Cavalier Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 30, 1972

195 N.L.R.B. 1121 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

INDUSTRIAL TOWEL AND UNIFORM SERVICE
Industrial Towel and Uniform Service, a Division of
Cavalier Industries , Inc. and Doris Lee Mitchell
Durham
Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Helpers and Taxicab Drivers
Local Union #327, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs , Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America and Doris Lee Mitchell
Durham . Cases 26-CA-3742 and 26-CB-560
March 30, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS
AND KENNEDY
On October 13, 1971, Trial Examiner Robert Cohn
issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. There-
after, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief. Respondent Teamsters Local Union
# 327 filed a reply to the General Counsel's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions only to the extent
consistent herewith.
The Charging Party, Doris Lee Mitchell Durham,
was employed by the Respondent Company in the lat-
ter part of 1963. At that time she executed a checkoff
authorization which authorized the Company to de-
duct her union dues' and initiation fees. She left the
Company's employment in 1966 because of illness. In
1969 she received a telephone call from the Company
asking her to come back. She explained that because of
her illness she could not return to her old job but that
if they had another job she would return. In September
1969, she returned to work at a different job. When
rehired she was not required to fill out a new applica-
tion form, did not receive the beginning rate of pay, and
did not have to pay a union initiation fee. Under the
contract between the Company and the Respondent
Union she lost the seniority acquired during her previ-
ous period of employment.
On these facts the Trial Examiner had "serious
doubts" as to whether Durham was a "new employee"
when rehired in September 1969. He found that Dur-
ham had failed to revoke her checkoff in accordance
with the terms of the authorization she had signed and
that she therefore remained bound by it. Accordingly
he found that the deduction of her dues was authorized
1121
and recommended dismissal of the complaint as to
Durham.
We do not agree. It is clear from the record that
when Durham left the employ of the Respondent Com-
pany she had no intention of returning and had no
reasonable expectancy of reemployment at that time.
That she was not required to make out a new employ-
ment application when she returned after a lapse of
several years, or that her pay rate was higher than that
of a beginner, is hardly surprising when one considers
the fact that she was a former and experienced em-
ployee. Nor can we give weight, under these circum-
stances, to the fact that the Respondent Union did not
charge Durham an initiation fee. There was no union-
security agreement which required her to join or to pay
such a fee and Respondent Union's only hope in obtain-
ing dues from her was the revivification of her checkoff
authorization. In short, there are no factors in this
record which militate against the conclusion that when
Durham left the employ of the Respondent Company
in 1966 the employer-employee relationship was com-
pletely severed.
The sole remaining question is whether the severance
of the relationship vitiated the checkoff authorization
which had been executed in Durham's previous period
of employment. In Idarado Mining Company.' an em-
ployee had joined a union during his first period of
employment under a maintenance-of-membership con-
tract. After quitting his job he returned to work and the
union insisted that he pay dues pursuant to his becom-
ing a union member during the first period of employ-
ment. The Board found that the severing of the employ-
ment relationship also severed the employee's
obligation to remain a member and that he had the
status of a new employee who would assume the obliga-
tion of membership only if he voluntarily rejoined the
union. By analogy we think that the severing of the
employment relationship severed Durham's obligation
under the checkoff authorization and that her obliga-
tion would not be revived until she had signed a new
authorization.'
It is now well settled that the deduction of dues from
an employee's pay after the employee has validly
revoked the checkoff authorization constitutes a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.' Certainly the same
result is justified where, as here, the checkoff authoriza-
tion has been extinguished by the employee's cessation
of employment. And it is obvious that the checkoff of
dues, under these circumstances, would encourage
membership in the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
77 NLRB 392.
See also Yellow Cab Company, 148 NLRB 620, 664.
Merchants Fast Motor Lines, 171 NLRB 1444; Bedford Can Manufac-
turing Corp., 162 NLRB 1428; Penn Cork & Closures. Inc., 156 NLRB 411,
enfd. 376 F.2d 52 (C.A. 2).
195 NLRB No. 187
1122 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and that the Union's causation4 of such a deduction of
dues is accordingly violative of Section 8(b)(2) of the
Act.
The parties agreed that there were other individuals
who, like Durham, had signed checkoff authorizations,
left the Respondent Company's employment, and then,
after being again employed, had dues checked off in
accordance with the checkoff authorization signed dur-
ing their initial employment. We find that such em-
ployees were also discriminated against in violation of
Section 8(a)(1),(2), and (3) and Section 8(b)(1)(A) and
(2) of the Act. However, as the record does not specifi-
cally identify all the individual employees, we shall
leave the determination of the identity of these in-
dividuals to compliance.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that:
A. Respondent Industrial Towel and Uniform Ser-
vice, a Division of Cavalier Industries, Inc., Nashville,
Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Assisting the Union by checking off membership
dues not sanctioned by employees through currently
executed checkoff authorizations.
(b) Continuing to deduct union membership dues
pursuant to checkoff authorizations which are no
longer valid because of a break in an employee's em-
ployment, or discriminating against employees in any
other manner to encourage membership in the Union.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Reimburse Doris Lee Mitchell Durham for all
sums improperly deducted from her wages in payment
of union dues, plus interest at the rate of 6 percent per
annum. Said liability shall be joint and several with the
Respondent Local.
(b) Reimburse other employees_who may have had
union dues improperly deducted from their wages, plus
interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum. Said liability
shall be joint and several with the Respondent Local.
Durham's dues were checked off pursuant to article XXX of the then
current collective-bargaining agreement Article XXX requires that dues be
remitted to the Union on the basis of the latter's monthly certification of
employees who have executed checkoff authorizations and the amounts due
from them for that month When Durham protested the checkoff in issue
here, the Union, consistent with its position that her earlier authorization
remained valid, failed to afford relief.
' Cf Laher Spring & Electric Car Corp., 192 NLRB No. 65.
(c) Post at its plant in Nashville, Tennessee, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix A."6 Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 26, after being duly signed by Re-
spondent's representative, shall be posted by it immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees, are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
B. Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers and Taxicab
Drivers Local Union #327, affiliated with Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, its officers, agents,
and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Causing or attempting to cause Industrial Towel
and Uniform Service, a Division of Cavalier Industries,
Inc., to deduct union dues from the wages of employees
pursuant to checkoff authorizations which are no
longer valid because of a break in an employee's em-
ployment.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or co-
ercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Jointly and severally with the Respondent Indus-
trial Towel reimburse Doris Lee Mitchell Durham for
all sums improperly deducted from her wages in pay-
ment of union dues plus interest at the rate of 6 percent
per annum.
(b) Jointly and severally with the Respondent Indus-
trial Towel reimburse other employees who may have
had union dues improperly deducted from their wages,
plus interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum.
(c) Post at its meeting hall copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix B."' Copies of said notice,
on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
2'6, after being duly signed by its authorized officer or
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
each of the Union's bulletin boards, and all places
where notices to its members are customarily posted.
6 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board."
7 See fn.1, supra
INDUSTRIAL TOWEL AND UNIFORM SERVICE
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Union to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. Dated By
(d) Furnish signed copies of said Appendix B to said
Regional Director for posting at the places where no-
tices of Respondent Industrial Towel to its employees
are posted, if said Respondent Industrial Towel is will-
ing to do so.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here-
with.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT assist the Union by checking off
membership dues not sanctioned by employees
through currently executed checkoff authoriza-
tions.
WE WILL NOT continue to deduct union mem-
bership dues pursuant to checkoff authorizations
which are no longer valid because of a break in an
employee's employment, or discriminate against
employees in any other manner to encourage
membership in the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
WE WILL, jointly and severally with Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Helpers and Taxicab Drivers Local
Union #327, affiliated with International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, reimburse Doris Lee
Mitchell Durham for all sums deducted from her
wages in payment of union dues pursuant to a
checkoff authorization which is no longer valid,
plus interest at 6 percent per annum.
WE WILL, jointly and severally with the above-
mentioned Union, reimburse other employees who
may similarly have had union dues deducted from
their wages pursuant to checkoff authorizations
which are no longer valid- Dlus interest at 6 per-
cent per annum.
INDUSTRIAL TOWEL
AND UNIFORM
SERVICE, A
DIVISION OF
CAVALIER
INDUSTRIES,
INC.
1123
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's
Office, 746 Federal Office Building , 167 North Main
Street, Memphis, Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901-
534-3161.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Indus-
trial Towel and Uniform Service, a Division of
Cavalier Industries, Inc., to deduct union dues
from the wages of employees pursuant to checkoff
authorizations which are no longer valid because
of a break in an employee's employment.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, jointly and severally with Industrial
Towel and Uniform Service, a Division of Cavalier
Industries, Inc., reimburse Doris Lee Mitchell
Durham for all sums deducted from her wages in
payment of union dues pursuant to a checkoff au-
thorization which is no longer valid because of a
break in her employment, plus interest at 6 percent
per annum.
WE WILL jointly and severally with the above-
mentioned Industrial Towel reimburse other em-
ployees who may similarly have had union dues
deducted from their wages pursuant to checkoff
authorizations which are no longer valid, plus in-
terest at 6 percent per annum.
TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS,
HELPERS AND
TAXICAB DRIVERS
LOCAL UNION
#327, AFFILIATED
WITH INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS,
CHAUFFEURS,
1124 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS
OF AMERICA
(Labor Organization)
Dated -0 By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance
with its provisions may be directed to the Board's
Office, 746 Federal Office Building, 167 North Main
Street, Memphis, Tennessee 38103, Telephone 901-
534-3161.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT COHN, Trial Examiner: This consolidated pro-
ceeding was heard before me in Nashville, Tennessee, on
August 10, 1971, pursuant to due notice. The original charge
against Industrial Towel and Uniform Service, a division of
Cavalier Industries, Inc.' (herein the Respondent Employer
or Company), was filed by Doris Lee Mitchell Durham,' an
individual, on July 13, 1970 (subsequently amended August
17, 1970 and September 21, 1970); the original charge against
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers and Taxicab Drivers Local
Union No. 327, Affiliated With International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America (herein Respondent Union) was filed by the same
individual on July 13, 1970 (subsequently amended on the
same dates as in the case against Respondent Employer). The
order consolidating cases, consolidated complaint and notice
of hearing was issued by the Regional Director for Region 26
on January 21, 1971, to which answers were duly filed on
behalf of both Respondent Employer and Respondent Union.
The pleadings present the issue of whether the Respondent
Company violated Section 8(a)(1), (2) and (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein the Act), and Re-
spondent Union violated Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the
Act by Respondent Employer's checking-off of union dues of
some 13 named employees and paying such sums over to the
Respondent Union without current authorizations from the
employees.'
At the trial, all parties were permitted to introduce relevant
evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue
orally on the record, and to submit briefs. Oral argument was
waived. Briefs submitted by the General Counsel, Respond-
ent Company and Respondent Union, have been duly consid-
ered.
Upon the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, I make the follow-
ing:
The name of the Company appears as corrected by an amendment to
the complaint at the hearing.
The name of the Charging Party appears as corrected at the hearing.
The complaint was amended at the hearing to include other unnamed
employees.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent Company is now, and has been at all times
material, a corporation with a plant and place of business
located in Nashville, Tennessee, where it is engaged in the
rental of industrial towels and uniforms. During an annual
period, Respondent Company, in the course and conduct of
its business operations, caused to be purchased and received
goods and services valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
points located outside the State of Tennessee.
I find, as Respondent Company admits, that it is now, and
has been at all times material, an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
Respondent Union is now, and has been at all times material,
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Respondents have, for many years, been parties to
collective-bargaining agreements wherein the Respondent
Employer recognized the Respondent Union as the exclusive
bargaining agent of its "inside plant employees." The collec-
tive agreement in effect during the time of the events critical
to the issue herein was effectivefrom October 15, 1966 to and
including December 15, 1970. (G.C. Exhibit No. 3) Article
XXX of such agreement provides for the checkoff of union
dues by the Respondent Company as follows:
ARTICLE XXX
Check-Off
The employer agrees to deduct from the pay of all
employees covered by this Agreement, the dues, initia-
tion fees and/or uniform assessments of the Local Union
having jurisdiction over such employees and agrees to
remit to said Local Union all such deductions prior to
the end of the month for which the deduction is made,
provided that the Union delivers to the Employer a writ-
ten authorization signed by the employee irrevocable for
one year or expiration of this Agreement whichever shall
occur sooner. The Union shall certify to the Employer
in writing each month, a list of its members working for
the Employer, who have furnished to the Employer such
authorization, together with an itemized statement of
dues, initiation fees, and uniform assessments owed, to
be deducted for such month from the pay of such mem-
bers. The Employer shall deduct and remit to the Union
in one lump sum the amount so certified in respect to
each such member following the receipt of such certifica-
tion of statement and remit the same to the Union within
seven (7) days following such deduction.
The Union agrees to indemnify and save the Employer
harmless against any and all claims , demands, suits, or
other forms of liability that may arise out of, or by reason
of, action taken by the Employer in complying with the
provisions of this Article, in reliance upon the executed
Check-Off Authorization and Assignment forms which
have been furnished to it.
During the first period of their employment with the Re-
spondent Company, the alleged discriminatees herein author-
ized the Respondent Company to deduct their dues, fees and
initiation fees due Respondent Union by executing a checkoff
card as follows:
INDUSTRIAL TOWEL AND UNIFORM SERVICE 1125
CHECK-OFF AUTHORIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT
PRINT DATE OF
NAME BIRTH
ADDRESS CITY
WHERE DATE
EMPLOYED EMPLOYED
I. the undersigned member of Local . of the International
. hereby authorize my employer to deduct
from my wages and to pay to Local No, and/or its authorized
representative , initiation fees and membership dues , including uniform
assessments , irk-such amounts as may be established by such Local Union
from time to time and in accordance with the agreement between such Local
Union and my employer.
This authorization and assignment shall be irrevocable for the term of the
applicable contract between the Union and the Company, or for one year,
whichever is the lesser , and shall automatically renew itself for successive
yearly or applicable contract periods thereafter, whichever is the lesser,
unless I give written notice to the Company and the Union at least 60 days
and not more than 75 days before any periodic renewal date of this
authorization and assignment of my desire to revoke the same.
Signed
Social Security No. Date
At varying times thereafter, the alleged discriminatees
were terminated by or voluntarily severed their employment
with the Respondent Company. Subsequently, again at vary-
ing times thereafter, they were rehired by the Respondent
Company. Contrary to the allegations in the complaint, how-
ever, the Respondent Company denies that such persons were
rehired as new employees. In any event, the Respondent
Company acknowledges that, upon rehire of said persons, it
commenced to check off union dues and transmit them to the
Union without requiring the execution of new dues deduction
authorizations, but rather relied upon the original dues de-
duction authorizations as the basis for checkoff.
The Charging Party was the only employee witness for the
General Counsel. She testified, in essence, that she executed
a checkoff authorization when she first went to work for the
Company in the latter part of 1963, and that dues were de-
ducted from her pay until 1966 when she left the employment
of the Company because of illness. In September 1961, she
was recalled to work at the same job. It appears that union
dues were first deducted from her paycheck in June 1970.1
The parties stipulated that the Charging Party protested to
the union stewardess concerning this deducation, but she
testified that she never did inquire from any management or
union representative as to the procedure for cancelling the
dues checkoff authorization. She further testified that she
read the checkoff authorization card when she signed it, but
that she did not notice what it said about revoking the
checkoff. Mrs. Durham quit her employment in September
1970, during which time (the second period of employment)
there was a total of $36 checked off from her pay by the
Respondent Company and transmitted to the Union.'
Analysis and Concluding Findings
Contrary to the contentions of Respondent Union in its
brief, it seems clear that checkoff of union dues by employers
without proper authorization of its employees constitutes im-
proper assistance to a labor organization in violation of the
unfair labor practice provisions of the Act, notwithstanding
the additional criminal sanctions prescribed in Section 302 of
4 At that time , $ 12 was deducted ; dues were $6 per month.
' Counsel for the General Counsel offered to call only one other person
named in the complaint as a witness , Linda Faye Shrum . However she was
not called, the parties stipulating that if she testified , she would state that
beginning in 1970 dues were withheld from her paycheck ; and that she
protested to both the Union and the Company concerning the deduction of
union dues.
1126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Act.' However , there is no attack by the General Counsel
in the instant case either as respects the arrangements for
checkoff, or that at one point in time during the course of
their employment , the persons named in the complaint ex-
ecuted valid checkoff authorization cards . The issue is, as
previously stated , whether it was incumbent upon the Re-
spondent to secure new authorizations from such persons
following a break in employment . The General Counsel
argues that execution of new authorizations was required
because the named persons were rehired as new employees
rather than simply being recalled by the Respondent Em-
ployer following a short layoff in their employment. How-
ever, the record evidence on this point is somewhat vague and
ambiguous.
It is true that the seniority roster supplied by the Respond-
ent Employer during the investigation of this case indicates
that the date of the second employment is controlling for the
purpose of seniority under the provisions of the collective-
bargaining agreement . However, the testimony of the Char-
ing Party (the only alleged discriminatee who testified in this
proceeding) is that when she was recalled to work by the
Respondent Company , in a job covered by the bargaining
unit , she was not (1) required to fill out a new application
form, (2) did not receive the beginning rate of pay, and (3)
was not charged a new or additional initiation fee by the
Respondent Union as was customary procedure for "new
employees ." Under these circumstances , I have serious
doubts that the General Counsel has proved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in the record as a whole that all the
named employees were rehired as "new employees" by the
Respondent Company, since the only evidence upon which to
base such a finding is the language in paragraph 14 of the
complaint that the named persons were "terminated by, or
voluntarily severed their employment with Respondent Em-
ployer" and that such persons were subsequently rehired and
given new seniority dates by the Respondent Employer.'
However, I need not , and do not , rest my ultimate conclu-
sion of dismissal of the complaint on this ground alone since
I am convinced that no violation of the Act occurred under
the facts of this case in any event . Counsel for the General
Counsel, in support of his position , relies principally on
Idarado Mining Company, 77 NLRB 392.8 That case in-
volved a maintenance of membership clause in a collective-
bargaining agreement between the Company and Union. The
alleged discriminatee (Miller ) voluntarily became a member
of the Union during his first period of employment. He then
voluntarily quit and approximately a year later applied to the
Company for a job and was hired the same day. He was
discharged approximately 3 months later when he failed to
rejoin the labor organization involved . A majority of a three-
member panel of the Board , holding that such discharge
constituted a violation of Section 8(3) of the Act, stated:
The obligation under the contract to remain a member
in good standing of the contracting union rested on em-
ployees. When Miller severed his employment relation-
ship with the respondent , his obligation to remain a
See Chun King Sales, Inc., 126 NLRB 851, 867.
As previously indicated, counsel for the General Counsel proffered no
evidence by the other alleged discriminatees as to the circumstances under
which they have returned to employment. I note that in the case of one
person named in the complaint (Ernestine Hill Braden), the lapsed time
between her leaving the employment of the Company and reemployment
was a mere 20 days. It should also be noted that, aside from the testimony
of the Charging Party and the stipulation respecting Linda Faye Shrum,
there is no record evidence that any of the other named (or unnamed)
persons in the complaint ever protested to the Respondents concerning the
continuation of the checkoff upon their reemployment.
'See also Yellow Cab Company, 148 NLRB 620.
member in good standing of the Mine Production Work-
ers ended at the same time. The obligation was not
merely suspended, ready to be imposed at any time in the
future that Miller might be again employed by the re-
spondent. On his reemployment by the respondent, in a
new position and as a new employee, approximately a
year after he had voluntarily resigned from the respond-
ent's employ, Miller's status was like that of any other
new employee; he was required to remain a member in
good standing of the Mine Production Workers only if
he voluntarily rejoined that organization after his reem-
ployment.
The dissenting member of the panel noted that Miller had
voluntarily assumed to maintain membership in his collec-
tive-bargaining representative during the effective period of
the contract and was free to withdraw during an escape
period, but did not do so. He felt that this obligation of
membership should not be lightly disregarded since "other-
wise the union security clause would become inoperative as
to every employee, otherwise bound, who resigned or was
discharged, even if for only a day, and was subsequently
rehired."'
I believe the instant case to be distinguishable from Idarado
on at least two grounds: (1) There was no question in that
case-and the decision is clearly bottomed on the rationale-
that Miller was rehired as a "new employee" by the Com-
pany. As noted above, I have grave reservations that such a
finding may be properly reached in the instant case; (2) The
employees here voluntarily entered into a written commit-
ment respecting the terms and conditions under which their
union dues might be deducted from their paychecks, which
commitment specifically provided for the manner in which
such employee might escape from this obligation. This situa-
tion can be fairly analogized, it seems to me, to that in a
Section 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain case wherein the majority
status of the employees in an appropriate unit is shown by
signed authorization cards. In that situation, the Board has
held, with court approval, that no inquiry may be made into
the subjective notions of the employee signing the card since
it is presumed that the employee knew what he was signing.
As the Supreme Court stated in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing
Company:'°
. we think it sufficient to point out that employees
should be bound by the clear language of what they sign
unless that language is deliberately and clearly cancelled
by a union adherent with words calculated to direct the
signer to disregard and forget the language ' above his
signature ... We cannot agree with the employers here
that employees as a rule are too unsophisticated to be
bound by what they sign unless expressly told that their
act of signing represents something else. In addition to
approving the use of cards, of course, Congress has ex-
pressly authorized reliance on employee signatures alone
in other areas of labor relations, even where criminal
sanctions hang in the balance, (citing Section 302 of the
Act) and we should not act hastily in disregarding con-
gressionaljudgments that employees can be counted on to
take responsibility for their acts. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly here, I do not believe that the Act requires that
the Respondents be subjected to large backpay claims, in
addition to the normal cease and desist order, by making an
arrangement for checkoff of union dues-otherwise valid un-
der the Statute-but here made invalid because the employee
signatories did not pursue their right under the checkoff au-
thorization to escape its sanctions during the appropriate
' 77 NLRB, at 395-396.
10 395 U.S. 575, 606-607.
INDUSTRIAL TOWEL AND UNIFORM SERVICE 1127
period . I shall therefore recommend that the complaint be
dismissed in its entirety.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record,
I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent Company is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The General Counsel has failed to establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the Respondents engaged in the
unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the Act, I issue the following recommended:
ORDER
The complaint herein is dismissed in its entirety.