Champlin Refining Co.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsJan 16, 195192 N.L.R.B. 1377 (N.L.R.B. 1951) Copy Citation In the Matter of CHAMPLIN REFINING COMPANY, EMPLOYER and OIL `YORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, CIO, PETITIONER Case No. 16-RC-594.-Decided January 16, 1951 DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTIONS Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National La- bor Relations Act, a hearing was held before William H. Renkel, Jr., hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-mem- ber panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and Reynolds]. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in producing, refining, and marketing crude oil and its products, with its principal plant and office in Enid, Oklahoma. It maintains warehouses in Denver, Colorado, Lincoln and Grand Island, Nebraska, and Mason City and Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The Employer owns and operates crude oil pipelines in Okla- homa,. and a finished products line running from Enid to Rock Rapids, Iowa. It also owns, and leases to individual operators, about 500 serv- ice stations, 300 in Oklahoma and the remainder in Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, Missouri, Iowa, and Minnesota. This proceeding is lim- ited. to 2 warehouses, 1 for merchandise and the other for equipment, both located in Enid, Oklahoma. During the 1-year period preceding the hearing, the Employer's total sales amounted to over $1,000,000, at least 50 percent being sales directly to points outside the State of Oklahoma. During the same period;' total purchases exceeded $1,000,000, an estimated 5 percent consisting of equipment and machinery purchased from sources out- side Oklahoma. It is clear, and the Employer does not deny, that when its opera- tions' are viewed as a whole, the Employer is engaged in interstate commerce ^ within the meaning of the Act. However, the Employer makes a two-fold argument challenging our jurisdiction in this case. It contends first, that for jurisdictional purposes we must consider separately each bargaining unit " in 'a 'proceeding, and second, that 92 NLRB No. 198. 1377 1378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD each such unit must independently do enough interstate business to satisfy our own jurisdictional requirements. We find no merit in this argument. The record shows that the activities carried on in the Employer's two warehouses, which are merely a part of its marketing department, are closely integrated with the sales and distribution ac- tivities which constitute the Employer's interstate business. We find, therefore, under well-established principles,' that for purposes of this proceeding the Employer's operations involved here affect commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organization involved claims to represent certain em- ployees of the Employer. 3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 4. The Petitioner requests a unit composed of all employees at the Employer's merchandise warehouse and equipment warehouse' in Enid, Oklahoma. Alternatively, it requests separate units for each warehouse. The Employer contends that the single unit requested is inappropriate because the employees in the two warehouses have dissimilar interests and working conditions. It makes no affirmative contention respecting the appropriateness of separate units for these employees. The Enid warehouses, one-half block apart, are 2 miles distant from the Employer's principal refinery. The merchandise warehouse pro- vides storage and distribution facilities for the Employer's local marketing activities. Under the direct supervision of the Enid sales agent, it is operated by five employees. Three of these are truck drivers who load and unload trucks and make local deliveries; one is a warehouseman who occasionally makes small local deliveries; the fifth is a clerk, who is excluded by agreement between the parties.2 These employees, who are paid by the hour and are hired directly by the sales agent, have no special skills. Other than their ability to drive, they need only a familiarity with the Employer's products to be qualified for their jobs. The equipment warehouse is a storage center and repair depot for gasoline pumps, lubrication machinery, and related equipment used in the Employer's many service stations. Employed in this warehouse are five equipment repairmen and one painter, all hired by and under the supervision of the construction foreman. They 1 Virginia Electric & Power Co . v. N. L. R. B., 115 F. 2d 414 (C. A. 4, 1940) reed. on other grounds, 314 U. S. 469; N. L. R. B. v. 'Weyerhaeuser Timber Co ., 132 F. 2d 234 (C. A. 9, 1942). 2 A clerk in the equipment warehouse is also excluded under the same agreement. CHAMPLIN REFINING COMPANY 1379 are on salary,3 and possess skills not exercised by the merchandise warehouse employees. They install, paint, repair, and replace equip- ment used in the Employer's service stations. Fifteen percent of their work is done outside Oklahoma, and the remainder either at the warehouse or at service stations within the State. Although the workers in the equipment warehouse, like the merchandise ware- house employees, are subject to company-wide employment and va- cation policies, there is no interchange between these two groups. Upon these facts, we agree with the Employer's contention that a single unit joining the employees of both warehouses would be in- appropriate. That the two groups have essentially different interests is clearly shown by their separate location, unrelated function, and entirely dissimilar skills and duties. We perceive no reason, how- ever, for denying them separate units, each limited to one warehouse. Accordingly, we find that the following employees of the Employer constitute units appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act : (1) All employees of the .Employer at its Enid, Oklahoma, mer- chandise warehouse, excluding clerks and all supervisors as defined in the Act; and (2) All employees of the Employer at its Enid, Oklahoma, equip. ment warehouse, excluding clerks and all supervisors as defined in the Act. [Text of Direction of Elections omitted from publication in this volume.] 8 These employees are under "bell" contract with the Employer , whereby they work a guaranteed number of hours per month at a fixed hourly rate. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation