C.C.E., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 31, 1995

318 N.L.R.B. 977 (N.L.R.B. 1995)

977
318 NLRB No. 82
C.C.E., INC.
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an admin-
istrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon-
derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incor-
rect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188
F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and
find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to provide the
standard notice-posting language.
3 The Respondent asserts that the Union requested unrestricted ac-
cess because the requests were not limited in terms of time or scope.
We disagree.
In October 1993, during a bargaining session, the Union’s inter-
national representative, Bob Brummitt, orally requested access to the
plant to collect information related to collective bargaining; the Re-
spondent refused. By letter dated November 23, 1993, Brummitt
again requested access ‘‘for informational purposes so I can properly
discharge my obligation as bargaining agent.’’ The Respondent de-
nied this request as well.
We find that the Union’s requests, clearly indicating that access
was sought for collective-bargaining purposes, were sufficiently spe-
cific to fall within the limited right of union access recognized in
Holyoke, supra.
C.C.E., Inc. and International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW. Case 8–CA–26025
August 31, 1995
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWNING, COHEN, AND
TRUESDALE
On August 18, 1994, Administrative Law Judge
Richard H. Beddow Jr. issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions as explained below and to adopt the rec-
ommended Order as modified.2
In agreeing with the judge that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we rely on the
Board’s decision in Holyoke Water Power Co., 273
NLRB 1369 (1985), enfd. 778 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1985),
which established a balancing test for determining
whether an employer’s denial of access to its facility
for the union representing its employees violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) and (1). In Holyoke, supra at 1370, the
Board said,
[E]ach of two conflicting rights must be accom-
modated. Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d
716 (2d Cir. 1966). First there is the right of em-
ployees to be responsibly represented by the labor
organization of their choice and, second, there is
the right of the employer to control its property
and ensure that its operations are not interfered
with. As noted by the Supreme Court in Babcock
& Wilcox, supra, 351 U.S. at 112, the Govern-
ment protects employee rights as well as property
rights, and ‘‘[a]ccommodation between the two
must be obtained with as little destruction of one
as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other.’’
Thus, we are constrained to balance the em-
ployer’s property rights against the employees’
right to proper representation. Where it is found
that responsible representation of employees can
be achieved only by the union’s having access to
the employer’s premises, the employer’s property
rights must yield to the extent necessary to
achieve this end. However, the access ordered
must be limited to reasonable periods so that the
union can fulfill its representation duties without
unwarranted interruption of the employer’s oper-
ations. On the other hand, where it is found that
a union can effectively represent employees
through some alternative means other than by en-
tering on the employer’s premises, the employer’s
property rights will predominate, and the union
may properly be denied access.
The Respondent argues in its exceptions that its con-
cerns about the disclosure of confidential, proprietary,
and trade secret information are a paramount consider-
ation. Further, the Respondent suggests that access as
requested by the Union would cause unwarranted dis-
ruption of its operations.3
We find, however, as the judge did, that the Re-
spondent has provided access to its facility to many in-
dividuals and groups, notably school children, a video
production crew, cub scouts, vocational school stu-
dents, potential customers, dealers and their drivers,
and suppliers. All of these visitors have been given ac-
cess to the facility subject to advance notice, accom-
paniment by a company representative, and such safety
measures as the Respondent deems necessary. Addi-
tionally, the Respondent has taken steps to ensure that
its proprietary interests are protected, such as covering
distinctive features of vehicles so visitors could not
disclose information about designs and materials to its
competitors. When the Union requested access, the Re-
spondent did not offer access conditioned on safety,
proprietary, or any other concerns; rather, as the judge
stated, the Respondent denied any and all access
‘‘even under conditions that would address [its] con-
cerns . . . pertaining to its asserted property rights.’’
Turning to the employees’ right to effective rep-
resentation, the Respondent contends in its exceptions
that access is not necessary because meaningful bar-
gaining has taken place without providing the Union
access. The Respondent points to the fact that the par-
978 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ties have reached agreement on all contractual issues
except one and argues that this proves that the Union
can properly represent the unit members without ac-
cess. We reject the Respondent’s argument.
It is well settled that the information the Union
seeks to obtain from direct observation of the plant
premises and processes is presumptively relevant to
and necessary for its role as the employees’ collective-
bargaining representative. In upholding a union’s need
for access to gather information about the relative posi-
tion of a particular job within the overall ‘‘hierarchy
of job classifications,’’ the Board has held that ‘‘there
is no adequate substitute for actual on-the-job observa-
tion of the work performed for the purpose of
ascertaining what skills are actually utilized.’’ Exxon
Chemical Co., 307 NLRB 1254, 1255 (1992). Like-
wise, in this case, there can be no adequate substitute
for the Union representative’s direct observation of the
plant equipment and conditions, and employee oper-
ations and working conditions, in order to evaluate
matters such as job classifications, safety concerns,
work rules, relative skills, and other matters necessary
to develop an informed and reasonable negotiating
strategy. This is particularly true in the circumstances
of this case where the parties were bargaining for an
initial contract.
In Holyoke, supra, the parties had a longstanding
bargaining relationship and the Union’s request for ac-
cess to the fan room was related to only one portion
of its representational responsibilities. In this case, by
contrast, the Union and the Respondent have been en-
gaged in negotiations for an initial contract and the re-
lationship is still in the fledgling stage. It is readily ap-
parent that the Respondent’s denial of access to the
Union’s international representative prevents the expe-
rienced official from gaining a complete understanding
of the Respondent’s operation and thus prevents the
employees from getting the representation they voted
for in the certification election. Furthermore, without a
collective-bargaining agreement, the Union has no
other avenue, such as a grievance procedure or arbitra-
tion, for obtaining the desired information. The denial
of access at this crucial phase of the parties’ bargain-
ing relationship can serve only to undermine the
Union’s status as bargaining representative.
In sum, we find that the Respondent’s interest in
keeping union representatives off its property is weak.
By contrast, the Union’s interest in obtaining informa-
tion for collective-bargaining purposes is substantial.
Therefore, we agree with the judge that, on balance,
the Respondent’s property rights are outweighed and
that the Respondent must afford the Union reasonable
access to its facility to observe, inspect, and investigate
plant conditions, equipment, employee operations, and
working conditions.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent,
C.C.E., Inc., Norwalk, Ohio, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b).
‘‘(b) Post at its facility in Norwalk, Ohio, copies of
the attached notice marked ‘Appendix.’3 Copies of the
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 8, after being signed by the Respondent’s au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material.’’
MEMBER BROWNING, concurring.
I concur in the Board’s decision finding a violation
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) under the Board’s current
standard for determining whether an employer unlaw-
fully denies the union representing its employees ac-
cess to its premises, Holyoke Water Power Co., 273
NLRB 1369 (1985), enfd. 778 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1985).
In the absence of sufficient votes on the Board to over-
rule Holyoke, I will continue to apply that standard as
existing precedent.
In my view, however, the Holyoke standard is un-
duly restrictive of a union’s right of access in cir-
cumstances where it already represents the employer’s
employees. I believe that, as the employees’ exclusive
representative for collective-bargaining purposes, the
union stands in the shoes of the employees because it
is their agent for the purposes of bargaining. Therefore,
the union’s right to enter the employer’s premises can
be limited only to the same extent that an employer
may limit its employees’ right to engage in Section 7
activity on its premises. In that regard, the Supreme
Court held in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324
U.S. 793 (1945), that an employer cannot lawfully im-
plement rules restricting employees’ union activities on
company premises during their breaktimes or before
and after work unless it demonstrates that special cir-
cumstances exist making such a rule necessary in order
to maintain production or discipline. Similarly, in my
view, an employer cannot restrict the access of the
union, its employees’ agent for purposes of bargaining,
unless it can show that restriction or denial of access
is necessary to maintain production or discipline. In
this case, the Respondent has not shown that its abso-
lute denial of access to the Union’s representatives is
necessary to maintain production or discipline. Indeed,
the evidence here is clear that no special circumstances
979C.C.E., INC.
1 All following dates will be in 1993 unless otherwise indicated.
exist, because the Respondent is able to maintain pro-
duction and discipline even when nonemployee visitors
enter the plant.
Accordingly, for these additional reasons, I would
find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act by refusing to grant the Union access
to the plant to obtain information for collective-bar-
gaining purposes.
Mark F. Neubecker, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Davis E. Bishop and Paul Mancino, Esqs., of Cleveland,
Ohio, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD H. BEDDOW JR., Administrative Law Judge. This
matter was heard in Bellevue, Ohio, on June 27, 1994. Briefs
subsequently were filed by both parties. The proceeding is
based on a charge filed December 22, 1993,1 by International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agriculture Imple-
ment Workers of America, UAW. The Regional Director’s
complaint dated February 4, 1994, alleges that Respondent
C.C.E., Inc., of Norwalk, Ohio, violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the National Labor Relations Act by failing and refus-
ing to allow the Charging Party access to its facility.
On review of the entire record in this case and from my
observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of
hearses and limousines at its facility in Norwalk and annually
purchases and receives goods and materials valued in excess
of $50,000 directly from points outside Ohio. It admits that
at all times material it has been an employer engaged in op-
erations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. It also admits that the Union
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
As noted, the Respondent is engaged in the manufacture
of funeral coaches (hearses) and stretch limousines. It has
been designated a ‘‘Qualified Vehicle Modifier’’ by Ford
Motor Company and has also been designated ‘‘Master
Coach Builder’’ by the Cadillac Division of General Motors.
It manufactures four product lines: funeral coaches and lim-
ousines under the ‘‘Miller-Meteor’’ brand names. The Com-
pany’s major competitor is S&S, a nonunion facility located
in nearby Lima, Ohio.
The Charging Party was certified on July 27 to represent
a unit of production and maintenance employees at Respond-
ent’s Norwalk facility. Subsequently, during October the
Union’s international representative, Bobby Brummitt, orally
requested permission to enter Respondent’s facility for the
purpose of collecting information vital to the process of col-
lective bargaining. Respondent’s agent, Attorney David
Bishop, denied Brummitt access to Respondent’s plant. By
letter dated November 23, Brummitt again requested access
to its plant. After Bishop’s letter of December 1, 1993, was
received, Brummitt filed the instant charge.
The record shows that approximately 80 employees work
at Respondent’s facility and use all manner of tools, includ-
ing saws, acetylene torches, welders, grimders, drills, screw
guns, spray guns, and pneumatic tools, and they are divided
into several different departments, they also utilize chemi-
cals, caulks, glues, thinners, paint, and cleaning supplies.
Brummitt testified that he sought access to the facility in
order to better serve the members of his union and specifi-
cally to observe the various skill levels required to perform
bargaining unit work, as well as to inspect possible health or
safety problem areas. (Brummitt testified that he had at-
tempted to obtain information from members of the Union’s
bargaining committee but with perfect results.)
The parties have met nine times for the purpose of nego-
tiating a first time contract. (Tr. 19.) To date the parties have
settled most language issues but have not made any progress
on economic items. Brummitt’s concern for the health and
safety of unit employees is based on the various substances
and tools mentioned above and his desire for a first hand in-
spection of the premises if the bargaining agent is expected
to intelligently address any health and safety issues. Also, be-
cause Respondent’s facility is highly departmentalized and
employees with different skills are employed in each depart-
ment, Brummitt indicates he will be better able to evaluate
Respondent’s economic offer after he has familiarized him-
self with Respondent’s operations.
Scott Plew, a member of the bargaining committee, has
been employed by the Respondent for 2 years and 7 months.
He currently works in metal fab but he has also worked in
the prep shop, the body shop, the refurb department, the
hoist area, in the assembly department, and in the quality
control department. (Tr. 35.) Plew testified that during his
time with Respondent that various nonemployees have toured
the facility. (Tr. 36.) These visitors included customers as
well as cub scouts and the mayor and city council.
Respondent’s executive vice president, Timothy Hall, testi-
fied that he participated in decisions to allow visitors to the
plant and that they attempted to protect their product line at
certain times. He stated that in general, the differences be-
tween their vehicle or the interior and exterior finishes and
shapes of those vehicles and that when they have new cars
or cars that are generally not available on the market, they
will hide them from certain people when they tour the facil-
ity; and have taken steps such as putting covers over the car
or putting them in the separated prep shop and then denying
access to that part of the facility when we give the tours. He
also said they have bagged the back end of a car to give
shape differences or so that the people don’t see what exactly
the car should look like and that information about its mate-
rials would hurt them if it got to their competition.
He agreed that school children had been shown tapes of
the production of their vehicles and given brief tours (under
supervision and with safety glasses), and that a video crew
had been in the plant to prepare at least two marketing tapes
which show an initial vehicle, different steps in the manufac-
ture of their product, and the finished limo or hearse. He also
noted that some cub scouts, students from a vocational
980 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
school, and Japanese visitors who were potential customers,
as well as dealers or drivers who pick up vehicles for deal-
ers, come in and inspect cars and may be given tours. It also
gives essentially unrestricted tours to representatives from
Cadillac, Lincoln, and Buick who provide their initial chas-
sis.
He also testified that Brummitt never objected to the possi-
bility of vehicle features being covered as it was never of-
fered as an option by the Company and was never discussed.
The Company also never disclosed to the Union the exist-
ence of the production and product tape prior to the disclo-
sure at the hearing. During contract negotiations on the sub-
ject of ‘‘Arbitration’’ the Respondent proposed the following
visitation language:
The International Representative of the Union shall be
permitted to visit the plant during working hours, pro-
viding he has received permission in advance, and such
permission shall not unreasonably be withheld, for the
purpose of investigating grievances at the third step of
the grievance procedure without any disruption of Com-
pany operations. During any plant visit, the Inter-
national Representative will be accompanied by a Com-
pany Representative.
No proposal was made, however, that would offer the union
representative any access, under any conditions or restric-
tions, during negotiations.
III. DISCUSSION
The Board has taken two approaches to access cases of
this nature, see Winonea Industries, 257 NLRB 695 (1981),
and Holyoke Water Power Co., 273 NLRB 1369 (1985),
enfd. 778 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1985), as discussed in Hercules
Inc., 281 NLRB 961 (1986).
The Holyoke Power decision recognizes that a union rep-
resentative does not have an absolute right to enter an em-
ployer’s premises to obtain information pertaining to its du-
ties as bargaining representative of unit employees but has a
qualified right that is to be balanced against the employer’s
right to control its property.
The Board, in Holyoke, at 1370, said that when respon-
sible representation by the union requires that it have access
to the employer’s property, i.e., there is no alternative means
to achieve that end, it would follow the balancing test ap-
plied by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956), to accommodate the rights of both
parties ‘‘with as little destruction of one as is consistent with
the maintenance of the other’’ and the Court observed, the
door should not be either ‘‘always open or always closed.’’
In Hercules, the Board said:
Thus, it is settled that relevance of, and need for, the
information does not translate into an absolute or un-
questioned right to access. On the other hand, it is
equally clear that, circumstances permitting, the Union
does have statutory right to invade Respondent’s prop-
erty rights in order to obtain live and direct information
of the kind involved in this case and ‘‘that property
rights alone will not suffice as a reason for denial of
rights guaranteed under the Act.’’ Fafnir Bearing Co.,
146 NLRB 1582, 1586 (1964), a case on which the
Board rested its Holyoke decision.
Here, the Union and the General Counsel clearly have
shown that the information sought by personal observation of
a qualified union representative is relevant and necessary for
the Union to properly function in its role as the bargaining
representative of the unit employees.
Information pertaining to working conditions is presump-
tively appropriate for bargaining, Press Democrat Publishing
Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 1320 (1979), and where the informa-
tion sought covers the terms and conditions of employment
within the bargaining unit it involves the core of the em-
ployer-employee relationship and the standard of relevance is
very broad, and no specific showing is normally required;
see Ohio Power Co., 216 NLRB 987 (1975), enfd. 531 F.2d
1381 (1976), moreover, a union need not demonstrate actual
instances of grievances or contractual violations as a pre-
requisite to requiring information. Doubarn Sheet Metal, 243
NLRB 821 (1979).
It otherwise is clear that for the Union to be afforded its
right to negotiate on a level playing field, the employees
must not be limited to representing and obtaining information
themselves but must be allowed the services of expert or ex-
perienced representatives. Accordingly, their representative is
entitled to access for the purposes of his own expert or expe-
rienced observation, inspection, or investigation of plant
equipment and conditions and employee operations and
working conditions, see the Hercules case, supra.
Here, the Respondent did not partially restrict access, but
denied any access at all, even under conditions that would
address the concerns that it argues on brief pertaining to its
asserted property rights. The only apparent concession it was
willing to advance occurred during contract negotiations
when it proposed a visitation provision (with advanced no-
tices, permission, and accompaniment by a company rep-
resentative) for investigation of grievances at the third step.
Just as an employer who asserts that information is con-
fidential must establish a legitimate and substantial confiden-
tiality interest sufficient to outweigh a union’s right to rel-
evant information, see Resorts International Hotel Casino v.
NLRB, 996 F.2d 1553 (3d Cir. 1993), an employer must
present a good-faith objection to an information or access re-
quest and offers to cooperate in reaching a mutually accept-
able accommodation. Then, it is incumbent on the union to
try to reach some type of agreement on the form, extent, or
timing of the visit, compare Soule Glass Co. v. NLRB, 652
F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981).
Here, the Respondent failed to communicate any legitimate
or substantial reasons for its denial of access and it has pro-
posed no alternatives. Otherwise, it is shown that the Com-
pany has made a common practice of allowing plant visits
by numerous and various groups (during working times) es-
sentially subject only to advance notice, safety consideration,
accompaniment by a company representative, and the occa-
sional concealment of new features on its vehicles.
Accordingly, I find that the Respondent has violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by asserting unlimited prop-
erty rights as it pertained to access by a union representative
during collective bargaining for a first contract, when at the
same time it was granting that right to components of the
general public.
981C.C.E., INC.
2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
3 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.’’
Here, the Union was not obligated to rely only on second
hand information and descriptions of working condition and
a union has the right to have an experienced representative
observe and obtain information if it so chooses, especially
during collective bargaining for a first contract. Here, the
Company has failed to show any serious potential for disrup-
tion of its rights or interest and the right of the Union to ob-
tain information for purposes of collective bargaining must
prevail, see the Holyoke and Hercules cases, supra.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. At all times material here the Union has been the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of the Respondent’s production
and maintenance employees at its Norwalk, Ohio facility.
4. Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the
Union as the representative of the employees in the certified
unit by refusing to grant requests for access to its facility in
order to allow the Union’s representatives to directly inves-
tigate, inspect, and observe plant equipment and conditions
and employee operations and working conditions relevant to
the representatives duty to fulfill the Union’s bargaining obli-
gation and has thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Because Re-
spondent’s denial of access was predicated on even a
colorable claim of business necessity, it shall be required to
grant requests for access to chosen representatives without
limitation or condition, except as follows. Respondent has
demonstrated a proprietary interest in securing its secret pro-
duction, however, it appears that the need for such security
does not extend to the entire plant or at all times. Accord-
ingly, the Respondent may protect its interest as it has with
other visitors by covering such ‘‘secret’’ portions of its prod-
uct or production.
Otherwise, the Unions’s representative shall have full ac-
cess in keeping with the Board’s accommodation policy set
forth in Holyoke Water Power Co., 273 NLRB 1369 (1985),
enfd. 778 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1985), i.e., limited to reasonable
periods and at reasonable times, consistent with the times
least likely to disrupt Respondent’s operations, to allow the
Union’s representatives to fully investigate not only potential
grievances but also to investigate, inspect, and observe plant
conditions, employee operations, and working conditions rel-
evant to the Union’s representatives duty to fulfill its bar-
gaining obligations. Otherwise, it is not considered to be nec-
essary that a broad order be issued; however, because the
Respondent has engaged in illegal practices that affected the
Union’s access to information relative to ongoing negotiation
of an initial contract, I recommend that the certification year
be extended by 12 months as provided in Thill Inc., 298
NLRB 669 (1990).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended2
ORDER
The Respondent, C.C.E., Inc., Norwalk, Ohio, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Refusing to bargain with International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, UAW, by refusing to grant the union request for
access by the Union’s representatives to its Norwalk, Ohio
facility for reasonable periods and at reasonable working or
production times sufficient to allow the Union’s representa-
tives to fully investigate, inspect, and observe plant equip-
ment and conditions and employee operations and working
conditions.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request of the Union grant access to its Norwalk,
Ohio facility for reasonable periods and at reasonable work-
ing or production times to allow union representatives to
fully investigate, inspect, and observe plant equipment and
conditions and employee operations and working conditions
relevant to the representatives duty to fulfill the Union’s bar-
gaining obligation.
(b) Post at its Norwalk, Ohio facility copies of the notice
marked ‘‘Appendix’’3 on forms provided by the Regional
Director of Region 8, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices
to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the certification year shall be
extended for 12 months after the date the Union is allowed
access in conformance with this decision.
982 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW, by refusing to grant the Union’s
request for access by the Union’s representatives to our Nor-
walk, Ohio facility.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, on request of the Union, grant access to our
Norwalk, Ohio facility for reasonable periods and at reason-
able working or production times to allow union representa-
tives to fully investigate, inspect, and observe plant equip-
ment and conditions and employee operations and working
conditions relevant to the representatives’ duty to fulfill the
Union’s bargaining and representative obligation.
C.C.E., INC.