Chemical Workers Local 6-0682 (Checker Motors Corp.)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 16, 2003

339 N.L.R.B. 291 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

CHEMICAL WORKERS LOCAL 6-0682 (CHECKER MOTORS CORP.) 291
Local No. 6-0682, Paper, Allied-Industrial Chemical
and Energy Workers International Union, AFL–
CIO–CLC and Checker Motors Corporation.
Case 7–CB–13325
June 16, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND ACOSTA
On December 12, 2002, Administrative Law Judge
William N. Cates issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and a reply
brief, and the General Counsel and the Charging Party
filed answering briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions2
and to adopt the recommended Order as modified be-
low.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Local
No. 6-0682, Paper, Allied-Industrial Chemical and En-
ergy Workers International Union, AFL–CIO–CLC,
Kalamazoo, Michigan, its officers, agents, and represen-

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
See Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544, 544-545 (1950), enfd.
188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 We agree with the judge that the Board’s decision in Tri-Pak Ma-
chinery, Inc., 325 NLRB 671 (1998), does not compel deferral in this
case. In Tri-Pak, unlike here, the charging party union had a right to
invoke the parties’ broad arbitration procedure, thereby ensuring that a
mutually agreed-upon dispute resolution procedure existed to arbitrate
the contract dispute. Id. at 673. By contrast, as the judge noted, defer-
ral here was inappropriate because the Charging Party, Checker Mo-
tors, had no ability to invoke the grievance procedure to resolve the
contract dispute. In distinguishing Tri-Pak, we do not rely on the
judge’s conclusion that Tri-Pak is inapposite because the parties here
disputed the existence of the contract at the time the Respondent filed
its July 2002 grievance.
Similarly, in adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent vio-
lated Sec. 8(b)(3) of the Act, we find it unnecessary to pass on the
judge’s alternative holding that the Union worded its March 18, 2002
notice to amend the collective-bargaining agreement so broadly that it
actually constituted a notice to terminate the contract.
3 We will substitute a new notice in accordance with our recent deci-
sion in Ishikawa Gasket America, Inc., 337 NLRB 175 (2001).
tatives shall take the action set forth in the Order as
modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1.
“1. Cease and desist
“(a) Refusing, as the exclusive bargaining reprsenta-
tive of the Company’s employees in the appropriate unit,
to bargain in good faith collectively with the Company.
“(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
with your employer
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT refuse, upon request, to meet and bar-
gain in good faith with Checker Motors Corporation with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment affecting the employees in the appropri-
ate unit.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain, or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request by Checker Motors Corporation,
bargain collectively, as the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the appropriate unit, with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment and, if an agreement is reached, embody
it in a signed contact.

LOCAL NO. 6-0682, PAPER, ALLIED-INDUSTRIAL
CHEMICAL AND ENERGY WORKERS INTER-
NATIONAL UNION, AFL–CIO–CLC

339 NLRB No. 37
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 292
A. Bradley Howell, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Kevin M. McCarthy, Esq. and Jedd E. Mendelson, Esq., for the
Company.
Stanley Eisenstein, Esq., for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this
case in Kalamazoo, Michigan, on October 3, 2002.1 The case
originates from a charge, filed by Checker Motors Corporation
(the Company) on May 31, against Local No. 6-0682, Paper,
Allied-Industrial Chemical and Energy Workers International
Union, AFL–CIO–CLC (the Union). The prosecution of this
case was formalized on July 25, when the Regional Director for
Region 7 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board),
acting in the name of the Board’s General Counsel, issued a
complaint and notice of hearing (the complaint) against the
Union.
The complaint alleges the Union violated Section 8(b)(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) when between about
May 29 and June 13, the Union, by its agent, International Rep-
resentative David Ferson (Union International Representative
Ferson), failed and refused to bargain with regard to collective-
bargaining agreement proposals submitted by the Company
during negotiations, unless such proposals coincided with pro-
posals submitted by the Union. It is also alleged that since on
or about June 13, the Union has refused to engage in any fur-
ther negotiations toward a collective-bargaining agreement.
Finally, it is alleged that by its overall conduct the Union has
failed and refused to bargain in good faith with the Company.
The Union admits the Board’s jurisdiction is properly in-
voked,2 that it is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act and that Union International Represen-
tative Ferson is it’s agent within the meaning of Section 2(13)
of the Act.
The Union denies bargaining in bad faith in violation of the
Act. Rather, the Union asserts, it, at the Company’s request,
agreed to listen to company contract proposals months before
their most recent collective-bargaining agreement was to ex-
pire, to see if a new early agreement could be arrived at. The
Union contends its willingness to listen to the Company’s pro-
posals did not constitute a waiver of its statutory, as well as
contractual, right to notice if the Company wanted to terminate
the collective-bargaining agreement. The Union notes article
VIII of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement, as well as
Section 8(d) of the Act, sets forth certain notice requirements
the parties must follow. The Union asserts that after early ef-

1 All dates hereinafter are 2002, unless otherwise indicated.
2 It is admitted the Company is a corporation with an office and
place of business located in Kalamazoo, Michigan, where it is engaged
in the manufacture and nonretail sale of automotive parts. During the
calendar year ending December 31, 2001, a representative period, the
Company in conducting its business operations sold and shipped from
its Kalamazoo, Michigan facility goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly to points outside the State of Michigan. The parties admit, the
evidence establishes and I find the Company is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
forts by the parties to arrive at a new collective-bargaining
agreement was unsuccessful it provided the Company with a
“Notice to Amend” the parties’ collective-bargaining agree-
ment. The Union asserts that pursuant to article VIII of the
parties’ collective-bargaining agreement and their “Notice to
Amend,” the collective-bargaining agreement rolled over or
extended its effectiveness for another year. The Union asserts
that when it refused to bargain over company proposals which
were not incorporated in its “Notice to Amend” it was not obli-
gated to do so. The Union correctly asserts the Company never
at any time filed a notice to amend or notice to terminate the
collective-bargaining agreement.
I have studied the whole record, the party’s briefs, and the
authorities they rely on. Based on more detailed findings and
analysis below, I shall conclude and find the Union violated the
Act substantially as alleged in the complaint.
A. The Facts
The Company for many years produced vehicles widely
known as Checker Taxi Cabs. In more recent years, and at
present, it manufactures automotive stampings and assembles
such as fenders, doors, hoods, and other metal automotive parts.
The Company’s principle customer is the General Motors Cor-
poration. The parties have had a long-term bargaining relation-
ship. From about 1943,3 and at all times material, the Union
has been recognized by the Company as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the following employees of
the Company, herein called the unit:

All production and maintenance employees employed by the
Company at its Kalamazoo facility; but excluding all watch-
men, timekeepers, clerical employees, draftsmen, Formen,
Assistant Formen, office employees, all experimental em-
ployees in Department 54 and all guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.

It is admitted the unit is appropriate for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act.
Since about 1943, the Company’s recognition of the Union
has been embodied in successive collective-bargaining agree-
ments, the most recent of which was by its terms effective from
June 14, 1999, to June 13, 2002. I find, based upon Section
9(a) of the Act, the Union has been, since 1943, and continues
to be, the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
unit.
Well prior to the expiration date of the parties’ most recent
collective-bargaining agreement, Company Chief Operating
Officer Larry Temple, approached Union Bargaining Chairman
James Savage about a need for early negotiations. Temple told
Savage the Company was under some pressure from a major
customer for price reductions and that “health care cost were
going out of site.” Savage told Temple, at their early December
meeting, that Temple would have to present his request to the
3 Although the complaint alleges “since about 1952” chairman of the
Union’s bargaining committee, James Savage (Union Bargaining
Chairman Savage), testified, without contradiction, regarding terms in
the parties’ 1943 collective-bargaining agreement.
CHEMICAL WORKERS LOCAL 6-0682 (CHECKER MOTORS CORP.) 293
entire union bargaining committee because he could not make
such a decision on his own.
On December 20, 2001, Company Chief Operating Officer
Temple called a meeting of the entire Union bargaining com-
mittee. Temple told the Union’s committee the Company
wanted to have early negotiations and added the Company had
a short list of concerns to negotiate. Temple explained that the
Company’s concerns centered around escalating health costs,
productivity improvement in order to be more competitive and
absenteeism. Temple explained the Company wanted early
negotiations to try and work out an agreement before June be-
cause it wanted to avoid the need for “banking parts.”4
The Union agreed to early meetings or negotiations5 but
stated they would need to poll their membership to see what the
membership’s concerns were. The union committee stated at
the December 20, 2001 meeting they were very concerned
about money for the employees’ pension fund and job security.
The Union and Company agreed to a number of dates for early
negotiations. Company Vice President of Human Resources
Marcia Koestner in a January 30 memorandum distributed to
certain company officials and the union bargaining committee
set forth agreed upon dates for negotiations which were Febru-
ary 18 and 25 and March 1, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, and 14 to be held at
an area hotel.
The Union requested and the Company granted the employ-
ees time at 1:30 p.m. on February 14, for a general membership
meeting which was held at an area fairgrounds. The general
membership met to talk about contract concerns and proposals.6
The parties met for their first negotiating session on February
18. The Company was represented by Company Chief Operat-
ing Officer Temple, Vice President of Human Resources
Koestner, company officials, Walburn and Markin, as well as
Local Counsel Kevin McCarthy. Attorney McCarthy acted as
chief spokesperson for the Company. The Union was repre-
sented by its spokesman, International Representative Ferson,
along with Union Bargaining Committee Chairman Savage and
employees Dennany, Norwood, and Miller.7 The Company
explained its purpose in asking for early negotiations namely
that its chief customer, General Motors Corporation, was ask-
ing that the Company decrease its prices for the coming year by
4.5 percent. The Company explained such a decrease or reduc-
tion would amount to approximately $1.7 million in give backs
to General Motors Corporation. Company Chief Operating
Officer Temple testified, “[w]e told them our health care costs

4 Temple explained “banking parts” meant the costly building of an
inventory of parts by extended overtime to meet customer demand in
the event of a work stoppage by the Union at the collective-bargaining
agreement expiration in June.
5 Union counsel at trial objected to the term negotiations in describ-
ing the meetings. The Union contends they agreed to meetings which
were more in the nature of discussions. I am using the term negotia-
tions simply to described the parties’ meetings.
6 The Union’s notice of the general membership’s meeting stated in
part that “all union members should make every effort to attend this
meeting” adding “the purpose of this very important meeting is to dis-
cuss contract proposals.”
7 The negotiating teams for the respective parties remained, for the
greater part, the same throughout their meetings.
were really hurting us badly and we reviewed . . . our labor
burden cost [and] . . . . We’re here to try to get a deal done
early to avoid having to build banks, that we had a contract that
expired on June 14th.” Union International Representative
Ferson told the Company that any deal done early by the Union
would have to contain increases in wages and benefits. Ferson
also explained the Union’s ratification procedure that included
a vote by the membership as well as the signed approval of the
International Union before any agreement could go into effect.
The Company presented a 15-point 4-page initial bargaining
proposal to the Union at the February 18 session. Company
Attorney McCarthy, “ran through” each of the Company’s pro-
posals and explained what the Company was looking for. The
Company’s initial bargaining proposal covered health insur-
ance, grievance procedures, pending grievances, employees
returning to the bargaining unit, recall procedures, leaves of
absence, holiday shutdowns, disability benefits, health insur-
ance restoration, vacations, wage rates for new hires, plant
relocation/severance agreement, wages, absenteeism/tardiness,
and duration.
At this first meeting the Union presented a 1-page proposal
on “successors and assigns” and a 44-point 2-page document
entitled, “2002 Suggested Contract Discussions.” The Union
noted at the top of its 44 points for discussion; “The Company
has approached the Union about the possibility of reaching an
early agreement. The Bargaining Committee has met to review
items that we may want to discuss with the Company in an
attempt to reach an early agreement.” Union International Rep-
resentative Ferson covered with the Company the 44 items on
the Union’s proposal, item by item. Some of the Union’s items
addressed temporary transfers, parking lots, overtime proce-
dures, modification to the incentives system, wages, holiday
schedules, improvement of dental and vision benefits, insurance
benefits, improvements in vacation eligibility, enhanced be-
reavement pay, modifications to the no-strike clause, additions
to the skilled trade classifications, enclosing all break areas, and
reviewing temporary transfer pay requirements.
No agreement was reached at the February 18 session.
The parties’ next met on February 25, with the same negotia-
tors. The Union presented the Company a 2-page proposal on
overtime. According to Company Chief Operating Officer
Temple the Union was having a “hard time” with the current
overtime provisions in the parties’ most recent collective-
bargaining agreement and wanted to change them. Union Bar-
gaining Committee Chairman Savage testified the Union made
several proposals on overtime. Union International Representa-
tive Ferson testified the parties spent the majority of their over-
all negotiating efforts on overtime and health care issues. Fer-
son presented the Company a proposal concerning yearend
holiday shutdown days with provisions for paid, as well as
certain unpaid, holidays. The Company verbally made its ini-
tial wage proposal which “was in the neighborhood of 30 plus
cents an hour [f]or three years.”
Company Chief Operating Officer Temple told the Union at
the February 25 session the Union’s proposals would cost the
Company $950,000 for the first year and noted the Union had
yet to make a wage proposal. According to Temple, Union
International Representative Ferson responded the Company
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 294
could save that much by not preparing for a strike. The Union
presented two written proposals regarding job descriptions.
The parties discussed all the proposals without arriving at any
agreement.
The parties met in sessions on March 1, 6, 7, and 8. During
these sessions the Company informed the Union it was looking
for a “cost neutral” agreement. Union International Represen-
tative Ferson testified the Union viewed the Company’s pro-
posals as “concessionary” not “cost neutral.” At the March 7
session the Union presented a 4-page revised noneconomic set
of proposals. The Union explained each of its revised propos-
als. Some tentative agreements were arrived at during the
March sessions.
Specifically at the March 8 session, the parties’ agreed on
matters such as changing certain dates in the collective-
bargaining agreement, changing certain union officials names
in the collective-bargaining agreement, increasing life insur-
ance coverage for the employees, and agreeing to dates certain
when vacation checks would be available. At some point in the
March sessions the Union proposed a 1-year extension of the
collective-bargaining agreement with some language changes
but wages and related economic matters would remain the
same. The Company responded it did not see how that would
help their financial situation. Union International Representa-
tive Ferson made a counter proposal on health coverage in
which he proposed splitting the coverage into bargaining unit
and nonbargaining unit categories. The Company explored this
with its insurance carrier, but the parties’ were never able to
agree on health insurance changes.
At the conclusion of the parties’ negotiating session on
March 8, Company Attorney McCarthy gave the negotiators a
synopsis of where he thought negotiations were. McCarthy
explained the Company had put forth proposals toward a cost
neutral contract and asserted what the Union had proposed,
without even discussing wages, would cost approximately
$950,000 the first year. McCarthy opined the parties’ were
going in opposite directions. McCarthy again stated costs were
escalating and one of its customers was asking for a $1.7-
million give back in price adjustments on parts. McCarthy
explained that any moneys spent to protect the customer be-
tween then and mid-June would not be available for benefits in
any new collective-bargaining agreement. McCarthy admon-
ished the Union, “If you’re prepared to go toward a neutral
contract with us, we need to see meaningful movement on your
part addressing some of our proposals and, when you’re ready
to do that, give us a call.” McCarthy summarized saying,
“[U]nless we can start turning this ship around and dealing in
realities, moving toward a cost neutral contract, we’re going to
have to go to June and see if there’s a way to solve this problem
then because the contract expires June 14, and what ever money
is spent by the Company to protect their customer between then
and June 14 wont be there in June.” Company Attorney
McCarthy indicated the Company was prepared to go forward
toward a cost neutral contract but needed meaningful move-
ment on the Union’s part by addressing some of the Company’s
proposals and added the Union; “When your ready to do that
give us a call.”
Union Bargaining Committee Chairman Savage recalled
Company Attorney McCarthy telling the union bargaining
committee at the March 8 session, “If we weren’t willing to
enter into an agreement like the Company had outlined we were
wasting our time.” Savage said the union negotiators left the
session at that time. The Company waited until 4 p.m. that day
and left also.
Thereafter, Union International Representative Ferson wrote,
Company Vice President of Human Resources Koestner on
March 18 notifying the Company that pursuant to article VIII,
“Term of Agreement” of the parties’ collective-bargaining
agreement the Union was providing notice of the Union’s de-
sire to amend the parties’ agreement. In his letter Ferson also
requested the Company provide the Union with certain speci-
fied information.
Company Chief Operating Officer Temple testified the
Company arranged for another session with the Union for May
9. The same negotiating committee members were present for
both sides except the Company added Attorney Theodore M.
Eisenberg to its negotiating committee.
At the May 9 session Company Attorney Eisenberg spoke
for the Company. Eisenberg explained the Company had
agreed to General Motors Corporation’s demand for a $1.7-
million reduction in cost and added health care costs had esca-
lated not the 15 to 16 percent earlier stated, but rather 26 per-
cent and added the Company was expending funds to build a
parts bank for its protection upon the collective-bargaining
agreements’ expiration in mid-June. Attorney Eisenberg ex-
pressed confusion as to the actual expiration date for the par-
ties’ collective-bargaining agreement. According to Temple,
Union International Representative Ferson responded he was
not sure the collective-bargaining agreement would expire.
Temple said this was the first time the Union had expressed an
opinion that the contract did not expire but rather renewed or
extended for another year. According to Union Bargaining
Committee Chairman Savage, Ferson explained that to cancel
the agreement required a 60-day notice prior to the expiration
date of the collective-bargaining agreement and noted the
Company had not provided such notice. Union International
Representative Ferson testified he told Company Attorney
Eisenberg, “I think the contract has rolled for another year.”
Eisenberg wanted to know how he came to that conclusion.
Ferson responded, it was outlined in the parties’ collective-
bargaining agreement. The May 9 meeting ended immediately
thereafter with the parties’ agreeing to get together about future
session dates.
The parties’ agreed to meet for further sessions on May 29
and 30 and June 3, 11, 12, and 13.
Company Attorney Eisenberg wrote Union International
Representative Ferson, on May 17, asking that the Union give
an unequivocal and definite statement to the Company that the
Union’s position was that the collective-bargaining agreement
would not expire on June 14, but rather extended for an addi-
tional year and that the no-strike clause remained in effect.
Company Chief Operating Officer Temple met with Ferson
on May 21, about Eisenberg’s May 17 letter. Ferson told Tem-
ple he had not seen Eisenberg’s letter, but the Union’s position
CHEMICAL WORKERS LOCAL 6-0682 (CHECKER MOTORS CORP.) 295
was that “the contract rolls over for another year.” Temple
provided Ferson a copy of Eisenberg’s letter.
Ferson responded to Eisenberg’s May 17 letter. In his May
21 response Ferson indicated he had told Company Chief Oper-
ating Officer Temple that day it was the Union’s position that
not only did the no-strike and no lockout clauses remain in
effect, but that all terms and conditions of the then current col-
lective-bargaining agreement remained in effect unchanged for
1 more year, unless modified by mutual agreement. Ferson
said the basis for the contract extension was the “Term of
Agreement” clause of the collective-bargaining agreement. In
his letter Ferson denied any “rumblings” concerning a strike at
the Company. Ferson further noted that negotiations towards
an “early” agreement “failed” on March 8 when the Company’s
attorney, after only six of nine scheduled meetings, issued an
ultimatum that the Union call the Company when they were
ready to reach an agreement on the Company’s terms. Ferson
asserted in his letter that the Company’s ultimatum resulted in
no further discussions concerning an early agreement.
Company Chief Operating Officer Temple credibly denied
the Company ever told the Union to call them whenever they
were ready to reach an agreement on company terms.
In a May 24 letter to Union International Representative Fer-
son, Company Attorney Eisenberg noted the Union’s position,
contrary to the Company’s, that the collective-bargaining
agreement would not expire on June 14, but rather extended for
another year. Eisenberg asked to arbitrate that issue and pro-
vided Ferson a request for arbitration panel form and urged
Ferson to sign it on behalf of the Union. The request form
indicated an arbitrator should decide the issue of whether the
collective-bargaining agreement between the parties rolled over
or extended for another year.
The parties’ met in session on May 29. Company Attorney
Eisenberg asked again if the matter of whether the contract
renewed for another year could be submitted to arbitration.
According to Company Chief Operating Officer Temple, Fer-
son said the Union did not want to go to arbitration and added
there was “no mechanism” for the Company to take that or any
issue to arbitration. Union Bargaining Committee Chairman
Savage testified Ferson simple said the collective-bargaining
agreement had “rolled over” for another year. International
Union Representative Ferson said he told Company Attorney
Eisenberg the Union was “considering what [its] position
would be as to whether or not [the Union] was going to ulti-
mately arbitrate . . . [but] he could expect a response by Mon-
day of the following week.”
At the May 29 bargaining session, the Union presented a 3-
page set of noneconomic proposals to the Company with a
notation:

Pursuant to the March 18, 2002, Union notification to the
Company of the Union’s desire for amendments to the exist-
ing contract the Union hereby tenders the non-economic por-
tion of these desired changes for consideration to the Com-
pany as to possible mutual agreement to allow for changes to
the exiting agreement between the parties.

The Union also presented a 1-page document setting forth its
economic proposals with the same notice referred to above,
namely that the economic proposals were presented pursuant to
the Union’s desire for amendments to the existing collective-
bargaining agreement.
At the May 29, bargaining session, the Company presented
four pages of economic and noneconomic proposals. Accord-
ing to Company Chief Operating Officer Temple, International
Union Representative Ferson stated the Union was under no
obligation to bargain over the Company’s proposals because
the Company had never given a notice to amend or to termi-
nate8 the collective-bargaining agreement, and as such, the
Union did not have to bargain over any of the Company’s pro-
posals. Company Attorney Eisenberg stated, “[T]hat it was
highly, highly, highly, a whole bunch of highlys unlikely” the
parties would reach an agreement “unless [the Union] changed
their mind about bargaining over [the Company’s] proposals.”
The parties stipulated that during the May 29 bargaining ses-
sion and continuing through the June 12 session the Union took
the position it would only bargain over it’s proposals presented
at the May 29 bargaining session and would only bargain on
company proposals presented on that date if such proposals
coincided with the Union’s proposals.
In a June 2 letter to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS), Union International Representative Ferson
notified FMCS the Company had no contractual right to submit
for arbitration the issue of whether the parties’ collective-
bargaining agreement renewed for an additional year. Ferson
advised FMCS the Union had not, and would not, agree, con-
tractually or otherwise to submit that issue to arbitration. The
Union requested FMCS stop processing the Company’s “uni-
lateral” demand for that issue be arbitrated.
Thereafter the parties held sessions on June 3, 11, 12, and 13.
At the June 3 meeting, Company Attorney Eisenberg again
asked if the Union had changed it’s position regarding arbitrat-
ing the issue of whether the collective-bargaining agreement
would extend for another year. Union International Represen-
tative Ferson explained the Union was “not going to proceed to
arbitration” as the Union considered “there was no responsibil-
ity to do so”; Ferson said, “[T]here was no right for the Com-
pany [to] grieve” . . . that the contract did not allow the em-
ployer to submit to arbitration that it was the Union who had to
be the moving party” and “there was no mechanism for the
employer to request arbitration.”
At the June 3 session the Union specifically advised the
Company it would not bargain with respect to the following
provisions of the Company’s May 29 contract proposals:

Section I. B. Wages For New Employees
Section II Health Insurance
Section III Pension, paragraphs B and C.
Section IV Grievance Procedure
Section V Pending Grievances
Section VI Return to Bargaining Unit
Section VII Recall procedure
Section VII Leaves of Absence
Section X Disability Benefits
Section XI Vacations

8 It is undisputed the Company never at any time gave a notice to
amended or to terminate the collective-bargaining agreement.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 296
Section XII Plant Relocation/Severance Agreement
Section XIII Excessive Absenteeism and Tardiness Pro-
gram

After further discussions Company Attorney Eisenberg
stated, “If you are not going to bargain over our proposals,
there’s no hope of reaching an agreement.”
The parties’ stipulated the Union took the position from the
May 29 bargaining session through the June 12 bargaining
session, that it would only bargain with respect to the following
items from the Company’s May 29 contract proposals:

Section I. A. Wages for Full Time Employees
Section III Pension, paragraph A.
Section IX Holiday Shutdown
Section XIV Term of Agreement-Termination Date

At the June 12 session the Company presented its final con-
tract proposals, which covered economic as well as non-
economic matters.
According to Company Chief Operating Officer Temple no
sessions have been held after June 13, nor has the Company
demanded that the Union come to any sessions since that date.
On June 13, Union International Representative Ferson
wrote the Company as follows:

Thursday, June 13, 2002

Mrs. Marcia Koestner
Vice President Human Resources
Checkers Motors
2016 N Pitcher Street
Kalamazoo, MI 49007

Dear Mrs. Koestner:

As you know the Company has provided the Union
with a final proposal containing various items that do not
coincide with the Union’s items of desired changes pursu-
ant to its March 18, 2002 notice of desire for amendments
to the existing contract. That proposal furthers the Com-
pany’s failure and refusal to bargain in good faith by con-
ditioning agreement on the Union accepting proposals
which the Company has improperly tendered, which ac-
tions(s) have been made subject of a charge filed by the
Union.
It has become obvious to the Union that your Mr.
Eisenberg’s statement of June 3rd concerning there being
“no hope of reaching an agreement” was tragically pro-
phetic and in hindsight a clear warning as to the extent the
Company is willing to go in engaging in improper and il-
legal activities to extract concessions from our member-
ship.
The Union has come to the realization that in fact the
parties will not be able to achieve mutual consent to
change the existing contract pursuant to the terms of Arti-
cle VIII of the agreement unless and until we concede to
the Company’s improper demands. Accordingly, effective
immediately PACE and its Local 6-0682 withdraw our
March 18, 2002 notice of the Unions desire to amend the
agreement. Further by copy of this letter and to the
Michigan Employment Relations Commission the Union
withdraws its March 18, 2002 Notice to Mediation Agen-
cies (FORM F-7).
PACE Local 6-0682 membership will continue to re-
port to work as usual and be working under the terms of
the automatically renewed agreement. Again, we would
consider any unilateral changes(s) by the Company as a
breach of the contract and or a violation of the law.

Sincerely,

/Signature/
Mr. Daniel E. Ferson
International Representative

Copy to Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
And to Michigan’s Bureau of Employment Relations
Mr. T. Eisenberg

The June 13 expiration date for the parties collective-
bargaining agreement passed uneventfully. On July 15, the
Union filed a grievance alleging, “the Company is in violation
of the term of agreement language (Article VIII), Article V
Section 8 and 22, Article VI Section 18, Article II and current
retiree contract language and/or other Articles and Sections.”
Union Chairman of Bargaining Committee Savage testified the
grievance was filed because the Company imposed changes in
the current collective-bargaining agreement that the Union
contends renewed or rolled over for another year.
Union International Representative Ferson specifically testi-
fied it was the Company’s unilaterally instituted changes to the
parties collective-bargaining agreement that triggered the
grievance and added the Union was “absolutely” prepared to
arbitrate the grievance. Ferson acknowledged some of the
changes the Company implemented were contained in the
Company’s final contract proposals.
On August 30, Company Attorney Mendelson wrote Union
International Representative Ferson regarding the Union’s de-
mand for arbitration of its grievance. In the letter the Company
proposed the parties consult to see if they could arrive at a mu-
tually agreeable arbitrator. The Company, however, also ad-
vised it was reserving all its rights and defenses in connection
with the grievance, including, but not limited to: “(1) the Un-
ion’s refusal to ‘unbundle’ its grievances, (2) the expiration of
the contract, (3) NLRB proceedings, (4) Union bad faith, (5)
estopped, and (6) any other defense, whether or not asserted at
this time.”
Union International Representative Ferson responded to
Mendelson on September 4, rejecting the Company’s proposal
for a mutually agreed upon arbitrator pointing out the contract
specifically called for the selection to be made from an FMCS
panel. Ferson also requested clarification of all the Company’s
defenses to the grievance except the one labeled “NLRB pro-
ceedings.”
On September 6, Company Attorney Mendelson responded
to Ferson’s September 4, letter saying the Union was wrong
insisting on an FMCS alternate striking method to select an
arbitrator. Mendelson insisted FMCS encourages parties to
reach an agreement on a method for selecting an arbitrator
when the expired labor agreement does not specify a method.
Attorney Mendelson then advised:

CHEMICAL WORKERS LOCAL 6-0682 (CHECKER MOTORS CORP.) 297
Finally, in view of the Union’s bad faith refusal to
process or resolve related grievances in a timely fashion
before contract expiration, the Union’s bad faith refusal to
define, explain or separate its post-contract termination
bundle of grievances (despite the Company’s repeated re-
quests), the dismissal of the Union’s spurious unfair labor
practice charge and the pending NLRB hearing concerning
the Union’s repeated and blatant violations of the National
Labor Relations Act, we do not believe that further discus-
sion of the Company’s defenses to the Union’s belated bad
faith posturing is warranted.

In as much as article VIII “Term of Agreement” of the par-
ties collective-bargaining agreement is intertwined with the
issues herein it is set forth in full:

ARTICLE VIII
TERM OF AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT between the undersigned officers of the
Company, on behalf of the Company, and the undersigned of-
ficers and members of the Union Bargaining Committee on
behalf of Local Union No. 6-0682 of the Paper, Allied Indus-
trial, Chemical & Energy Workers International Union, shall
become effective June 14, 1999, and shall extend until June
13, 2002, and from year to year thereafter unless changed by
consent of both parties. Should either party desire to amend
or cancel this Agreement, such party shall give the other sixty
(60) days written notice before the expiration of the contract.
B. The Deferral Issue
The Union seeks to have all complaint allegations herein re-
solved pursuant to the grievance-arbitration procedure of its
collective-bargaining agreement with the Company under Col-
lyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971), and United Tech-
nologies Corp., 268 NLRB 557 (1984). The Union argues the
crux of the dispute herein involves the obligations of the parties
under article VIII “Term of Agreement” of their collective-
bargaining agreement with emphasis on the parties obligations
when a notice to amend the agreement is filed by one of the
parties.
The Government argues the case should not be deferred un-
der the Collyer doctrine because before the parties collective-
bargaining agreement’s expiration date of June 13, and at a
time when both parties agreed the collective-bargaining agree-
ment containing a grievance arbitration procedure was in effect,
the Union unequivocally refused to arbitrate the issue of
whether the contract expired or automatically renewed for an-
other year. The Government notes the Union rests its claim for
deferral on a grievance it filed on July 15, a month after the
collective-bargaining agreement’s normal expiration date, and
at a time when the Company disputes the existence of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement. The Government contends de-
ferral is inappropriate when the existence of the collective-
bargaining agreement containing the arbitration clause is in
dispute. The Government also contends deferral is inappropri-
ate, when, as here, the Charging Party Company did not have
the right to invoke arbitration under the grievance-arbitration
procedure.
The Company takes the position the Union’s argument for
deferral is frivolous, and notes the Union had consistently re-
fused to arbitrate at the Company’s request and did not even
raise deferral in its initial answer but only did so after the
Board’s dismissal of its Section 8(a)(5) and (1) charge against
the Company. The Company argues, as does the Government,
that deferral is inappropriate when the charging party before the
Board does not have the right to trigger arbitration under the
contractual dispute resolution mechanism. The Company spe-
cifically points out the parties collective-bargaining agreement
did not empower it to file a grievance or move a contractual
dispute into arbitration.9
The parties have sought to have the issue of whether the con-
tract extended or rolled over for an additional year submitted to
arbitration but never at the same time or pursuant to the same
rationale.
In addressing this issue, I first note that after learning from
the Union in early-May that it was the Union’s position the
parties agreement extended or rolled over for an additional
year, the Company sought to have that issue submitted to arbi-
tration. The Company in late-May even forwarded a request
for arbitration panel form to the Union for its approval. The
Union objected to having the issue presented to arbitration con-
tending there was “no mechanism” for the Company to take
that, or any other issue, to arbitration. The Union even notified
FMCS on June 2, the Company had no contractual right to
submit for arbitration the issue of whether the parties’ collec-
tive-bargaining agreement renewed for an additional year. The
Union advised FMCS it had not, and would not agree, contrac-
tually or otherwise, to submit the issue to arbitration. The Un-
ion specifically requested FMCS stop processing the Com-
pany’s “unilateral” attempt to have the issue arbitrated.
After June 13, and specifically on and after July 15, the Un-
ion changed its position and sought to have the issue of whether
the parties’ agreement expired on June 13 or renewed for an-
other year submitted to arbitration. The Company at that point
changed its position and declined arbitration.
The parties collective-bargaining agreement is clear that em-
ployees or the Union may file grievances but only the Union
can initiate arbitration. Stated differently the grievance and
arbitration mechanisms in the parties’ contract are one-sided in
that the Union alone has the right to initiate arbitration.
In agreement with the Government and Company, I find de-
ferral is inappropriate in this case because the parties’ collec-
tive-bargaining agreement does not provide the charging party
(Company herein) with access to the grievance/arbitration pro-
cedure. The Board in Communications Workers (C & P Tele-
phone), 280 NLRB 78 fn. 3 (1986), adopted the judge’s denial

9 The Company also advances other reasons that deferral is not ap-
propriate namely; the grievance is nonarbitrable because of the expira-
tion of the agreement; the Union is estopped from arbitrating this griev-
ance since it refused to proceed to arbitration when requested to do so
by the Company; the Union’s grievance is really multiple grievances
which the Union refuses to unbundled; an arbitrator should defer to a
decision of the Board; and, the Union’s bad-faith refusal to bargain
precludes arbitrating its grievance. By my disposition of this issue I
need not address all of the Company’s reasons for nondeferral.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 298
of a motion for deferral to arbitration in an 8(b)(3) refusal to
bargain case by holding:

In adopting the judge’s denial of the Respondent’s motion for
deferral to arbitration, we solely rely on the fact that the par-
ties’ collective-bargaining agreement does not provide for the
Charging Parties with access to the grievance/arbitration pro-
cedure and that to allow Respondent to waive this procedural
defect would fundamentally alter the existing dispute resolu-
tion procedure.

I am persuaded the Board’s holding in Communications
Workers is controlling herein and I conclude deferral is inap-
propriate.
I reject the Union’s contention the Board’s decision in Tri-
Pak Machinery, Inc., 325 NLRB 671 (1998), compels a differ-
ent conclusion namely a finding of deferral in the instant case.
In Tri-Pak, the Board found no merit to the Government’s
broad assertion: “that deferral to arbitration is inappropriate for
questions regarding extensions or renewals of collective-
bargaining agreements as to which the parties are in dispute.”
However, the Board went on to add, “[I]f there is no dispute
about the existence of the contract containing the arbitration
clause.” At the time in July that the Union filed the grievance
which it now seeks to have form the basis for deferral to arbi-
tration there existed a real dispute as to whether the contact
continued to exist. The Union’s conversion to the arbitration
route comes too late to be successful because it comes at a time
when the Company is unwilling to go to arbitration because of
a dispute over whether the contract continues to exist.
C. The Bargaining and Filings
Did the Union between May 29 and June 13, violate the Act
when it failed and refused to bargain with regard to collective-
bargaining proposals submitted by the Company unless the
proposals coincided with proposals submitted by the Union?
Additionally, did the Union violated the Act by refusing since
June 13, to engage in any further negotiations with the Com-
pany toward reaching a collective-bargaining agreement?
The Union contends it was within its contractual rights in re-
fusing to bargain with the Company over those proposals of the
Company that were not encompassed within the Union’s notice
to amend. The Union takes the position that if the Company
had wanted to negotiate or bargain over such other items the
Company should have sent a notice to amend or a notice to
cancel but did neither. The Union contends the absence of a
reciprocal notice to amend or notice to cancel is fatal to the
Government’s and Company’s interpretation of the parties col-
lective-bargaining agreement. The Union takes the position
that the mere fact that in its notice to amend it cited multiple
sections of the parties agreement did not transform its notice to
amend into a notice terminate the agreement.
The Government and Company, on the other hand, take the
position the Company’s February 18 comprehensive collective-
bargaining proposal for a 3-year agreement terminating on June
12, 2005, evidenced the Company’s intention to terminate the
agreement and as such was provided to the Union greater than
the required 60 days before the expiration of the contract.
Thus, they argue the Union was not privileged to limit negotia-
tions to its (the Union’s) proposals.
Does the Company’s February 18 proposal satisfy the lan-
guage of the party’s agreement such as to be considered a ter-
mination of agreement notice? The termination language of the
parties agreement, as noted elsewhere in this decision, in part
reads; “Should either party desire to amend or chance this
Agreement, such party shall give the other sixty (60) days writ-
ten notice before the expiration of the contract.”
In agreement with the Government and Company I find the
Company fulfilled the requirements of the termination clause of
the parties collective-bargaining agreement by the actions it
took and the Union’s reactions and responses thereto. First, the
Company made it clear to the Union when it first approached
the Union in December 2001, that it needed a new agreement
because of price reduction requests from its main customer and
escalating health care costs. The Company explained to the
Union’s entire bargaining committee on December 20, 2001,
that it needed early negotiations to try and work out an agree-
ment before June, with June being the expiration date of the
parties collective-bargaining agreement. Second, the Union
held a general membership meeting on February 14, at which
all “union members” were urged to attend “to discuss contract
proposals.” Third, the parties agreed to and participated in
bargaining commencing on February 18, and continuing there-
after through March 8, during the first phase of their negotia-
tions. At the February 18 negotiating session the Company
presented a 15-point contract proposal explaining each item
which included health insurance, grievance procedures, bar-
gaining unit composition, recall procedures, leaves of absence,
vacations, wages, absenteeism, and that the Company was seek-
ing a 3-year agreement with a June 12, 2005 expiration date.
Fourth, the Union recognized it was negotiating toward a new
collective-bargaining agreement in that it presented its 44-point
set of contract proposals at the February 18 negotiating session
covering various items including “agreeable wage increases
each year of agreement” as well as holidays, retiree insurance
benefits, overtime, vacations, parking facilities, job descrip-
tions, modifications to the no-strike clause, pay days, and tem-
porary transfer pay requirements. Fifth, during these February
and/or March negotiating sessions the parties arrived at a few
tentative agreements. The parties continued to make, review
and exchange proposals during this time to include the Com-
pany’s making a 30-cent-per-hour wage increase proposal for
each of the 3 years of their proposed agreement. The Com-
pany’s attorney, on March 8, in summarizing the parties negoti-
ating status urged moving toward an agreement “because the
contract expires June 14 . . . .” At one point in the March nego-
tiations the Union even proposed a 1-year extension to the
collective-bargaining agreement.
In light of the above actions and responses of the Company
and Union I am fully persuaded the Company, clearly conveyed
the essential message to the Union that it wished to terminate
their contract and negotiate a replacement collective-bargaining
agreement. That the Union understood that the Company’s
actions and February 18 contract proposals constituted notice to
terminate the agreement is self-evident. The Union actively
participated in the negotiations making full contract proposals
CHEMICAL WORKERS LOCAL 6-0682 (CHECKER MOTORS CORP.) 299
even proposing a 1-year extension of the parties’ agreement.
Absolute perfection is not required to give notice to terminate
an agreement. For example, the Board in Oakland Press Co.,
229 NLRB 476 (1977), upheld a finding by Judge James L.
Rose that there had been substantial compliance with the parties
termination clause therein even though the party attempting to
terminate the agreement had not followed their contract lan-
guage. Judge Rose concluded, with Board approval, that so
long as the essential message was conveyed regarding terminat-
ing the agreement, such would be sufficient. In that regard
Judge Rose noted that a collective-bargaining agreement is a
total document and changes in one or more of its terms neces-
sarily implies termination of the agreement and emergence of a
new one. That same rationale applies herein, namely, that the
Company’s February 18 contract proposals constituted notice to
terminate the agreement, thus the Union was precluded from
insisting bargaining be limited to its proposals. See also Cam-
paign County Contractors Assn., 210 NLRB 467 (1974).
Furthermore, the Board has recognized that even when no-
tice is not given, a party, by its actions, may waive notice re-
quirements and agree to bargain. Industrial Workers AIW Lo-
cal 770 (Hutco Equipment), 285 NLRB 651 fn. 2 and 654
(1987). Here, the Union negotiated over an extended period
making extensive proposals and responded to several counter
proposals. For example, as noted, the Union even proposed a
1-year extension to the parties’ agreement. I find the Union
herein by its extended negotiations with the Company also
waived any contractual termination notification requirements.
See Lou’s Produce, 308 NLRB 1194, 1200 fn. 4 (1992).
Finally, and out of an abundance of caution, I address the
contention by the Government and Company that the Union’s
March 18 notice to amend the parties collective-bargaining
agreement was so broad that, in reality, it constituted a notice to
terminate the agreement.
Again in agreement with the Government and Company I
find the Union’s letter was so broad and nonspecific that it
constituted a notice to terminate the agreement notwithstanding
the fact the Union’s March 18 letter stated, “[P]lease accept this
letter as written notice of the Union’s desire to amend the
agreement.” The Union in its letter advised, for example, that
acceptance by the membership “of a collective-bargaining
agreement” was subject to the approval of the Union’s Interna-
tional president and continued “there will be no collective-
bargaining agreement between the Union and [C]ompany until
the Company is notified by the International Representative
after acquiring approval of the contract in question under the
foregoing constitutional provision from the International Presi-
dent.” The Union also made an information request for copies
of “all signed mutual agreements now in effect which amend or
otherwise alter or clarify the agreement, which the [C]ompany
intends to no longer honor upon reaching a new agreement.”
The Notice to Mediation Agencies form the Union submitted to
FMCS and attached to its March 18 letter reflects the contract
expiration date as June 13. As alluded to the Union made an
extensive information request in its letter asking for; wage rates
and dates of hire for all bargaining unit employees; hourly
straight time earning reports; cent-per-hour costs of all fringe
benefits; copies of pension and health insurance plans, stock
options, and profit and gain sharing plans for unit employees;
insurance experience data for unit employees; copies of various
government required filings such as IRS-5500 and EEO-1
forms; and, current job evaluations for each job and classifica-
tion of employees represented by the Union. It is clear from the
above references to a collective-bargaining agreement, as well
as the all encompassing information request, that the Union was
asking, although labeled otherwise, to terminate the parties
collective-bargaining agreement and negotiate a new replace-
ment agreement. The Board has held that a notice to amend
that is broadly framed, as was the notice herein, is tantamount
or equivalent to a notice to terminate. See Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 331 NLRB 205, 208 (2000).
In summary, and for all the above reasons, I find the parties
collective-bargaining agreement did not, as contended by the
Union, “roll over” extend or renew for an additional year. The
Union was not privileged to bargain only about those proposals
of the Company that coincided with the proposals it submitted.
The Union by bargaining, between May 29 and June 13, only
on proposals of its choosing, and refusing to bargain concern-
ing mandatory subjects of bargaining advanced by the Com-
pany, violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act and I so find. The
Union also violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by its refusal to
bargain further with the Company after June 13. The Union by
its overall conduct on and after May 29, has failed and refused
to bargain in good faith with the Company in violation of Sec-
tion 8(b)(3) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local No. 6-0682, Paper, Allied-Industrial Chemical and
Energy Workers International Union, AFL–CIO–CLC is a la-
bor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Checker Motors Corporation is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
3. By refusing between May 29 and June 13, to bargain with
regard to collective-bargaining agreement proposals submitted
by the Company during negotiations unless such proposals
coincided with proposals submitted by the Union; and, since
June 13 refusing to engage in any further negotiations toward a
collective-bargaining agreement with the Company, the Union
has refused to bargain in good faith with the Company in viola-
tion of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act.
4. These unfair labor practices affect commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Union has violated Section 8(b)(3) of
the Act, I order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of
the Act.
I recommend the Union be ordered to meet and bargain in
good faith with the Company upon request. I also recommend
the Union be ordered, within 14 days after service by the Re-
gion, to post an appropriate notice to members for a period of
60 days.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 300
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended10
ORDER
The Union, Local No. 6-0682, Paper, Allied-Industrial
Chemical and Energy Workers International Union, AFL–CIO–
CLC, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from refusing, as the exclusive bargain-
ing representative of the Company’s employees in the appro-
priate unit, to bargain in good faith collectively with the Com-
pany.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request by Checker Motors Corporation, bargain in
good faith, as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
Company’s unit employees, with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment and, if an agreement
is reached, embody it in a signed contract.

10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec.102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec.102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Regional Director for
Region 7 of the National Labor Relations Board post at its
business office, meeting places and on any Company provided
bulletin boards where union materials are posted, copies of the
attached notice to members marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of
the notice to members, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 7, after being signed by the Union’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Union upon receipt
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to members are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 7 of the Board a sworn certifica-
tion of a responsible agent or representative on a form provided
by the Region attesting to the steps that the Union has taken to
comply.

11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”