Center State Beef & Veal Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 18, 1999

330 N.L.R.B. 41 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

CENTER STATE BEEF & VEAL CO. 41
Center State Beef and Veal Co., Inc. and Teamsters
Local 317, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. Cases 3–CA–21521,
3–CA–21582, 3–CA–21636, and 3–CA–21702
November 18, 1999
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS HURTGEN
AND BRAME
On March 31, 1999, the National Labor Relations
Board issued a Decision and Order in this proceeding,
which granted the General Counsel’s Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment in part, and denied the motion in part.1
Specifically, based on the withdrawal of the Respon-
dent’s answer to the consolidated complaint, and in the
absence of good cause being shown for the Respondent’s
failure to file a timely answer to the amended consoli-
dated complaint and the second amended consolidated
complaint (complaint), the Board granted the General
Counsel’s Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as the
complaint alleged that the Respondent had violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, including by discharging
or permanently laying off four employees because of
their union and other protected concerted activities.
The Board, however, denied the General Counsel’s
Motion for Summary Judgment insofar as it alleged that
a bargaining order was warranted under NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co.,2 and that the Respondent therefore violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to recognize
and bargain with the Union over the effects on employ-
ees of its decision to close its facility in Cortland, New
York. In denying the General Counsel’s request for a
bargaining order, the Board concluded that the complaint
did not allege sufficient facts to enable the Board to
evaluate the pervasiveness of the 8(a)(1) and (3) viola-
tions, and therefore the possibility of erasing their effects
by the use of traditional remedies. Accordingly, the
Board remanded the case for a hearing before an admin-
istrative law judge on the issue of whether a bargaining
order is an appropriate remedy under the circumstances
of this case. The Board, however, stated that a hearing
was not required:

[i]f, in the event of an amendment to the complaint, the
Respondent fails to answer thereby admitting evidence
that would permit the Board to resolve the bargaining
order issue. In such circumstances, the General Coun-
sel may renew the Motion for Summary Judgment with
respect to the 8(a)(5) allegations and remedies.

Subsequently, on April 28, 1999, the General Counsel
issued an amendment to second amended consolidated
complaint and compliance specification and notice of
hearing. The amendment to second amended consoli-
dated complaint sets forth additional factual allegations
specifically relating to the bargaining order sought by the
General Counsel. The compliance specification sets
forth amounts owed to the four discriminatees pursuant
to the Board’s March 31, 1999 Decision and Order. Al-
though properly served a copy of the amendment to sec-
ond amended consolidated complaint and compliance
specification, the Respondent failed to file an answer.

1 327 NLRB 1246.
2 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
Thereafter, on June 23, 1999, the General Counsel
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with the Board.
On June 25, 1999, the Board issued an order transferring
the proceeding to the Board and a Notice to Show Cause
why the motion should not be granted. The Respondent
filed no response. The allegations in the motion are
therefore undisputed.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment
I. AMENDMENT TO SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED
COMPLAINT
Sections 102.20 and 102.21 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations provide that the allegations in the complaint
shall be deemed admitted if an answer is not filed within
14 days from service of the complaint, unless good cause
is shown. In addition, the amendment to second amended
consolidated complaint (amendment to complaint) af-
firmatively notes that unless an answer is filed within 14
days of service, all the allegations in the amendment to
complaint will be considered admitted. Further, the un-
disputed allegations in the Motion for Summary Judg-
ment disclose that the Region, by certified letters3 dated
May 21, 1999, notified the Respondent that unless an-
swers to the amendment to second amended consolidated
complaint and to the compliance specification were re-
ceived by June 1, 1999, a Motion for Summary Judgment
would be filed. These letters were returned to the Re-
gional Office with the designation “moved, left no ad-
dress.”4
The General Counsel’s June 23, 1999 motion renews
her prior motion’s request for findings of 8(a)(5) viola-
tions and a Gissel bargaining order based on the Respon-
dent’s failure to answer the allegations set forth in the
April 28, 1999 amendment to complaint. For the reasons
set forth below, we conclude that, in view of the amend-
ment to second amended consolidated complaint, there
are no material facts bearing on the appropriateness of a
3 The letters were sent to the Respondent’s addresses in Cortland,
Utica, and Frankfort, New York.
4 We find service sufficient in these circumstances. It is well estab-
lished that the failure to provide for receiving appropriate service can-
not serve to defeat the purposes of the Act. See Summit Mechanical
Contractors, 316 NLRB 699 fn. 2 (1995); National Automatic Sprin-
klers, 307 NLRB 481 fn. 1 (1992); and Michigan Expediting Service,
282 NLRB 210 fn. 6 (1986).
330 NLRB No. 14
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 42
bargaining order that are absent from the complaint.
Accordingly, we find that the General Counsel has dem-
onstrated that a bargaining order is necessary to remedy
the Respondent’s unlawful conduct.
In our previous decision, we found that the Respondent
had committed numerous 8(a)(1) violations, which we
again will list in this decision because they are germane
to determining whether a bargaining order is warranted.
Further, as mentioned above, we found that the Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by discharging or
permanently laying off four employees because they en-
gaged in union or other concerted activities.
Although we found in our earlier decision that these
8(a)(1) and (3) violations are serious in nature, we de-
clined to give a bargaining order because we found that
the complaint allegations at that time were inadequate to
support such an order. For example, we noted that the
complaint did not allege the size of the unit or the extent
of dissemination, if any, of the violations among the em-
ployees not directly affected by them. Accordingly, we
concluded that a remand for a hearing on the 8(a)(5) al-
legations was necessary.
The subsequent April 1999 amendment to complaint,
however, does set forth sufficient facts that enable us to
assess the propriety of a Gissel bargaining order without
the need for a hearing. Thus, the amendment to com-
plaint alleges, and we find to be admitted as true in the
absence of an answer by the Respondent, the facts set
forth below.5
The following employees of the Respondent constitute
a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act:

All full-time and regular part-time butchers, laborers,
loaders, plant clericals and working foremen employed
by the Respondent at its East River Crossings Road,
Cortland, New York facility, excluding all office cleri-
cal employees, professional employees, sales employ-
ees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

The unit was comprised of 22 employees. The Un-
ion’s first organizational meeting with unit employees
occurred on September 10, 1998,6 and the Respondent
learned about the Union’s meeting on that same day. On
about September 14, the Union filed a representation
petition regarding the unit, and on that same date, the
Union, by letter, requested that the Respondent recognize
it as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the unit. By about September 17, a majority of the unit
employees had signed authorization cards that designated
and selected the Union as their representative for the
purposes of collective bargaining with the Respondent.

5 In our prior decision, we found that the Respondent is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Sec. 2(5) of the Act.
6 All subsequent dates are in 1998, unless stated otherwise.
At all times since September 17, based on Section 9(a)
of the Act, the Union has been the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the unit. Since on about
September 17, the Respondent has failed and refused to
recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the unit. As a
result of the Respondent’s pervasive and severe unfair
labor practices, which were widely disseminated among
the unit employees, the Union’s support was seriously
eroded, and it lost the representation election held on
October 9, by a margin of 16 votes against the Union and
1 vote for.
In our prior decision, we found that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) when its vice president and
agent, Victor Broccoli, at the Respondent’s facility be-
tween September 14 and October 5: (1) informed em-
ployees that if they selected the Union as their collective-
bargaining representative, all employees would be paid
the same; (2) told employees that if they selected the
Union as their collective-bargaining representative, cur-
rent employees would make the same wages as new em-
ployees, and urged employees to vote against the Union
to prevent that occurrence; (3) threatened employees that
the Respondent’s facility would close if employees se-
lected the Union as their collective-bargaining represen-
tative; and (4) promised employees a job and a raise at a
different facility if they voted against the Union.
We now find, based on the allegations in the April
1999 amendment to complaint, which the Respondent
has admitted, that these unlawful statements were made
by Broccoli during meetings with employees at which all
22 unit employees were present and, thus, these coercive
statements affected every unit employee.
We also previously found that the Respondent, through
Broccoli, additionally violated Section 8(a)(1) between
September 14 and October 5, by offering an employee a
wage raise if the employee voted against the Union and
by threatening to have an employee arrested if he came
on the Respondent’s premises to vote in the representa-
tion election. The amendment to complaint alleges, and
we find, that information about these two statements was
disseminated to a majority of the unit employees.
Further, in our earlier decision we found that on about
September 11, the Respondent unlawfully discharged
employees Gerald Cobb Jr. and Rodney Clark, and per-
manently laid off employee Jon Horner, and that on
about October 5, the Respondent unlawfully discharged
employee Kenny Grewe. We now find that these termi-
nations were carried out by Broccoli or Plant Foreman
Frank Lussier, and that these four discriminatees were
leading organizers for the Union and/or employees who
openly supported the Union. The discharges of Cobb Jr.,
and Clark, and the permanent layoff of Horner occurred
on the day after the Union’s first organizational meeting
held on September 10, about which the Respondent had
acquired knowledge on that same day. Information
CENTER STATE BEEF & VEAL CO. 43
about these terminations was widely disseminated to all
unit employees, and was discussed with employees at a
meeting held by Broccoli. Grewe’s discharge—which
was disseminated to other employees in the unit—
directly followed his open assertion to Broccoli, both
individually and at an employee meeting, that he in-
tended to vote for the Union in the election.
In addition, on about December 18, the Respondent
closed its Cortland facility and terminated the employ-
ment of all unit employees. The Respondent closed this
facility without any prior notice to the Union and without
affording the Union an opportunity to bargain with the
Respondent with respect to the effects of the closing.
The complaint alleges that the Respondent’s violations
of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) are “so serious and substantial
in character that the possibility of erasing the effects of
these unfair labor practices and of conducting a fair rerun
election by the use of traditional remedies is slight, and
the employees’ sentiments regarding representation, hav-
ing been expressed through authorization cards, would,
on balance, be protected better by issuance of a bargain-
ing order than by traditional remedies alone.” In light of
the additional facts pled in the amendment to complaint,
we agree that a bargaining order is warranted in this case
under the principles explicated in Gissel.
Under Gissel, the Board will issue a bargaining order,
absent an election, in two categories of cases. The first
category involves “exceptional cases” marked by unfair
labor practices so “outrageous” and “pervasive” that tra-
ditional remedies cannot erase their coercive effects, thus
rendering a fair election impossible. The second cate-
gory involves “less extraordinary cases marked by less
pervasive practices which nonetheless have a tendency to
undermine majority strength and impede the election
processes.” In this second category of cases, the “possi-
bility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensur-
ing a fair election . . . by the use of traditional remedies,
although present, is slight and . . . employee sentiments
once expressed [by authorization] cards would, on bal-
ance, be better protected by a bargaining order.” Id. at
613–615.
We find that the complaint, as supplemented by the
April 1999 amendment, sets out sufficient grounds for
the issuance of a bargaining order remedy under the sec-
ond category of the Gissel standards, and that those
grounds are uncontested and must be accepted as fact as
a result of the Respondent’s failure to answer the General
Counsel’s allegations.7 The General Counsel has pled
only the Gissel category II standards in his complaint,
and the Respondent has admitted, by not answering the

7 Member Brame joins this reasoning and further notes specifically
that he finds this case of no precedential value, however, given its
posture as a no-answer summary judgment proceeding. Member
Brame simply finds that the sum of the General Counsel’s uncontested
allegations, which must be accepted as fact in the face of a failure to
answer them, warrants the imposition of a bargaining order.
complaint, only the category II justification for a bar-
gaining order.8
In concluding that a bargaining order is necessary to
remedy the Respondent’s unfair labor practices we rely
on the following. First, we have found that the Union
attained majority status in the unit on September 17,
1998, and that it has been the unit employees’ collective-
bargaining representative since that date. We have also
found that on September 11, just 1 day after the Respon-
dent learned of the Union’s September 10 meeting with
employees, the Respondent discharged or permanently
laid off three employees because they were leading or-
ganizers for the Union. And, about 3 weeks later—just 4
days before the election—the Respondent discharged
union supporter Grewe, directly following his informing
Vice President Broccoli that he would vote for the Un-
ion.
Further, on learning of the employees’ organizational
activities, Broccoli embarked on a series of threats and
promises that delivered the unmistakable message to all
unit employees that the plant would close and they would
lose their jobs if they selected the Union, but that they
would reap benefits if they rejected union representation.
The Respondent’s unlawful conduct, carried out pri-
marily by the Respondent’s vice president, either af-
fected or was disseminated to all unit employees. Thus,
contemporaneous with the discharges or permanent lay-
offs of four leading union activists and/or open support-
ers of the Union, the Respondent made it crystal clear to
the remaining employees that their continued employ-
ment depended on their rejection of the Union. The Re-
spondent’s reaction to its employees’ organizational ac-
tivities was swift and severe. The effectiveness of the
Respondent’s unlawful conduct is shown by the dramatic
and rapid loss of employee support for the Union in the 3
weeks between September 17, when a majority of the
unit signed authorization cards for the Union, and Octo-
ber 9, when only one employee voted for the Union in
the representation election. There is a strong likelihood
that the Respondent’s unfair labor practices will have a
pervasive and lasting deleterious effect on the Respon-
dent’s employees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights.
Consequently, we find that the Respondent’s conduct
warrants a bargaining order under category II of the Gis-
sel standards, as the Respondent’s unfair labor practices
certainly qualify as “less pervasive practices which none-
theless still have the tendency to undermine majority
strength and impede the election processes,” Gissel
Packing, supra at 614. The discharge of union adherents
has long been considered by the Board and the courts to
be a “hallmark” violation of the Act because of its lasting
effect on election conditions.
8 In view of the pleadings, we find it unnecessary to pass on whether
a bargaining order is warranted under category I of the Gissel stan-
dards.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 44
In view of our conclusion that the Respondent had a
bargaining obligation since September 17, we find that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by closing its Cortland facility and terminating the
employment of all unit employees on about December 18
without prior notice to the Union, and without giving the
Union an opportunity to bargain concerning the effects of
this closing on unit employees. Accordingly, we shall
order the Respondent, on request, to bargain with the
Union regarding the effects of the decision to close its
Cortland facility. In addition, we shall accompany our
bargaining order with a limited backpay requirement
related to the closing designed both to make whole the
employees for losses they may have suffered as a result
of the failure to bargain about such effects and to recreate
in some practicable manner a situation in which the par-
ties’ bargaining position is not entirely devoid of eco-
nomic consequences for the Respondent. We shall do so
by ordering the Respondent to pay backpay to employees
in a manner similar to that required in Transmarine
Navigation Corp., 170 NLRB 389 (1968).9 Backpay
shall be computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth
Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as prescribed in
New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
II. THE COMPLIANCE SPECIFICATION
As mentioned above, our prior decision found that the
Respondent discharged or permanently laid off employ-
ees Cobb, Clark, Grewe, and Horner in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. We ordered the Respon-
dent to make these discriminatees whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
discrimination against them by paying them backpay
from the time of their discharges and/or layoff until the
date the Cortland facility closed. Pursuant to that back-
pay remedy, the General Counsel issued the instant com-
pliance specification.
Section 102.56(a) of the Board’s Rules and Regula-
tions provides that the Respondent shall file an answer
within 21 days from service of a compliance specifica-
tion. Section 102.56(c) of the Board’s Rules and Regula-
tions states:

If the respondent fails to file any answer to the specifi-
cation within the time prescribed by this section, the
Board may, either with or without taking evidence in
support of the allegations of the specification and with-

9 See also Live Oak Skilled Care & Manor, 300 NLRB 1040 (1990).
In Transmarine, the Board ordered an employer that had unlawfully
refused to bargain over the effects of its plant closure decision to, inter
alia, pay unit employees at their normal rate of pay beginning 5 days
after the Board’s decision until the first of four events: (1) an effects
bargaining agreement was reached; (2) a bona fide bargaining impasse
was reached; (3) the union failed to timely request or commence bar-
gaining; or (4) the union failed to bargain in good faith. Id. The Board
further specified that “in no event shall this sum be less than these
employees would have earned for a 2-week period at the rate of their
normal wages when last in the Respondent’s employ.” Id.
out further notice to the respondent, find the specifica-
tion to be true and enter such order as may be appropri-
ate.

According to the uncontroverted allegations of the Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment, the Respondent, despite
having been advised of the filing requirements, has failed
to file an answer to the compliance specification. In the
absence of good cause for the Respondent’s failure to file
an answer, we deem the allegations in the compliance
specification to be admitted as true, and grant the Gen-
eral Counsel’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to the
specification. Accordingly, we conclude that the net
backpay due the discriminatees is as stated in the com-
pliance specification and we will order payment by the
Respondent of those amounts to the discriminatees, plus
interest accrued on the amounts to the date of payment.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Center State Beef and Veal Co., Inc., Cort-
land, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing and failing to recognize and bargain in
good faith with Teamsters Local 317, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, as the exclusive
collective-bargaining representative of the employees in
the appropriate unit set forth below by refusing to bar-
gain with the Union concerning the effects on the unit
employees of the Respondent’s closing of its facility in
Cortland, New York on December 18, 1998, and the ter-
mination of the unit employees.

All full-time and regular part-time butchers, laborers,
loaders, plant clericals and working foremen employed
by the Respondent at its East River Crossings Road,
Cortland, New York facility, excluding all office cleri-
cal employees, professional employees, sales employ-
ees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.

(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union concerning the
effects on the unit employees of the closing of the Re-
spondent’s facility in Cortland, New York, and the ter-
mination of the unit employees.
(b) Pay the employees in the unit described above their
normal wages when in the Respondent’s employ from 5
days after the date of this decision until the occurrence of
the earliest of the following conditions: (1) the date the
Respondent bargains to agreement with the Union on
those subjects pertaining to the effects of the closing of
its facility in Cortland, New York, and its termination of
CENTER STATE BEEF & VEAL CO. 45
the unit employees; (2) the date a bona fide impasse in
bargaining occurs; (3) the failure of the Union to request
bargaining within 5 business days after receipt of this
decision, or to commence negotiations within 5 business
days after receipt of the Respondent’s notice of its desire
to bargain with the Union;10 or (4) the subsequent failure
of the Union to bargain in good faith; but in no event
shall the sum paid to any of the employees exceed the
amount he or she would have earned as wages from
about December 18, 1998, when the Respondent closed
its Cortland, New York facility, to the time he or she
secured equivalent employment elsewhere, or the date on
which the Respondent shall have offered to bargain in
good faith, whichever occurs sooner; provided, however,
that in no event shall this sum be less than these employ-
ees would have earned for a 2-week period at the rate of
their normal wages when last in the Respondent’s em-
ploy, with interest, as set forth above.
(c) Make whole Gerald Cobb Jr., Rodney Clark,
Kenny Grewe, and Jon Horner by paying them the
amounts following their names below, plus interest ac-
crued to the date of payment, minus tax withholding re-
quired by Federal and state laws. Interest shall be com-
puted in accordance with New Horizons for the Retarded,
283 NLRB 1173 (1987).

Gerald Cobb Jr. $ 5,396
Rodney Clark 5,396
Kenny Grewe 3,080
Jon Horner 4,544
TOTAL: 18,416

(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make
available to the Board or its agents for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records, including an electronic copy of such re-
cords if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze
the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.11

10 Melody Toyota, 325 NLRB 846 (1998).
11 In the complaint, the General Counsel seeks an order requiring the
Respondent to preserve and, on request, provide at the office designated
by the Board or its agents, copies of specified records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of the Board’s
Order, including electronic copies, if such records are stored in elec-
tronic form.
We find that electronic copies of the relevant records, where such al-
ready exist, are encompassed within the Board’s traditional remedial
language. See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 34 (definition of “document”
includes data compilations). See also Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108
F.R.D. 459 (D.Utah 1985) (requesting party need not accept only data
that exists in traditional forms, but may discover the same information
when stored in electronic form in a computer); National Union Electric
Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F.Supp. 1257 (E.D.Pa.
1980) (same). Moreover, the Respondent has not established that it
would be prejudiced in any way by a requirement that it produce elec-
tronic copies of these documents. Accordingly, and to clarify any
ambiguity with respect to this matter, we have provided in the Order for
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, dupli-
cate and mail, at its own expense and after being signed
by the Respondent’s authorized representative, copies of
the attached notice marked “Appendix”12 to all current
employees and former employees employed by the Re-
spondent at any time since September 11, 1998.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 3 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

WE WILL NOT refuse and fail to recognize and bargain
in good faith with Teamsters Local 317, affiliated with
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the employ-
ees in the appropriate unit set forth below by refusing to
bargain with the Union concerning the effects on the unit
employees of our closing of our facility in Cortland, New
York on December 18, 1998, and the termination of the
unit employees.

All full-time and regular part-time butchers, laborers,
loaders, plant clericals and working foremen employed
by us at our East River Crossings Road, Cortland, New
York facility, excluding all office clerical employees,
professional employees, sales employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union concern-
ing the effects on the unit employees of the closing of
our facility in Cortland, New York and the termination of
the unit employees.

the production of electronic copies of the specified backpay records if
they are stored in electronic form.
With respect to the General Counsel’s proposed requirement that the
Respondent submit copies of the necessary backpay records at the
office designated by the Board or its agents, however, we find that this
proceeding does not satisfactorily present the question of whether a
respondent should be ordered to provide copies of its records in this
manner. We accordingly decline to order the Respondent to do so in
connection with this case.
12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 46
WE WILL pay limited backpay to the unit employees in
connection with our failure to bargain with the Union
concerning the effects of the closing of our Cortland,
New York facility.
CENTER STATE BEEF AND VEAL CO., INC.