Charles W. Walton, Complainant,v.Louis Caldera, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 27, 2000
01994493 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 27, 2000)

01994493

07-27-2000

Charles W. Walton, Complainant, v. Louis Caldera, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.


Charles W. Walton v. Louis Caldera

01994493

.

Charles W. Walton,

Complainant,

v.

Louis Caldera,

Secretary,

Department of the Army,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01994493

Agency No. AOEWFO-98-0710210

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final

agency decision (FAD) dismissing his complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> We accept the appeal pursuant to 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405).

After receiving a notice of proposed suspension in January 1998, regarding

his conduct which was the subject of a successful EEO complaint against

him by a subordinate, complainant filed a grievance, followed-up by

another grievance filed on March 24, 1998, after he received a 10 day

suspension, hand-delivered on March 11, 1998. Complainant then "refiled"

his grievance on May 5, 1998, to sever the EEO matters contained therein,

and brought these severed matters to the attention of an EEO Counselor

on May 11, 1998.

During counseling, complainant alleged that he had been subjected to

discrimination and harassment for years due to his race and sexual

orientation. More specifically, he alleged that the 1997 EEO complaint

against him was based on erroneous information, which the agency did

not attempt to verify, and that management then used this erroneous

information as the basis for his January 1998 suspension. Moreover

complainant contends that in January 1998, this EEO documentation, as

well as the suspension itself, were publicized to his detriment and in

violation of his privacy, and yet those who released the information

were not disciplined. In this context, complainant also contends that

the agency based a 1997 EEO newsletter on the complaint against

him, and that EEO counselors made statements against him during the 1995

to 1997 complaint processing period. When the above matters were not

successfully resolved, complainant filed a formal complaint on July 20,

1999, wherein he identified these matters (claim A).

Complainant also raised the following matters, claimed as reprisal for

role as the discriminating agency official in the EEO complaint against

him (claim B):

(1) his office was required to take a refresher course on customer

service based on only a single negative comment;

(2) the Director uses only first names to address those of Chinese

ethnicity;

(3) he was not interviewed by the EEO counselor;

(4) an EEO Counselor made statements about a certain individual being

involved in the complaint against him; and,

(5) when the Director hand-delivered his 10 day suspension, she told

him how she was treated when she took her car for repairs because the

repair did not think she was from Hawaii.

In its FAD, the agency dismissed claim A for untimely contact with an

EEO Counselor, noting that complainant had previously served as an EEO

Counselor and was aware of the time limits, and that he clearly knew of

the discrimination prior to March 24, 1998, when he acknowledged that

some of the matters he raised in his grievance were EEO related, and

that he was deciding whether to engage in the EEO process. Claim B was

dismissed by the agency for failure to state a claim upon the finding

that complainant had not engaged in EEO activity prior to the events in

question.

On appeal, complainant argues that the correct date to use to determine

timeliness is May 5, 1998, the date the EEO issues were separated from

the grievance issues, arguing that this is when the EEO "clock began to

tick," apparently contending that filing the grievance tolled the time

for filing the EEO complaint. Complainant additionally contends that

the Director failed to inform him about election rights and procedures,

and that the EEO Counselor failed to inform him that his contact was

untimely. Regarding the dismissal of his reprisal claim, complainant

argues that because he was adversely treated as the named discriminating

official in the EEO complaint against him, that this is sufficient to

state a claim of reprisal. Complainant also requests adding additional

claims to his complaint, arguing that they are related, including: sexual

actions and talk by other employees; a subordinate mistakenly attributing

a negative remark to him; and, a situation involving comments that an

former EEO official helped the complainant in the EEO complaint against

him.

The regulation set forth at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,656 (1999) (to be

codified and hereinafter referred to as EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �

1614.105(a)(1)) requires that complaints of discrimination should be

brought to the attention of the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor

within forty-five (45) days of the date of the matter alleged to be

discriminatory or, in the case of a personnel action, within forty-five

(45) days of the effective date of the action. The Commission . has

adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard (as opposed to a "supportive

facts" standard) to determine when the forty-five (45) day limitation

period is triggered. See Howard v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request

No. 05970852 (February 11, 1999). Thus, the time limitation is not

triggered until a complainant reasonably suspects discrimination, but

before all the facts that support a charge of discrimination have become

apparent.

EEOC Regulations provide that the agency or the Commission shall extend

the time limits when the individual shows that he was not notified of the

time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that he did not know

and reasonably should not have known that the discriminatory matter or

personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence he was prevented

by circumstances beyond his control from contacting the Counselor within

the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency

or the Commission.

Review of the record discloses that complainant does not dispute that

he was aware of the EEO potential of the incidents in claim A at the

time they occurred, as acknowledged in his March 24, 1998 statement,

but instead he argues that by virtue of filing the grievance, and

initiating the negotiated grievance procedure, he tolled the 45 day time

requirement for contacting an EEO counselor. We note, however that the

use of the negotiated grievance procedure does not toll the time limit

for contacting an EEO Counselor. Schermerhorn v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Request No. 05940729 (February 10, 1995). Moreover, although

complainant claims that he was not informed about the election process

early on in the grievance procedure, we find that the record reflects

that the complainant nevertheless was aware of the election procedure,

and any omission of this nature was therefore harmless. Accordingly,

we AFFIRM the agency's DISMISSAL of claim A for untimely EEO contact.

Volume 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,656 (1999)(to be codified and hereinafter

cited as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1)) provides, in relevant part, that an

agency shall dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim. An agency

shall accept a complaint from any aggrieved employee or applicant for

employment who believes that he or she has been discriminated against

by that agency because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,

age, disability, or reprisal for engaging in protected EEO activity. 29

C. F. R. 05 16 14.103, .106(a). The Commission's federal sector case

precedent has long defined an "aggrieved employee" as one who suffers a

present harm or loss with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of

employment for which there is a remedy. Diaz v. Department of the Air

Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).

Here, we find that complainant has failed to state an actionable claim of

reprisal because the record confirms that he did not engage in protected

EEO activity previous to the instant complaint.<2> Moreover, although

he claims reprisal because of the adversity he experienced as being the

named discriminating official in an EEO complaint, this is not recognized

by the Commission as "protected EEO activity." Cote v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01974213 (August 4, 1998). Accordingly,

we AFFIRM the agency's DISMISSAL of claim B for failure to state a claim.

Finally, regarding complainant's request to add additional claims to

his formal complaint, we note that it appears that these matters are

being raised for the first time on appeal. We advise complainant that

if he wishes to pursue these new matters through the EEO process, he is

advised to contact an EEO Counselor regarding them.

In conclusion, we AFFIRM the FAD's dismissal of the instant complaint.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9 -18 (November 9,

1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director,

Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible

postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it

is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable

filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified

and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. �1614.604). The request or

opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANTS' RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0400)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to

file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e

et seq. ; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791,

794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion

of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 27, 2000

__________________

Date

1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2Although the record shows that complainant had been an EEO counselor

at some point in time, he did not identify this as the "protected EEO

activity" upon which the instant claim is based.