Chelvadaurai Harichandran, Appellant,v.Togo D. West, Jr. Secretary, Department of Veteran Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 9, 1999
01975112 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 9, 1999)

01975112

09-09-1999

Chelvadaurai Harichandran, Appellant, v. Togo D. West, Jr. Secretary, Department of Veteran Affairs, Agency.


Chelvadaurai Harichandran v. Department of Veteran Affairs

01975112

September 9, 1999

Chelvadaurai Harichandran, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01975112

v. ) Agency Nos. 95-1100

) 95-1724

Togo D. West, Jr. )

Secretary, ) Hearing Nos. 370-96-X2117

Department of Veteran Affairs, ) 370-96-X2118

Agency. )

)

_______________________________)

DECISION

Appellant filed an appeal with this Commission from a final decision

of the Department of Veteran Affairs (agency) concerning his complaint

of unlawful employment discrimination, in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

Appellant alleges discrimination based upon his race (South Asian),

national origin (Sir Lankan), color (brown) and reprisal (Prior EEO

activities) when the agency harassed, suspended and terminated him.

The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 13, 1995, appellant requested EEO counseling and raised

allegations of discrimination pertaining to his prior suspensions

which occurred in January, 1995 and ongoing harassment. Appellant

requested EEO counseling on May 1, 1995, pertaining to appellant's

termination which was effective on May 4, 1995. Appellant filed a

formal complaint on June 2, 1995, adding 13 additional allegations of

discrimination which were not raised during his initial EEO counselor

contact either in January or May, 1995. The additional allegations

are summarized as follows: (1) appellant was transferred to the

Palo Alto (Veteran's Administration Hospital) Virginia from October,

1991 to February 24, 1992;<1>(2) appellant was forced into settling

his prior EEO complaint on October 27, 1992; (3) since February 24,

1992, appellant was placed in an interminable trainee-like status;

(4) on June 23, 1993, appellant's supervisor (S2) attempted an assault

upon appellant; (5) from November 15, 1991 to the present, the agency

engaged in acts of intimidation and persistent accusations, including,

but not limited to, a competency investigation, medical peer review,

threats to reassign workload, and special supervision; (6) from March

8, 1992 to the present, the agency engaged in discriminatory staffing;

(7) on June 2, 1992, appellant's faculty position with the University

of California was discontinued; (8) from March 8, 1992 to the present,

appellant was deprived of administrative opportunities (e.g. office

space, computer equipment, paid travel, administrative leave); (9)

since October, 1992, on several instances, appellant's telephone was

bugged and S2 forced himself into appellant's office through locked

doors despite appellant's objections; (10) appellant's 1992 through

1994 annual proficiency reports were downgraded; (11) since October 27,

1992, appellant was constantly pressured to transfer; (12) appellant was

forced to sign an illegal contract on June 3, 1986 to freeze his grade and

step, thereby denying appellant the opportunity for promotion; and (13)

from March 2, 1992 to the present the agency exploited the basic trust

of vulnerable veterans and their families with manufactured patient and

family complaints, thus creating a toxic and hostile work environment.

On April 20, 1995, appellant's EEO officer requested additional

information regarding the 13 additional allegations in order to determine

if such allegations were timely. Appellant responded to the EEO officer's

request on May 8, 1995. However, appellant failed to attempt to justify

the apparent untimeliness of the new allegations, but rather provided

additional factual information regarding the substance of each allegation.

Thereafter, on May 18, 1995, the EEO officer notified appellant, in

writing, of the precise issues which were accepted for investigation.

The issues accepted were: (1) the incidents of harassment which appellant

alleged during the period between October 27, 1992 (date of settlement

of prior EEO complaint) and February 10, 1995: (2) incidents involving

appellant's suspension; and (3) appellant's termination. No Final Agency

Decision was issued dismissing the new allegations, however, appellant

was advised that if he had other matters to complain about which were not

currently accepted for investigation that he should immediately contact

an EEO Counselor. Appellant never contacted an EEO counselor regarding

the 13 allegations.

An investigation took place on the issues accepted and the AJ issued a

partial decision without a hearing. The AJ determined that after viewing

the record in the light most favorable to appellant, he nevertheless

failed to make out a prima facie case of race, national origin or color

discrimination. However, the AJ determined that appellant raised issues

of material fact with respect to his reprisal claim and held a hearing

with respect to that issue. The hearing took place on October 31, 1996.

Following the hearing, the AJ issued a recommended decision on May

1, 1997 outlining his findings of no discrimination on all issues.

The agency subsequently adopted the AJ's recommended decision. It is

this agency decision which the appellant now appeals.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was hired in 1982 as a Psychiatrist in the agency's Mental

Health Clinic in Martinez, California, which was one of six agency clinics

in California. In 1989, S2 became the Chief of Psychiatric Service and

appellant's second-line supervisor. However, at various times during

appellant's employment, when the position of clinic chief was vacant,

S2 technically served as appellant's first-line supervisor.

On October 27, 1992, appellant signed a settlement agreement on

three previous EEO complaints as full relief. On October 1, 1992,

appellant's clinical privileges were suspended due to complaints regarding

appellant's competency. An investigation was convened which resulted in

the recommendation, inter alia, that a comprehensive, supervisory plan

based on performance criteria be communicated to appellant. However,

the agency did not find appellant incompetent. On November 27, 1992,

appellant's clinical privileges were reinstated and S2 moved forward

in implementing a supervisor plan for appellant. Due to appellant's

ongoing resistance to work with S2, he assigned alternative supervisors

to oversee appellant's work. However, appellant failed to utilize the

supervision assigned to him.

In June, 1993, S2 met with appellant to discuss one of his patients who

committed suicide. The discussion resulted in a heated argument with

both parties shouting.

On August 18, 1994, at a Psychiatry Service meeting, S2 was summarizing

a case, carefully omitting any reference which identified the patient.

Appellant repeatedly interrupted the meeting and stated the proceeding was

aimed at him and that he believed he was being persecuted. Appellant

was reprimanded but refused to sign proposed disciplinary actions.

Appellant often refused to accept disciplinary action or supervision.

On several occasions he would lock himself in his office and refuse to

answer the door, phone, or pages by his colleagues. Since appellant

would refuse to answer the door, S2 would unlock appellant's door and

find him at his desk.

On November 23, 1994, a memorandum was sent to appellant proposing a

suspension for refusing to meet with S2. On December 8, 1994, the Chief

of Staff (S3) notified appellant that he would be suspended for five days

starting on January 3, 1995. Appellant continued to refuse to follow

direct orders of his superiors and on December 19, 1994, S3 ordered

a second suspension for appellant which commenced on January 30, 1995.

Appellant continued to refuse to follow direct orders of his superiors

and accordingly, he was terminated on April 4, 1995.

The AJ Recommended Decision

The AJ determined that, assuming facts in the light most favorable to

the appellant, a prima facie case of race, national origin or color

discrimination was not established. Specifically, the AJ found that

the evidence did not reveal that appellant had been treated differently

than any similarly situated physician outside of his protected classes

who was working under the supervision of S2. In addition, none of

the witnesses testified to behavior or statements that could indicate

discriminatory animus. Moreover, the consensus of the witnesses was that

appellant had problems with interpersonal relationships; that he did not

make himself available to staff when he was requested to provide patient

care; and that he failed to follow S2's directions. Accordingly, the AJ

determined that appellant was not harassed, suspended, and terminated

for any reason related to his race, national origin, or color, even

considering the evidence in the light most favorable to him.

Assuming appellant presented a prima facie case of reprisal

discrimination, the AJ found that the agency articulated a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for its employment actions and the

appellant failed to meet his ultimate burden of proving discrimination.

Specifically, the AJ found that appellant was insubordinate on numerous

occasions without any apparent justification, both before and after the

prior EEO activity, and that appellant admitted that his problems with

S2 began well before he filed his prior EEO complaints. In addition,

the AJ found significant the fact that disciplinary actions were not

taken against appellant until three other employees had been unsuccessful

in supervising appellant in place of S2 and no evidence was presented

that these temporary supervisors had been enlisted by S2 to retaliate

against appellant in any way. The AJ also noted the evidence did show

that appellant frequently failed to answer his pages and would refuse

to acknowledge S2 and other staff members who knocked on his door,

even when he was in his office not seeing patients. The record also

indicates that appellant was insubordinate in numerous other ways and

that no other physician failed to follow orders. The AJ determined

that appellant's two suspensions and ultimate termination in 1995, were

simply the culmination of appellant's consistent failure to follow S2's

directions, in particular, his continued refusal to comply with S2's

request that he meet with S2 to discuss performance and conduct issues, a

requirement which S2 imposed on all physicians in the Psychiatric Service.

Lastly, the AJ noted that appellant's actions at the hearing lend credence

to the agency's claim that appellant was disciplined and terminated

because he simply refused to follow the directions of his appointed

supervisors and S2 based on appellant's belief that a physician should

not be "subordinated" to the wishes of others, particularly non-physician

staffers who requested his help. Accordingly, the AJ found that appellant

failed to meet his burden of proving that he was harassed, suspended and

ultimately terminated because of a conspiracy to retaliate against him.

After a careful review of the entire record, including arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, the Commission finds

that, in all material respects, the AJ accurately set forth the relevant

facts and properly analyzed the case using the appropriate regulations,

policies, and laws.

Appellant makes numerous unpersuasive arguments on appeal. For example,

appellant contends that the AJ intentionally delayed the hearing.

However, appellant fails to present any evidence of delay or how he was

harmed by the delay. Accordingly, we find the record does not support

the finding of a delay. Appellant also claims that the AJ improperly

excluded the testimony of appellant's EEO officer. We agree with the AJ

and find that appellant's EEO officer had no personal knowledge of any

facts relevant to this matter and accordingly, do not find the exclusion

of this witness improper. Appellant also argues that the AJ improperly

excluded evidence which pre-dated his EEO settlement in October, 1992.

We find assuming, arguendo, that the pre-settlement allegations were

improperly excluded, the record, nevertheless, fails to support a finding

of discrimination. Assuming the truth of the pre-settlement allegations

and considering the record in its entirety, we find no evidence of

discriminatory animus.

Lastly, appellant argues that the AJ improperly excluded the additional

13 allegations which were presented, for the first time, in appellant's

formal complaint. Since the 13 allegations were treated as background

evidence and developed in the record<2>, the fact that they were not

treated as formal allegations had no effect on the ultimate finding

of no discrimination. Accordingly, any error that may have occurred

was harmless.

In addition to the arguments addressed above, nothing asserted by

appellant on appeal differs significantly from arguments previously

raised and given full consideration by the AJ. Accordingly, we discern

no basis upon which to disturb the AJ's finding of no discrimination

and hereby AFFIRM the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS -- ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407.

All requests and arguments must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to

the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of

a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on

the date it is received by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in

which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST

NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL

AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER

FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the

dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you

to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��

791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

9/9/99

_______________ _________________________________

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

1It should be noted that this allegation was previously alleged in

appellant's EEO Complaint Nos. 94-1264, 92-1583, and 92-1178. It is also

noted that appellant settled those complaints in October, 1992.

2At the very least, appellant was permitted the opportunity to develop

the record on all 13 allegations.