CENTRAL KY BRANCH 361, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER CARRIERS, AFL-CIO (NALC) (United States Postal

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 16, 2018

367 NLRB No. 19 (N.L.R.B. 2018)

367 NLRB No. 19
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Central KY Branch 361, National Association of Let-
ter Carriers, AFL-CIO (NALC) (United States
Postal Service) and Leslie Denise Wells. Case
09–CB–202214
October 16, 2018
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS MCFERRAN, KAPLAN, AND EMANUEL
On May 4, 2018, Administrative Law Judge Andrew
S. Gollin issued the attached decision. The General
Counsel filed exceptions with supporting argument. The
Respondent filed an answering brief, and the General
Counsel filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.1
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The recommended Order of the administrative law
judge is adopted and the complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 16, 2018
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
______________________________________
Marvin E. Kaplan, Member

1 Chairman Ring is recused and did not participate in the considera-
tion of this case.
2 The General Counsel has excepted to some of the judge’s credibil-
ity findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an ad-
ministrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
Member McFerran notes in particular that the judge did not credit
the Charging Party’s claim that the Union agreed to file grievances on
her behalf. Given that finding, Member McFerran finds it unnecessary
to pass on the judge’s alternative reasoning that even if the Union had
agreed to the Charging Party’s requests, the Union still would not have
breached its duty of fair representation.
________________________________________
William J. Emanuel Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Julius Emetu, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Joshua J. Ellison and Hiram M. Arnaud, Esqs., for the Union.
DECISION
INTRODUCTION1
ANDREW S. GOLLIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. This case
was tried on March 27–28, 2018, in Cincinnati, Ohio, based on
allegations that the Central KY Branch 361, National Associa-
tion of Letter Carriers, AFL–CIO (NALC) (Union) breached its
duty of fair representation when it failed to file and process
grievances against the United States Postal Service (USPS) on
behalf of carrier Leslie Denise Wells. On March 1, 2017,2
Wells provided the USPS with medical documentation tempo-
rarily restricting her to standing/walking for no more than four
hours a day because of pain and swelling in her left ankle. The
USPS verbally agreed to reduce Wells’ workload/schedule
based on her restrictions. Over the next 3 months, Wells was
regularly unable to complete her reduced workload within the
time allotted, and she contends that management, at times, re-
quired her to work beyond her restrictions. On May 27, the
USPS removed Wells from her reduced workload/schedule.
Wells asked the Union to file grievances over these matters, but
none were filed.
The General Counsel alleges the Union violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act) when
it failed to file and process grievances between March 2 and
May 27 over Wells being required to work beyond her medical
restrictions, and on around May 27 over Wells’ removal from
her reduced workload/schedule. The Union denies the allega-
tions, contending Wells never requested that it file grievances
over these matters, and, even if she had, its failure to do so was
not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. For the reasons
stated below, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed in
its entirety.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On about July 11, Wells filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the Union in the above-referenced case. On November
21, following an investigation, the Regional Director for Re-
gion 9 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board), on
behalf of the General Counsel, issued a complaint alleging the
violations at issue. On December 1, the Union filed its answer
denying the alleged violations.
At the hearing, all parties were afforded the right to call, ex-
amine, and cross-examine witnesses, present any relevant doc-

1 Abbreviations in the decision are as follows: “Tr.” for transcript;
“Jt. Exh.” for Joint Exhibits; “GC Exh.” for General Counsel’s Exhibit;
“R. Exh.” for Union’s Exhibit; “GC Br.” for General Counsel’s Brief;
and “U. Br.” for the Union’s Brief.
2 All dates hereinafter refer to 2017, unless otherwise stated.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
umentary evidence, and argue their respective legal positions
orally. The Union and the General Counsel filed post-hearing
briefs, which I have carefully considered. Accordingly, based
upon the entire record, including the posthearing briefs and my
observations of the credibility of the witnesses, I make the fol-
lowing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommenda-
tions:
FINDINGS OF FACT3
Jurisdiction and Labor Organization Status
The USPS provides postal services for the United States and
operates various facilities throughout the United States, includ-
ing in Lexington, Kentucky. The Union admits, and I find, that
the Board has jurisdiction over the USPS and this matter by
virtue of Section 1209 of the Postal Reorganization Act, 39
U.S.C. Section 1209. The Union admits, and I find, that it is a
labor organization within the m of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Collective-Bargaining Relationship
The parties have stipulated that the National Association of
Letter Carriers (NALC) is the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of employees of the USPS in the letter carrier
craft, as described in Article 1, Union Recognition, of the col-
lective-bargaining agreement between the USPS and the NALC
(the National Agreement). At all relevant times, the NALC
delegated to the Union certain collective-bargaining duties with
respect to employees in the letter carrier craft who were sta-
tioned in and around Lexington, Kentucky, including but not
limited to the negotiation of certain local agreements where
permitted by the National Agreement, and the filing, pro-
cessing, and settlement of grievances through Step A of the
grievance process set forth in the National Agreement.4 (Jt.

3 Although I have included record citations to highlight particular
testimony or exhibits, my findings and conclusions are not based solely
on those specific citations, but rather on my review and consideration
of the entire record. The findings of fact are a compilation of credible
testimony and other evidence, as well as logical inferences drawn there-
from. To the extent testimony contradicts with the findings herein,
such testimony has been discredited, either as having been in conflict
with credited testimony or other evidence, or because it was in and of
itself incredible and unworthy of belief.
4 Art. 15, Sec. 2 of the National Agreement sets forth the Grievance
Procedure. The procedure begins with the Informal Step A. At Infor-
mal Step A, any employee who feels aggrieved must discuss the griev-
ance with their immediate supervisor within fourteen (14) days of the
date on which the employee or the union first learned or may reasona-
bly have been expected to have learned of its cause. The employee may
be accompanied and represented by the steward or a union representa-
tive. The supervisor, steward, and union representative shall have au-
thority to resolve the grievance in whole or in part at the Informal Step
A. If no resolution is reached, the Union shall be entitled to file a writ-
ten appeal to Formal Step A within seven (7) days of the date of the
discussion. Such appeal shall be made by completing the Informal Step
A portion of the Joint Step A Grievance Form and filing it with the
installation head or designee within 14 days of the date on which the
union or the employee first learned or may reasonably have been ex-
pected to have learned of its cause. The parties will then meet and
discuss and possibly resolve the grievance. If there is no resolution, the
grievance continues through the grievance-arbitration procedure. (Jt.
Exh. 1.)
Exh. 3.) With respect to the collective-bargaining agreement
currently in force between NALC, the Union, and the USPS,
the NALC's position is that a document that was published and
ratified by its membership in August 2017 embodies the terms
and conditions of employment for NALC-represented employ-
ees. The USPS, however, has refused to accept that document
as the basis for publishing a collective-bargaining agreement,
which has been the practice between the parties, and there is
currently a dispute between the NALC and the USPS over this
matter. (Jt. Exh. 3.)
The Union and the USPS also agreed to a Memorandum of
Understanding supplementing the National Agreement. (Jt.
Exh. 2.)
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Background
The USPS operates five post offices in the Lexington, Ken-
tucky area: Brentwood, Beaumont, Bluegrass, Gardenside, and
Liberty Road. The carriers working at these facilities are cov-
ered by the National Agreement and the local Memorandum of
Understanding. Kenneth Becraft is the Union’s President.
David Blackburn is the Union’s Vice President. Mark Whit-
comb is the Union Steward for the Gardenside facility.
Leslie Denise Wells began working for the USPS in around
November 2015. She began at the Beaumont facility. For the
first month or so, she carried parcels out of a rented minivan.
After the holiday season was over, she began carrying mail.
Her supervisor and the station manager approached Union Pres-
ident Kenneth Becraft, who also worked at the Beaumont facili-
ty, about Wells, stating that she was having issues catching on
to the job. Prior to the end of her 90-day probationary period,
the USPS was prepared to remove Wells, but the USPS, the
NALC, and the Union negotiated an agreement to keep her
employed. (Tr. 478–479.)
Thereafter, Wells transferred to the Brentwood facility, and
later to the Liberty Road facility. In March 2016, Wells frac-
tured her left ankle while performing her route. Wells eventual-
ly returned to work full time. Union President Becraft assisted
Wells with issues she was having getting paid following her
injury, and later when she was injured following a dog bite. At
around this time, Wells reported to Becraft that she was being
harassed and discriminated against by a supervisor at the Liber-
ty Road facility. (R. Exh. 4.) Union Vice President Blackburn
(then a union steward), who worked at the Liberty Road facili-
ty, filed a grievance on Wells’ behalf, and the matter was even-
tually resolved through the Equal Employment Opportunity
(EEO) process. (Tr. 392.)
In February 2017, Wells bid on and was awarded a route out
of the Gardenside facility. The route (Route 421) Wells bid on
was a walking route, requiring her to walk approximately 8-11
miles a day. She initially worked an 8-hour shift, starting at 8
a.m.
Carriers’ start and end times, hours of work, as well as their
activities throughout the day, are documented by their coded
clock rings. The carriers clock in at the beginning of their shift

POSTAL WORKERS (CENTRAL KY BRANCH 361) 3
(BT), and they then attend a brief informational meeting. Fol-
lowing the meeting, carriers “case” their routes, which involves
them sorting the mail on their route by street address. Carriers
can case standing or, if requested, sitting. (Tr. 481–482.) Car-
riers then pull and load their mail and parcels into their delivery
vehicle. Before leaving the facility, carriers clock over into a
different status (MV), which signifies they are moving to out on
the street. They drive to their route location and perform their
deliveries. After completing their route, they drive back to the
facility and clock back in as having returned from the street
(MV). They unload their vehicle, return their equipment, and
then clock out at the end of their shift (ET).
Medical Restrictions and Reduced Workload/Schedule
In late February 2017, Wells began experiencing pain and
swelling in her previously injured left ankle. She made a doc-
tor’s appointment with her orthopedic surgeon (Dr. Steven
Lawrence). On February 27, prior to going to her appointment,
Wells met with USPS’s Finance Manager, James Carl, at the
Greenside facility. Wells told Carl about her ankle injury and
explained that she was going to her doctor that day. Wells
informed Carl she might not be able to perform her full route
because of her ankle and asked about possibly switching routes,
switching crafts, or moving into a management position. Carl
informed Wells there were waiting lists for those management
positions, and that she was doing well and should continue to
give her current route a chance.
Later that day, Wells had her appointment with Dr. Law-
rence. Dr. Lawrence concluded the X-rays of Wells’ ankle
appeared normal but recommended that she have an MRI done
and then follow-up with him after. In the meantime, he issued
Wells written restrictions limiting her to “4 hours of standing
and walking per shift.” (GC Exh. 2.) Wells testified her under-
standing from her conversation with Dr. Lawrence was that her
restrictions were “supposed to have been 2 hours of standing
and two hours of walking.” (Tr. 120–121.)
On March 1, Wells gave a copy of her temporary restrictions
to USPS Customer Service Supervisor Amanda Boblitt who
supervised Wells at the Gardenside facility. Boblitt informed
Wells there was no eight-hour light duty available, but she of-
fered to reduce Wells’ schedule to 4 hours a day based on her
restrictions. Wells agreed. Wells later gave a copy of her med-
ical restrictions to Union Steward Mark Whitcomb, who
worked as carrier at the Gardenside facility, and informed him
about her conversation with Boblitt.5

5 On March 1, when Wells spoke with Boblitt and Whitcomb, she
presented her supposed restrictions as her actual restrictions. As for her
conversation with Boblitt, Wells testified that: “I told her that I had
restrictions. It was a total of four hours. It was two hours of standing
and two hours of walking, a total of four hours, and she said okay, and
we both agreed to it.” (Tr. 298–299.) As for Whitcomb, Wells testi-
fied: “I just let him know that I had two hours of standing and 2 hours
of walking. And I was informing him of these restrictions, and I told
him that it was a verbal agreement between [Boblitt] and I that my
workload would be reduced, and he said okay. (Tr. 124–125.) Boblitt
testified she agreed to assign Wells “total work hours, walking, stand-
ing, four hours.” (Tr. 347–348.) Whitcomb was not questioned about
this conversation with Wells.
Each day the USPS “measures” the mail and sets up each
route so it can be completed during an eight-hour shift. If on a
particular day a carrier has less or more than eight hours of mail
to deliver, the carrier is to inform management so that mail can
be reassigned. After March 1, under her reduced work-
load/schedule, Wells remained responsible for casing her entire
eight-hour route. However, after she finished casing, Wells
was responsible for estimating and dividing up her route based
on how long it would take to perform. She was assigned to
perform 4 hours of the route, and the remaining four hours was
divided up and reassigned to one or more other carriers who
had volunteered to work overtime. These other carriers would
deliver their own routes, plus a portion of Wells’ route. (Tr.
349–352.) These reassignments were based on estimates, and
there were instances in which it took carriers longer than esti-
mated to complete their assigned portions.
Allegations Wells Required to Work Beyond Her Restrictions
and Requests for Grievance
Almost immediately, Wells had issues delivering her allotted
portion within four hours. When it appeared that Wells would
not complete her allotted portion in time, she would call or text
Boblitt. According to Wells, Boblitt would either tell her to
complete her deliveries or to bring the portion she could not
deliver back to the facility. Wells believed that whenever her
timesheets reflect that she worked beyond 12 p.m., Boblitt had
instructed her either at the start of the day or during her shift to
work beyond her restrictions, because, according to Wells, she
was only permitted to work 4 hours a day.6 (Tr. 194–195; 204–
206.)
Union Steward Mark Whitcomb’s work station was about
four feet from Wells’ work station. The two spoke regularly
and he was one of the carriers who volunteered to work over-
time to help perform a portion of Wells’ route. Wells testified
that beginning on around March 2 through May 27 she regular-
ly informed Whitcomb that she was being forced to work be-
yond her restrictions and asked him to file a grievance.7 Ac-

6 Wells’ timesheets from mid-March through late May are in the
record. (GC Exh. 3.) Wells clocked in by 8 a.m. Following the morn-
ing meeting, she cased her route. Wells confirmed there were times
when she sat to case her mail. (Tr. 255–256.) Wells typically complet-
ed casing and clocked over to begin performing her route between 8:45
a.m. and 9:45 a.m. She testified it took 10–15 minutes to drive to her
route location, and the same amount of time to drive back to the facili-
ty. She typically returned to the facility between 11:45 a.m. and 12:45
p.m., and she clocked out for the day within 15 minutes after returning.
In total, Wells usually worked between 4 and 5 hours a day, and she
typically spent 4 hours or less out on the street performing her route.
(GC Exh. 3.) There is a dispute as to whether Wells’ restrictions lim-
ited her to working a total of 4 hours a day or limited her to stand-
ing/walking for a total of 4 hours a day. As discussed below, this dis-
pute is immaterial to whether the Union’s alleged failure to file and
process grievances breached its duty of fair representation.
7 The only agents of the Union alleged in the complaint are Mark
Whitcomb and David Blackburn. However, Wells contacted several
other (current and former) Union and NALC representatives between
March and May. Wells called and texted Linda Dunn. Dunn worked
with Wells at the Brentwood facility, where Dunn had been a union
steward. Dunn suggested that Wells contact her supervisor while out
on her route to state that she would not be able to complete her route
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
cording to Wells, Whitcomb would tell her he was talking with
Manager Carl, and they had discussed possibly having Wells
transfer to another facility or into another craft that involved
less standing or walking. Wells informed Whitcomb that she
still wanted him to file grievance about being required to work
beyond her restrictions. According to Wells, Whitcomb told
her, on multiple occasions, that he would file a grievance.
Whitcomb denies Wells told him management was requiring
her to work beyond her restrictions, and denies she asked him
to file a grievance. Whitcomb was a newer steward, and he had
filed about four grievances. He testified that if an employee
wants to meet with a steward to discuss filing a grievance, the
employee must submit a written request so the steward can
claim and be paid for union time under the contract. Whitcomb
testified that during this period of time he never received any
request from Wells to meet to discuss filing a grievance or any
request from her to file a grievance. (Tr. 379–380.) Addition-
ally, Whitcomb testified that under the contractual grievance
procedure, the first step (Informal Step A) is for the employee
to speak directly with a supervisor and attempt to resolve the
issue, which does not require a steward’s involvement.
The Wells’ Removal from Reduced Workload/Schedule
Wells continued to have issues performing her reduced
workload/schedule, and she states there were times when she
called or texted Boblitt about what she should do, and Boblitt
told her continue or complete her route.8 Wells testified that on

within her restrictions and ask the supervisor what he/she wanted her to
do—work beyond her restrictions or return to the facility with the mail.
If the supervisor told Wells to complete her route in violation of her
restrictions, Wells should inform her steward and ask him to file a
grievance. Wells never asked Dunn to file a grievance on her behalf.
Wells later informed Dunn that she had asked Whitcomb to file a griev-
ance, and he had not done so. Dunn later had a conversation with
Whitcomb at the union hall, and she asked him about Wells. According
to Dunn, Whitcomb told Dunn that he was going to talk to Manager
James Carl about the matter. (Tr. 61–62.) Also, Dunn gave Wells the
telephone number of Denise Preston, a Union steward at the Beaumont
facility, and told her to call Preston because Preston would get on
Whitcomb to file a grievance. Wells later spoke with Preston in late
May. There is no contention Wells asked Preston to file a grievance on
her behalf. From March through late May, Wells also spoke with
NALC representatives David Mudd, Chris Jackson, and David Likart
about working beyond her restrictions. Wells did not contact Union
President Becraft regarding these concerns until June (discussed be-
low), even though he previously had assisted Wells when she had is-
sues in 2016.
8 On May 18, Boblitt sent Wells a letter informing her that it was
her obligation to provide current medical documentation no less than
every 30 days, or as otherwise instructed by her front-line manager.
Boblitt requested Wells provide acceptable, updated medical documen-
tation regarding her medical condition no later than the close of busi-
ness on Monday, May 29. The acceptable medical documentation will,
at a minimum, consist of the following elements: diagnosis of your
condition; prognosis of your condition; any current medical restrictions
you have, and anticipated date of maximum medical improvement. (R.
Exh. 5.) Although the letter set May 29 as the deadline, Wells testified
she had a conversation with Manager Carl, and he informed her that she
could provide the documentation after that date. Carl does not recall
this conversation, but he admits he likely would have made such a
statement. Wells provided medical documentation on around June 27.
March 15 she had a telephone conversation with Union Vice
President David Blackburn in which she informed him that she
was being required to work beyond her restrictions, and that she
had asked Whitcomb to file a grievance on her behalf, but he
had not done so. According to Wells, Blackburn stated that he
would contact Whitcomb about the matter. Blackburn
acknowledged he had a telephone conversation with Wells, but
he does not recall what was discussed.
Wells testified she had another telephone conversation with
Blackburn on May 18. Wells told Blackburn that this has been
going on way too long, that she needed a grievance filed on her
behalf. Wells asked Blackburn if he would get with Whitcomb
or if he could file a grievance on her behalf. Wells initially
testified that Blackburn stated he would file a grievance. (Tr.
210–211.) But, on cross-examination, Wells testified Black-
burn said he was going to get with Whitcomb. (Tr. 285–286.)
Blackburn testified he spoke with Wells on May 18, but he
does not recall what was discussed, and he does not recall her
asking the Union to file a grievance.
Blackburn testified that on around May 26 he had a conver-
sation with Manager Carl. (Tr. 394–395.) Blackburn asked
Carl if the USPS was requiring Wells to work beyond her re-
strictions, and Carl said they were not. Blackburn said they
could not work Wells beyond her restrictions.9 Blackburn does
not recall having any further conversations with Wells that day,
and does not recall Wells asking him to file a grievance about
working past her restrictions.
On May 27, Wells testified that prior to the start of her shift
she had a telephone conversation with Blackburn. According
to Wells, she informed Blackburn that she had been forced to
work past her restrictions the day before, and that she had been
asking for almost 3 months for a grievance to be filed on her
behalf. According to Wells, she then asked Blackburn if he
could file that grievance, and he said that he would.
That day, Wells was once again unable to complete her route
within 4 hours. She spoke with Supervisor Mike Genncio to
report this. She later texted Genncio to ask him what she
should do. He texted her back that she should continue her
route. She texted back to confirm that he wanted her to work
beyond her restrictions, and he responded that he would call her
back. Genncio initially called and told Wells to continue work-
ing, but then he told her that Manager Carl said for her to bring
back the mail. Wells returned to the facility, and Genncio told
her, "Jim told me to have you unload your vehicle, give me
your keys, and that right now, you're not on the schedule until
further notice." Wells then spoke with Blackburn, and Black-
burn reported that Carl was stating that she did not have the
necessary paperwork to work a reduced workload/schedule.10

9 The transcript incorrectly omits “not” from line 23 of p. 395, and
that omission is hereby corrected.
10 Manager Carl testified that the USPS attempted to accommodate
Wells’ restrictions, but, as time went on, she was being assigned “less
and less work, but it was taking [her] more and more time [to get it
done].” (Tr. 320.) By May 27, it became clear that the USPS “was
accommodating a situation that [it] was not required to accommodate,
that was not going to work out for Ms. Wells or the Postal Service, was
not going to meet any mandate in the national or local agreement, was
going to be very expensive to the Postal Service [because of paying
POSTAL WORKERS (CENTRAL KY BRANCH 361) 5
Blackburn testified that on May 27th, Wells sent him a text
message stating she was just leaving the facility, and that she
had asked Whitcomb to call, and she was not sure if he had.
Blackburn responded to Wells that if she believed she was be-
ing asked to work beyond her restrictions, she should ask man-
agement if they are directing her to break her restrictions. Later
that day, Wells called and informed Blackburn she had been
escorted out of the building. (Tr. 419–420.) According to
Wells, she asked Blackburn to file a grievance over her remov-
al, and he said he would. Blackburn does not recall Wells ask-
ing him to file a grievance.
Later, Wells spoke with Whitcomb about what happened.
Wells testified she told Whitcomb that she had been asking him
for months to file a grievance because she sort of knew that this
was going to happen, and he told her that he was going to file a
grievance, but he never did. According to Wells, Whitcomb
again said he would file a grievance. She asked him when he
was going to do it, because it had not been done. Whitcomb
denies that Wells asked him to file a grievance. Whitcomb
recalls having a conversation with Wells on around May 27 in
which Wells reported to him she was having issues with man-
agement, and she was being asked to work beyond her re-
strictions. Whitcomb testified he told Wells that she needed to
contact her supervisor and ask if they wanted her to work be-
yond her restrictions. She later reported to him that she had
done that, and that Mike Genncio told her to bring the mail
back to the facility. (Tr. 382–383.)
There is no dispute the Union did not file a grievance over
the USPS allegedly requiring Wells to work beyond her re-
strictions, or over the USPS’s decision to remove Wells from
her reduced workload/schedule on May 27.
Union Files and Processes Grievances Over USPS’s Denying
Wells Light Duty
In late May, Wells spoke with Union Vice President Black-
burn, and he informed her that under the collective-bargaining
agreement, she needed to submit a request for light duty in
order to work a reduced workload/schedule.11 On around June

overtime to reassign her work], and could possibly result in another or a
compounded injury to Ms. Wells.” (Tr. 322–323.) As a result, Carl
spoke to the Union about Wells, and he made the decision to remove
her from her reduced workload/schedule.
11 There are three duty statuses: regular duty, light duty, and limited
duty. Limited duty is primarily governed by statute and is only availa-
ble to employees who are temporarily or permanently incapable of
performing their normal duties as a result of compensable (work-
related) injury or illness. Light duty is governed by Article 13 of the
National Agreement, and, pursuant to Article 30 of the National
Agreement, Art. 17 of the local Memorandum of Understanding. Light
duty is available to employees who are temporarily or permanently
incapable of performing their normal duties as a result of a (non-work
related) injury or illness. Under Art. 13 of the National Agreement, an
employee seeking temporary reassignment to light duty work must
submit a request in writing; the request must be supported by a medical
statement from a licensed physician or licensed chiropractor; the em-
ployee bears any cost connected with the statement required; the em-
ployee must agree to submit to a further examination by a physician
designated by the installation had, if requested; the USPS will be re-
sponsible for any costs when it requests a second medical examination;
1, Wells submitted a written request for light duty. (R. Exh. 9.)
On June 9, Wells exchanged text messages with Union Presi-
dent Kenneth Becraft. Wells asked Becraft whether there was
any news about her returning to her reduced schedule. (R. Exh.
4, pg 30.) Becraft responded that Blackburn should have dis-
cussed with her light duty. Wells replied that he had spoken to
her about light duty, but she was not clear if they were calling
her restrictions light duty. Becraft responded that light duty
(which she had just applied for) meant she could not perform
all the required activities of her normal day; and limited duty is
the same only it is with an approved workers’ compensation
case, which Wells did not have. (R. Exh. 4, pg. 30.) He went
on to state:
What you were working for the last 3 months was neither
light duty or limited duty[.] The post office was letting you
work to your restrictions while waiting clearer instructions
and a decision on your OWCP claim. In reality they should
have never let you work then without giving you a light duty
offer. I assume that’s what you will get in your letter from the
Postmaster. It’s my understanding that you were violating the
4 hour restrictions you had either by direction of the post of-
fice or of your own accord. When I found out about that I in-
structed [Blackburn] to ensure your restrictions were not be-
ing violated. Which puts us where we are today.
(R. Exh. 4, pg. 30–31.)
Wells expressed confusion, stating “I thought my 4 hours
(sic.) restrictions was I can do my [route] but only within the
confines of my restrictions, and the other 4 hours would come
from light duty. Making an 8 hour day. So are you saying a
light duty offer could be 8 hours a day for regular employ-
ees[?]” Becraft replied that a light duty offer is “an offer that
does not violate your restrictions.” Wells responded, “Ok that’s
so clear now!” (R. Exh. 4, pg. 31.)
Wells later provided the USPS with forms Dr. Lawrence
completed regarding her left ankle, stating that she was limited
to no more than 2 hours of standing and 2 hours of walking,
with a period of rest in between, per day. (R. Exh. 7.) On June
13, the USPS denied Wells’ request for light duty based upon
her limitations. (R. Exh. 10.) Following this denial, the Union,
through Union Steward Mark Whitcomb, filed a Formal Step A

and the employee may specifically seek light duty or may seek “other
assignment” within his/her medical limitations. Under Art. 17 of local
Memorandum of Understanding, light duty assignments shall be con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis and all requests for light duty shall be
submitted in writing to the Postmaster (or designee) accompanied by
acceptable medical documentation. Management shall make every
reasonable effort to accommodate light duty requests based on produc-
tive work available within the employee's work restrictions. Light duty
assignments shall consist of up to 8 hours of work and may be assigned
within the Installation, within normal work hours. Under Art. 13 of the
National Agreement, an employee can apply for permanent light duty
assignment as a result of an injury or illness, but only after 5 years of
service.
Limited duty is available to employees who have successfully sub-
mitted a claim to the Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Com-
pensation and found to have a compensable work-related injury or
illness. Wells unsuccessfully filed an OWCP claim following her
March 2016 injury to her left ankle. In around February 2017, she filed
another OWCP claim, and that claim is pending.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
grievance. (R. Exh. 11.) Carl spoke with Whitcomb regarding
the grievance, and the grievance was eventually settled. The
parties agreed that all requests for light duty will continue to be
considered on a case-by-case basis based on the availability of
productive work within the requesting employee's work re-
strictions, but, in Wells’ case, there was no productive work
available within her stated restrictions. Thereafter, Wells made
a second request for light duty and included additional docu-
mentation from her doctor. On August 7, the Postmaster for
Lexington, Kentucky denied Wells’ second request for light
duty, stating that the USPS was unable to identify any light
duty assignments within her restrictions, and based on the med-
ical documentation she provided it appeared that her condition
was permanent. (R. Exh. 12.) The Union did not file a griev-
ance over this denial, because Wells was ineligible under the
contract for permanent reassignment because she did not have
the required five years of service. (Tr. 496–497.)
CREDIBILITY
There are discrepancies in testimony that require credibility
resolution. In assessing the witnesses’ credibility, I have relied
primarily on demeanor. I also have considered: the context of
the witness' testimony; the quality of the witness’ recollection;
testimonial consistency; the presence or absence of corrobora-
tion; the weight of the respective evidence; established or ad-
mitted facts; inherent probabilities, and reasonable inferences
that may be drawn from the record as a whole. See Double D
Construction Group, 339 NLRB 303, 305 (2003); Daikichi
Sushi, 335 NLRB 622, 623 (2001) (citing Shen Automotive
Dealership Group, 321 NLRB 586, 589 (1996)), enfd. sub
nom., 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Credibility findings
need not be all-or-nothing propositions. Indeed, nothing is more
common in judicial decisions than to believe some, but not all,
of a witness’ testimony. Daikichi Sushi, supra at 622; Jerry
Ryce Builders, 352 NLRB 1262, 1262 fn. 2 (2008), citing
NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179 F.2d 749, 754 (2nd Cir.
1950), revd. on other grounds 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
The key discrepancies in testimony are: whether Wells sepa-
rately informed Whitcomb and Blackburn between March 2
and May 27 that she was being worked beyond her restrictions
and asked them to file a grievance on her behalf; whether Wells
asked Whitcomb and Blackburn to file a grievance over her
May 27 removal; and whether Whitcomb and/or Blackburn
agreed to file grievances over these matters.
Generally speaking, I found the testimony of Wells, Whit-
comb, and Blackburn to be partially credible. I find Wells had
a tendency to conflate her opinions and interpretations with
facts, which cause me doubt the veracity of some of her testi-
mony. One example concerns her statements about her re-
strictions. Her February 27 medical restrictions clearly state
she was limited to “4 hours of standing and walking per shift.”
But Wells testified her restrictions were supposed to have been
2 hours of standing and 2 hours of walking, and she communi-
cated those supposed restrictions as her actual restrictions when
she spoke separately with Boblitt and Whitcomb on March 1,
and later to Blackburn on May 18. Another example concerns
her statements about being required to work beyond her re-
strictions. Wells testified that when it took her longer than four
hours to perform her reduced route, and her phone records do
not reflect that she called or texted Boblitt about what she
should do, it was because in the morning she had been told to
deliver her route, which Wells interpreted as instructing her to
work beyond her restrictions. (Tr. 193–195.)
On the other hand, I find that Whitcomb was apprehensive,
evasive, and less than fully forthright in his responses, particu-
larly regarding his conversations with Wells in which she re-
ported her concerns and asked for his assistance with the mat-
ters at issue. Blackburn had limited or incomplete recollection,
and he often responded to questions, particularly regarding his
communications with Wells, by claiming he could not recall,
while simultaneously recalling conversations and events in-
volving others at or around the same time. With these assess-
ments in mind, I make the following credibility determinations
on the discrepancies stated above.
I credit Wells told Whitcomb she believed she was being re-
quired to work beyond her medical restrictions and asked him
for assistance, and eventually asked him to file a grievance.
Wells’ phone records reflect she contacted several (current or
former) Union and NALC representatives to ask for their guid-
ance or assistance on what she should do. Wells was told by at
least one former union steward (Linda Dunn) to confront her
supervisor about her concerns, and that if the supervisor in-
structed her to work beyond her restrictions then she needed to
contact her steward to file a grievance. Whitcomb and Wells
spoke to one another on a daily basis. I credit that, at some
point, Wells told Whitcomb about what she believed was oc-
curring and asked for his assistance, including asking him to
file a grievance over the matter. That being said, I do not credit
that Whitcomb agreed to file a grievance on her behalf. Whit-
comb was not an experienced steward. He had filed four griev-
ances in his tenure, and it was his understanding, correctly or
incorrectly, that an employee needed to submit a formal request
for him to be approved for steward time in order for him to be
able to meet and discuss filing a grievance. I credit that when
Wells approached Whitcomb about what was happening, Whit-
comb told her (and later Dunn) that he would talk with Manag-
er Carl about the possibility of Wells transferring to another
facility or another craft that involved less standing or walking.
But I do not credit Wells that he also agreed to file a grievance.
Similarly, I credit that Wells spoke with Blackburn about
these matters and asked for his assistance. As stated, Wells
made several calls to Union and NALC representatives seeking
assistance, and I find it is more probable than not that she even-
tually would raise her issues with the Union vice president,
particularly since he had helped her a year before with her EEO
issue. However, I do not credit that Blackburn agreed to file a
grievance on Wells’ behalf over this matter. Wells’ situation
was unique: she had not been approved for light duty or limited
duty, but the USPS was allowing her to work a reduced work-
load/schedule. Blackburn would have required more infor-
mation about her restrictions and her status, as well as dis-
cussed the matter with management before agreeing to file a
grievance. Blackburn later did communicate with Carl as to
whether the USPS was requiring Wells to work beyond her
restrictions, and Carl denied that it was. In light of these facts,
I find Blackburn did not agree to file a grievance.
POSTAL WORKERS (CENTRAL KY BRANCH 361) 7
Finally, for these same reasons, I credit that Wells separately
spoke to Blackburn and Whitcomb about her May 27 removal,
but I do not credit her that either committed to filing a griev-
ance over her removal, particularly when it became clear that
Wells had not been approved for light duty and had no contrac-
tual right to work a reduced workload/schedule. When the
Union learned that she been working this modified schedule
without being approved for light or limited duty, Blackburn and
Becraft separately informed her that she needed to apply and
get approved for light duty in order to work a reduced work-
load/schedule under the collective-bargaining agreement.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The General Counsel alleges the Union violated Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act: (1) from March 2 through May 27 when
it failed to file a grievance over the USPS requiring Wells to
work beyond her medical restrictions; and (2) on about May 27
when it failed to file a grievance over the USPS’s decision to
remove Wells from her reduced workload/schedule. The Gen-
eral Counsel further alleges the Union acted perfunctory by this
conduct. A union owes a duty of fair representation to all of
the employees it represents. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967). The union breaches its duty when its action or inaction
is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Id. at 190-191,
207 (1967). In Airline Pilots Assn. v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 66,
78 (1991), the Supreme Court held that actions are “arbitrary
only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of
the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a
‘wide range of reasonableness’ as to be irrational[,]” and “any
subsequent examination of a union's performance, therefore,
must be highly deferential . . .” Thus, a union has a broad
range of discretion in carrying out its representational duties,
including grievance handling, and an individual does not have
an absolute right to have a grievance filed or have it processed
through arbitration. Vaca, supra at 191. In addition, the Board
has established that something more than mere negligence, poor
judgment, or ineptitude in grievance handling is needed to es-
tablish a breach of the duty of fair representation. Service Em-
ployees Intl. Union, Local 579 (Beverly Manor Convalescent
Center), 229 NLRB 692, (1977); Truck Drivers, Oil Drivers
and Filling Station and Platform Workers, Local No. 705 (As-
sociated Transport, Inc.), 209 NLRB 292, 304 (1974). See also
Local Union No. 195, Plumbers (Stone & Webster), 240 NLRB
504, 508 (1979); General Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Union, Local No. 692 (Great Western Unifreight System), 209
NLRB 446, 448 (1974). Similarly, a union does not violate the
duty of fair representation where it refuses to file or process a
grievance pursuant to a reasonable interpretation of the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement and/or a good-faith evaluation as to
the merits of the employee’s complaint. Teamsters Local 814
(Beth Israel Medical), 281 NLRB 1130, 1146–1147 (1986).
The duty, however, is breached when a union arbitrarily ignores
a meritorious grievance or processes it a perfunctory fashion.
See Local 579 SEIU (Beverly Manor Center), 229 NLRB 692,
695 (1977); and Local 76B Furniture Workers (Office Furni-
ture Service), 290 NLRB 51, 63 (1988).
I conclude the Union did not act in an arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or bad faith manner, or that it acted perfunctorily, when it
did not file and process grievances over the USPS allegedly
requiring Wells to work beyond her temporary medical re-
strictions and/or over the USPS removing Wells from her re-
duced workload/schedule.12 Even if the Union had agreed to
file grievances over these matters, I find there is no persuasive
evidence in this record that those grievances would have been
successful. It is immaterial whether the USPS was requiring
Wells to work beyond her verbally-agreed upon temporary
medical restrictions, because under the contract, there are three
types of work status: regular duty, light duty, and limited duty.
Wells was not working regular duty, and she had not been ap-
proved by the Department of Labor’s Office of Workers Com-
pensation for limited duty. And while Wells orally communi-
cated with the USPS about her restrictions, and the USPS at-
tempted to accommodate her, Wells had not applied for, or
been approved to work, light duty in accordance with the Na-
tional Agreement and/or the local Memorandum of Understand-
ing. As a result, the USPS was not contractually obligated to
allow Wells to work her reduced workload/schedule. Union
President Becraft informed Wells of all of this in his June 9 text
message. He told her that: what she had been working for the
last three months was neither light duty nor limited duty; the
USPS was letting her work within her restrictions while waiting
clearer instructions and a decision on her workers’ compensa-
tion claim; and that, under the contract, the USPS should never
have let her work without giving her a light duty offer.
The General Counsel asserts in its post-hearing brief that the
Union breached its duty of fair representation because it did not
advance any compelling reason for its failure to file a grievance
on Wells' behalf after repeatedly leading her to believe that it
would do so. I reject this assertion. A union's duty to fairly
represent includes the duty to neither willfully misinform em-
ployees about their grievance nor to willfully keep them unin-
formed about their grievance. See American Postal Workers
Union, 328 NLRB 281 (1999); Local 417 UAW (Falcon Indus-
tries), 245 NLRB 527, 534 (1980); and Groves-Granite, 229
NLRB 56, 63 (1977). There is no allegation in the complaint, or
evidence in the record, that the Union willfully misinformed
Wells, or kept her uninformed, about any grievance. And, as
stated, I do not credit that Whitcomb or Blackburn ever com-
mitted to filing a grievance on Wells’ behalf over the USPS
allegedly working her beyond her restrictions or over her re-
moval from her reduced workload/schedule. Additionally,
Wells testified that she knew as of May 27 that, despite her
requests, the Union had not filed a grievance for her on these
matters. And, even if Whitcomb or Blackburn had committed
to filing grievances, Union President Becraft explained to Wells
in his June 9 text why, absent being approved for light or lim-
ited duty, she was not contractually entitled to work a reduced
workload/schedule, and the USPS should not have allowed her
to do so. Wells then responded that Becraft’s explanation clari-
fied matters for her.
Moreover, following her removal, the Union advised Wells

12 I find that Union Steward Mark Whitcomb was, at most, inept in
his communications with Wells on these matters, likely due to his lack
of experience and knowledge. However, as stated above, negligence or
ineptitude is insufficient to breach the duty of fair representation.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
to apply for light duty and provided her with information on
how to do so. Later, after Wells applied for and was denied
light duty, the Union filed and processed a grievance on her
behalf. The Union eventually resolved the grievance because,
under Wells’ new restrictions (2 hours of standing, 2 hours of
walking, with a break in between) there was no productive
temporary work available for her, and she was not yet contrac-
tually eligible for permanent reassignment based on her years
of service. As such, the Union reasonably concluded that there
was nothing more it could do for Wells under the National
Agreement or the local Memorandum of Understanding.
In light of the foregoing, I find the Union did not act in an
arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith manner towards Wells as
alleged. For the reasons stated, the Union did not arbitrarily
ignore a meritorious grievance or act in a perfunctory manner.
The Union’s (in)action was based on a reasonable interpretation
of the relevant agreements and a good-faith evaluation as to the
merits of Wells’ complaints. I, therefore, conclude that the
General Counsel has failed to establish that the Union breached
its duty of fair representation as alleged in the complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Central KY Branch 361, National Associa-
tion of Letter Carriers, AFL–CIO (NALC), is a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Respondent is subject to the National Labor Relations
Board's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1209 of the Postal Re-
organization Act.
3. Respondent did not violate the National Labor Relations
Act in any manner alleged in the complaint.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended:13
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed.
Dated, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2018.

13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”