Champion Home Builders

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 23, 2007

350 N.L.R.B. 289 (N.L.R.B. 2007)

CHAMPION HOME BUILDERS CO.
350 NLRB No. 35
289
Champion Home Builders Co. a subsidiary of Cham-
pion Enterprises, Inc. and Carpenters Union
Local No. 1109, a/w United Brotherhood of Car-
penters and Joiners of America.1 Case 32–CA–
17185
July 23, 2007
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS SCHAUMBER, KIRSANOW,
AND WALSH
On November 19, 2004, the National Labor Relations
Board issued a Decision and Order in this proceeding, in
which it found, among other things, that the Respondent,
Champion Home Builders Co., did not violate Section
8(a)(1) by failing and refusing to stay or seek the dissolu-
tion of a restraining order issued against Ramon Rivas by
a California State court.2 Subsequently, the Union peti-
tioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit for review of the Board's Order.3 By unpublished
memorandum dated December 4, 2006, as amended on
January 22, 2007, the Ninth Circuit granted the Union’s
petition for review in part and remanded the case to the
Board “for further proceedings consistent with this dis-
position.”4
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
We accept the court's remand as the law of the case. In
doing so, we find that additional briefing is not war-
ranted. The court's decision holds that, “to the extent the
state court’s restraining order prohibited Rivas from con-
tacting or sending any messages to Champion employ-
ees, it encompassed protected activity under the [Act]
and was preempted as of the date the [Board] complaint
against Champion issued.” Consistent with the court’s
decision, we now find that the Respondent violated Sec-

1 We have amended the caption to reflect the disaffiliation of the
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America from the
AFL–CIO effective March 29, 2001.
2 343 NLRB 671. Member Walsh, dissenting in part, would have
found that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by failing to stay or
seek dissolution of the restraining order against Rivas following issu-
ance of the unfair labor practice complaint. Member Kirsanow did not
participate in the Board’s prior decision.
3 The Board also filed an application for enforcement of its Order,
and the Respondent filed a petition for review.
4 In addition to the finding at issue here, the court granted the
Board’s application for enforcement regarding its finding that the Re-
spondent discharged Rivas in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Carpenters Local 109 v. NLRB, 219 Fed. Appx. 654 (9th Cir. Jan. 22,
2007), amending 209 Fed. Appx. 692 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2006).
On February 8, 2007, the Charging Party filed a letter with the
Board, stating that the court’s remand “should allow the parties to
submit position statements.” However, as discussed below, given the
specific terms of the court’s remand, we find that additional briefing is
not warranted.
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by failing and refusing to stay or
seek the dissolution of the restraining order issued
against Rivas by the California State court once the
Board issued the complaint in this proceeding alleging
that Rivas’ discharge violated the Act. Our reasoning
follows.
Facts and Prior Dispositions
The Respondent discharged Rivas on or about Decem-
ber 18, 1998.5 On December 23, the Respondent initiated
legal proceedings in state court to seek a temporary re-
straining order (TRO) against Rivas. The next day, Rivas
was served with a TRO issued by the State court. The
TRO included a prohibition against coming within 100
yards of the Respondent's facility or contacting Plant
Manager Jim Stewart or any of the Respondent's em-
ployees. Following the hearing to show cause, the State
court issued a restraining order on January 7, 1999, pro-
hibiting Rivas from coming within 50 yards of the Re-
spondent's facility and contacting the Respondent's em-
ployees during working hours. On March 30, 1999, the
General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the
Respondent had unlawfully discharged Rivas.
In a letter dated September 1, 1999, the Regional Di-
rector demanded that the Respondent request the State
court to withdraw the restraining order. The Respondent
refused to do so. On September 3, 1999, the General
Counsel issued an amended complaint containing an ad-
ditional allegation that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) by failing and refusing to stay or seek dissolution
of the TRO.
In its initial decision, the Board found, consistent with
the administrative law judge, that the Respondent unlaw-
fully discharged Rivas. Contrary to the administrative
law judge, however, the Board dismissed the allegation
that the Respondent violated the Act by failing to stay or
seek dissolution of its restraining order. The Board rea-
soned that the State court lawsuit was directed at Rivas’
unprotected activity—specifically, threats of violence—
but not at his protected concerted activity. Thus, the
Board found that the State court lawsuit was not pre-
empted upon issuance of the complaint. Rather, the
Board concluded that “the better approach is to allow the
restraining order to coexist with the unfair labor practice
complaint, and to find preemption only at the point the
Board issues an order containing a remedy that conflicts
with the State court lawsuit.”6 Under that approach, the
Board found that its reinstatement remedy conflicted
“with the part of the restraining order prohibiting Rivas
from entering the Respondent’s property and contacting

5 Dates are in 1998 unless otherwise noted.
6 343 NLRB at 673.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD290
employees during working hours,” and ordered the Re-
spondent to petition the State court to withdraw those
portions of the restraining order.
Upon review, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with this as-
pect of the Board’s decision. It concluded that
“[a]lthough the state court had discretionary power to
enjoin Rivas from engaging in violent behavior, to the
extent the state court’s restraining order prohibited Rivas
from contacting or sending any messages to Champion
employees, it encompassed protected activity under the
NLRA, and was preempted as of the date the NLRB
Complaint against Champion issued.”
Analysis
It is not disputed that the states “must yield to the
Board’s primary jurisdiction over conduct clearly pro-
tected or prohibited by Sections 7 or 8 of the Act.”7 The
only issue here concerns that date on which the relevant
portions of the State court lawsuit were preempted. The
court found that, to the extent the State court order pro-
hibited protected concerted activity under the Act, it was
preempted as of the date the Board complaint issued.
We accept the court’s decision as the law of the case and
therefore find that the portion of the Respondent's re-
straining order that “prohibited Rivas from contacting or
sending any messages to Champion’s employees” was
preempted as of the date the Board’s complaint on Rivas’
discharge issued, rather than the date the Board issued its
Order. Therefore, by failing to withdraw those portions
of its lawsuit after the Board complaint issued, the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By failing, upon issuance of the Board’s complaint
on Rivas’ discharge, to stay or seek the dissolution of the
portion of its restraining order prohibiting Rivas from
contacting or sending any messages to the Respondent’s
employees, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.

7 Loehmann's Plaza (Loehmann's Plaza I), 305 NLRB 663, 669
(1991) (relying on San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 244 (1959)), revd. on other grounds, Loehmann's Plaza
(Loehmann's Plaza II), 316 NLRB 109 (1995), rev. denied sub nom.
Commercial Workers, Local 880 v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir.
1996), cert. denied sub nom. Teamsters Local 243 v. NLRB, 519 U.S.
809 (1996).
4. The above unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision, we shall
direct the Respondent to cease and desist from maintain-
ing the preempted portions of its restraining order.8 In its
prior Decision and Order in this case, the Board directed
the Respondent to petition the State court to withdraw
the portion of its lawsuit prohibiting Rivas “from enter-
ing the Respondent’s property and contacting its em-
ployees during working hours.”9 Inasmuch as the court
has already enforced this provision of our original Order,
we shall not repeat it here.10
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Champion Home Builders Co., Lindsay
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to stay or seek the dissolution
of the portions of its restraining order that prohibit
Ramon Rivas from contacting or sending any messages
to the Respondent’s employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Lindsay, California facility copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”11 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 32,
after being signed by the Respondent's authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,

8 The record indicates that the restraining order was set to expire by
its own terms in January 2002.
9 Champion Home Builders, supra at 674.
10 See, e.g., West Penn Power Co., 346 NLRB 425, 429 fn. 10
(2006).
In its letter, the Charging Party requests that the Board consider or-
dering intranet posting of the notice. Assuming arguendo that this
request is properly before us (see fn. 4, supra), we find that intranet
posting of the notice is not necessary to remedy the violation found.
11 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
CHAMPION HOME BUILDERS CO. 291
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall du-
plicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed
by the Respondent at any time since December 18, 1998.
(b) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to stay or seek the dissolu-
tion of the portions of our restraining order that prohibit
Ramon Rivas from contacting or sending any messages
to our employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
CHAMPION HOME BUILDERS CO.