Charles B.,1 Complainant,v.Robert Wilkie, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 17, 20190120181982 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 17, 2019) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Charles B.,1 Complainant, v. Robert Wilkie, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency. Appeal No. 0120181982 Agency No. 200J-0330-2017103490 DECISION Complainant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s final decision concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final decision. ISSUES PRESENTED The issues presented are: (1) whether Complainant established that he was denied reasonable accommodation for his disability; and (2) whether Complainant established that the Agency's proffered explanations for his termination were pretext to mask discrimination based on his disability. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Claims Assistant, GS-6, at the Agency’s Regional Office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Report of Investigation (ROI), at 4. 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120181982 2 On January 5, 2017, management issued Complainant a Letter of Proposed Removal for being Absent without Leave (AWOL) on multiple dates from December 7, 2016, through January 5, 2017, for a total of 161.5 hours. ROI, at 76-77. Complainant and the Agency subsequently entered into a Last Change Agreement (LCA), signed by Complainant on March 1, 2017. Id. at 83-84. Therein, the Agency agreed to hold Complainant’s January 5, 2017, Proposed Removal in abeyance for two years provided that Complainant maintained satisfactory conduct and attendance and refrained from committing any offense that could result in disciplinary action. Id. The Agency also agreed to reduce the Proposed Removal to a 30-day suspension should Complainant abide by the terms of the agreement. Id. Subsequently, after Complainant was found sleeping on duty on March 23, 2017, and April 5, 2017, management issued Complainant a Notice of Removal on April 7, 2017. Id. at 78-79 Therein, management cited to Complainant’s AWOL from December 7, 2016, through January 5, 2017, and noted that his sleeping while on duty constituted a violation of the terms of the LCA. Id. However, while Complainant was being presented with the Notice of Removal on April 7, 2017, he stated that he recently sought medical advice for a sleeping disorder. Id. at 60. At that time, Complainant forwarded management an April 4, 2017, email that he had sent to his medical provider indicating that he was having trouble staying awake at work. Id. at 67. Complainant thereafter asked management not to fire him but to give him more time to find out what was medically wrong with him. Management informed Complainant that the decision to remove him had already been made and it was too late for him to request such an accommodation. Id. at 60. Complainant averred that he did not make a formal accommodation request and simply instead asked management for additional time for his sleeping condition to be properly diagnosed. Id. Management sustained the Letter of Removal on April 13, 2017, and Complainant was terminated. On July 22, 2017, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the basis of disability (sleep disorder) when: (1) on April 13, 2017, management failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation; and (2) on April 13, 2017, he was terminated from his position as a Claims Assistant, GS-6. Following the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged. The Agency specifically found that Complainant did not show that the Agency had a duty to accommodate him under the Rehabilitation Act. 0120181982 3 In so finding, the Agency noted that Complainant acknowledged that he did not inform management of his sleeping disorder until after he was issued the April 7, 2017, Letter of Removal. The Agency noted that Complainant did not take advantage of his opportunities to inform management of his sleeping disorder when he was found asleep at his desk on March 23 and April 5, 2017. The Agency further explained that Complainant did not inform management what accommodations he needed to perform his duties. The Agency also found that it articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, which Complainant did not show were pretextual. The Agency explained that Complainant was terminated because he violated the terms of the LCA, which was issued because Complainant had accumulated over 161 hours of unauthorized absences. The Agency further stated that Complainant was found sleeping on duty on March 23 and April 5, 2017, which violated the terms of the LCA that Complainant maintain satisfactory attendance and conduct. The Agency found that Complainant failed to show that it was motivated by discriminatory animus with respect to its decision to terminate him.2 CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL Complainant did not file a brief on appeal. The Agency requests that we affirm its decision, finding no discrimination. STANDARD OF REVIEW As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the Agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. 2 The Agency provided Complainant with appeal rights to the Commission on his reasonable accommodation claim but provided Complainant with appeal rights to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) for his removal claim. It is not clear if Complainant filed an appeal with the MSPB. Nevertheless, the Commission properly may assume initial jurisdiction of a mixed-case issue (i.e., an adverse action which is properly within the jurisdiction of the MSPB) when, for example, the allegation is so firmly enmeshed in the EEO process that it would unduly delay justice and create unnecessary procedural complications to remand it to the MSPB. See Richardson v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal Nos. 01982915, 01984977 (Nov. 5, 2001). In this case, given the passage of time and to avoid unnecessary procedural complications, we find that Complainant’s removal claim is so firmly enmeshed in the EEO process that it would better serve the interests of administrative economy to address it in the instant appeal. See Willia M. v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120171396 (Nov. 7, 2018) (finding complainant’s termination claim, wherein she was given appeal rights to the MSPB, was firmly enmeshed in the EEO process, and therefore the Commission adjudicated complainant’s termination, along with her claim of denial of reasonable accommodation). 0120181982 4 § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Reasonable Accommodation In order to establish that Complainant was denied a reasonable accommodation, Complainant must show that: (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) the Agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002) (Enforcement Guidance). “The term ‘qualified,’ with respect to an individual with a disability, means that the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires and, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). An agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical and mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless the Agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o), (p). For the purposes of this decision, we will assume that Complainant is a qualified individual with a disability. In the instant case, it is undisputed that Complainant did not inform the Agency of his medical condition until after his was issued the April 7, 2017, Letter of Removal. He did not inform the Agency of his medical condition when he was found sleeping on duty on March 23, 2017, and April 5, 2017. As such, Complainant acknowledged that he did not inform management that he needed accommodation or that he had a sleeping impairment until after he was terminated. Therefore, we find that Complainant’s assertion that he was denied a reasonable to be unavailing. In so finding, we note that the need for a reasonable accommodation does not excuse past misconduct. See Enforcement Guidance, at Question 36 (“An employer must make reasonable accommodation to enable an otherwise qualified employee with a disability to meet such a conduct standard in the future, barring undue hardship, except where the punishment for the violation is termination. Since reasonable accommodation is always prospective, an employer is not required to excuse past misconduct even if it is the result of the individual's disability.”); see also id., at Question 40 (“As a general rule, the individual with a disability -- who has the most knowledge about the need for reasonable accommodation -- must inform the employer that an accommodation is needed.”). Therefore, we find that Complainant did not show he was denied a reasonable accommodation for his condition, as alleged. Disparate Treatment 0120181982 5 To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, a complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A complainant must initially establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). Proof of a prima facie case will vary depending on the facts of the particular case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Dep't of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately prevail, a complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993). After a review of the record, assuming arguendo that Complainant has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on his disability, we find that the Agency has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The Agency explained that Complainant was terminated because he violated the terms of the LCA, which was issued because Complainant had accumulated over 161 hours of unauthorized absences. The Agency stated that Complainant was found sleeping on duty on March 23, 2017, and April 5, 2017, which constituted a violation of the terms of the LCA that Complainant maintain satisfactory attendance and conduct. The burden now shifts to Complainant to establish that the Agency's nondiscriminatory reasons were pretext for discrimination. Burdine, at 256. Upon review, we find that Complainant has not established that the Agency’s reasons for his termination were pretextual based on his disability. Complainant specifically does not dispute that he had accumulated 161 hours of unauthorized absences, and that he was found sleeping on duty. It is also undisputed that Complainant did not inform the Agency of his medical condition until after he was issued the Letter of Removal on April 7, 2017. Based on the record, there is simply no evidence from which to conclude that management was motivated by discriminatory animus. CONCLUSION Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we find that Complainant has not established that he was subjected to discrimination based on his disability, as alleged. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision. 0120181982 6 STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0617) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal (FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. 0120181982 7 RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations September 17, 2019 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation