Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 23, 1972

195 N.L.R.B. 543 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

CAYUGA CRUSHED STONE , INC. 543
Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc. and International Union
of Operating Engineers Local No. 545; Chauffeurs,
Teamsters , Warehousemen and Helpers Local No.
65 affiliated with the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers
of America. Case 3-CA-4494
to bargain with the Unions in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act.'
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses I make the following'
FINDINGS OF FACTS
I THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
February 23, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
On November 12, 1971, Trial Examiner Thomas A.
Ricci issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a sup-
porting- brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's rulings,
findings, and conclusions and to adopt his recom-
mended Order.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of
the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that the Re-
spondent, Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., South Lansing,
New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
recommended Order.
' In affirming the Trial Examiner's finding of an 8(a)(5) violation, we rely
solely upon Respondent's withdrawal of voluntary recognition before a
reasonable period of bargaining had taken place (see Kimbrough Trucking
Co., 160 NLRB 954, 957-958), .and upon the Trial Examiner's alternative
finding that, in any event, Respondent had insufficient objective evidence
upon which it could question the Union's representative status
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. Ricci, Trial Examiner; A hearing in the
above-entitled proceeding was held before the duly desig-
nated Trial Examiner on October 5, 1971, at Ithaca, New
York, on complaint of the General Counsel against Cayuga
Crushed Stone, Inc., herein called the Respondent or the
Company. The complaint issued on August 10, 1971, on a
charge filed on June 11, 1971, jointly by International Union
of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 545, herein called
the Operating Engineers, and Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Ware-
housemen and Helpers Local Union No. 65, affiliated with
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, herein called the
Teamsters. The sole issue is whether the Respondent refused
195 NLRB No. 108
The Respondent is a New York corporation engaged in the
quarrying, crushing, and nonretail selling of crushed stone,
with its principal place of business in South Lansing, New
York. It wasnot shown to make direct out-of-state sales, but
jurisdiction is predicated upon its sales, within the State, to
purchasers who are themselves' engaged in direct interstate
commerce to an extent sufficient to satisfy the Board's juris-
dictional standards. The Respondent's customers, said to do
an interstate business, are Lane Construction Corporation, of
Meriden, Connecticut, and the State of New York. Two let-
ters, dated August 6 and September 7, 1971, from Lane to the
Board's Regional Office in Buffalo, state that that company
is engaged in constructing a road in the State of New York,
and for that purpose purchased materials "in excess of $50,-
000 per year." Moreover, the Board has asserted jurisdiction
over the Lane Company in 138 NLRB 1118. As to the State
bf New York, a document received in evidence, issued by the
office of General Services, Standards and Purchases of the
State, shows that under a single contract for the period Au-
gust 1970 to May 1971 it purchased mineral crushed rock for
use in the State from a Pennsylvania concern, valued far in
excess of $50,000. The General Counsel, the Respondent, and
the Charging Parties stipulated that the Respondent made
the following sales of crushed stone to Lane and the State of
New York: For the period August 1, 1970, to July 31, 1971,
$326.20 to Lane and $15,848.90 to New York State. For the
calendar year 1970, $31,918.40 to Lane and $20,121.01 to
New York State.
As originally drawn the complaint based jurisdiction upon
the indirect sales made "during the past 12 months," meaning
August 1970 to August 1971, for the complaint is dated
August 10, 1971. At the hearing the General Counsel moved
to amend the complaint to make the jurisdiction allegation
read "during the calendar year 1970" instead. The motion
was granted over the Respondent's opposition. The Respond-
ent contends that the complaint must be dismissed because its
indirect outflow sales during the most recent 12-month
period preceding issuance of the complaint fails to satisfy the
Board's jurisdictional standards. In Aroostook Federation of
Farmers, 114 NLRB 538, the Board said it would assert
jurisdiction relying "on the experience of an employer during
the most recent calendar or fiscal year, or the 12-month
period immediately preceding the hearing before the Board,
where such experience was available."
What is presented is a question of policy. The quoted lan-
guage from Aroostook is ambiguous. It can be read to mean
that if commerce data for any one, or for all of three different
12-month periods is available-last calendar year, last fiscal
year or 12-months preceding the hearing-and any one of
them satisfies the established standards, the Board will exer-
cise its jurisdiction. Or, it can be taken to mean that if the data
is availablefor more than one of the three 12-month periods,
the data reflected for the most recent 12-month period availa-
ble will be determinative, without regard to what any earlier
12-month period may show. The matter seems to have been
put at rest, in Jos. McSweeney, 119 NLRB 1399. I therefore
A typographical error in the transcript on p. 79, 1 25, is hereby cor-
rected to change the word "Steamfitters" to "Teamsters "
544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of
the Act to exercise jurisdiction herein.
II THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
I find that International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local Union No. 5451 and Chauffeurs , Teamsters, Ware-
housemen and Helpers Local Union No. 65, affiliated with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, are labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Issue
This is a refusal-to-bargain case. The two unions, Operat-
ing Engineers Local 545 and Teamsters Local 65, jointly
organized the Company's employees at the end of March
1971, and demanded recognition on the basis of signed au-
thorization cards. The Respondent conceded the majority
status and signed a written recognition agreement early in
April. Three bargaining sessions followed-on April 12 and
29 and May 18. Before the next planned meeting the Re-
spondent withdrew recognition and refused to meet further.
The complaint alleges this was a refusal to bargain within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The Company defends
on the ground that towards the end of May it learned there
had been a change of heart by the employees and that there-
fore it had a right to change its position and put the Unions
to the test of an election. The General Counsel asks that the
Company be ordered to bargain with the Unions now.
B. Appropriate Bargaining Unit and Majority Status
The complaint alleges, the answer admits , and I find that
all employees of the Respondent at its Portland Point, South
Lansing, plant excluding all office clerical employees, guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit appro-
priate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
At the hearing the parties stipulated that during the payroll
period ending March 31, 1971 , there were 13 employees in-
cluded within this bargaining unit; an exhibit listing their
names was received in evidence.
On March 29, 1971, seven of these employees signed au-
thorization cards in favor of the Operating Engineers; the
cards were received in evidence without objection. In perti-
nent part they read as follows:
I hereby designate the INTERNATIONAL UNION
OF OPERATING ENGINEERS Local Union No. 545
to represent me for the purpose of collective bargaining
and in any and all other situations that may arise under
the operation of the National Labor Relations Act and-
/or with any individual employer where the provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act are not invoked.
On March 30 two other employees signed union cards,
Donald Rogers also in favor of the Operating Engineers, and
Orrin Warner in favor of Teamsters, Local 65. The last card
reads as follows:
I hereby designate the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen, Helpers and Inside Plant Workers Local
Union No. 65, Ithaca, Cortland, Hornell, N.Y. &
Vicinity through its authorized agents, as my representa-
tive for collective bargaining.
C. Demand, Recognition, and Bargaining
On behalf of the Unions a lawyer wrote a letter to the
Company on March 30, asserting majority representative
status, requesting recognition for bargaining purposes, and
offering to "submit to a card check of union authorization
cards." As suggested in the lawyer's letter, General Manager
Herman Besemer , of the Respondent , then telephoned Busi-
ness Representative Fay Chapman of the Operating Engi-
neers, and arranged for a meeting. Accompanied by Law-
rence Small, Teamsters business representative , Chapman
met with Besemer in his office on April 6 or 7. When the
union agents spoke of recognition, Besemer asked to see their
authorization cards. Small answered he would only show
them to a judge or a clergyman "to check in [sic] the validity
of the cards." This according to Small as a witness. As
Besemer recalled it , Small did not offer to have the cards
examined by anyone. Besemer continued to testify that when
the union agents told him the employees wanted a union, "I
thought, if they want it, no use of fighting it," and agreed to
recognize the Unions as a bargaining agent . It was also agreed
a recognition document would be prepared; Small did this,
and Chapman , on April 9, brought it to Besemer for signa-
ture. In Besemer 's office Chapman and Besemer also signed
the agreement . It reads as follows:
LETTER OF RECOGNITION
It is hereby agreed between Herman D. Besemer for and
on the behalf of Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc. located on
Portland Point Road, Lansing, New York and Fay
Chapman for and on the behalf of the International
Union of Operating Engineers Local # 545, and Law-
rence Small for and on the behalf of Chauffeurs, Team-
sters, Warehousemen and Helpers Union Local # 65,
that the said Company will recognize the said Unions as
the collective bargaining agents of all the employees of
said Company, exclusive of office clerical employees,
guards, supervisory personnel as defined under the Act.
It is further agreed that the Company and the Unions
will immediately within reason commence to meet for
the purpose of negotiating a collective bargaining agree-
ment.
Between the lawyer's demand letter and the April 9 signing
of the recognition agreement, the Unions had filed a joint
petition with the Board requesting an election ; it is dated
April 5. Besemer had already, received notification of this
petition from the Board, together with the usual copies of a
Notice to Employees for posting in the work areas. After
agreeing to recognize the Unions he`told Chapman "to cancel
it out ... because he had already signed the letter of recogni-
tion." The Unions withdrew the petition and on the 15th the
Board's Regional Office informed, the Respondent of the fact.
Chapman met with Besemer in his office on April 12 and
the two spent "a couple" of hours talking. Two subjects
occupied most of the time, the Union 's welfare and pension
plan and job classification . A union contract demand would
have been contributions, based upon hours worked, by the
employer into the plan. On the question of job classification
it seems the Respondent has differing wage rates for em-
ployees working on the same machine, or doing the same
work, and also, in some instances , pays the same scale to
employees operating different kinds of machines. Chapman
explained the Operating Engineers concept of job classifica-
tion, distinguishing one piece of equipment from another,
with applicable diverse rates of pay. No decisions were
reached and it was decided to meet again.
CAYUGA CRUSHED STONE, INC. 545
They did so on April 29, again in Besemer's office; now
they were together about 4 hours, and again the major issue
was the matter of job classification and relative or pertinent
wage rates. According to Chapman:
We discussed what he was paying the men then that
would fall into those classifications. Like, he had three
men that were shovel operators and he was paying them
all three, a different rate. And we were trying to figure
out a rate that would be satisfactory to him and the men
to balance it out. The one, rate for that classification
instead of three rates for the same classification.
Matters remained open and another meeting was set for May
18.
This time Small, of the Teamsters, was also present. The
Unions presented a proposed comprehensive written con-
tract, 16 pages of print, and containing the usual terms and
conditions of collective-bargaining agreements. Three to 3Y,
hours were devoted to discussing the various items. After all
the talk, all that was settled was a minor question of how
overtime work should be assigned. Again it was agreed to
meet later, possibly in the office of a Mr. Cartwright, of the
Local Builders Association.
All the foregoing concerning these meetings was related by
Chapman and Small as witnesses. Besemer testified in defense
but spoke little about the meetings. He contradicted none of
the other men's stories. All he said was of the May 18 meet-
ing: "Q. Did you discuss the written proposals? A. Very much
... Q. You spent a lot of time discussing each proposal?
... The Witness: Well, I haven't seen it [the written
proposal] for a time. I'd have to go over it. But I know there
was many items there I Xed out and put question marks
behind and we was talking quite heatedly about the various
items. We didn't get through all of them. Twelve, I think, and
I-it got to be 8:30. We all decided it was getting pretty late."
No useful purpose would be served by detailing what hap-
pened thereafter between the parties, because there is no issue
about it. A tentative meeting for May 27 was canceled; the
Union agents tried several times to communicate with
Besemer but without success; a further union demand letter
of June 15 went unanswered. The Respondent concedes that
by about June 1 it had decided no longer to recognize the
Unions as representatives of the employees.
D. Affirmative Defense,- Analysis and Conclusions
At the time of Besemer's first meeting with Chapman, as
well as on April 9 when he signed the recognition agreement,
the Unions had clearly been authorized by a majority of the
employees to bargain for them. Nine out of 13 had signed
unequivocal designation cards. There is no contention that
the card signers then intended anything other than immediate
authorization for collective bargaining, or entertained any
mental reservations. Certainly there is no evidence even in-
directly casting doubt upon this one critical fact. Besemer
admitted at the hearing that at the first meeting he said
nothing to indicate doubt as to the validity of the cards, and
that there were no facts that could raise any question then in
his mind. And the only employee who appeared at the hear-
ing to speak about the matter made clear his desire not to be
represented by a union came into being long after he had
signed his card, that he had changed his mind as an after-
thought.
Although the question presented here is not precisely
analogous to more common situations of which Board law
speaks, there is a certain similarity to other cases. The Re-
spondent first asserts that at the end of May or early in June
it learned that the Unions had lost majority. support, that the
employees no longer wished to be represented, and then
argues it was privileged to discontinue collective bargaining
for this reason. Had the employees voted in a Board election
on March 30 instead of signing cards, and a majority chosen
the union as a bargaining agent, this defense would not have
been available to the employer, regardless of any change of
heart by some few of the employees. N.L.R.B. v. Brooks, 348
U.S. 96. There is, of course, a difference between voting in
secret ballot and signing authorization cards. Compare
N.L.R.B. v. Gissel, 395 U.S. 575. But if the determinative
element in the Brooks line of cases is the uncontrovertible fact
of majority authorization, as evidenced finally by issuance of
a Board certification, the signed cards in this case, coupled
with the Respondent's execution of the recognition agree-
ment, could also be said to fix the bargaining relationship and
protect it from this kind of attack for a certain period. In that
event this employer, too, would be precluded from question-
ing the majority only 2 months after it was affirmatively
established and in the teeth of the bargaining.
The case can also be analogized to the situation where a
question concerning the duty to bargain arises after expira-
tion of an earlier contract. United Gypsum Company, 157
NLRB 652. There consideration, starts with the fact of
majority authorization established in the old contract, recog-
nition of necessity conceded and extended to the union in the
very language of the agreement itself; the majority status
there fixed is presumed to continue. Unlike the case of the
decertification year, however, an employer faced with a de-
mand to negotiate a new contract may raise a question of
continuing majority, provided his asserted doubt is based on
reasonable and objective criteria. A persuasive argument
could be made that the recognition agreement signed by
Besemer on April 9 is comparable to any collective-bargain-
ing relationship established by contract, and that therefore
the fixed majority status must be presumed to continue in the
absence of objective proof to the contrary.
A third possible analogy is to the case of Snow and Sons,
134 NLRB 709; there, as here, the Board was faced with an
initial organizational campaign situation. The employer in
Snow first agreed to abide by the results of a card check, and
to extend recognition if it should appear that a majority of
employees had signed appropriate authorization cards. He
reneged and refused to bargain after the fact of majority was
so proved, and the Board found a violation of Section 8(a)(5)
as a result. The employer in Snow looked at the cards;
Besemer did not. But if a mere promise to extend recognition
on the basis of the cards binds an employer to his word, so
that he may not soon thereafter question majority, does it not
follow, a fortiori, that actual concession of proper representa-
tive status, in writing, also precludes the employer from too
early a refusal to bargain?
However the case be viewed, I find that the Respondent
unlawfully refused to bargain with the Unions on June 15,
1971, if not earlier, and thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act. It admitted the decision to withdraw recognition had
been made before that date, and that is the date the Unions'
final written invitation to continue negotiations was con-
sciously ignored. The best possible view of the defense is that
the recognition agreement ought be likened to an earlier con-
tract establishing majority status. The Respondent contends
that the Unions thereafter lost standing as exclusive bargain-
ing agent; this is essentially an affirmative defense. I find the
evidence insufficient to justify its refusal to bargain.
The evidence offered to support the defense consists
primarily of Besemer's testimony as to what an employee
named Donald Rogers told him at the end of May and early
in June. Besemer started by saying he once overheard Orin
Lovelace, also an employee say "I hope they kill this Union.
We're getting sick of hearing about it." Besemer added that
employee Hagg was then present and said, "well, I agree with
546 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that." Shown his earlier affidavit on cross-examination,
Besemer altered this testimony, and said all Lovelace had
spoken was "I hope they kill this Union," and that as to Hagg
all that he knew was that the man "was somewhere there
because he was getting ready to do the shooting," but that he,
Besemer, did not recall whether Hagg said anything at all.
As to employee Rogers, Besemer related how towards the
end of May the mane"came in and said, in the conversation
back and forth around the workers, that they didn't think the
majority of them wanted it [the Union] ... He says `I can't
speak for actually the particular names, but the talks back
and forth.' And he, says, `I' think that we'd like to have a
vote."' Besemer then gave Rogers the name and address of
the Labor Board Regional Office, and Rogers wrote the fol-
lowing letter to the Board about June 1:
I am employed by Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc. at Port-
land Point, South Lansing, N.Y. I and my fellow em-
ployees, who work in the quarry, do not have a union.
We found out that our boss has agreed to have the
Teamsters and Engineers represent us. Most of us do not
want this . Will you please send me forms so that we can
send them in, and have an election.
After a telephone conversation with him to inquire further,
the Regional Office wrote to Rogers on'June 15, indicating it
did not have enough information to advise whether a decer-
tification petition might be appropriate at the moment. Rog-
ers then showed both his and the Board's letters to Besemer.
Asked had he heard from any other employee concerning
union representation, Besemer at one point answered: "No,
I didn't, just hearsay I heard." Later, asked once again by his
own lawyer to give what employees' names he could recall,
he said : "Well, I'm not going to quote the men's names, I
don't think I have to quote men's names because I didn't
write them all down. I have talked to various ones. I do have
one man down from there, Croffert." There is no employee
named Croffert on the stipulated employee list. And finally,
Besemer threw in the name "Ward," as a person also express-
ing dissatisfaction about the Union, but with no comment as
to anything Ward might have said. There is an employee
named Ward on the agreed-upon list of employees, but he was
1 of,the 4, out of the 13, who did not sign a union card.
Rogers, called by the General Counsel to authenticate his
authorization card, did so directly. He then said that some-
time in May he decided he did not wish to be represented and
told this to Besemer. He also testified, however, that in talk-
ing to the manager he made clear the fact he was speaking
only for himself. "Mr. Burke: And at that time did you say
anything about other' employees? The Witness: That I
couldn't speak for them ... Mr. Burke: In substance, in
substance what did you say to him? The Witness: That we'd
lieen thinking it over and we had some second thoughts about
the Union. And we decided that'we didn't want it. But I could
not speak for everybody because I didn't know 'exactly what
everyone thought. Now that's the nearest I can get at it." "Q.
Did you ever go back ' to Mr. Besemer and tell him, I'm
speaking for all the other guys, we'all changed our minds? A.
No, I-Q. No?'A.'I told him several times I couldn't possible
speak for the others."
At best Besemer had objective grounds early in June for
believing that one man had changed his mind after authoriz-
ing the Union, and one or two others, of whose earlier atti-
tude he knew nothing, were lukewarm on the subject. This
was not sufficient basis for a reasonable belief that the joint
unions no longer commanded the majority adherence which .
had been established to Besemer's satisfaction 2 months ear-
her, and which he was willing to accept during the several
bargaining sessions in which he participated.
No single case need be decisive of a future one in this field
of law, and no specific precedent is required for finding ille-
gality on a set of facts presented in a later proceeding before
the Board. I do not hold, as a rule of law, that an employer
who signs a proper recognition agreement with a first organ-
izing union may not thereafter justify its refusal to bargain on
the grounds of reasonable basis for doubting majority, nor do
I hold that he does have the right to prove such a defense
against, a refusal-to-bargain complaint. I find only that, even
assuming the defense to be available as a matter of law, on
the evidence here shown this Respondent has failed to satisfy
the affirmative burden.
Regardless of which of them may be necessary, or indeed
pertinent, all of the following facts are revealing. The Unions
in fact represented a majority of the employees on March 30.
The Company conceded as much and signed a regular recog-
nition agreement. It requested the Unions to withdraw, their
election petition then in the hands of the ,Board Regional
Office, thereby avoiding the necessity of posting any notice
advising its employees of their statutory organizational
rights. The employer in fact negotiated with the thus recog-
nized exclusive bargaining agent over- a period of almost 2
months. Besemer discussed matters of substance with Chap-
man and Small ; payment to a union welfare and pension plan
involved money contributions for ' work, as did proposed
modifications of work classifications. It does not appear that
the Respondent yielded on significant clauses in the Unions'
proposed contract, but on Besemer's own testimony it is clear
he rejected a number of, them. Bargaining consists not only
of making concessions , but also of denying demands of one
party or another after "heated" discussions, to use Besemer's
own words. And finally, the assertion that the Unions had
lost majority support is advanced without sufficient sub-
stance. The refusal to bargain in this case was a violation of
the statute, and the Respondent must be,ordered to bargain
now on request.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The Unions are labor organizations within the meaning
of the Act.
3. The Unions are and have at all material times herein
been the exclusive majority representative of all employees in
the following bargaining unit of employees at the Respond-
ent's South Lansing, New York, plant: All employees, ex-
cluding all office clerical employees , guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
4. By refusing, on June 15, 1971, and thereafter, to bargain
with the Unions upon request, the Respondent has refused to
bargain collectively with the Unions as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of its employees in violation of
Section 8 (a)(5) of the Act.
5. By the foregoing conduct the Respondent has interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed to them by Section '7 of the Act, in violation
of'Section 8(a)(1).
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices proscribed by Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law and
the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I
hereby issue the following recommended:'
In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the
Board and become its findings, conclusions , and order, and all objections
CAYUGA CRUSHED STONE, INC. 547
ORDER
The Respondent, Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., South Lans-
ing, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain, upon request,
with the Unions as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit
described above.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with the Unions as
the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropri-
ate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work,
and other terms and conditions of employment.
(b) Post at its plant in South Lansing, New York, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 3, after being duly signed by an authorized representa-
tive of the Respondent, shall be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasona-
ble steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.'
thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
' In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
° In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this
provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a full trial in which both sides had the opportunity to
present their evidence the National Labor Relations Board
has found that we, Cayuga Crushed Stone, Inc., violated the
National Labor Relations Act, and ordered us to post this
notice. We therefore notify you that:
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with
these Unions as the exclusive representative of all em-
ployees in the above-described bargaining unit with re-
spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment and, if an
understanding is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement.
WE WILL NOT refuse to meet and bargain with Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union
No. 545, and Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen
and Helpers Local Union No. 65, affiliated with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as the exclusive
representative of the following employees:
All employees employed in our Portland Point,
South Lansing, New York, location, excluding all
office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as
defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
any labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to re-
frain from any and all such activities.
Dated By
CAYUGA CRUSHED
STONE, INC.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by any-
one.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. Any questions concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions may be directed to
the Board's Office, Federal Building, Ninth Floor, 111 West
Huron Street, Buffalo, New York 14202, Telephone 716-
842-3100.