CFPH, LLCDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardApr 2, 202014968891 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/968,891 12/14/2015 Howard W. Lutnick 14-2433 9184 63710 7590 04/02/2020 INNOVATION DIVISION CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P. 110 EAST 59TH STREET (6TH FLOOR) NEW YORK, NY 10022 EXAMINER ALLEN, WILLIAM J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3625 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/02/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): lkorovich@cantor.com patentdocketing@cantor.com phowe@cantor.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte HOWARD W. LUTNICK, THOMAS D. BRADSHAW, MILLER A. MARK, and GERARD PHELAN ____________________ Appeal 2019-0052421 Application 14/968,891 Technology Center 3600 ____________________ Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOYCE CRAIG, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges. FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to: (1) the Final Office Action mailed October 19, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed March 13, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed May 3, 2019 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief filed July 1, 2019 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 2 STATEMENT OF CASE Introduction Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of claims 1 and 2. Claims 3–7, 9, 12–17, 18–24, and 26 have been withdrawn as a result of the Examiner’s Restriction Requirement of February 1, 2018 (see Appeal Br. 6; Final Act. 2; see also Appeal Br. 15–20 (Claims Appendix)). Claims 8, 10, 11, 18, 25, 27, and 28 have been canceled (see Appeal Br. 6; Final Act. 2; see also Appeal Br. 16–18, 20 (Claims Appendix)). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Appellant’s Disclosed and Claimed Invention Appellant’s disclosed invention, entitled “Computer Implemented Systems and Methods for Asset Transfer” (Spec. Title), provides consumers of tangible goods, using computers connected to a database over the Internet, an improved method of search for goods from providers of the goods (see Spec. ¶ 7, 9). More specifically, Appellant’s disclosed and claimed invention provides an escrow process for a transaction for tangible goods (Spec. ¶ 7; claim 1; Abstract). Appellant’s invention computerizes the search and transaction process for consumers (see Fig. 1; Spec. ¶¶ 41–47, 55–58 (describing Fig. 1)). Appellant’s Specification describes the process as follows: 2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. “The word ‘applicant’ when used in this title refers to the inventor or all of the joint inventors, or to the person applying for a patent as provided in §§ 1.43, 1.45, or 1.46.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as CFPH, LLC (see Appeal Br. 3). Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 3 Accordingly, in some embodiments, a computer-implemented system over a network may connect a plurality of providers of commitments (e.g., loan commitments) to a plurality of recipients (e.g., possible borrowers). Compared to conventional systems, a computer-implemented system that networks a plurality of providers and recipients achieves greater liquidity and price transparency because it dramatically reduces the amount of time and effort needed to shop for products and services. The ability to electronically search a single database having information organized in a consistent format is far superior to bespoke methods of comparison shopping among different vendors, which also consumes significant time for the shopper and provider salespeople. Providers/lenders benefit by reaching a larger base of potential customers/borrowers, and borrowers/customers achieve greater price transparency and product availability. With the greater availability resulting from a larger number of participating lender/providers, customers/borrowers who otherwise may not find a loan/product that meets all of their specifications may find it with the click of a few buttons on a search engine. Spec. ¶ 7 (emphases added). Substantially instantaneous communication offered by a computer network linking providers, recipients, and margin/escrow agents enables a transaction to be offered, negotiated, and closed very quickly compared to conventional systems. The greater speed further enables all parties to modify their commitments and product/service specifications to respond quickly to the market, e.g., a change in interest rate or a change in the price of oil or another commodity. Effective “prices” tend to be more accurate and more accurately reflect the capabilities of each provider, and this further leads to commitments that are more likely to be kept by providers. Spec. ¶ 9 (emphases added). Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 4 Exemplary Claim Claims 1 and 2 are method claims, and contain commensurate limitations relating to facilitating a financial transaction for goods with the aid of a computer, database, and/or network (see claims 1, 2). Exemplary claim 1 under appeal, with (i) bracketed lettering added to correspond to the limitations in the body of the claim, and (ii) emphases added to key portions of the claim at issue, reads as follows: 1. A method comprising: [A] receiving, by at least one processor, a request from a remote computer terminal for a tangible product, the request comprising data indicative of parameters associated with the tangible product, the parameters including a quantity parameter and a date of delivery parameter; [B] searching, by the at least one processor, a database comprising commitments to provide a tangible good; [C] transmitting, by the at least one processor, to the remote computer terminal, data indicative of a commitment to fulfill the request, in response to finding the commitment in the database; [D] receiving, by the at least one processor, indicia that a portion of an amount of the tangible good will be physically delivered to and held by an escrow associated with the commitment to provide the tangible good; [E] determining, by the at least one processor, a commitment fee based on the portion held in escrow; [F] causing, by the at least one processor, the commitment fee to be paid to an account associated with a provider of the tangible good; [G] receiving, by the at least one processor, from the remote computer terminal a request to accept the commitment to provide the tangible good; [H] receiving, by the at least one processor, from the remote computer terminal a request for the provider to deliver Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 5 the tangible good in an amount that satisfies the quantity parameter; [I] transmitting, by the at least one processor, to the provider a request to physically deliver remaining portion of the amount of the tangible good that is not held in escrow, the remaining portion comprising an amount of the tangible good that satisfies the quantity parameter less the portion of the tangible good held in escrow; [J] determining, by the at least one processor, that the provider failed to transfer the remaining portion of the tangible good before an expiration time pursuant to the delivery parameter; [K] responsive to determining that the provider failed to deliver the remaining portion of the tangible good before the expiration time, notifying, by the at least one processor, the provider that at least a part of the portion held in escrow has been forfeit by the provider; and [L] after notifying the provider that at least a part of the portion held in escrow has been forfeit by the provider, transmitting, by the at least one processor, an instruction that causes the at least part of the portion held in escrow to be physically delivered to another location. Appeal Br. 14–15, Claims Appendix (emphases and bracketed lettering added). Examiner’s Rejection Claims 1 and 2 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (an abstract idea), without significantly more. Final Act. 5–8; Ans. 3–7. Appellant’s Contentions With regard to the patent eligibility rejection, Appellant primarily makes arguments regarding claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 7–11), and generally Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 6 contends the claim is not directed to an abstract idea, but “to a technological improvement” (Appeal Br. 9), e.g., a computer-implemented method of facilitating financial/commercial transactions between consumers and providers that “reduces the amount of time and effort needed to shop for products and services” (Appeal Br. 9). Appellant also argues that the Examiner has ignored the technical advantages of the claimed method provided in paragraph 7 of the Specification (see Appeal Br. 10). Lastly, Appellant argues (see Appeal Br. 10–11) that because the facts of the decisions in Bancorp Services v. Sun Life3 and Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services4 do not correspond to the facts of the instant case on appeal, the Examiner has not met the burden required by Berkenheimer v. HP Inc.5 for showing limitations to be well-understood, routine, and conventional. Appellant makes only nominal arguments to dependent claim 2, simply relying on the arguments presented for claim 1 as to the eligibility of claim 2, and contending that claim 2 adds further distinction to the aspects of claim 1 that recite patent eligible subject matter (see Appeal Br. 12). Such conclusions are not considered a separate argument for patent eligibility. See e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)(last sentence) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument 3 Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 4 Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 5 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 7 for separate patentability of the claim.”); In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that interpreting 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1) to require a more substantive argument than a naked assertion that the prior art fails to teach limitation in order to address a claim separately, is not an unreasonable interpretation of the rule); Ex parte Belinne, 2009 WL 2477843 at *4 (BPAI 2009) (informative) (“Appellants’ argument . . . repeatedly restates elements of the claim language and simply argues that the elements are missing from the reference. However, Appellants do not present any arguments to explain why the Examiner’s explicit fact finding is in error.”). Additionally, any arguments not presented are waived. See Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (BPAI 2010) (informative). Therefore, based on Appellant’s patent eligibility arguments, and because claims 1 and 2 contain commensurate limitations, we select claim 1 as representative of claims 1 and 2 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for patent-ineligibility. Principal Issue on Appeal Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 6– 13) and the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2), the following issue is presented on appeal: Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting representative claim 1, as well as claim 2 grouped therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (i.e., a judicial exception such as an abstract idea), without significantly more)? Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 8 ANALYSIS Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 9 determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 10 omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).6 Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong 1”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017, 2018) (“Step 2A, Prong 2”).7 6 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, updating and clarifying the Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p df). 7 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 11 Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception (“Step 2B”). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56. Even if the claim recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept: The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world. See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”) Rather, the “directed to” inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether “their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 12 technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”). Step 1 Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. In the instant case on appeal, representative claim 1 recites “[a] method” (see claim 1, preamble) for managing a financial transaction for “tangible goods” by performing a series of steps (see claim 1, limitations A– l) (emphasis added). Therefore, claim 1, as a method claim setting forth a process having a series of steps, recites at least one of the enumerated categories (e.g., a process) of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. As a result, as to claim 1, and claim 2 grouped therewith, we continue our analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance to determine whether the representative claim (1) recites a judicial exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above); and (2) is patent-eligible. Step 2A, Prong 1 At a high level, representative claim 1 recites a method for facilitating management of a financial transaction for tangible goods (see claim 1). More specifically, the Examiner determines, and we agree, that: The concepts embodied by claim 1 are “directed to” “certain methods of organizing human activity” in that claim 1 describes concepts relating to interpersonal and intrapersonal activities, such as managing relationships or transactions between people and satisfying or avoiding a legal obligation (see: MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(11)). That is, claim 1 directs itself to Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 13 a methodology of managing a transaction and implementing a contractual agreement between parties, such as by receiving a commitment from a provider to provide a quantity of a tangible good to a receiving party, accepting the commitment by the receiving part, and managing the fulfillment of the transaction in accordance with the terms of the transaction. At least similar concepts have been found to be abstract by in a number of precedential decisions by the courts, most notably in buySAFE, Inc. v. Google (Creating a contractual relationship), but also in In re Comiskey (arbitration) and Accenture Global Services, GmbH v. Guidewire Software (Generating rule-based tasks for processing an insurance claim). In addition to certain methods of organizing human activity, claim 1 is also considered to be “directed to” a “fundamental economic practice” in that claim 1 describes concepts relating to the economy and commerce, such as agreements between people in the form of contracts, legal obligations, and business relations (see: MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(1)). Final Act. 6–7 (underlining emphases added). Appellant describes the invention as a computer implemented method for asset transfer (see Title) of goods from providers (Spec. ¶¶ 4, 7), to allow consumers/recipients to find products meeting all of their specifications “with the click of a few buttons on a search engine” (Spec. ¶ 7). Appellant describes the main purposes of the recited invention are to (i) achieve great liquidity and price transparency by reducing the amount of time and effort needed for consumers/recipients to shop for products (see Spec. ¶ 7); (ii) allow users to search a single database in which information is organized in a consistent format to allow for better and faster comparison shopping amongst plural vendors/providers (see Spec. ¶ 7); (iii) allow providers to benefit by reaching a larger base of potential customers (see Spec. ¶ 7); (iv) Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 14 “achieve greater price transparency and product availability” (Spec. ¶ 7); and (v) provide almost instantaneous communication between providers and customers/recipients to enable transactions to be offered “very quickly compared to conventional systems” and with “greater speed” to “respond quickly to the market” (Spec. ¶ 9). In our view, claim 1 recites a combination of abstract ideas: (1) a fundamental economic practice (i.e., managing a financial transaction involving receiving a request for tangible goods as in limitation A, receiving indicia of a commitment fee and an escrow being received from a provider as in limitations D and E, receiving and transmitting offer and acceptance information as in limitations G, H, and I, and alerting the provider of any escrow forfeiture and delivering the escrowed goods to another location as in limitations K and L); and (ii) a mental process (i.e., determining a commitment fee as in limitation E, and determining that the provider failed to transfer goods before an expiration time as in limitation J). Our reviewing court has held that combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (patent-ineligible claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas). Appellant contends that the claims “are directed to a technological improvement” and are thus patent eligible (see Appeal Br. 2). This Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 15 contention does not refute that the claims are abstract, and is unpersuasive of Examiner error for at least the following reasons. First, the determination of a commitment fee as in limitation E, and the determination that the provider failed to transfer goods before an expiration time as in limitation J, are mental processes, and can be performed mentally or by a human with pen and paper. See Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1146 (“While the Supreme Court has altered the § 101 analysis since CyberSource in cases like Mayo and Alice, we continue to ‘treat[] analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.’”) (quoting Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354); see also CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. We find that the determination of a commitment fee (claim 1, limitation E), and whether goods have been transferred before a time deadline (claim 1, limitation J), are mental processes involving evaluation, judgment, and/or opinion. Second, our reviewing courts have often identified abstract ideas by referring to earlier precedent, e.g., by comparing a claimed concept to the concepts previously identified as abstract ideas by the courts. Amdocs (Israel), Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, 822 F.3d. at 1334. For example, in Alice, the Supreme Court identified the claimed systems and methods as describing the concept of intermediated settlement, and then compared this concept to the risk hedging Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 16 concept identified as an abstract idea in Bilski. Because this comparison revealed “no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue here,” the Court concluded that the concept of intermediated settlement was an abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356-57. Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Amdocs compared the claims at issue with “eligible and ineligible claims of a similar nature from past cases” as part of its eligibility analysis. 841 F.3d at 1295– 1300. In this light, we determine that the limitations of claim 1 are focused on, and generally relate to a mental process for escrowing goods during a transaction between a provider/vendor and a consumer/recipient, which is a business relation between people and the organization of human activity (see generally claim 1; Spec. ¶¶ 4, 7; Abstract). As such, the claimed invention recites a mental process as well as a method of organizing human activity, which is an abstract idea. See, e.g., Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that concept of “local processing of payments for remotely purchased goods” is a “fundamental economic practice, which Alice made clear is, without more, outside the patent system.”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A]nalyzing information by steps people [can] go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more [are] mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”); Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that a process that starts with data, applies an algorithm, and ends with a new form of data is directed to an abstract idea); Digitech Information Sys., Inc. v. BMW Auto Leasing, LLC, 504 F. App’x 920 (mem.) Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 17 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rendering a decision based on data and mathematical formulas and finding process of operating on information using mathematical formulas/correlations patent ineligible); Clarilogic, Inc. v. FormFree Holdings, Co., 681 F. App’x 950, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (gathering, analyzing, and outputting financial data/assessment is an abstract idea that is patent ineligible). Therefore, under Step 2A, Prong 1, we agree with the Examiner (see Final Act. 6; Ans. 5) that the invention claimed in independent claim 1 recites an abstract idea, i.e., managing a financial transaction for tangible goods, specifically a financial transaction that includes a commitment fee and an escrow of goods, which we also conclude is a fundamental economic practice or, alternatively, a method of organizing human activity. Third, claim 1 recites not only a mental process, but also the organization of human activity, such as business relations between people (e.g., facilitating selling/purchasing of tangible goods remotely by managing a commitment fee and escrow). See, e.g., Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that concept of “local processing of payments for remotely purchased goods” is a “fundamental economic practice, which Alice made clear is, without more, outside the patent system.” Clarilogic, Inc. v. Formfree Holdings Corp., 681 F. App’x. 950, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (gathering, analyzing, and outputting financial data/assessment is an abstract idea that is patent ineligible). Receiving indicia of a commitment fee and an escrow being received from a provider as in limitations D and E, receiving and transmitting offer and acceptance information as in limitations G, H, and I, and alerting the Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 18 provider of any escrow forfeiture and delivering the escrowed goods to another location as in limitations K and L are all part of the business relation and organization of human activity between consumers/recipients and providers/vendors. Fourth, with regard to limitations A, D, G, H (receiving data); C, I, and L (transmitting data); limitation K (notifying the provider of results), of claim 1, our reviewing court has also concluded that abstract ideas include the concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected data set, storing the data in memory, and notifying the user of the results. Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding “claims directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of data are directed to an abstract idea”). Moreover, our reviewing court has concluded that acts of parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas. Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In addition, the collection of information and analysis of information (e.g., recognizing certain data within the dataset) are also abstract ideas. Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Similarly, “collecting, displaying, and manipulating data” is an abstract idea. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[M]erely presenting the results of abstract processes Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 19 of collecting and analyzing information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis”).8 Fifth, as mentioned above, our reviewing court has held that combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (patent-ineligible claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas). In view of the foregoing, we conclude claim 1 recites (i) searching a database (limitation B); and (ii) determining a commitment fee (limitation E) and whether the provider failed to transfer the remaining portion of the tangible good before an expiration time (limitation J), which are mental processes. We also conclude claim 1 (limitations A–L) recites a method of organizing human activity, such as a commercial or financial interaction, sales/marketing interaction, and/or business relation between people, which are fundamental activities. Because we conclude claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to determine whether claim 1 is “directed to” the judicial exception, by determining whether additional elements of the claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical 8 We further note that, when generically claimed, storing and retrieving and operating on information in memory and displaying information are computer functions that have been recognized as either insignificant extra- solution activity or well-understood, routine, conventional functions. MPEP 2106.05(d)(II)(i) (citing Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 20 application. Such additional elements may reflect an improvement to a technology or technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Step 2A, Prong 2 – Practical Application Under Step 2A, Prong 2, we determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. If the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim is not directed to the judicial exception. Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “at least one processor” and “a remote computer terminal” (see claim 1, limitation A), and “a database” (claim 1, limitation B). Considering claim 1 as a whole, none of the additional elements, alone or in any ordered combination, integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. But for the recitation of a generic “processor,” “database,” and “computer terminal” for communicating with each other (see claim 1) to search the database, we find the recited steps or acts (see e.g., claim 1, limitations A, C–L), could be performed as mental steps. As to limitations A, D, G, and H of claim 1, “merely selecting information, by content or source, for collection [and] analysis . . . does nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes.” Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355. Receiving and analyzing (or identifying data), by itself, does not transform an otherwise-abstract process or system of information collection and analysis. See id. Like the claims at issue in Electric Power, we find Appellant’s claim 1 does not invoke “any assertedly inventive programming” or an “arguably inventive set of components or methods.” Id. Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 21 As to limitation A and C–L of claim 1, these steps involve generic computer/network functionality, like receiving/transmitting data or operating on data to provide results by notification and instruction of certain criteria being met. As to limitation B of claim 1, the step of searching a database also involves generic computer/network functionality. Appellant contends (Appeal Br. 9) that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea, because claim 1 recites “various specific features” that provide a technological improvement, such as providing the advantages outlined in paragraph 7 of the Specification, namely (i) achieving great liquidity and price transparency by reducing the amount of time and effort needed for consumers/recipients to shop for products (see Spec. ¶ 7); (ii) allowing users to search a single database in which information is organized in a consistent format to allow for better and faster comparison shopping amongst plural vendors/providers (see Spec. ¶ 7); (iii) allowing providers to benefit by reaching a larger base of potential customers (see Spec. ¶ 7); and (iv) “achiev[ing] greater price transparency and product availability” (Spec. ¶ 7). We disagree with Appellant (see Appeal Br. 9) that the focus of claim 1 is on a technical improvement or solution (i.e., a practical application of the abstract idea). The mere recitations of searching the database (e.g., limitation B), or receiving and transmitting data to make determinations (e.g., limitations A and C–L) in claim 1 does not embody an improvement in computer capabilities as in Enfish. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336 (“[T]he plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.”). Rather, the focus of claim 1 is on managing a financial Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 22 transaction between a provider and a consumer for tangible goods. This is an improvement to help the provider to be notified if some of the escrow has been forfeit, and help the consumer perform better searches, but not the computer itself (or in the case of claim 1, the recited processor, computer terminal, and/or database). Claim 1 does not recite a method of that improves the speed or efficiency of the processor, computer terminal, or database, reduces memory requirements of a database, or otherwise improves a computer terminal. Claim 1 merely recites steps for managing a financial transaction between a provider and a consumer for tangible goods (see claim 1). We consider this idea to be abstract. The claimed invention (see claim 1) receives data (limitations A, D, G, H); transmits data (limitations C, I, and L); notifies of results (limitation K), determines a commitment fee and the provider’s failure to transfer goods before an expiration time (limitations E and J) – this is merely conventional data gathering and analysis. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354. In addition, merely adding a programmed processor to perform generic computer functions does not automatically overcome an eligibility rejection. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24. Furthermore, the use of a general- purpose computer to apply an otherwise ineligible algorithm does not qualify as a particular machine. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation of concrete or tangible components is not an inventive concept); EON Corp. IP Holdings Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 23 LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that Alappat’s rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or software could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer to the claim was superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice decisions). “[I]ntegration into a practical application” requires an additional element or a combination of additional elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See Revised Guidance, at 54. In the instant case before us on appeal, based on the record before us, we determine that claimed invention in representative claim 1 is not integrated into a practical application. Appellant’s argument that the claimed method performs faster than other methods by reducing the time and effort of shopping for products (see Appeal Br. 9), is not persuasive, as the recited and disclosed method would not provide an improvement to the computer itself. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining that in order for a machine to add significantly more, it must “play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved more quickly”) (emphasis added); FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (2016) (“While the claimed system and method certainly purport to accelerate the process of analyzing audit log data, the speed increase comes from the capabilities of a general- purpose computer, rather than the patented method itself”); Bancorp Servs., Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 24 L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter”). In the instant case, using a computer and/or processor to more quickly facilitate financial transaction management involving a commitment fee and escrow is nothing more than the abstract idea itself (i.e., managing a transaction for tangible goods, which is a fundamental economic practice and mental process). For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1 (and claim 2 grouped therewith) invokes generic computer components (a “processor” interacting with “a database” and “a remote computer terminal” to provide a financial transaction) merely as a tool in which the computer instructions apply the judicial exception and, thus, the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application. Because Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 recites an abstract idea under Step 2A is in error, and claim 1 recites a judicial exception (i.e., the abstract idea of a method of organizing human activity and/or mental process) that is not integrated into a practical application, in accordance with the Guidance, we conclude claims 1 and claim 1 grouped therewith, are directed to an abstract idea under Step 2A, and the eligibility analysis with regard to claims 1 and 2 proceeds to Step 2B. Step 2B – Inventive Concept Having determined claim 1 and claim 2 grouped therewith are directed to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, we now evaluate whether the additional elements add a specific limitation Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 25 that is not well-understood, routine, or conventional activity in the field, or simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract idea. See generally Guidance. Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “at least one processor,” “a remote computer terminal” and “a database” (claim 1, limitation A), and “a database” (see claim 1, limitation B). Considering claim 1 as a whole, none of the additional elements applies or uses the abstract idea in a meaningful way such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. Appellant has not identified what it is about claim 1 (or claim 2) that allegedly amounts to more than a conventional arrangement of limitations for performing the abstract idea identified above. In other words, Appellant does not persuasively argue any specific limitation or combination thereof is not well-understood, routine, or conventional in the field (see generally Appeal Br. 10–11). Nor does Appellant persuasively argue the Examiner erred in that aspect. In particular, Appellant’s attorney arguments that the subject matter in the claims is a technological improvement and meaningful application of a judicial exception (see Appeal Br. 9), are unpersuasive, because they are not supported by competent evidence. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1977). In addition, Appellant’s arguments (see Appeal Br. 10–11) are, in essence, conclusory assertions that the claims are non- conventional, and thus a technological improvement. Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 26 The Examiner determines, and we agree, that the only elements beyond the abstract idea are generic computer components (e.g., a processor, remote computer terminal, and database) used to perform generic computer functions (Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 6–7) — a determination that is supported by the Specification, particularly paragraphs 41 through 47 and 55 through 58, describing Figure 1 including server 2 and database 80, found in the Specification (see Spec. ¶¶ 41–47, 55–58; Fig. 1). We note that paragraphs 41 through 47 and 55 through 58 and Figure 1 of Appellant’s Specification also show and describes well-understood, routine, conventional computer components used for facilitating financial transactions between parties using computer terminals having processors and input/output devices in combination with a database that are in a general purpose computing environment in a manner that indicates the components and the functions they perform were well-known in the art. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “a patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art”); see also USPTO, Memorandum on Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer- 20180419.PDF (explaining that a specification that describes additional elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can show that the elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional); Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 27 Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to retrieve the user-specific resources.”). Specifically, Appellant’s Specification describes the server, computer terminals, and database shown in Figure 1 in the following manner, indicating they are conventional and generic: FIG. 1 depicts a system according to at least one embodiment of the systems disclosed herein. System may comprise one or more computers (e.g., in communication over a network) and other computing elements coupled to databases and programmed with software that instructs the computing elements to perform the functions described herein. Spec. ¶ 42; The system 100 may comprise one or more servers 2 coupled to one or more databases 80, one or more providers 8a-8n, one or more recipients 10a-10n, and one or more agents, escrow, and data entities 12 (collectively called "agents"). The providers 8a- 8n, recipients 10, agents 12, and server 2 may each communicate with one other. Recipients 10a may also communicate with other recipients 10b, and likewise providers 8a may communicate with other providers 8b, and agents 12a may communicate with other agents 12b. Recipients 10 and providers 8 may collectively be referred to herein as "users" of the system. Spec. ¶ 43; Server 2 may comprise one or more processors, computers, computer systems, computer networks, and or computer databases. Server 2 may comprise modules. Server 2 may also comprise one or more databases, such as databases 80. Server 2 Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 28 may communicate with recipients 10, providers 8, and agents 12. For instance, server 2 may communicate with a user 10, 8 computer, such as a browser of a user computer, e.g., over the internet. Spec. ¶ 45; Databases 80 may comprise one or more processors, computers, computer systems, computer networks, and/or computer databases configured to store information. Each of databases 80 may communicate with server 2, e.g., via one or more modules of server 2. For instance, server 2 and modules may store information in databases 80 and may also use information stored in databases 80. Spec. ¶ 47; Recipients 10a-10n may comprise one or more recipients, such as borrowers, purchasers, acquirers, and traders. Recipients 10 may comprise one or more human persons, computers, terminals, users, traders, trading entities, or other entities. Recipients 10 may interact with agents 12, server 2, and/or other recipients 10. As used in this application, recipients 10a- 10n may also refer to a user’s interface to other system 100 components (like server 2), such as a user’s PDA or computer or a program running on a user’s computer such as a computer web browser like Internet Explorer™, which may communicate with providers 8, agents 12, and/or server 2. Spec. ¶ 48; The server 2 may comprise a computer, server, hub, central processor, or other entity in a network, or other processor. The server 2 may comprise input and output devices for communicating with other various system 100 elements. Spec. 55; and As shown in FIG. 1, server 2 may comprise a plurality of modules. Each module may comprise a processor as well as Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 29 input and output devices for communicating with other modules, databases, and other system elements. Spec. 57. These portions of the Specification provide evidence that the computer terminal, processor, and database limitations recited in claim 1 are well-known, routine, and/or conventional elements. The Examiner also cites to prior court decisions (see Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 9, 11) as evidence that the use of generic computer components to perform generic functions in the business field is well-understood, routine, or conventional activity in the field, and simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract idea. See generally Guidance. Appellant’s arguments (see Appeal Br. 10–11) that the facts of the decisions in Bancorp Services v. Sun Life9 and Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services10 do not correspond to the facts of the instant case on appeal are not persuasive. Appellant argues that “the claims at issue in Bancorp were directed to managing a stable value protected life insurance policy” (Appeal Br. 11), and “the claims at issue in Credit Acceptance were drawn to a method for providing a financing source (Appeal Br. 11). Although Bancorp involved computerizing “[a] method for managing a life insurance policy on behalf of a policy holder” (Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d at 1270), the claims at 9 Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 10 Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 30 issue in Bancorp simply used a (i) policy generator and calculators (i.e., computer/processor), and (ii) a digital storage element (i.e., a database) as tools to facilitate the issuance of insurance policies (i.e., a financial transaction) based on certain calculations made by the computer/processor. Thus, the claims in Bancorp present similar issues as claim 1 on appeal, namely that of using a computer and database to perform a method of providing a financial product or service in a financial transaction. And, Credit Acceptance involved a system for customers of products from dealers that use a database, user terminal, and server to facilitate the process of providing financial transactions for products to customers, including allowing dealers of the products to provide an advance amount. This is similar to the instant case on appeal, where a processor receives requests from remote computer terminals and searches a database to facilitate financial transactions for tangible goods, including allowing providers of goods to provide a commitment fee. Credit Acceptance is therefore applicable here, and stands for the proposition that merely automating previously manual processing by using computers does not qualify as an eligibility-rejection-defeating improvement (see Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Even if we were persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the facts of Bancorp and Credit Acceptance do not correspond to the facts of the instant case on appeal, this alone would not show the Examiner erred in determining certain claimed elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional. This is because the Examiner additionally relies on (i) buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014), to show “that merely using a Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 31 computer to perform more efficiently what could otherwise be accomplished manually does not confer patent-eligibility” (Final Act. 8); and (ii) SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014), to show that “the recited additional elements function solely as an obvious mechanism to achieve the claimed result more efficiently, which is insufficient to save a claim from ineligibility” (Ans. 9). In buySAFE, the claims were directed to the well-known practice of creating a transaction performance guaranty, i.e., a contractual relationship, which was determined to be an abstract idea, and which can be analogized to the financial transaction process involving a commitment fee and escrow (see buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)), as in claims 1 and 2 on appeal in the instant case. Thus, buySAFE serves as unrefuted evidence that the computer terminal, processor, and/or database in claim 1 of the instant case on appeal were well-understood, routine, and conventional. In SiRF Technology, Inc., the claims involved a method of performing calculations and estimations of position information to determine the absolute position of a global positioning system (GPS) receiver (SiRF Technology, Inc., 601 F.3d at 1332). Because the court in SiRF Technology, Inc. agreed with the International Trade Commission that the claims were tied to a specific machine, e.g., a GPS receiver, the court held that the claims at issue in SiRF Technology, Inc. were directed to patentable subject matter. Thus, SiRF Technology, Inc. does not serve as evidence that the computer Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 32 terminal, processor, and/or database in claim 1 of the instant case on appeal were well-understood, routine, and conventional. In Alice, the claims involved a method for exchanging obligations between parties (i.e., a financial or commercial transaction) using a computer. The Supreme Court determined the concept of computerizing such transactions to (i) be an abstract idea; (ii) to include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices; and (iii) thus, be patent ineligible (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20). Thus, Alice serves as unrefuted evidence that the computer terminal, processor, and/or database in claim 1 of the instant case on appeal were well-understood, routine, and conventional. Claims fall short of an inventive concept when they “simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea with routine, conventional activity.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In this case, we agree the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as to Step B, and we cannot agree with Appellant (see Appeal Br. 10–11) that the Examiner has not met the burden of showing the additional elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional. As a result, we are not persuaded that the operations recited in claim 1 are anything beyond generic computer functions as opposed to an improvement to a fundamental economic practice and/or method of organizing human activity. Considering the elements of claim 1 individually and as an ordered combination, claim 1 does no more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea on a generic computer terminal, processer, and/or database. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 33 1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to render [a] claim patent eligible.”). Claim 1, as whole, is focused on an easier and more efficient process for managing a financial transaction for tangible goods, invokes generic computer components, and does not serve to improve the computing system/components. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”). Claim 1 recites an abstract idea (i.e., a mental process and a fundamental economic practice such as business relations and/or commercial practices), and “does not include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). Instead, claim 1 merely requires generic computer implementation and fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Id.; see also Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1277–78 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (performance by computer of operations that previously were performed manually or mentally, albeit less efficiently, does not convert a known abstract idea into eligible subject matter). In view of the foregoing, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred with respect to the Guidance’s Step 2B analysis. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at Step 2B. Accordingly, claim 1 does not recite an Appeal 2019-005242 Application 14/968,891 34 inventive concept because claim 1 simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract idea. Summary As explained above, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility Guidance, based on the record before us, and informed by our governing case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting representative claim 1, as well as claim 2 grouped therewith, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter without significantly more, and we sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. CONCLUSION For all of the reasons above, we hold as follows: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2 101 Eligibility 1, 2 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b) (2013). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation