Cherokee Sportswear, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1969

178 N.L.R.B. 233 (N.L.R.B. 1969)

CHEROKEE SPORTSWEAR, INC.
Cherokee Sportswear, Inc. and Local 444, and
International Ladies' Garment Workers ' Union,
AFL-CIO, Charging Party-Union , and William P.
Hutcheson , Attorney , Employees , Intervenor-
Petitioner . Cases 10-CA-6939 and 10-RD-342
August 27, 1969
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS
JENKINS AND ZAGORIA
On March 26, 1969, Trial Examiner Frederick U.
Reel issued a Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in certain unfair labor practices in violation
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom, as set forth in the attached Trial
Examiner's Decision. He further recommended that
the election of April 7, 1967, be set aside.
Thereafter, the Respondent, the General Counsel,
and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with these cases to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and
the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts
the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the Trial Examiner, except as modified herein:
1. The record shows, and we find, that on the
Friday before the election Respondent, through its
agent Larry Perla, approached employee Mildred
Stakley and stated that, while he was not going to
tell Stakley how to vote, he knew that she would
vote for the Union. The record further shows, and
we find, that on the day of, but prior to, the
election, Perla approached employee Glenda Davis
and stated that he knew how she and her mother
were going to vote. Contrary to the Trial Examiner,
we do not find that the above statements were made
merely in a context to reassure the employees as to
their future with the Respondent. Rather, we find
that these remarks to employees Stakley and Davis
conveyed the impression of surveillance and
constituted unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' We find further that
said remarks, occurring within the critical period
prior to the election, constitute objectionable
conduct and therefore provide additional grounds
for setting aside the election.
233
2. We conclude, in agreement with the Trial
Examiner, that Respondent's refusal to allow
incumbent Union Representative MaCoy to visit the
plant shortly before the election constituted an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. We view this act, coming at a
time when antiunion employees were being allowed
to circulate freely throughout the plant soliciting
support, as motivated by Respondent's antiunion
animus and not by any legitimate concern, and as
comprising an additional example of Respondent's
unlawful disparate treatment of union supporters.
3. The Trial Examiner expressly refused to
recommend that the usual "Notice" be posted on
the ground that in view of the long period which has
elapsed since the occurrence of the unlawful acts,
any posting of notices would serve only to stir up
old animosities and would not further the statutory
goal of industrial peace. However, we find merit in
the General Counsel's exception to the Trial
Examiner's failure to recommend a notice, for such
a notice,even if long-delayed, has salutary prospective
effects. Consequently, we shall order the usual
posting of notices.
4. We shall remand the representation case to the
Regional Director for the purpose of counting the
ballots of employees Bert Mincey, Carl Lichlyter,
Bill Lichlyter, Glenn Rodgers, John Newman, and
Howell Pressley. If the Union receives, on the
revised tally of ballots, a majority of the valid votes
cast, then the Regional Director shall certify it as
the representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit. However, if the Union does not
receive such a majority the Regional Director shall
set the election aside, and we direct that, in that
case, the Regional Director shall conduct a second
election at such time as he deems appropriate but
not later than 6 months from the date of this
Decision, Order, and Direction of Second Election.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that Respondent,
Cherokee Sportswear, Inc., Madisonville, Tennessee,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Permitting employees in violation of plant
rules to circulate antiunion petitions among the
employees in the plant on company time.
(b) Promising employees benefits for having
signed an antiunion petition.
(c) Stimulating employees to withdraw their
membership in, or support of, a labor organization.
(d) Coercively interrogating employees, or
commenting to employees, as to how they would
vote or have voted in a Board election.
' Queen City Coach Company . 160 NLRB 216.
178 NLRB No. 40
234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(e) Refusing for unlawful reasons to let union
representatives visit the plant.
(f) In any like manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act
2. Take the following affirmative action which we
find necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its plant at Madisonville, Tennessee,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."2
Copies of said notice, on forms to be provided by
the Regional Director for Region 10, shall, after
being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized
representative, be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and shall be
maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter,
in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case 10-RD-342 be,
and it hereby is, remanded to the Regional Director
for Region 10, and said Regional Director shall,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, open
and count the ballots of Bert Mincey, Carl
Lichlyter, Bill Lichlyter, Glenn Rodgers, John
Newman, and Howell Pressley. Thereafter, the
Regional Director shall prepare and cause to be
served upon the parties a revised tally of ballots. If
the Union receives a majority of valid votes cast, the
Regional Director shall certify it as the
representative of the employees in the appropriate
unit. If the Union does not receive a majority of the
valid votes, the Regional Director shall set the
election aside and proceed to hold a second election
as provided above in paragraph 4 of our Decision.
[Direction of Second Election' omitted from
publication.]
'In the event the Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court
of Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and
Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order "
'In order to assure that all eligible voters may have the opportunity to
be informed of the issues in the exercise of their statutory right to vote, all
parties to the election should have access to a list of voters and their
addresses which may be used to communicate with them Excelsior
Underwear Inc, 156 NLRB 1236, N L R B v Wyman-Gordon Company
394 U S 759 Accordingly , it is hereby directed that an election eligibility
list, containing the names and addresses of all the eligible voters, must be
filed by the Employer with the Regional Director for Region 10 within 7
days after the date of issuance of the Notice of Second Election by the
Regional Director The Regional Director shall make the list available to
all parties to the election No extension of time to file this list shall be
granted by the Regional Director except in extraordinary circumstances
Failure to comply with this requirement shall be grounds for setting aside
the election whenever proper objections are filed
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National
Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the
policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
we hereby notify our employees that.
WE WILL NOT permit employees in violation of plant
rules to circulate antiunion petitions among the
employees in the plant on company time.
WE WILL NOT promise employees benefits for having
signed an antiunion petition.
WE WILL NOT stimulate employees to withdraw their
membership in, or support of, a labor organization.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees, or comment to
employees, as how they would vote or voted in a Board
election
WE WILL NOT refuse for unlawful reasons to let
union representatives visit the plant
WE WILL NOT in any like manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
Dated
CHEROKEE SPORTSWEAR, INC.
(Employer)
By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 730 Peachtree
Street, NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30308, Telephone
404-526-5760.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
FREDRICK U. REEL, Trial Examiner' These cases,
consolidated by the Acting Regional Director,' and heard
at Madisonville, Tennessee, on February 4, 5 and 6, 1969,2
present questions arising out of the efforts of a group of
employees to unseat their certified bargaining
representative. At issue in both the complaint and
representation cases is whether the Employer rendered
such assistance to the antiunion group as to infringe the
statutory prohibition against interference, restraint, and
coercion, and to prevent the holding of a fair election.
The caption of the proceeding reflects the consolidation and the
granting at the hearing of Mr Hutcheson 's motion to intervene in the CA
case
'The complaint case arose pursuant to a charge filed April 28, 1967, and
a complaint issued December 9, 1968 The representation proceeding
originated with a decertification petition filed February 28, 1967, followed
by a stipulation entered into on March 24 , 1967, for a consent election
which was held on April 7, 1967 The Union on April 14, 1967, filed
objections to conduct affecting the election , and the Regional Director
issued his report on April 22, 1968, recommending that the objections be
overruled The Union thereupon filed exceptions to his report The
National Labor Relations Board on December 27, 1968, issued its order
directing hearing in the decertification proceeding, noting that the Union
had raised "substantial and material issues which can best be resolved
by a hearing "
The unusual delay between the filing of the charge and the issuance of
the complaint (nearly 20 months ) is apparently traceable in substantial part
to the fact that the Regional Director dismissed the charge on October 31,
CHEROKEE SPORTSWEAR , INC. 235
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs filed by
General Counsel and Intervenor,' I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY, AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent, herein called the Company, a Tennessee
corporation engaged at Madisonville in the manufacture
of wearing apparel, annually ships goods valued in excess
of $50,000 to points outside the State, and is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
Charging Party, herein called the Union, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act Intervenor (petitioner in the representation
proceeding) is an attorney representing a group of
antiunion employees, herein called the Committee There
is no allegation that the Committee is a labor
organization A contention to that effect, advanced by
Charging Party at the end of the hearing, appears to have
been abandoned by Charging Party's adoption of General
Counsel's brief In any event I find no evidence that the
Committee is a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act. Cf. N L.R B v. Cleveland Trust Co , 214 F 2d
95, 100 (C A. 6), approving in this respect 102 NLRB
1497, 1501, fn 5
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A Background and Chronology
Late in 1965 the Union, despite company opposition,
won a Board election and was certified as the bargaining
representative of the Company's production and
maintenance employees On May 2, 1966, the Company
and the Union executed a collective-bargaining agreement
which was due to expire May 2, 1967
Early in 1967' a number of employees commenced
circulating an antiunion petition in the plant At some
date not shown in the record these employees retained
counsel, who on February 28 filed a decertification
petition with the Board's Regional Office, and this
culminated, as noted above, in an election on April 7. The
instant litigation turns on whether the Company rendered
such assistance to the antiunion movement as to constitute
unlawful interference with employees in the exercise of
their Section 7 rights and as to require setting aside the
election.
In the April 7 election the Union received 96 votes,
while 95 votes were cast against the Union, and 6 ballots
were challenged The Regional Director in the course of
overruling objections to the election also overruled the six
challenges, and the Union in obtaining Board review of
his action abandoned four of its challenges. The eligibility
of the voters who cast the remaining two challenged
ballots is therefore also before me in this litigation,
pursuant to the Board's order directing a hearing in the
decertification proceeding.
Immediately following the election the Union called a
strike, which was attended by some violence and which
shut down the plant. On April 17 the Union and the
Company executed a strike settlement agreement in which
they referred to the strike (allegedly caused by the
Company's alleged unfair labor practices) and to the
pending objections to the election, and agreed that the
strike would end, the employees would be reinstated, the
election would be set aside, and the Union and the
Company would resume negotiations for a renewal of the
contract due to expire May 2. The antiunion group and its
counsel were not parties to this agreement. On May 1 the
Union and the Company executed a new 3-year contract,
to run from May 2, 1967, to May 2, 1970. Meanwhile, on
April 25 counsel for the antiunion group filed a charge
alleging that the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) and (2)
of the Act by recognizing and negotiating with the Union
at a time when its status as bargaining representative was
under challenge in the decertification case. This charge
still rests in the Board's Regional Office, apparently
awaiting disposition of the instant proceeding.
1967, and the General Counsel, on appeal from that ruling , first sustained
the dismissal on August 13, 1968, and then , after timely application for
reconsideration , partially reversed his ruling on October 15 , 1968, and
directed issuance of the complaint
The time-consuming procedures , described above, most certainly do not
redound to the credit of the administrative agency, but my attention has
not been directed to any deviation from prescribed rules and regulations
which would warrant my not reaching the merits of the controversy "The
law's delay ," complained of by writers as separated in time as Shakespeare
and Dickens , is occasionally still with us, and this agency bears its share of
the guilt On some occasions even the Federal circuit courts of appeals
have allowed over a year to elapse between argument and decision I can
only recommend that if any further steps are taken in this case, every
effort should be made to expedite it
'Charging Party adopted the brief of General Counsel as its own, and
Respondent filed no brief Intervenor asks that I "discredit " the statements
in General Counsel's brief because they are inconsistent with the opinions
"he" expressed in "his" "Report on Objections " Even assuming that
counsel was the author of the Regional Director ' s report, I would not for
that reason "discredit" his brief to me The scheme of the statute requires
General Counsel himself , to say nothing of his subordinates , occasionally
to take inconsistent positions For example in this very case, if the Board
should dismiss and the Charging Party seek review, General Counsel and
his subordinates would argue in support of the Board order of dismissal,
and would urge that General Counsel was either wrong as a matter of law,
or failed to carry his burden of proof, in his presentation to me Certainly
the reviewing court would not "discredit " such arguments because they are
contrary to arguments advanced by General Counsel at an earlier stage of
the proceeding
B. Company Assistance to the Antiunion Group
As just noted, shortly after the election and while
objections thereto were pending, the Company negotiated
a strike settlement agreement and a new contract with the
Union, recognizing the Union as the statutory bargaining
representative of the employees. Both Company President
Sayah and union negotiator MaCoy had been advised by
counsel that company recognition of the Union at that
time would be in violation of the Act unless the
apparently pending "question concerning representation"
were first disposed of, and this could apparently be
brought about only if the decertification petition could be
nullified as the product of company assistance. Indeed,
MaCoy testified that Sayah admitted to such assistance,
although Sayah and his local counsel, one Burnstein, deny
having made such admissions. Both Sayah and Burnstein
point out, moreover, that Sayah was immediately
concerned with ending the strike, resuming operations,
and avoiding further violence. Whether or not Sayah in so
many words admitted unlawfully assisting the antiunion
movement seems unnecessary to decide His admission
'Except where otherwise indicated , all events subsequently referred to
herein occurred in the year 1967
236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
would at the most be supporting evidence, not conclusive
evidence, of the ultimate fact to be proved. Furthermore,
while his conduct in signing the agreements with
knowledge that he could do so legally only if he had
earlier violated the law furnishes support for MaCoy's
testimony that Sayah admitted the violations, the question
would still remain what weight to give the "confession" in
the light of the somewhat coercive circumstances
surrounding it. I see no need to grasp these nettles at this
time, for as detailed below, I find unlawful assistance
established by direct testimony concerning the events in
question, and that suffices to dispose of the issues before
me.
The complaint alleges and the answer admits that the
Company at all times material herein, maintained, inter
alia, the following rules:
I Do not leave your station or routine during
working hours unless for personal reasons.
2. Do not carry on a conversation with your
neighbors during working hours- a few words now and
then are permissible.
This rule was apparently normally observed and enforced,
with exceptions for special collections; the record
establishes that the supervisors stopped conversations
between employees But in the weeks preceding the
election the leading supporters of the antiunion movement
roamed widely and at will through the plant, talking to
employees about the antiunion petition. These patent
infringements of the Company's rules were conducted in
full view of the supervisors who made no effort to prevent
them. Witness after witness testified to this practice,
establishing its widespread character, its relation to the
antiunion movement, and its timing, for it began a few
weeks before the election and stopped immediately
thereafter.
Company President Sayah testified that he twice
warned leaders of the antiunion group not to circulate
their petition on working time. These warnings were
allegedly given in February, but the testimony of
numerous witnesses establishes that if given they were
ignored, as the antiunion group continued its widespread
and open flouting of the rule (and of the "warnings")
throughout March Sayah also made a public
announcement on February 22 prohibiting solicitation, this
was, of course, likewise flouted. But some explanation as
to why Sayah's public strictures were so ineffectual may
also be found in Sayah's testimony, for he admitted telling
his supervisors that they should tolerate "things going on
that normally shouldn't."
Intervenor, admitting that "the Employer, through its
supervisors, tolerated anti-union activity on its premises,
and in some cases on company time," argues that Sayah
did not enforce the no-solicitation rule against "Union
people." As noted above, there is evidence that the rule
was normally enforced, except for collections for "good
causes," and indeed Sayah publicly referred to it early in
the preelection period. Moreover, as Sayah himself
pointed out on the witness stand , the existing contract
expressly prohibited union activity by any employee on
company time. Intervenor also points out that the Union
by contract had a bulletin board, a facility not available to
antiunion employees. But this situation falls far short of
justifying the widespread antiunion activity which the
Company through its supervisors openly tolerated on
company time. A far different question, and one on which
I intimate no opinion, would have been presented had the
Company merely permitted the antiunion faction to use a
bulletin board
I find that the action of the Company, through its
supervisors, in knowingly permitting widespread antiunion
activity on company time and property in violation of
company rules constituted unlawful interference with
employee rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and
prevented the holding of a fair election
As the foregoing finding necessitates the issuance of an
appropriate order and the setting aside of the election, it
is unnecessary to dwell at length on other violations
alleged in the complaint and urged as additional grounds
for setting the election aside.
The evidence establishes that Company Supervisors
Romita and Rosenberg, together with one Texter, a labor
relations consultant retained by the Company,
collaborated in the preparation of antiunion posters
displayed at the plant on the morning of the election. The
posters were plainly designed to assist the antiunion
movement. One read "If the Union wins, you might lose,"
and the other read: "The Union representative was here
yesterday and threatened to strike our plant; is this what
you want?" There is no evidence as to the truth or falsity
of the latter statement The first is probably within the
orbit of "free speech" under Section 8(c) of the Act; it
seems to be more of an "opinion" and less of a "threat"
than the familiar "serious harm" language On the day
before the election and on election day itself, the
Company selected "guards" from among its regular
employees to patrol the parking lot for the avowed
purpose of preventing sabotage. Although the only
damage theretofore inflicted had been to the car of a
union supporter, the men selected as guards belonged to
the antiunion faction, and used this opportunity to place
antiunion literature in the cars The record does not,
however, conclusively establish that they were selected for
that purpose or that the supervisor of their guard duties
was aware they were spreading propaganda.
Clear violations of the Act, however, are established by
the undenied testimony of employee Strickland that
Production Manager Perla, unsolicited by her, obtained
for her the Union's address for the purpose of submitting
her resignation from the Union, and that Sewing Room
Supervisor Pack, upon learning that Strickland had signed
the antiunion petition, told her, "Well, if you signed it, I
will see that you get regular work "
General Counsel urges still other conduct as
establishing violations of the Act. Uncontradicted
testimony establishes that Perla asked one employee how
she had voted and told several others, individually, that he
knew how each would vote The direct interrogation
infringed the employee's rights. The other comments
complained of, taken in context, were not evidence of
surveillance or other interference, but were designed to
reassure the employees as to their future with the
Company There is also some evidence that in a
preelection speech to the employees Sayah referred to, but
did not dispel, rumors of the plant's moving. Sayah's
prepared text, which was strongly antiunion but stayed
within permissible limits, did not deal with this matter. He
testified that in addition he denied rumors that the plant
might close. I credit his testimony in this regard. I do not
believe that if he referred at all to rumors of moving, he
left the matter "in the air," as the employees testified, and
therefore make no adverse finding
The Company admittedly refused to let Union
Representative MaCoy visit the plant shortly before the
election This appears to have been in breach of the
collective-bargaining agreement, which expressly provided
a right of access to the plant subject only to the condition
CHEROKEE SPORTSWEAR , INC. 237
of noninterference with production The Company's
ostensible grounds for the refusal were that it feared
MaCoy's presence so shortly before the election might
disturb the employees and that his purpose was "strictly
electioneering," reasons which throw in high relief the
antiunion solicitation freely permitted in the plant. As
MaCoy's efforts to visit the plant were within the
contractual rights won by the Union, and as the Section 7
right to be represented by a union extends to the right to
have such representation made effective by carrying out
visitation rights under a contract, I find the refusal to let
MaCoy visit the plant violated Section 8(a)(1)
Finally, I am directed to pass on the challenged ballots
of Bert Mincey and Carl Lichlyter. This may be an
academic exercise as I believe the election should be set
aside I find that Lichlyter, a skilled mechanic, and
Mincey, a marker in the cutting department, possessed
none of the qualifications prescribed in Section 2(11) of
the Act, and therefore were not supervisors within the
meaning of the Act The evidence establishes that
Lichlyter is a salaried employee and has a parking space
next to that of President Sayah, but while this may be
some evidence that the employees regarded him as an
authoritative source when he expressed views on company
policy, it falls far short of establishing supervisory status
Cf. N L R B. v. Birmingham Publishing Co , 262 F.2d 2,
8 (C.A. 5). Mincey since the election has been given the
title of assistant patternmaker, and the Company has
notified the Union that he is now considered outside the
bargaining unit. Apparently Mincey's job duties have not
changed, and his present "exclusion" from the unit arose
from the Company's desire to satisfy his personal desires
to be known as a supervisor and not to be represented by
the Union. The evidence in the record as to his duties
discloses nothing of a supervisory character, as he marks
patterns, attaches cutting orders to the marked papers,
and sends them on their way. He has little or no contact
with other personnel except for Supervisor Romita, the
patternmaker I therefore would overrule the challenges to
the ballots of Lichlyter and Mincey.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
The Company (a) by permitting widespread circulation
of an antiunion petition in the plant during working hours,
in violation of its otherwise normally enforced rules, (b)
by promising benefits to an employee for signing the
petition, (c) by encouraging an employee to resign from
the Union, (d) by interrogating an employee as to how she
voted in a Board election, and (e) by refusing to let a
union representative exercise his contractual right to visit
the plant engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
I shall recommend a cease-and-desist order embracing
any interference with employee rights under Section 7.
The Company appears to have been practicing
"brinksmanship" (see Wausau Steel Corp v. N L.R B ,
377 F.2d 369, 372 (C.A 7), and I think it unwise upon
consideration of the unlawful interference shown on this
record "that all of the untraveled roads to that end be left
open and that only the worn one be closed " International
Salt Co v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400. See also
N.L R B. v. Bailey Co, 180 F.2d 278, 280 (C.A. 6), citing
with approval N.L.R B. v. Sunbeam Electric Mfg. Co ,
133 F 2d 856 (C.A. 7) I shall also recommend sustaining
the objections to the election and setting it aside. I am
inclined, however, not to recommend the posting of a
notice. The events here are already several years behind us
and should this matter be litigated further, the lapse of
time between the events and the "remedy" could well be
as much as 4 or 5 years Meanwhile, the Union, although
the object of the unfair labor practices, has retained its
status as bargaining representative and has executed a
3-year contract with the Company. While this
circumstance alone would not preclude the posting of a
notice, it is my sense of the situation that to post a notice
here would be more likely to reopen old wounds than to
give needed assurances. I am therefore not recommending
such a posting If the Charging Party or the General
Counsel has views differing from mine on this matter,
they can so indicate in any exceptions or cross-exceptions
they may file.
Finally, it should be noted that although I find
company assistance to the antiunion group, I do not find
that the Company instigated the antiunion movement. I
make no finding, and I imply none, as to whether the
Company acted lawfully in making a new contract with
the Union while the decertification petition was pending
(for my holding that the election was tainted does not
require dismissal of that petition), or as to what remedy
might be appropriate if the execution of the contract was
not proper. I also consider it outside my province to make
any recommendation with respect to future action on the
decertification petition.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]