01A42725
07-14-2004
Charles R. McCloud, Sr., Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Charles R. McCloud, Sr. v. United States Postal Service
01A42725
July 14, 2004
.
Charles R. McCloud, Sr.,
Complainant,
v.
John E. Potter,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A42725
Agency No. H0-000-0196-02
Hearing No. 330-2003-08103X
DECISION
Complainant filed this appeal from the February 19, 2004 final action
implementing the February 17, 2004 decision of the EEOC Administrative
Judge (AJ) finding no discrimination. Complainant alleged that the agency
had discriminated against him on the bases of race (African-American), sex
(male), age (D.O.B. June 29, 1947), and reprisal for prior EEO activity
when he was denied overtime back pay awarded to agency employees who
were improperly classified as exempt from the overtime pay requirements
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy of
the investigative report and requested a hearing before an AJ. The AJ
issued a decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination.
As background, the AJ noted that complainant was an EEO Counselor from
1983-1999 and during that period he worked unpaid overtime. The AJ noted
that between May 1, 1999, and September 7, 2001, the agency misclassified
some employees, including EEO Counselors and Investigators as exempt
employees under the FLSA. The AJ noted that the practice occurred
prior to these dates, but was outside the period for which the agency
was liable under the FLSA. The AJ noted that, as part of settlement
attempts for these complaints the agency determined it would resolve
the back pay issue for the period of time for which it believed it had
liability and subsequently paid back pay to employees who worked in the
affected positions between May 1, 1999, and September 7, 2001.
In her decision, the AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish
a prima facie case of race, age, sex, or reprisal discrimination.
Specifically, the AJ noted that others of complainant's race and sex
received back pay. Additionally, the AJ found that there was no evidence
that any agency officials were aware of the ages of the individuals who
received back pay or that the individuals making the decisions concerning
the back pay were aware of complainant's protected activity. The AJ
also determined that complainant had not shown that he was eligible to
receive back pay.
The AJ further concluded that even if complainant had established a prima
facie case, the agency had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for its actions. The AJ noted that the agency believed it had
liability for overtime for the period from May 1, 1999, to September 7,
2001, and paid individuals in the three affected positions for this
period. The AJ noted that there was no evidence that complainant was
eligible for overtime during the period in question because he did not
work in any of the positions at issue during May 1, 1999, to September
7, 2001. The AJ also found that complainant did not establish that more
likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask
unlawful discrimination.
In a February 19, 2004 Notice of Final Action, the agency fully
implemented the AJ's decision finding no discrimination.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after
the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment
is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive
legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists
no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine
whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of
the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor.
Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that
a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). A fact is "material"
if it has the potential to affect the outcome of a case. If a case can
only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment
is not appropriate. In the context of an administrative proceeding,
an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that grant
of summary judgment was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material
fact exists. We find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the
relevant facts and referenced the appropriate regulations, policies,
and laws. Further, construing the evidence to be most favorable to
complainant, we note that complainant failed to present evidence that
any of the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus
toward complainant's protected classes.
The agency's decision finding no discrimination is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0701)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
July 14, 2004
__________________
Date