of an
election to be permitted to vote therein. We are, there-
fore, not governed in our determination here by either
the Administrative Law Judge's determination that
Townsend had a reasonable expectancy of reemploy-
ment , nor by Respondent's contention that the pre-
cedent of Thomas Engine would indicate that she had
no such expectancy of reemployment.
What we do hold is that Respondent's inquiry into
whether she had signed an authorization card, plus
Respondent's further inquiry as to whether there had
yet been a union meeting, both in a context making
apparent Respondent's opposition to unions, was a
part of a pattern of unlawful interrogation and inter-
ference which further exhibited itself in like questions
addressed to active employees Ruvolo, Thomas, and
Paul. As Respondent's foreman, Wrobel, conceded at
the hearing in the case of employee Paul, this ques-
tioning was designed to put the employees "on the
spot."
We therefore have no hesitancy in accepting the
Administrative Law Judge's findings that each such
instance of interrogation, including the instances in-
203 NLRB No. 15
CHESTERFIELD CHROME CO. 37
volving laid-off employee Townsend, forms a proper
basis for a finding of unlawful interference with em-
ployee rights and the ineluctable conclusion that Re-
spondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
cordingly . I also find and conclude that , as admitted, the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES AND THE
OBJECTIONS TO ELECTION
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby
orders that Chesterfield Chrome Co., Mt. Clemens,
Michigan, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Administrative
Law Judge's recommended Order.
DECISION
LOYD BUCHANAN , Administrative Law Judge : The com-
plaint herein (issued August 10, 1972; charge filed June 28,
1972) alleges that the Company has violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , 73 Stat.
519, by coercively interrogating employees concerning their
own and other employees' union activities and sympathies.
The answer denies the allegations of unfair labor practice.
Consolidated with the trial of the above issues was a hearing
with respect to certain objections to election in Case 7-
RC-11214, for ruling and decision by a Trial Examiner
(now Administrative Law Judge), the representation case
thereafter to be severed and transferred to the Regional
Director for further processing . The petition in the repre-
sentation proceeding was filed on May 18, 1972; a consent
election was held on June 15, the tally being 29 for the
Union and 31 against , with 2 ballots challenged ; and objec-
tions were filed by the Union on June 20.
At the trial it was early noted that the proof in support
of the objections to election would not go beyond the allega-
tions in the complaint , which might "possibly" include some
acts prior to the filing of the petition.
The case was tried before me at Detroit, Michigan, on
September 7 and 8, 1972 . The General Counsel and counsel
for the Union were heard in brief oral argument at the
conclusion of the trial. Pursuant to permission granted to all
parties, a brief has been filed by the Company.
Upon the entire record in the case and from my observa-
tion of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR)
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE COMPANY'S BUSINESS AND THE
LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The facts concerning the Company's status as a Michigan
corporation , the nature and extent of its business in the
anodizing and painting of automotive parts and rendering
related services , and its engagement in commerce within the
meaning of the Act are admitted ; I find and conclude ac-
The problems to be resolved in these consolidated cases
center almost wholly on the issue of credibility. The testimo-
ny provides objective basis for resolution of that issue in
favor of the General Counsel and the Union.
Ruvolo, who quit the Company's employ on June 2, 1972,
testified that about a month (he was manifestly unable to
pinpoint the date or attendant circumstances) before he left,
Plant Manager Wrobel asked him whether he knew
anything about the Union trying to get into the shop; that
he replied in the affirmative and, when Wrobel inquired
how long, he said that he had known for 3 or 4 weeks.
Ruvolo did not stretch his claim to include further interfer-
ence although he was tested to do so on cross-examination.
The Union's efforts to organize this plant apparently be-
gan about February. Wrobel testified that he became aware
of the Union's efforts on May 15, when he received a reg-
istered letter from the Union requesting that the Company
bargain with it. About a week later he received a registered
letter from the Board requesting a meeting in connection
with the representation issue; and on May 23 he met with
his attorneys and was instructed to make sure that his super-
visors did not speak to the employees concerning union
activities . He testified that he immediately transmitted these
instructions to his shift supervisor and his foremen , but did
not to Goodnuff, the Company's production control super-
visor, whose status will be considered below. Wrobel denied
that he interrogated Ruvolo, or Paul or Thomas, two other
employees who as we shall see testified to interrogation by
him; and he made a blanket denial of interrogation of any
production employees with respect to their union sympa-
thies , activities , or desires, or concerning any union organi-
zational attempts.
Considering what he testified to and what he would not
say, Ruvolo impressed me as a reliable witness and I find
and conclude that , in the context of the pending campaign
and the other events noted , Wrobel, in violation of Section
8(a)(1), interrogated him as alleged . On the other hand, I
find that the testimony concerning this interrogation does
not support the corresponding objection to election inas-
much as it appears from Ruvolo's testimony that the inci-
dent occurred well before the May 18 petition date. I have
not overlooked the possibility that, with Wrobel' s insistence
that he first learned of union activities on the 15th, his
interrogation of Ruvolo may have occurred after the peti-
tion was filed . But that possibility does not warrant a find-
ing to sustain the objection.
Townsend was employed by the Company in July 1970
and quit in January 1971; she returned to work in April 1971
and was laid off for lack of work on February 11, 1972,
when she refused to accept a lower paying job; she was
again reinstated when she filed a new application for any
kind of work and accepted a lesser payingjob on August 18,
shortly before this trial. Having been laid off in February,
Townsend remained with a reasonable expectancy of reem-
ployment, consistent with which she attended union meet-
38 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rags in May and June . Suggestive if not completely
indicative of the continuing impression of her status, and
more persuasive than the Company 's claim that she was not
an employee while on layoff and its denial of a reasonable
reemployment expectancy , is the fact that on her recall she
continued with her accrued seniority . At the time of her
layoff Wrobel told her that he did not know how long the
layoff would last; he did not know how long her department
would be on a one -shift basis. She was not told either that
she would or would not be recalled . Townsend apparently
did not work elsewhere during the interim ; she was receiv-
ing unemployment compensation . While as noted the testi-
mony indicates that Townsend continued as an employee,
I make no formal finding in this connection, since, although
fully litigated in connection with the issues before us, the
challenge to her ballot has not been referred to me ; i.e., no
formal finding beyond the requirements of the issues here.
The alleged interference with Townsend was committed
by Goodnuff, admittedly an agent of the Company and a
supervisor within the meaning of the Act , but whose status
was strenuously litigated . The evidence leaves little doubt
that Goodnuff was a supervisor of stature and no basis for
the Company 's claim that it is not responsible for what he
said . Indeed the testimony offered by the Company with
respect to his status reflects on the credibility of both Good-
nuff and Wrobel , and itself points to resolutions of the
credibility issue with respect to the allegations of interfer-
ence with employees ' protected activities and with the elec-
tion.
Wrobel testified that Goodnuff directs three employees
who also work under the shift foreman; he has no right to
hire or fire despite the admission in the answer . Wrobel told
us also that , when instructing his foremen , he did not tell
Goodnuff not to talk with employees about the Union,
explaining that he considered Goodnuff a clerical employ-
ee, a claim which was belied even by the latter's appearance
and manner on the stand.
As we shall further note , Goodnuff proved himself to be
thoroughly unreliable as a witness . But on the direct ques-
tion of his authority as he also attempted to minimize it, he
told us first that he makes no recommendations for pay
increases but does for promotions; then , that he has recom-
mended pay increases where promotions are granted. Fur-
ther , he has issued reprimands to employees. When he
recommends promotions for employees whom he considers
deserving , this is done over his own signature with Wrobel's
approval , not the foreman 's. Wrobel , knowledgeable but
not altogether frank , had told us that "it would be probably
the foreman" who recommends increases and promotions.
Further on the issue of Goodnuff 's credibility , he testified
that he first learned of the Union 's attempt to organize when
he recognized the registered envelope from the Union about
May 12. The significance of this was not in the least clarified
when he testified that he saw the registered envelope with
the Union's name on it at the time when it was brought into
the office and that that is all that he did see . Similarly, while
it is clear that he is well acquainted with Townsend's room-
mate and has spoken to her over the telephone some 10 or
15 times, or more , Goodnuff told us that he does not recog-
nize her voice on the telephone . This was to refute her
testimony that she spoke with him when he telephoned on
May 22 , in contradiction to his statement that he never
telephoned or visited Townsend after May 5 and specifical-
ly that he never telephoned and spoke with her roommate
on May 22.
Almost startling in view of the firm decision now assumed
by the Company with respect to Goodnuff 's status was
Wrobel 's reply when asked whether at an employee meeting
he had said that he was number one man, Goodnuff was
next in line, and then the foremen . Whether or not he re-
called the incident , he would be expected to reply , in light
of his earlier testimony , that he could not and certainly
would not have made any such statement . His actual reply
was, "I can't recall such an occasion ." Recalled as the trial
closed , Wrobel now denied that he had ever said that Good-
nuff was second in command.
With these findings concerning authority and credibility,
we come to the allegations of interference by Goodnuff.
Spared what as suggested may have been more sordid de-
tails , we were told that employee Townsend and Goodnuff
had for some time maintained a personal relationship: They
saw each other "on a social basis." We need not review nor
make a finding as to which of them discontinued the rela-
tionship : It would be stretching inference to hold , were it
found as the evidence scarcely even suggests , that this is a
case of a woman scorned , and that Townsend on that ac-
count developed at least a bias which she then transferred
to the Company and therefore fabricated her testimony
against it . I credit Townsend 's testimony concerning several
conversations between herself and Goodnuff concerning
the Union.
On May 7 or 8 Goodnuff inquired of Townsend whether
she had heard about the Union , and when she replied in the
affirmative , asked her who had started it. To the latter ques-
tion she replied that she did not know and would not tell
him if she did know . Antedating the election petition, the
questions on this occasion do not support the objection to
the election.
On May 22 Goodnuff telephoned Townsend at home,
asked whether she had signed a union card , and when she
replied that she had not seen one , told her that if they got
a union in the shop , it would not help her . He called again
later that day and remarked that the Union would not do
any good ; he had seen it happen before . He also asked
whether there had been a union meeting yet, and to this
Townsend replied in the negative.
In all three conversations Goodnuff was guilty of viola-
tive interrogation , and in the latter two of conduct which
interfered with the election ; I so find and conclude. I also
find and conclude that Goodnuff committed further inter-
ference and violation in the two calls on May 22 when he
indicated the futility of union activity . While not alleged,
this last was litigated with Goodnuff 's denial of any such
telephone calls. As for the fact that Townsend was not
actually working at the time , the interference was certainly
no less than had it been directed toward an applicant for
employment ; and even were Townsend but a former em-
ployee engaged in organizational activity at the plant with
only a hope that she might return . Indeed the tendency of
such interrogation and comment is to interfere with organi-
CHESTERFIELD CHROME CO.
zational activity of one potentially to be reinstated or even
newly employed.'
The pattern of interrogation continued on May 24 when
Wrobel asked employee Thomas whether he had heard any
union talk and added, after Thomas replied in the negative,
that he did not believe him. The Company suggests that
Thomas was biased because, after he had been promoted
and served as foreman for about 6 months from the latter
part of June to the early part of December 1971. he was
demoted by Wrobel to his former rank-and-file job. Were
we to indulge in any such assumption, we could as well
assume Thomas' gratitude for his earlier promotion and,
more important, that a hope for future advancement might
now incline him to favor the Company in his testimony.
Even if Townsend told Goodnuff that Thomas "hated his
guts," there is no warrant for finding anticompany bias here
(a comforting thought with respect to these witnesses who
continue in the Company's employ).
On the question of bias, now returning to Townsend, we
are asked not only to assume, as I do not, antagonism on
her part toward Goodnuff because he allegedly "dropped"
her; but also because of Thomas' alleged antagonism to-
ward the Company as suggested above. The connection
between Thomas' alleged attitude and Townsend's is re-
markably tenuous: Her roommate's sister had for a long
time been dating Thomas!
Employee Paul testified that about 2 weeks after she
signed a union card on May 4, Wrobel asked her what she
thought of the Union; that she replied with a question, "A
union here? "; and that Wrobel then remarked that he had
just wanted to put her "on the spot." She added that later
that day Wrobel again asked what she thought of the Union
and that she replied that she didn't think they needed one.
With Wrobel's insistence that he first became aware of un-
ion interest on receipt of the Union's letter on May 15, and
that after receipt of the Board's letter about a week later he
met with his attorneys on May 23, the finding is warranted
that, now concerned with formal Board action and the pos-
sibility of a requirement that the Company recognize and
bargain with the Union, Wrobel questioned Paul when or
about the time when he received the Board's letter. Further,
bearing in mind that Paul had not been working for a week
before the representation petition was filed , having been
laid off from May 12 to May 22, I find that this interroga-
tion occurred after the filing of the representation petition
by the Union.
In assessing the interrogation and other interference here
and elsewhere in this case , we must consider that , occurring
during an organizing campaign and shortly before a Board-
conducted election, it does indeed, in Wrobel's words, put
employees "on the spot." I find and conclude that Wrobel
unlawfully interrogated Thomas and Paul in violation of the
Act.
Although such remarks as Wrobel's and Goodnuff's can
hardly be regarded as accidental or incidental, and I find
violations here, I do not suggest that the perpetrators were
guilty of any fell intent. Wrobel, operating in what was
i An existing employment relationship is not a sine qua non for a finding
of interference . Cf the longstanding rule expressed in Phelps Dodge Corp v
N L.R B.. 313 U.S 177, 185 (1941 ), where a broader finding of discrimination
was made
39
apparently a normally decent atmosphere, may have in-
quired without awareness or consideration of the tendency
of such questions to interfere with employees' protected
concerted activities. As much can be said for Goodnuff's
questions in more intimate or friendly circumstances. But
the questions are not to be condoned as necessary, and
employee rights are not to be trampled.
Insofar as the representation proceeding is concerned, the
inquiries directed toward employees after the filing of the
petition adversely affected and prevented those laboratory
conditions which are to be maintained for the free expres-
sion of employee desires . In reaching this conclusion I have
considered the nature, the extent, and the timing of the
interference found and the closeness of the election tally:
Since we are concerned with a practical situation , lesser
interference might be overlooked were the voting disparity
relatively greater.
Except for that testified to by Ruvolo, which was not
shown to have occurred after the filing of the representation
petition, and Goodnuff's questions to Townsend early in
May, the interference found herein requires that the election
be set aside.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following recommended :2
ORDER
Respondent, Chesterfield Chrome Co., Mt. Clemens,
Michigan , its officers , agents , successors, and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Unlawfully interrogating employees concerning un-
ion activities or sympathies.
(b) Suggesting to employees the futility of engaging in
union activities.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces-
sary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its place of business in Mt. Clemens, Michi-
gan, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 7, shall be posted by the Company,
after being duly signed by its representative, immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consec-
utive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to its employees are customarily post-
ed. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
2In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec . 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec . 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
I In the event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board"
40 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
I FURTHER RECOMMEND that the objections to conduct af-
fecting the results of the election be sustained and, severed
pursuant to the Regional Director's order of consolidation,
Case 7-RC-11214 be transferred to him.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT unlawfully interrogate employees con-
cerning employee union activities or sympathies.
WE WILL NOT suggest the futility of protected concert-
ed activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise
of their rights to self -organization, to form labor orga-
nizations , to loin or assist International Union, Allied
Industrial Workers of America , AFL-CIO, or any oth-
er labor organization , and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any
or all such activities , except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment , as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
Dated By
CHESTERFIELD CHROME CO
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 500
Book Building , 1249 Washington Boulevard, Detroit, Mich-
igan 48226, Telephone 313-226-3200.