Charles Lagor et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 29, 2020

13125821 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 29, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/125,821 04/25/2011 Charles Lagor 2008P01686WOUS 7922
24737 7590 06/29/2020
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus Avenue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
EXAMINER
KANAAN, MAROUN P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/29/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
katelyn.mulroy@philips.com
marianne.fox@philips.com
patti.demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CHARLES LAGOR, CORNELIS VAN ZON,
and WILLIAM P. LORD
____________

Appeal 2020-0012341
Application 13/125,821
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges.

MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 6–12, 14, and 16–20, which constitute all the
claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief
(“Appeal Br.,” filed July 11, 2019) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed
December 3, 2019), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed October 3,
2019) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed March 22, 2019).
2 Appellant identifies “KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS N.V.” as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention relates “to a system and method for
interpreting a computer-readable representation of clinical guidelines.”
Spec. ¶ 12.
Claims 1, 11, and 20 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below with bracketed matter and emphasis added, is illustrative
of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method, comprising:
[(a)] receiving patient information via a user interface
such that it is recorded;
[(b)] processing the patient information based in part on
sorting and ranking the patient information to generate an initial
worklist, wherein the initial worklist comprises a list of tasks
based on the patient information and a computer-readable and
accessible representation of a clinical guideline written in a
computer-interpretable guideline language, wherein the clinical
guideline prescribes a series of steps for treating a patient based
on a combination of the patient information entered, wherein
the initial worklist further comprises tasks ranked by urgency
based on the patient information, data stored in the guideline;
[(c)] displaying the initial worklist;
[(d)] receiving a first user input indicating that a task on
the initial worklist has been completed;
[(e)] processing the first user input to generate an
updated worklist based on the patient information, the urgency
of each task, the guideline, and further user input indicating
tasks that have been completed;
[(f)] displaying the updated worklist, wherein the
display of the updated worklist includes an indication of the
completed task;
[(g)] receiving a second user input comprising new
patient information;
[(h)] updating the list of tasks based on the new patient
information and the computer-readable representation of the
clinical guideline, wherein the clinical guideline prescribes a
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different series of steps for treating the patient in light of the
new patient information;
[(i)] processing the second user input to generate an
altered updated worklist comprising the updated list of tasks;
[(j)] displaying the altered updated worklist; and
[(k)] generating an audit trail to indicate the tasks that
have been completed.

REJECTION
Claims 1, 3, 4, 6–12, 14, and 16–20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Brandt et al. (US 2003/0045958 A1, pub. Mar. 6,
2003) (“Brandt”), Hussain (US 2006/0282302 A1, pub. Dec. 14, 2006), and
Hahn et al. (US 2006/0212317 A1, pub. Sept. 21, 2006).

ANALYSIS
Claims 1, 3, 4, 7–12, 14, and 16–20
Appellant argues claims 1, 3, 4, 7–12, 14, and 16–20 as a group (see
Appeal Br. 4–8; Reply Br. 2–6). We select independent claim 1 as
representative. Claims 3, 4, 7–12, 14, and 16–20 stand or fall with
independent claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because the
combination of Brandt, Hussain, Hahn fails to disclose or suggest the subject
matter of claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 4–8; Reply Br. 2–6).
Instead, we agree with, and adopt, the Examiner’s findings and
rationales as our own (see Final Act. 3–7; Ans. 3–4). We add the following
discussion for emphasis.
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner finds that Brandt discloses a
method of receiving and processing patient information to generate an initial
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worklist based on the patient information and a clinical guideline, and that
Brandt’s worklist is dynamic and continuously updated based on user input
(Final Act. 3–6). In particular, the Examiner finds that Brandt discloses
claim 1 limitations (b) and (e), including “tasks that have been completed,”
but the Examiner acknowledges that Brandt does not explicitly teach
“sorting and ranking the patient information” and “wherein the initial
worklist further comprises tasks ranked by urgency based on the patient
information, data stored in the guideline” (i.e., limitation (b)) and “wherein
the updated worklist is based on the urgency of each task, the guideline, and
further user input indicating tasks that have been completed” (i.e.,
limitation (e)) (Final Act. 4–5). The Examiner finds that Hussain discloses
these limitations and the Examiner determines that it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the workflow system of
Brandt to include ranking tasks in a worklist by urgency as taught in Hussain
(id.; Ans. 3) (citing Hussain ¶¶ 62–63, 66).
Appellant argues that paragraphs 62, 63, and 66 of Hussain, on which
the Examiner relies, “merely disclose prioritizing tasks within a list of tasks
associated with a patient wherein tasks are completed in series” (Appeal
Br. 6). Appellant characterizes Hussain as being “concerned with
determining the priority of tasks to determine which tasks need to be
completed prior to others” and argues that “[t]here is simply no disclosure in
Hussain that teaches or suggests updating a worklist based on all the recited
factors” (id.).
Responding to Appellant’s argument in the Answer, the Examiner
states that “Brandt teaches tasks [that] have been completed” and “Hussain
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in paragraphs 62–63 teaches wherein tasks are prioritized based on urgency;
i.e. based on urgency of each task and the guidelines” (Ans. 3).
In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues that “Hussain merely discloses
that tasks may be placed higher on the list because of dependencies” (Reply
Br. 4). According to Appellant, claim 1 distinguishes over Hussain’s
prioritizing of tasks because “[i]n contrast, the urgency of each task as
recited in the present claims indicates that the task is either an emergency or
not and thus requires immediate attention irrespective of any dependencies”
(id.).
We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection. As to
Appellant’s argument that the claimed “urgency of each task” “indicates that
the task is either an emergency or not” (Reply Br. 4), we do not see, and
Appellant does not point to any support in the Specification for that
interpretation. In the absence of an express definition of a claim term in the
specification or a clear disclaimer of scope, the claim term is interpreted as
broadly as the ordinary usage of the term by one of ordinary skill in the art
would permit. See In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2007); see also In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1997). Here, Appellant fails to direct us to any specific definition in the
Specification for the term “urgency.” Indeed, we note that the Specification
does not use the term “urgency” even once. Thus, the term “urgency” is
given its broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification.
See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“[d]uring examination [of a patent application, a pending claim is] given
[the] broadest reasonable [construction] consistent with the specification,
and . . . claim language should be read in light of the specification as it
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would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art”) (internal citation
and quotations omitted).
As to Appellant’s argument that Hussain is limited to prioritizing
tasks based on dependencies, we do not agree. See, e.g., Hussain ¶ 39
(“Tasks may be linked (e.g., one must occur before another is started) or
they may be independent of one another.”) (emphasis added).
In paragraph 62, Hussain discloses:
A creator of tasks (e.g. a physician) can also determine which
tasks have priority over others within the list of tasks associated
with a patients. For example, the physician may judge that the
x-ray is a higher priority task than getting blood for clinical
laboratory tests. Setting priorities allows the receiver of tasks to
prioritize their work; furthermore, the system can also automate
prioritization once algorithms are employed. In this scenario,
the list for receivers of tasks can automatically be ordered by
priority.
Appellant has not persuasively explained how the claimed “urgency
of each task” distinguishes over the priority of tasks as determined by a
creator (e.g., a physician) in Hussain. A person of ordinary skill in the art
would understand that a physician would assign priorities to tasks based on
the urgency of each task in view of the patient information. In the example
provided in paragraph 62 of Hussain, “the physician may judge that the
x-ray is a higher priority task than getting blood for clinical laboratory tests.”
In other words, the physician has determined that it is more urgent to obtain
x-ray images of a particular patient than to obtain blood from that patient for
clinical laboratory tests. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that
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Hussain discloses ranking tasks based on the urgency of each task under a
broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification.3
Appellant further argues that Hahn does not disclose “generating an
audit trail to indicate the tasks that have been completed” (limitation (k))
(Appeal Br. 7–8). Appellant contends that paragraph 164 of Hahn, on which
the Examiner relies (Final Act. 7), “discloses two different types of audits”
(Appeal Br. 7). According to Appellant, “the first type of audit is a system
that generates audit reports on mammography management systems” (id.)
(reproducing paragraph 162 of Hahn). Appellant characterizes this first type
of audit as “a once a year review of mammogram diagnoses to determine
statistics related to the diagnoses” (id.) (citing Hahn ¶ 163), and contends
that this first type of audit “has no relationship” to the claimed audit trail.
According to Appellant, the second type of audit disclosed in Hahn is “the
recording of access to specific records” (id. at 8) (quoting paragraph 164 of
Hahn). Appellant contends that “[t]he accessing of a record does not
indicate one way or another whether a task has been completed” (Reply
Br. 5).
In paragraph 164, Hahn discloses that “the mammography
management system creates an audit trail throughout normal usage by
tracking, storing, and identifying users’ access of specific records.” Hahn
further describes this audit trail in paragraph 73:
After the exam information is collected the front-desk or other
user may either create the exam and cause the patient’s status to
change to ‘Arrived’ 1220 by pressing the ‘Create Exam’ button
or create the exam and then go to the ‘start exam’ page directly

3 See also Hussain ¶ 61 (“all open tasks can be sorted . . . by ‘acuity’ (i.e. a
term used to rate how sick a patient is when presenting to the department)”).
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by pressing the ‘Create & Start Exam’ button. When either
button is pushed the following actions occur: an exam record is
transmitted to and created in a mammography management
system database, the patient’s exam status is set to ‘Arrived’
1220, an exam audit log entry is made to indicate the creation
of the exam, the exam is displayed in the facility dashboard
arrived patients section, the exam is displayed on the arrived
patients screen for the facility.
Given that Hahn discloses creating an exam audit log entry in response to
the creation of an exam, we do not agree with Appellant that Hahn’s audit
log or trail is simply limited to tracking access to records. We also note that
claim 1 is not limited to any particular type of task, and Appellant has not
explained why accessing a record is not itself a task (e.g., a task of accessing
of a patient’s medical record assigned to a staff member at a hospital).4
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 3, 4, 7–12, 14, and 16–20, which fall with claim 1.

Claim 6
Claim 6 depends from claim 1 and further recites “wherein the initial
worklist, the updated worklist, and the altered updated worklist include a list
of recommended tasks derived from the patient information and ranked by
urgency.”
Similar to the discussion above, the Examiner’s position is that
Hussain discloses ranking tasks by urgency (Final Act. 8; Ans. 4).

4 For example, Hussain discloses that steps of a task of writing a prescription
for a patient may include “[c]heck for patient allergy to the selected
medication” (Hussain ¶ 47) and “[r]ecord the prescription information in
medical record” (id. ¶ 54).
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Appellant argues that “[t]here is simply no disclosure in Hussain that
teaches or suggests generating a recommended list of tasks ranked based on
urgency for a specific user” (Appeal Br. 9). According to Appellant,
“Hussain is not concerned with ranking the recommended list of tasks by
urgency” and “[a]t no point does Hussain indicate the level of urgency of a
task delegated to a specific user, requiring the user to reshuffle the tasks at
hand to perform the most urgent task first.” (Reply Br. 6).
We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection for
substantially the same reasons discussed above. We further note that claim 6
does not recite “a task delegated to a specific user” or “requiring the user to
reshuffle the tasks” and Appellant’s arguments in that regard are not
commensurate with the scope of the claim.
In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3, 4, 6–
12, 14, 16–
20
103(a) Brandt, Hussain,
Hahn
1, 3, 4, 6–
12, 14, 16–
20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED