Central Transport, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 28, 1980

247 N.L.R.B. 1482 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Central Transport, Inc. and General Drivers, Ware-
housemen and Helpers Local Union No. 28, affili-
ated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Ameri-
ca. Case 11 l-CA-8179
February 28, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND
TRUESDALE
On November 13, 1979, Administrative Law Judge
Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions
and a supporting brief and the General Counsel filed a
cross-exception and supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified
below, and hereby orders that Respondent, Central
Transport, Inc., Greenville, South Carolina, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so
modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a):
We find merit in the General Counsel's exception to the Administrative
Law udge's statement that the General Counsel failed to file a post-hearing
brief. Such a brief was filed.
Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the
clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products Inc.. 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
' While the proposed remedy properly requires Respondent to compensate
Suttles for lost earnings and offer him immediate employment, displacing if
necessary anyone hired since the discrimination against him, it fails to provide
for the possibility that no drivers have been employed since that discrimina-
tion. Where applicants have discriminatorily been refused employment, the
Board's traditional remedy includes requiring that a preferential hiring list be
established and that the discriminatee's name be placed at the top of that list.
See, e.g., H. C. Thomson. Inc.. 230 NLRB 808 (1977); Consolidated Dairy
Products Company. d/b/a Darigold Dairy Products Company, 194 NLRB 701
(1971). Accordingly, we have modified the recommended Order to include
this remedial measure.
247 NLRB No. 198
"(a) Offer immediate employment to John C.
Suttles as a lease driver, without prejudice to whatever
seniority and other rights and privileges he would
have enjoyed had been employed on February 13,
1979, discharging if necessary anyone hired to that
position since that date, and make him whole for all
earnings lost by reason of the discrimination against
him as set forth in the section herein entitled The
'Remedy.' In the event that no lease driver has been
hired since February 13, 1979, establish a preferred
hiring list and place the name of John C. Suttles at the
top of said list. If such a preferred hiring list is
established, offer Suttles immediate employment upon
the development of a lease driver vacancy."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all parties were represented
by their attorneys and afforded the opportunity to
present evidence in support of their respective posi-
tions, it has been found that we have violated the
National Labor Relations Act in certain respects and
we have been ordered to post this notice and to carry
out its terms.
The National Labor Relations Act, gives you, as
employees, certain rights including the right:
To engage in self-organization
To Form, join, or help a union
To bargain collectively through a representa-
tive of your own choosing
To act together for collective barganing or
other mutual aid or protection
To refrain from any or all of these things.
Accordingly, we give you these assurances.
WE WILL NOT tell employment applicants or
any of our employees that we maintain a policy
against hiring or employing individuals who had
worked previously for an employer whose em-
ployees were represented by a union.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in a
labor organization by refusing to hire, or in any
other manner discriminating against employees
with respect to their hire, tenure of employment,
or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights outlined above.
WE WILL offer immediate employment to John
C. Suttles as a lease driver, without prejudice to
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1483CENTRAL TRANSPORT, INC.
whatever seniority and other rights and privileges
he would have enjoyed had he been employed on
February 13, 1979, discharging, if necessary to
make room for him, any lease driver who was
hired after our discrimination against him.
WE WILL establish, if necessary in order to
carry out the foregoing, a preferential hiring list,
placing the name of John C. Suttles at the top of
said list, if we do not have a vacancy for a lease
driver or have not hired a lease driver since our
discrimination against him, and WE WILL offer
Suttles immediate employment upon the develop-
ment of a lease driver vacancy.
WE WILL make John C. Suttles whole for any
earnings lost by reason of our discrimination
against him, with interest.
CENTRAL TRANSPORT, INC.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge: This
proceeding was heard in Spartanburg, South Carolina, on
August 28, 1979, upon an initial unfair labor practice charge
filed on February 26, 1979, and a complaint issued on April
13, 1979, alleging that Respondent independently violated
Section 8(aX) of the Act by telling a job applicant that his
applicant had to be cleared at higher management levels in
view of Respondent's policy of not hiring those who had
worked for a union firm, and further alleged that Respon-
dent violated Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by refusing
to employ John C. Suttles because of his union or protected
activity. In its duly filed answer, Respondent denied that any
unfair labor practices were committed. Neither counsel for
the General Counsel, nor Respondent filed a post-hearing
brief.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, including my
opportunity to personally observe the witnesses while
testifying and their demeanor, I make the following:
' Some discussion is in order concerning the employee status of alleged
discriminatee Suttlea. Clearly established on this record is the fact that Suttles
applied for a job with Respondent in which his own labor would be committed
to secure compensation to be received. See, e.g., N.LR.R v. Steinberg, 182
F.2d 850, 854-855 (5th Cir. 1950). At the same time, however, Suttles owned
his own tractor, and this vehicle was to be used in the employment sought
with Respondent. Counsel for the eneral Counsel, apparently, anticipating
that Respondent would defend on grounds that Suttles was an independent
contractor, and hence outside the protective scope of the Act, set out to
diaprove such status. The undersigned, being unaware that Respondent was of
uch a position, interceded in the interest of asuring both an orderly
presentation of the evidence and a hearing confined to the issues properly
joined by the parties. In consequence, the effort by the Oeneral Counsel in this
regard was curtailed provisionally-until such time as it became clear that
Suttes' employee status was challenged by Respondent on such grounds.
Thus, as stated by the undersigned at the hearing, it was not the initial burden
of the General Counsel to disprove independent contractor status. See, e.g.,
Local Na 6, of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada. A.4FL to
CIO, et al. (The Detroit Edison Company and Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
tion), 123 NLRB 225, 230-231 (1959). Sec. 2(3) of the Act provides, in
material part that, "The term employee shall include any employee, .... but
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
Respondent is a carrier engaged in the hauling of freight
by motor vehicle under a certificate of convenience and
necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Pursuant thereto, Respondent operates terminals and con-
ducts operations in the States of North Carolina and South
Carolina and other States of the United States from which it
is engaged in the interstate transportation of freight. In the
course of said operations, Respondent, during the preceding
calendar year, a representative period, derived gross revenue
in excess of S50,000 for services performed directly outside
the State of North Carolina and transported materials from
the State of North Carolina to points directly outside the
State of North Carolina valued in excess of S50,000.
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Respondent is now, and has been at all times material
herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, Local 28, herein called
the Union, is now and has been at all times material herein, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
This case turns on critical conflicts in testimony relative to
whether John Suttles, an applicant for employment with
Respondent, was told in the course of a preemployment
interview that Respondent had a policy against hiring those
who had worked for firms whose employees were represent-
ed by a union, and whether Suttles was subsequently denied
employment because he had been employed by such a firm
in the past.'
Respondent is a certificated interstate carrier which
employs some 46 drivers, half of whom operate their own
shall not include . .. any individual having the status of an independent
contractor." It was in such fashion that Congress elected to exclude
independent contractors from the prohibitory scheme of the Act. Within this
framework it is noted that, as stated by the Supreme Court, it is ". .. the
general rule of statury construction that the burden of proving justification or
exemption under a special exception to the prohibitions of a statute generally
rests on one who claims its benefits .... See Trade Commission v. Morton
Salt Co. 334 U.S. 37. 44-45 (1948). On the instant presents no cause appears
for a departure from such a relegation of proof responsibility. The determina-
tion as to independent contractor status requires careful assessment of a
myriad of factors, principally consisting of matters emerging from contracts
and agreements solemnizing the relationship, statutes bearing thereon, and the
particular employer's practice with respect thereto. Quite obviously, employ-
enrs would be thoroughly conversant with such matten so fundamental to the
relationship through which their economic interests are pursued. Thus no
unreasonable burden is imposed by placing the onus on them to affirmatively
plead and substantiate such a defense on the basis of record proof Here
Respondent, through answer and evidence both parole and documentary,
declined to raise or address itself to that issue. Morever, no brief was filed
from which one might discern that Respondent was of a view that Suttles was
disqualified from statutory remedy because an applicant for a position
possessing the attributes of independent contractor status. Yet, even if
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
vehicles and half being directly employed and supplied
tractors by Respondent. It does not appear that any of these
drivers had a history of union representation. Indeed, Gary
Honbarrier, Respondent's vice president, testified that at
least since 1970, to his knowledge, no formal organization
campaign was waged among Respondent's employees.
Suttles, a truckdriver for some 8 or 9 years who owned his
own tractor, sought employment with Respondent on
February 12, 1979. On that date he was interviewed by
Hubert Hendricks, Respondent's manager of its Greenville,
South Carolina,2 terminal. After Suttles advised Hendricks
of his interest in leasing his truck to Respondent, the latter
responded "sure, that they needed four or five lease
operators right then and he'd be glad to take an application
so he could put me to work."'" During the conversation,
Hendricks advised that Suttles' truck would be acceptable to
Respondent if it could pass inspection under standards of the
Department of Transportation. Also considered was Suttles'
prior work experience, with the latter informing Hendricks
that for the past several years he had "wildcatted," but that
he had worked in 1973 and 1974 for Chemical Leaman Tank
Lines in Spartanburg. At that point, according to Suttles,
Hendricks interrupted, advising that if Suttles wanted to
work for Respondent any such reference should be omitted
from his application. Suttles inquired why, and Hendricks
allegedly stated "They are a Union company, you know ...
we have a policy that we don't hire anybody's ever worked
for a Union company or been affiliated with a Union
company." Suttles then reasoned that it would be inappro-
priate to omit the matter from his application because he
was aware that former managerial employees of Chemical
Leaman were then in the employ of Central Transport in a
managerial capacity. Hendricks agreed that Suttles place the
Chemical Leaman work history on the application, but
expressed that he would have to clear this with Honbarrier.
Carrying the matter further, Suttles observed that it had
been 5 years since he last worked for Chemical Leaman,
whereupon Hendricks opined that he did not think that such
dated employment would have any effect. Nonetheless,
Hendricks reiterated that he would still have to obtain
approval from his boss. Also discussed was Suttles' past
driving record. He told Hendricks that he had been cited for
speeding on Interstate "95" on November 26, 1978, and that
Respondent were not deemed estopped from raising the issue further, the
evidence adduced by the General Counsel in this regard was too sketchy and
incomplete to afford a conclusive basis for determination. In sum, the
evidence he adduced hardly sufficed to fulfill the burden carried by
Respondent in this regard.
I Hendricks testified that although all hirings at Greenville must be cleared
through Honbarrier, Hendricks is the sole management representative who
interviews such applicants. Hendricks admitted that his recommendations on
hiring are "usually" approved. Honbarrier confirmed that in connection with
the review of Hendricks' recommendations on hiring, officials at Respondent's
headquarters are "there to primarily see that all paper work is submitted."
' Based on the credited, uncontradicted, testimony of Suttles.
· According to Hendricks, Suttles told him he had been clocked on the
"Florida Turnpike" at 95 miles per hour. Hendrick obviously labored under a
limited capacity for recall and impressed me as lacking a reasonable grasp of
detail. Aside from my general distrust of Hendricks, I consider it unlikely that
Suttles would have made such a remark during an initial hire interview. I
credit the latter.
' Hendricks denied that he made any statement that Respondent disregards
driving infractions beyond such a limited period. Honbarrier testified that
Respondent had no such policy but that driving records would be examined as
far back as records would permit. In this regard, I am inclined to give
Hendricks and Honbarrier the benefit of the doubt.
this was his only driving offense during the past 12 months.'
Suttles also related that as a truckdriver he had experienced
no accidents at all, but, while employed by Chemical
Leaman, his driver's license was revoked on December 23,
1974, on the basis of a point system and that as a result he
had been fired. According to Suttles, Hendricks said that
said incident was of no concern inasmuch as Respondent
only considered citations occurring within the past 12
months.' At the close of the interview, Hendricks gave
Suttles an application to be completed and returned to
Respondent when Suttles brought his truck in for inspection.
Suttles was again reminded that Hendricks would have to
check with his boss before he could hire him, Hendricks
added that, while the Company had a policy against hiring
anybody that ever worked for a union firm,' since Suttles
had not worked for such a firm in the past 5 years,
Hendricks did not believe it really mattered. Suttles was
instructed to check back with Hendricks the next day.'
Suttles claimed that after departing from Respondent's
terminal he went to a truck dealership and traded his tractor
in for a later model. The tractor he selected had been
stripped for repainting. He testified that because of a
possibility that Respondent had a uniform color requirement
and the new truck was in the paint shop, he called Hendricks
to inquire whether Respondent required that its leased
vehicles be painted any particular color. Hendricks indicated
that the Company presently operated a multicolored fleet.
The conversation ended with Suttles stating that he would
call Hendricks the next day.'
The next day, February 13, Suttles, according to his
testimony, telephoned Hendricks at approximately 3 p.m.
Hendricks advised that he had not as yet received approval
from his boss and requested that Suttles get back to him in
about 2 hours. At 5 p.m. Suttles called again. On that
occasion, Hendricks informed Suttles that he had discussed
the matter with Honbarrier and that Suttles could not be
hired. The latter asked why, and Hendricks explained that it
was because of his affiliation with Chemical Leaman.9
On February 14 according to Suttles, he, in the company
of Stephen Surett, a fellow truckdriver, went to Respon-
dent's terminal. Suttles, in Surett's presence, again met with
Hendricks. Suttles gave Hendricks his completed application
advising that he wished that document to be made part of
' Hendricks denied making any statement to Suttles to the effect that
Respondent had a policy against hiring employees with such a history of
employment, or that he told Suttles that he would have to check with
Honbarrier before hiring him. In this respect, I regarded Suttles as the more
believable.
? Hendricks denied that he gave Suttles an idea that he could expect to be
employed. However he did not contradict Suttles' testimony that he informed
the latter that a number of lease operators were needed by Respondent.
Furthermore, Hendricks admitted that he gave Suttles the application which
the latter was to complete and, as he testified, "return ... when he (Suttles]
brought his truck by for me to inspect."
' Hendricks, except for testimony that his nest contact with Suttles came a
week later, did not deny specifically that such a telephone conversation took
place. Indeed, he acknowledges that Suttles told him that his truck was in the
paint shop. The only discrepancy in their testimony relates to when Hendricks
was informed of this fact. Considered against the entire record and my
mistrust of Hendricks, the testimony of Suttles was regarded as the more
probable. I credit him.
' Hendricks and Honbarrier denied having any conversation concerning
Suttles until after the latter was notified that he would not be employed. I did
not believe them. Suttles is credited.
1484
CENTRAL TRANSPORT, INC.
the record. At that point, according to Suttles, with
corroboration from Surett, he asked Hendricks for a better
explanation as to why he was not hired. It is asserted that
Hendricks again stated that Suttles could not be hired
because of his affiliation with Chemical Leaman and the
Union and that the Company had a policy against hiring
anyone with such a background.
Hendricks claims, with corroboration from Honbarrier,
that he alone decided not to hire Suttles. He admits that he
had not received the completed application until after Suttles
was informed that he would not be hired and claims that he
talked to no one concerning Suttles in the interim between
the initial interview and his determination to reject Suttles.
He avers that he elected not to hire Suttles on two grounds,
i.e., his driving record" and his involvement in a fuel theft
dispute involving Chemical Leaman.'2 Hendricks denied that
he made any remarks as to any nonunion policy, or that he
told Suttles to omit reference to his employment with
Chemical Leaman from his application, or that he indicated
to Suttles that he would have to check with his boss before
Suttles could be hired. Finally, he denied that he told Suttles
that he would have to check with Honbarrier before hiring
him. Honbarrier testified that he had no contact with
Hendricks concerning Suttles until after Suttles submitted
his completed application. He claims that Suttles' action in
this latter respect was unusual, and, therefore, Hendricks
reported what had occurred.
For the reasons heretofore indicated, and based on the
demeanor of the witnesses and the relative probability of
their respective accounts, I find that, except as heretofore
noted, the material testimony offered by Suttles was the
more believable. I have already noted that the testimony of
Hendricks concerning the oil theft incident struck me as
pure afterthought. Other comparisons between the testimo-
ny of Hendricks and Suttles strongly suggested the truth in
Suttles' version. Thus it does not appear that Hendricks
discouraged Suttles during the initial employment interview.
Indeed, he admits to giving Suttles an application and to
requesting its completion and return when Suttles brought
his truck to the terminal to see if it conformed with
Department of Transportation regulations. Hendricks con-
"' The denial by Hendricks that he made any reference to such a policy is
discredited. Hendricks testified that on this occasion Suttles appeared at his
ofice for the sole purpose of leaving his application. It is unlikely that Suttles
would go to the trouble of having a witness present if his visit to the terminal
were for such a limited purpose. I accept the mutually corroborative
testimony of Suttles and Surett.
" Hendricks asserted that the revocation of Suttles' license while employed
by Chemical Leaman in 1975 and the latter's statement that he had been
clocked on the Florida Turnpike at 95 m.p.h. while boasting his truck would
run that fast, convinced Hendricks that Suttles was not the type of driver that
Respondent wished to employ. I have discredited Hendricks' testimony that
Suttles made this latter remark.
" Suttles had been charged with theft in connection with the disappearance
of fuel under a haul contract with Chemical Leaman. In 1977 Suttles stood
trial and was acquitted of the charges against him in that respect. Though
Hendricks indicated that prior to his initial interview he did not know Suttles
and did not know whether Suttles referred to the fuel controversy in the initial
interview, Hendricks testified that he was mindful of Suttles' involvement
from media coverage of the trial. Suttles denied that the incident was the
subject of extensive media coverage. It is of interest that Honbarrier did not
attribute his knowledge thereof to the media, but testified that he was aware of
the oil theft controversy because it was generally known fact "around the
industry". Honbarrier relates that, after he learned of the decision not to hire
Suttles, he contacted two Chemical Leaman representatives. One of those,
cluded the interview under conditions which at the very least
held open the prospect of employment to Suttles. Even if
Hendricks' testimony were to be believed, this course was
adopted with full knowledge of any lack of qualification on
the part of Suttles. Nonetheless, thereafter, Hendricks
consulted with no one and, apparently, as one would
construe his testimony, changed his mind and decided not to
hire Suttles on the basis of what he learned or knew at the
initial interview. Suttles was not only the more credible
witness, but his account was in consonance with a more
logical and persuasive explanation of what actually prompt-
ed the turnabout on the part of Hendricks.
Based on the credited testimony of Suttles, I find that at
the initial employment interview he was informed that
Respondent maintained a policy that it would not hire
employees with a history of employment with organized
employers, and that he was subsequently informed that he
was denied employment for that very reason. I find that
Respondent's assigned grounds for said discrimination were
to a controlling extent based on incredible testimony and
that the real reason was unveiled by Hendricks on February
14, when Suttles appeared at the terminal with Stephen
Surett. I find that the statements concerning this antiunion
policy violated Section 8(a)(1) and that the implementation
thereof manifested by the refusal to hire Suttles violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. The Respondent, Central Transport, Inc., is an employ-
er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
2. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
telling an applicant for employment that the Company had a
policy of not hiring employees who had worked for a union
Company.
4. Respondent, on February 13, 1978, violated Section
8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing to hire John
Robert Cowan, testified to such a contact by Honbarrier in late February or
March. He related that in the course of their discussion Honbarrier inquired
whether Suttles had been involved in the oil theft controversy. Cowan
responded in the affirmative. Neither Hendricks nor Honbarrier impressed me
as reliable, and this ground for the alleged refusal to hire seemed pure
afterthought. Hendricks testified that he did not know Suttles before the
interview, did not discuss Suttles with anyone thereafter, did not raise the fuel
controversy with Suttles at that interview, yet had known all along that
Suttles had been involved. I did not believe him. Furthermore, from Cowan's
description of his conversation with Honbarrier, which I credit, it is suggested
strongly that Honbarrier himself was uncertain of Suttles' involvement until
well after the refusal to hire had become manifest. However, the suspicion cast
on Respondent's testimony in this regard is not limited to the foregoing
considerations. G.C. Exh. 5 is a statement of position dated March 29, 1979,
furnished by Honbarrier, in connection with the instant unfair labor practice
charges. In reciting the reasons for the refusal to hire Suttles, that document
makes no reference to the fuel theft controversy. Based on the foregoing, I am
convinced that the first real knowledge acquired by Respondent at this
assigned ground for the refusal to hire Suttles came only after the events
giving rise to this proceeding. This incredible effort on the part of Hendricks
and Honbarrier to clothe with apparent legitimacy the action taken against
Suttles through reliance on a contrived ground only serves to enforce the
claim of discrimination herein.
1485
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. Suttles because of his prior employment with a union
Company.
5. The above are unfair labor practices having an effect on
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, it shall be recommended that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent discriminatorily denied
employment to John C. Suttles, it shall be recommended
that Respondent offer him employment as lease driver
immediately, displacing if necessary anyone occupying that
position hired since the discrimination against him, and
make him whole by payment of a sum of money equal to
that which he would have earned but for the discrimination
against him, less net interim earnings. Backpay shall be
computed on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed in F
W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, (1950) and shall
include interest as specified in Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977)."'
On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and on the entire record in this proceeding, and
pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the
following
ORDER"
The Respondent, Central Transport, Inc., Greenville,
South Carolina, its officers, agents, successors and assigns,
shall:
i. Cease and desist from:
(a) Telling employment applicants that it maintains a
policy precluding the employment of individuals previously
" See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
" In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 120.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
employed by firms whose employees were represented by a
union.
(b) Discouraging membership in any labor organization
by refusing to hire, or in any other manner discriminating
against employees with regard to their hire, tenure of
employment, or any other term or condition of employment.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer immediate employment to John C. Suttles as a
lease driver, discharging if necessary anyone hired to that
position since the discrimination against him, and make him
whole for all earnings lost by reason of the discrimination
against him as set forth in the section of this Decision
entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
National Labor Relations Board or its agents, for examina-
tion and copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its terminal in Greenville, South Carolina,
copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix.""
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 11, shall, after being duly signed by a
representative of Respondent, be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are customari-
ly posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 11, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
' In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
1486