CASINO PAUMA

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 3, 2015

363 NLRB No. 60 (N.L.R.B. 2015)

363 NLRB No. 60
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Casino Pauma and Unite Here International Union.
Cases 21–CA–125450, 21–CA–126528, and 21–
CA–131428
December 3, 2015
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS MISCIMARRA, HIROZAWA,
AND MCFERRAN
On June 4, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Ariel L.
Sotolongo issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and

1 We adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(1) by disciplining employee Audelia Reyes for distributing union
literature in a nonworking area and during non-working time. We find
it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s finding that the discipline also
violated Sec. 8(a)(3), as the additional finding would not materially
affect the remedy. Member Hirozawa would adopt the additional viola-
tion.
Although the judge states that the “issue of jurisdiction is res judica-
ta,” we note that it is the doctrine of issue preclusion that forecloses the
Respondent from arguing that the Board lacks jurisdiction. See Migra
v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 fn. 1 (1984)
(explaining that the application of res judicata in a “narrow sense”
refers only to claim preclusion, which forecloses relitigation of matters
that should have been raised in an earlier action but were not, while
collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, refers to the effect of a judg-
ment in foreclosing relitigation of a matter that has already been decid-
ed).
In the absence of exceptions, we adopt the judge’s dismissal of the
8(a)(1) allegations that the Respondent unlawfully interrogated Reyes
and instructed her to keep confidential her conversation with Human
Resources about her discipline. In the absence of exceptions, we also
adopt the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by
photographing employees who were engaged in distributing union
literature. The Respondent excepts to the judge’s remedy for the pho-
tography violation. We adopt the judge’s remedy, which is consistent
with the Board’s standard remedial language.
Member Miscimarra agrees with the judge and his colleagues that
the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining a rule prohibiting
employees from distributing literature in “guest areas.” He has ex-
pressed disagreement, however, with the current Board standard regard-
ing alleged overly broad rules and policies, which is set forth as the first
prong of the test in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646,
646–647 (2004) (finding rules and policies unlawful where “employees
would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity”),
and he advocates that the Board formulate a different standard in an
appropriate future case. See, e.g., Lily Transportation Corp., 362
NLRB No. 54, slip op. at 1 fn. 3 (2015); Conagra Foods, Inc., 361
NLRB No. 113, slip op. at 8 fn. 2 (2014); Triple Play Sports Bar &
to adopt the recommended Order as modified and set
forth in full below.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that Re-
spondent, Casino Pauma, Pauma Valley, California, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a rule that prohibits employees from
distributing literature in “guest areas.”
(b) Interfering with the distribution of union literature
by employees in nonworking public or guest areas of the
hotel.
(c) Threatening employees with discipline if they en-
gage in protected concerted activities.
(d) Placing employees under surveillance while they
engage in union or other protected concerted activities.
(e) Creating the impression that it is engaged in sur-
veillance of its employees’ union or other protected con-
certed activities.
(f) Disciplining employees because they engage in
protected concerted activities.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Revise or rescind its rule that prohibits employees
from distributing literature in “guest areas.”
(b) Furnish employees with an insert for the current
employee handbook that (1) advises that the unlawful
provision has been rescinded, or (2) provides a lawfully
worded provision on adhesive backing that will cover the
unlawful provision; or publish and distribute to employ-
ees revised employee handbooks that (1) do not contain
the unlawful provision, or (2) provide a lawfully worded
provision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the unlawful disci-
plinary warning issued to Audelia Reyes, and, within 3
days thereafter, notify her in writing that this has been

Grille, 361 NLRB No. 31, slip op. at 10 fn. 3 (2014), affd. sub nom.
Three D, LLC v. NLRB, Nos. 14–3284, 14–3814, 2015 WL 6161477
(2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2015). In addition, Member Miscimarra would not
find, in every case, that the area immediately outside a hotel entrance is
a non-work area. In his view, whether or not such an area is non-
working depends on the facts in each case. See Sheraton Anchorage,
362 NLRB No. 123, slip op. at 5 (2015) (Member Miscimarra, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). He agrees with the judge’s finding,
based on the record evidence here, that the valet driveway leading to
the public entrance to the Respondent’s casino was a non-working area.
2 We have modified the judge’s recommended Order and substituted
a new notice consistent with this decision and to conform to the
Board’s standard remedial language and the violations found.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
done and that the warning will not be used against her in
any way.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Pauma Valley, California, copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 21, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electroni-
cally, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an in-
ternet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respond-
ent customarily communicates with its employees by
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material. In the event that,
during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respond-
ent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall dupli-
cate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed
by the Respondent at any time since September 1, 2011.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 3, 2015
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule that prohibits employees
from distributing literature in “guest areas.”
WE WILL NOT interfere with the distribution of union
literature by employees in nonworking public or guest
areas of the hotel.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with discipline for
engaging in protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT place employees under surveillance
while they engage in union or other protected concerted
activities.
WE WILL NOT create the impression that we are en-
gaged in surveillance of employees’ union or other pro-
tected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT discipline employees because they en-
gage in protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL revise or rescind our rule prohibiting em-
ployees from distributing literature in “guest areas.”
WE WILL furnish employees with an insert for the cur-
rent employee handbook that (1) advises that the unlaw-
ful provision has been rescinded, or (2) provides a law-
fully worded provision on adhesive backing that will
cover the unlawful provision; or WE WILL publish and
distribute to employees revised employee handbooks that
(1) do not contain the unlawful provision, or (2) provide
a lawfully worded provision.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful disciplinary warning issued to Audelia Reyes, and WE
WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify her in writing that
this has been done and that the warning will not be used
against her in any way.
CASINO PAUMA 3
CASINO PAUMA
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/21-CA-125450 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or
by calling (202) 273–1940.
Irma Hernandez, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Scott A. Wilson, Esq., for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ARIEL L. SOTOLONGO, Administrative Law Judge. I presided
over this trial in Temecula, California, on December 15, 16,
and 17, 2014. On July 24, 2014 the Regional Director for Re-
gion 21 of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board)
issued an order consolidating cases, consolidated complaint and
notice of hearing in the above-captioned cases. The consolidat-
ed complaint alleges that Casino Pauma (Respondent) violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)
by: (1) maintaining a rule in its employee handbook prohibiting
distribution of literature in “working or guest areas” at any
time; (2) by interfering with the distribution of union literature
by employees near the public entrance to its casino; (3) by
threatening employees with discipline for distributing union
literature at that location; (4) by taking a photograph of an em-
ployee who was distributing union literature; (5) by interrogat-
ing an employee about her union activity; and (6) by directing
an employee to keep a discussion about possible discipline as
confidential. The complaint additionally alleges that Respond-
ent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by issuing a writ-
ten disciplinary warning to an employee for engaging in union
activity. Respondent thereafter filed a timely answer to the
complaint.
I. JURISDICTION
At the outset, I note that on March 31, 2015, the Board is-
sued a decision involving this same Respondent in Casino
Pauma, 362 NLRB No. 52 (2015), affirming the decision of
administrative law judge Jeffrey D. Wedekind that the Board
had jurisdiction over Respondent pursuant to the Board’s ruling
in San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 NLRB 1005
(2004), enfd. 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007).1 In Casino
Pauma, the Board also cites Little River Band of Ottawa Indi-
ans Tribal Government, 361 NLRB No. 45 (2014), and Soaring
Eagle Casino & Resort, 361 NLRB No. 73 (2014), in support
of its finding that the Board has jurisdiction over Indian casi-
nos, including Respondent. The Board additionally rejected
Respondent’s argument, which it again makes in this case, that
the Supreme Court has implicitly overruled the Board’s San
Manuel decision in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community,
134 S.Ct. 2024 (2014).
I also note that the parties have stipulated that the same facts
that underlie and support the jurisdictional findings in the prior
case before Judge Wedekind also exist and are applicable in the
present case, to wit:
 That Respondent operates a gaming and entertain-
ing establishment (the Casino) in Pauma Valley,
California, and that the Casino has slot machines,
gaming tables and several restaurants;
 That Respondent is owned the Pauma Band of
Mission Indians (the Tribe), but that there is no ev-
idence of any Tribal involvement in the day-to-day
operation of the Casino;
 That Respondent operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week, to members of the public, and that the vast
majority of its customers are not members of the
Tribe or of any other Native American Tribe;
 That the vast majority of Respondent’s employees,
security guards, supervisors and managers are not
members of the Tribe or any other Native Ameri-
can Tribe, and that of the 236 members of the
Tribe, only 5 are employed by Respondent;
 That Respondent advertises its Casino using multi-
ple sources, including website, television, radio,
mail, and mobile billboards on buses, and advertis-
es in various California counties, including San Di-
ego, Riverside, San Bernardino, Orange, and Los
Angeles. (See Jt. Exh. 1) 2
Additionally, I note that the parties stipulated that in calendar
year 2013, Respondent had revenues of at least $50,000,000
(Tr. 19–20), and that in its answer to the complaint Respondent
admitted that: (1) during the 12-month period ending on June
30, 2014, it had gross revenues in excess of $500,000; and (2)
that (during the same period) it purchased and received at its
Pauma Valley, California facility goods valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside California (GC Exh. 1(o)).
Finally, I note that in its answer to the complaint Respondent
admitted that there is no Federal treaty between the Tribe and
the Federal government (GC Exh. 1 (o)).

1 The Board also affirmed Judge Wedekind’s findings that Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by, inter alia, interfering
with its employees’ wearing of union pins and other conduct.
2 Joint Exhibits will be referred to as “Jt. Exh.(s);” General Coun-
sel’s exhibits will be referred to as “GC Exh.(s);” and Respondents
exhibits will “R Exh.(s).” The transcript will be referenced as “Tr.,”
followed by applicable page number(s).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
In light of the above facts, which have not changed since
Judge Wedekind issued his decision in the prior case, I con-
clude that pursuant to the Board’s recent decision in Casino
Pauma, the issue of jurisdiction is res judicata. Accordingly, I
find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and
that the Board therefore has jurisdiction over Respondent.
During the trial, as well as in its post-hearing brief, Re-
spondent advances arguments against the Board exercising
jurisdiction, including arguments that it apparently did not raise
in the prior case. Briefly, Respondent first argues that the Su-
preme Court in Bay Mills, id., impliedly overruled the Board’s
ruling in San Manuel, an argument that the Board specifically
rejected in footnote 3 of Casino Pauma, supra. While Re-
spondent’s arguments in that regard may ultimately be found
valid by a circuit court, or even the Supreme Court, I am bound
by the Board’s recent ruling, and therefore reject it.
Secondly, Respondent argues that in 2000, Respondent en-
tered into a Tribal State Compact with the State of California
(the Compact), under the auspices and provisions of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (25 U.S.C. §2710 (d)(3)(B)).
The Compact provides for certain union organizing rights under
its provisions, including the Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance,
which Respondent argues should be controlling in this case,
and not the Act.3 Such argument would have been valid prior
to the Board’s 2004 decision in San Manuel, pursuant to which
the Board for the first time opted to exercise jurisdiction over
Indian casinos, which it had previously declined to do for the
historical and policy reasons discussed at length in that deci-
sion. Once the Board opted to exercise jurisdiction over Indian
casinos, however, the doctrine of Federal preemption applied,
thus preempting the Compact and any other State laws or regu-
lations that govern matters over which the Board has exclusive
jurisdiction. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor
Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 773–774, 746 (1947); San Die-
go Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242–243
(1959); Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comission, 427 U.S. 132, 150–151 (1976). Accordingly,
I do not find merit in Respondent’s arguments, and as stated
above, conclude that the issue of jurisdiction in this case is res
judicata and thus a settled matter pursuant to the Board’s ruling
in Casino Pauma.
II. THE FACTS
A. Background
As reflected above, Respondent operates a gaming estab-
lishment, which the parties stipulated consists of 35,000 square
feet of gaming area, with a total of 7 buildings housing differ-
ent aspects of Respondent’s operations and a parking lot that
can accommodate approximately 859 vehicles, 5 bus parking
places, and 24 RV parking places (Jt. Exh. 1). Aerial (or satel-
lite) photos of Respondent’s property were introduced as joint
exhibits, which provide a good perspective of the size of the
facility and overall property, as well as the location of various

3 A copy of the Compact, and its addendums, appears on the record
as R. Exh. 4.
areas where some of the activities at issue herein took place.4
As described in Judge Wedekind’s prior decision, UNITE
HERE International Union (the Union) has been conducting an
organizing campaign among Respondent’s employees since at
least early 2013. It is the conduct of Respondent’s employees
as part of this campaign, and Respondent’s response to such
conduct, as described below, that is at issue in the present case,
just as it was in the prior case.
Additionally, at issue is language contained in Respondent’s
employee handbook, which the parties stipulated to and intro-
duced as Joint Exhibit 4. The language (rule) in question ap-
pears on page 24 of the handbook and reads as follows:
Circulation of Petitions
No one shall be allowed to distribute literature in working or
guest areas at any time. Team Members may not solicit other
Team Members for any purpose during scheduled work time.
Work time does not include break time. In addition a Team
Member who is on his/her break may not solicit or distribute
literature of any kind to a Team Member who is working.
It was Respondent’s enforcement of this rule which gave rise
to some of the allegations of the consolidated complaint dis-
cussed below.
B. The Events of December 14, 2013
It is undisputed that on December 14, 2013, a number of Re-
spondent’s employees, at various times of the day, distributed
union leaflets at the valet entrance of the casino, which is on the
front or “public” side of the casino, facing and immediately
adjacent to the visitor parking lot. Based on undisputed testi-
mony from witnesses, the evidence indicates that the location
where the employees distributed leaflets was approximately
75–100 feet from the front doors of the casino (Tr. 102, 236).5
It is undisputed, and indeed admitted by Respondent, that Re-
spondent’s security personnel approached these employees on
each occasion they were distributing flyers and informed them
that they were prohibited from doing so in that area of the
property, and informed the employees that they could be disci-

4 Thus, Jt. Exh. 3A is a photograph taken from above showing the
two main white-roofed buildings housing Respondent’s casino, includ-
ing its restaurants, and part of the parking lot closest to the casino. To
the left of the building in the center of the photo is a crescent (or half-
moon) shaped driveway, which is the valet entrance to the casino,
where the main doors are located (below the bronze-colored roof). This
is the public entrance to the casino, and part of the public parking lot
can be seen. The second white-roofed building (connected to the first
and similar in shape and size) that appears closer to the edge of the
photograph is the back side of the casino, and an area immediately
outside the building where blue-colored awnings can be seen is where
the employee (non-public) entrance to the casino is located. A second
photograph from a higher perspective and showing a wider field was
introduced an admitted as Jt. Exh. 3B. An additional 4 photographs
taken from a ground perspective and showing the valet (or public)
entrance to the casino were also introduced as Jt. Exhs. 2A through 2D.
It is at this location where the leafleting activities described below took
place.
5 The parties agreed that the main entrance doors of the casino were
about 80–90 feet from the location where the leaflets were being dis-
tributed (Tr. 138–139).
CASINO PAUMA 5
plined if they continued to do so.6 Finally, I note that there is
no evidence, or allegations, that the employees distributing the
union leaflets/flyers were littering, obstructing foot or vehicular
traffic, or harassing casino customers in any manner. The tes-
timony about the events of December 14 was as follows:
Victor Diaz Huerta (Huerta), an employee of Respondent for
8 years, testified that on December 14, starting at approximate-
ly 11:30 a.m., he and fellow employees Maria Ponce, Guada-
lupe Piñeda,7 and Raul Marquez began distributing union leaf-
lets by the entry and exit points at the valet driveway in the
front or public entrance of the casino. These employees sta-
tioned themselves strategically so that any customer walking
into the casino from the public parking lot on the front (or pub-
lic) side of the casino would have to walk past them, and could
thus be handed a leaflet.8 Although Huerta could not specifi-
cally recall if the flyer introduced into evidence as General
Counsel Exhibit 2 was the one he distributed on that day, other
witnesses confirmed that this leaflet was indeed the one they
distributed on that day, and the parties stipulated that General
Counsel Exhibit 2 was the flyer distributed by the union to the
employees that day to pass out (Tr. 49–56, 290).9
Huerta testified that he positioned himself on the sidewalk on
the exit side of the valet driveway, with Ponce directly across
the driveway from him on same side, while Piñeda and
Marquez positioned themselves across each other on the entry
side of the valet driveway. About ten minutes after Huerta
started distributing leaflets, Jacob Hanson, Respondent’s secu-
rity director, approached him. Hanson told Huerta, in English
(which Huerta understands), that he could not distribute flyers
there, adding that he could distribute the flyers in the back (of
the casino), by the employee entrance. Huerta asked Hanson
what would happen if he continued to distribute flyers at the

6 As described below, it is also undisputed that on several occasions
the security personnel informed the employees that they were allowed
to distribute the leaflets on the “back” or employee entrance of the
casino.
7 Although the transcript reflects the name as “Pineda,” the correct
Spanish spelling of the employee’s name is “Piñeda,” and the transcript
shall thus be corrected.
8 Much testimony and time was devoted to describing the precise
spots by the valet driveway where the employees were standing while
they distributed leaflets, and indeed photographs were introduced to
mark these spots. Thus, for example, Jt. Exh. 2A shows the “exit” side
of the crescent-shaped valet driveway (also shown in the aerial photo-
graphs in Exhs 3A and 3B), and Jt. Exh. 2C shows the entrance of that
driveway. All the employees who testified about having distributed
leaflets on December 14 testified that they stationed themselves on the
sidewalk on either side of the entrance or the exit of such driveway. As
previously discussed, it is undisputed that these spots were located
about 75–100 feet from the main doors of the casino, that the employ-
ees were on the sidewalk and not blocking foot or vehicular traffic, and
that neither they nor the customers were littering or otherwise throwing
leaflets on the ground. In light of these undisputed facts, the exact
location of each employee distributing the leaflets has no legal signifi-
cance, and henceforth I will simply describe their location by indicating
that they were stationed by the valet driveway.
9 GC Exh. 2 is a double-sided flyer, in English on one side and
Spanish on the other, containing the photograph of employees in the
union organizing committee, and exhorting customers of the casino to
support the employees’ organizational activities.
present location, and Hanson responded that he could report
him to Human Resources (HR), which could result in discipli-
nary action. Huerta added that just as Hanson was approaching
him, Ponce crossed the driveway and joined them as their con-
versation was occurring. (Tr. 59–67, 93–96.)
Hanson, Huerta and Ponce then walked to the entry side of
the valet driveway where Piñeda and Marquez were distributing
leaflets, and Huerta noticed that two security guards, Max Ortiz
and Ricardo (“Ricky”) Torres had also approached that loca-
tion.10 According to Huerta, “Max” Ortiz told Piñeda and
Marquez, in Spanish (which Huerta speaks), that they could not
distribute flyers in that area, but could do so in the “back,” by
the employee entrance. Huerta also testified that Piñeda asked
Ortiz what would occur if they did not stop distributing flyers at
that location, and that Ortiz replied that they would be reported
to HR for disciplinary action.11 (Tr. 68–72.)
Ponce and Piñeda corroborated Huerta’s testimony, whom I
found to be credible (Tr. 118–125, 129–134, 135–139, 159–
163, 170-173). Indeed, Respondent’s security director, Han-
son, admitted that he told Huerta and the others that they could
not distribute flyers at the location where they were, pursuant to
Respondent’s employee handbook, which prohibited distribu-
tion of literature in “public” (the term used by Hanson) areas of
the casino, as quoted above.12 Moreover, Hanson admitted that
he instructed his security personnel not to permit such distribu-
tion of flyers in the public areas, and admitted that his person-
nel had multiple encounters throughout that day with employ-
ees distributing literature in these areas, which they stopped.
(Tr. 370–375.)
In light of Hanson’s admission, there can be no dispute that
the other encounters later on the same day occurred as de-
scribed by the union witnesses (and as alleged in the com-
plaint), with one limited exception involving the alleged taking
of a photograph by a security guard, which as discussed below,
is disputed.
Thus, employee James Bayton testified that approximately at
12:20 p.m. on the same day, he and fellow employees Alvaro
and Maria Bolanos (husband and wife) started distributing un-
ion leaflets (GC Exh. 2) at the same location(s) by the valet

10 The parties stipulated to the names of the security guards as well
as to their status as agents of Respondent. Undisputed testimony by
various witnesses also established that Respondent’s security guards or
personnel wore distinguishable clothing that identified them as mem-
bers of the security staff, many of whom were well-known to the em-
ployees.
11 Almost every employee who testified about these encounters
asked the same question as to what would occur if they did not stop
distributing flyers at this location, and they all testified receiving the
same replies. Apparently, the employees were coached by the Union to
ask such question, and Respondent’s security personnel obliged them
with the same replies. Indeed, the Union gave the employees a printed
card that spelled out what their rights were, including their right to
distribute union literature in the public areas and parking lots pursuant
to cited Board cases, and requested them to give out these cards to any
security personnel that tried to stop them (See GC Exh. 3). The em-
ployees attempted to give these cards to the guards, which in most
cases declined to take them.
12 It appears Respondent uses the terms “guest areas” and public ar-
eas” to mean the same.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
driveway previously described above. About 10 minutes after
they started distributing the flyers, security guard Gene
Oseguera, approached Bayton and told him and the Bolanos,
who had also approached, that they could not distribute the
flyers at that location. Bayton asked Oseguera what would
happen if they did not stop, and Oseguera replied that he would
take their names and report them to the HR department. (Tr.
224–232.)13 In his testimony, Oseguera confirmed that he in-
structed individuals distributing flyers at the valet entrance,
which he described as the “guest entrance,” to stop doing so,
but his account varies from Bayton’s in two respects. First, he
testified that he was on a bike when he approached, not on foot.
Second, he testified that he approached a man and a woman
whom he recognized as employees, and as he was telling them
they could not distribute flyers at that location they were ap-
proached by another “older” white male who told Oseguera that
he was wrong and that they could distribute the flyers any-
where. Oseguera testified that this man had no employee iden-
tification, so he asked him to leave the property. (Tr. 393–
398.)14
Employee Maria Tavarez testified that at approximately 1:00
p.m. on the same day she and fellow employee Maria Alba
were distributing union flyers at the valet entrance previously
described. A few minutes after they started, two security
guards whom she recognized (and whose identities were stipu-
lated to by the parties), Gene Oseguera and Jesus Solis, ap-
proached her on foot. As they did, Alba came over to where
the three of them were. Solis, in Spanish, told them they could
not distribute flyers in this location. Just as this was occurring,
a third security guard arrived on a bike and approached the
group. Tavarez testified that she did not know the name of the
security guard on the bike, but that she’s seen him before both
inside the casino floor as well as patrolling in the parking lot on
a bike. This security guard also told them, in Spanish, that they
could not distribute flyers at that location. Tavarez then handed
him a copy of the “union rights” card (GC Exh. 3) that the Un-
ion had given them to pass out to anyone who tried to stop them
from distributing flyers, and she asked this guard what would
happen if they did not stop doing so. According to Tavarez, the

13 Bayton testified that Oseguera approached on foot, not on a bike.
He had seen Oseguera patrolling on a bike before, but not on this occa-
sion.
14 The identity of this “older” man was never clearly established,
although it is not ultimately important. In this regard, I conclude that I
need not make any credibility determinations regarding this encounter
except as discussed below, because Oseguera admitted the main allega-
tion: that he instructed the individuals distributing the flyers to stop,
and did not deny threatening to report them to HR if they did not stop.
The dispute as to whether he was on foot or on a bike is important,
however, because it impacts testimony regarding another encounter that
Oseguera allegedly had later that afternoon with other employees dis-
tributing flyers. I credit Bayton’s testimony that Oseguera was on foot,
not on a bike, because another employee testified that Oseguera was on
foot at an encounter shortly thereafter, as described below, and because
an “Incident Report” introduced by Respondent describing the encoun-
ter at approximately 12:24 p.m. makes no mention of Oseguera being
on a bike (R. Exh. 2). Indeed, contrary to Oseguera’s testimony, the
incident report describes him encountering two women distributing
leaflets, not a man and a woman as he testified.
guard on the bike pointed at Tavarez’ employee badge and
stated that he would report them to HR, and then took a photo
of Tavarez and Alba (who was standing next to Tavarez) with a
camera, whose “flash” caught Tavarez’ eye. Alba was not
called to testify by the General Counsel, but neither was Solis
nor the unidentified guard on the bike called to testify by Re-
spondent. Oseguera testified about an earlier incident, as de-
scribed above, but did not testify about this encounter occurring
at 1 p.m. Tavarez’ testimony is thus uncontradicted, and I cred-
it it. (Tr. 193–205, 207, 214.)15
Finally, employees Catalina Gutierrez and Olivia Garcia,
who corroborated each other’s testimony, testified that around
4:20–4:30 p.m. that day, they along with fellow employee An-
dreas Ramirez, were distributing union flyers (GC Exh. 2) at
the same area by the valet driveway described earlier. A few
minutes after they started distributing the flyers, they were
confronted by security guard Brian Linderman, who needed to
call on a second security guard, Antonio Alcaraz to translate
into Spanish for him.16 Through Alcaraz, Linderman told
Gutierrez, Garcia and Ramirez that they could not distribute
flyers to customers at that location, because the customers “did
not need to know the problems of the casino.” Linderman add-
ed that they could distribute flyers in the “back,” at the employ-
ee entrance to the casino. Linderman also told them that he
would report them to management if they did not stop, and that

15 There are additional reasons for crediting Tavarez’ version, while
discrediting Respondent’s assertion that it was Oseguera who was on
the bike during this encounter (see, e.g., Tr. 212–213). Oseguera had
denied taking any photos at the 12:24 p.m. encounter described earlier,
but said nothing about 1:00 p.m. encounter with Tavarez and Alba,
despite the “incident report” submitted by Respondent confirming that
Oseguera was indeed present at the 1:00 p.m. encounter (R Exh. 3).
Tavarez, who knew Oseguera and provided a description of him which
differed from that of the guard on the bike, was positive that Oseguera
was not on a bike, and was positive that it was a third guard on a bike
who showed up (Tr. 214). Moreover, as described earlier by Bayton,
who had an encounter with Oseguera about 30 minutes before,
Oseguera was not on a bike that day, contrary to Oseguera’s testimony,
but on foot. Finally, Respondent refused to comply with the subpoena
duces tecum issued by the General Counsel requesting, inter alia, pho-
tos of all the guards employed by or performing services for Respond-
ent that day, despite my order directing that it do so in response to a
Motion to Revoke subpoena filed by Respondent. I concluded such
photos were relevant and necessary because they could have helped
Tavarez identify the security guard on the bike, who was the subject of
an allegation of the complaint denied by Respondent. Accordingly, I
draw an adverse inference against Respondent, and conclude that had
such photos been made available, Tavarez would have positively identi-
fied a third guard (on the bike) present at this encounter. See, e.g.,
Metro–West Ambulance Service, 360 NLRB No. 124, slip op. at 2–3
(2014). In that regard, I note that Respondent did not comply with the
subpoena on the grounds that it would have to seek authorization from
the “Tribal Gaming Authority” to release the photos of the guards, but
failed to demonstrate any diligence on its part in trying to obtain such
authority—assuming that such authority is necessary, a doubtful propo-
sition in the face of a Federal subpoena. Accordingly, I conclude that
Respondent failed to provide a valid reason for its failure to comply
with the subpoena, and that the adverse inference described above is
proper.
16 The parties stipulated to the identity of these 2 security guards.
(Tr. 273–274).
CASINO PAUMA 7
they could lose their jobs. (Tr. 242–248, 267–272, 274–276.)
Neither Linderman nor Alcaraz testified, and I credit the testi-
mony of Garcia and Gutierrez, which is uncontradicted.
Accordingly, the above facts show that on 4 separate occa-
sions on December 14, 2013, Respondent’s security personnel
stopped employees from distributing union flyers at or near the
public entrance of Respondent’s casino, threatened them with
discipline if they persisted, and on one occasion took a photo-
graph of two of the employees distributing the flyers.
C. The Disciplinary Warning Issued to Audelia Reyes
Audelia Reyes has worked for Respondent since 2003 as a
buffet attendant, normally working in the 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift.
She has been an active participant in the Union’s organizing
activities, having distributed Union flyers at the “back” or em-
ployee entrance of the casino in plain sight on a number of
occasions, and having worn a union pin or button during work-
ing hours.17 According to the testimony of Reyes, which was
uncontradicted in this regard, employees are normally given 2
half-hour breaks during their working hours. During the time at
issue, in January 2014, employees were allowed to decide for
themselves when to take their breaks, which employees did
sequentially, so that when one finished his/her break another
employee would then go on break.18 This meant that employ-
ees would take their breaks at different times, and sometimes
the last employee taking his/her break would not do so until the
last half hour of their work shift. (Tr. 303–308, 311, 314–316,
320–323.)
On January 24, 2014, Reyes took her second (or afternoon)
break between 3:30 p.m. and 4 p.m., which happened to be at
the end of her work shift. About 1 to 2 minutes before 4 p.m.,
employees whose shift ended at 4 p.m., including Reyes, started
gathering in a hallway outside the employee cafeteria where the
time clock where they “clock” or “punch” in/out” is located.
Apparently taking advantage of a “captive” audience, Reyes
gave out Union flyers to 3 employees standing in line at the
time clock, starting about 45 seconds prior to 4:00 p.m., the
exact time when Reyes clocked out (GC Exh. 5). At the time
Reyes gave out the flyers (introduced into evidence as General
Counsel Exhibit 6, neither she nor the 3 employees had yet
clocked out, but all did so within about 30 seconds. The exact
timing of these events was captured in a security video that was
played during the trial and introduced into evidence (GC Exh.
9; Tr. 318–321, 324).
Almost a month later, on February 20, 2014, Respondent’s
Human Resources (HR) director, Annabelle Lerner, summoned
Reyes to a meeting in the HR office, also attended by Director
of Food & Beverage Department Jorg Limper and HR Assistant
Maria Perez, who acted as a Spanish interpreter. Lerner,
through Perez, asked Reyes if she was authorized to distribute

17 Reyes is also one of about a dozen employees who appear on a
photograph contained in the union flyer that was distributed on Decem-
ber 14, 2013, discussed above (GC Exh. 2).
18 Employees would thus relieve one another to go on break, with-
out having to obtain permission from, or even having to notify, a super-
visor before doing so. This policy was apparently changed thereafter,
so that employees had to “punch out” on their time cards when going
on break. (Tr. 320, 322–323.)
information in the casino.19 Reyes initially replied “No,” ap-
parently unsure of what Lerner was referring to. After Lerner
reminded Reyes that there were many surveillance cameras in
the casino, and suggesting that being untruthful could have
serious consequences, Reyes realized that Lerner was referring
to her distribution of flyers by the time clock a month before.
Reyes then admitted she had distributed flyers on that occasion,
by the “punch machine,” and said that the Union had authorized
her to do so. Lerner then asked Reyes if she was familiar with
the no solicitation/distribution policy of Respondent, which
Reyes had acknowledged receiving when she was hired—
although she stated that it was in English so she had not under-
stood. Reyes, however, acknowledged that she knew which
areas she was allowed to distribute literature in, including the
employee cafeteria, outside of work, and in the parking lot.
Lerner then played a video of the incident by the time clock for
Reyes on a computer, which they watched together. Reyes then
apologized and said that it had been a mistake to give out flyers
before she had punched out, but added that she had been on
break at the time. Lerner then asked Reyes to write a statement
describing what she had done, and Reyes went to a separate
room where she wrote a short statement in Spanish, which she
then gave to Lerner.20 Lerner thanked Reyes for her honesty
and said that if there was anything else, she would call Reyes.
According to Reyes, Lerner then said “And everything that we
spoke about will stay here. Everything is confidential. Nothing
else should be said outside.” The meeting ended at this point.
(Tr. 304–308, 311, 316–322, 324–326, 328–334).
Neither Lerner nor Limpert testified, but Perez, who had
translated during the meeting, testified as a witness for Re-
spondent. Perez testified that she translated at a meeting that
took place in March 2014 (not February, as testified by Reyes).
Perez was not asked any details as to what happened at the
meeting, except she was specifically asked if Lerner had said
anything to Reyes about keeping the meeting confidential.
Perez replied “No. I don’t recall. No.” Asked if she heard
Lerner say to Reyes that Reyes had to keep the meeting confi-
dential, Perez testified: “No, I don’t recall.” I asked if she had
served as translator at other disciplinary meetings with employ-
ees, and Perez replied that she had. I asked if employees are
told in these meetings to keep things confidential, and she re-
plied “No, they are told that it’s kept confidential as a policy
within the HR department . . . It is a policy to be kept confiden-
tial within the HR department.” She clarified that the HR de-
partment has a policy not to “distribute publicly” issues of em-
ployee discipline. (Tr. 403–406).
While I generally credit Reyes, who gave a far more detailed
account of the meeting in question, which I conclude occurred

19 Reyes initially testified that the question Lerner asked was if she
was authorized to give information in the casino (Tr. 327), but later
testified that the question was “who authorized me to give information .
. . ” (Tr. 329–330).
20 The original statement in Spanish was introduced as Jt. Exh. 7A,
and the translation in English as Jt. Exh 7B, which reads as follows:
“On January 24, I am aware that I passed out information to like three
people. I apologize because the truth is I had not clocked-out yet. I
was on my break. Like you say that it was still work time, I know I
made a mistake.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
in February and not March 2014, I do not discredit Perez,
whom I also found was being truthful during her testimony.21
It is undisputed that on March 6, 2014 Respondent issued
Reyes a disciplinary warning, admitted as a joint exhibit (Jt.
Exh. 6), for her conduct in distributing flyers by the time clock
on January 24, 2014. The warning quotes Respondent’s “No
Solicitation or Distribution Policy,” contained on page 24 of
Respondent’s employee handbook (Jt. Exh. 4) as follows:
Casino Pauma wants to protect its Team Members from an-
noying interruptions, and to promote a proper and litter-free
working environment. Therefore:
 Solicitation of any type by Team Members during
working time is prohibited.
 Distribution of literature of any type or description
by Team Members during working time is prohib-
ited.
 Distribution of literature of any type or description
in working areas is prohibited.
Violation of any of the above rules will result in immediate
disciplinary action up to and including termination of em-
ployment.
Respondent has not disciplined any other employee for vio-
lating it’s no solicitation/no distribution policy, and thus did not
produce any such disciplinary warnings subpoenaed by the
General Counsel, because it claims no other violations of this
rule have occurred. (Tr. 23.)
III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. The Rule Regarding “Circulation of Petitions”
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent’s rule (Jt. Exh.
4), which prohibits distribution of literature in working or guest
areas (emphasis supplied) within Respondent’s property is
overbroad and thus unlawful, because it prohibits distribution
of literature in areas where work is not being performed and
where Respondent has no compelling interest to suppress or
control activities protected by Section 7 of the Act. For the
following reasons, I agree with the General Counsel.
In determining the validity of the work rule, the Board’s de-
cision in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646
(2004), directs me to first determine if the rule in question ex-
plicitly restricts activities protected by Section 7. If so, the rule
is unlawful. If the rule does not explicitly restrict Section 7
rights, I must next examine the following criteria: (1) whether

21 In that regard, I conclude that when Perez testified “No, I don’t
recall. No” when asked if Lerner had directed Reyes to keep what oc-
curred at the meeting confidential, she was not indicating that she had
no recollection of what was said, as suggested by the General Counsel,
but rather that she does not remember that particular statement being
made. Moreover, I do not draw any negative inferences from the fact
that Perez was not asked any questions as to what else occurred at the
meeting, since apparently Respondent does not otherwise factually
contest Reyes’ account of what transpired during the rest of this meet-
ing. For the same reason, I do not draw any negative inferences as to
Lerner’s failure to testify. As I will discuss below, some of the state-
ments that were made during the course of this meeting can reasonably
be interpreted differently than the General Counsel suggests.
employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit
(or restrict) Section 7 activity; (2) whether the rule was prom-
ulgated in response to union activity; (3) whether the rule has
been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights. Lu-
theran Heritage, at 647. See also, U-Haul Co. of California,
347 NLRB 375, 377 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed.Appx. 527 (D.C.
Cir. 2007). If any of the above 3 criteria is met, there would
likewise be a violation of the Act.
Since Respondent’s rule does not explicitly restrict protected
Section 7 activity, I must apply the above-enumerated criteria
to determine its validity under the Act. First, I note there is no
evidence that Respondent promulgated the rule in response to
union or protected activity, so it is clear that criteria 2 does not
apply. The validity of the rule thus turns upon the application
of the first and third criteria. Regarding the first criteria,
whether employees would reasonably construe the language of
the rule to restrict Section 7 rights, such determination rests on
the clarity or vagueness of the language that prohibits distribu-
tion of literature in “working or guest areas,” with emphasis on
the word guest. The restriction on distribution on “working”
areas is reasonably clear, and I conclude that any reasonable
person would understand that such prohibition only applies to
areas were work is normally performed—a prohibition that
presumably does not violate the Act.22 The dispute in this case
stems from the application of the no-distribution/solicitation
rule in guest areas, which is not only vague and ambiguous in
its meaning and definition, but which apparently applies to
areas beyond traditional or normal working areas. It is by now
well-settled that employees are allowed, absent unusual or spe-
cial circumstances, to distribute union literature on their em-
ployer’s premises during nonwork time in nonwork areas. Re-
public Aviation Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793,803–804 (1945);
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105, 110–111 (1956);
Santa Fe Hotel & Casino, 331 NLRB 723 (2000). No unusual
or special circumstances have been shown to exist in the pre-
sent case.
With regard to the third criteria under Lutheran Heritage, at
issue in this case is also the application of the no distribution
rule to the area of the valet driveway near the entrance to the
casino as well as the public parking lot. This rule could argua-
bly apply to other areas as well, such as restrooms, which may
not be considered working areas but may be considered “guest”
areas. The Board’s rulings in Santa Fe Hotel & Casino, supra,
Dunes Hotel, 284 NLRB 871, 875 (1987) (cited in Santa Fe),
and Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287, 288 (1999) are
dispositive of this issue. In Santa Fe, the Board, citing Dunes
Hotel and other cases, held that casinos are analogous to retail
stores when evaluating the legality of no-solicitation/no-
distribution rules, and while these rules can be enforced in gam-
ing areas (the equivalent of a retail’s store’s selling floor), pro-
hibition in other areas such as restrooms and parking lots is
unlawful. See also, Double Eagle Hotel, 324 NLRB 112, 113
(2004). In Santa Fe, the Board found that restricting off-duty

22 Such rule could be unlawfully applied, however, if the employer
allowed other types of distribution or solicitation in working areas but
prohibited the distribution of union literature. There is no evidence of
such disparate treatment in this case, however.
CASINO PAUMA 9
employees from distributing literature at the main entrance to
the facility—as employees in the present case did—violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Likewise, in Dunes Hotel, the
Board held that a rule prohibiting off-duty employee distribu-
tion of literature in “areas open to the guests or the public” to
be unlawful. In Flamingo Hilton, the Board similarly found
unlawful a rule prohibiting off-duty employee distribution in
“public areas” of the employer’s facility other than gambling
areas.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s rule prohibiting solici-
tation or distribution of literature in guest areas violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act and is unlawful both because it runs afoul of
the first criteria under Lutheran Heritage (employees would
reasonably construe the rule to restrict Section 7 activity), and
because it also runs afoul of the third criteria under that case,
because the rule was in fact applied to restrict the lawful exer-
cise of Section 7 rights, as discussed below.
B. Respondent’s Conduct on December 14, 2013
As described in the Facts section, on December 14, 2013 Re-
spondent’s security personnel confronted employees who were
distributing union flyers on the side of the valet driveway by
the public entrance to the casino. On at least 4 separate occa-
sions that day, security personnel instructed the off-duty em-
ployees to stop distributing flyers and threatened that discipline
might result if they did not stop such activity. In light of the
cases cited above, including Santa Fe, Dunes Hotel and Fla-
mingo Hilton (and cases cited therein), employees had the right
under Section 7 to distribute union literature in this public, non-
working area of the casino, and Respondent’s interference with
such activity violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Likewise, the
threat to impose discipline for engaging in such activity consti-
tutes a separate violation of Section 8(a)(1).23
As also described in the Facts section, one of the security of-
ficers, on a bike, who confronted off-duty employees Maria
Tavarez and Maria Alba at approximately 1 p.m., took a photo-
graph of them after directing them to stop distributing flyers
and threatening them with discipline. It is well established that
the photographing of employees engaged in protected activity

23 Respondent’s defense mainly consists of again arguing that Indian
casinos are not subject to Board jurisdiction, or to argue that even if
they are, special rules are applicable to them, allowing Indian casinos to
protect their “economic interests” by barring unions, their agents,
members or sympathizers from engaging in conduct that is otherwise
protected when other employers are involved. There is simply no sup-
port for this proposition under Board law, and as previously stated, the
issue of Board jurisdiction over Indian casinos and specifically over
Respondent is res judicata. In this regard, I note that during the trial
Respondent asked many questions as to how the employees distributing
union flyers arrived at or departed Respondent’s property. It is undis-
puted that in many instances the employees engaged in distributing
flyers were driven to Respondent’s parking lot and picked up there
afterwards by a union representative, a fact that Respondent attempts to
argue is legally significant for the reasons described above. While in
some circumstances non-employee union representatives may be barred
from entering an employer’s property, such issue has no bearing on the
right of employees to be present at Respondent’s property during their
non-work time. Simply put, how employees arrived at Respondent’s
premises is completely irrelevant in the present circumstances.
by an employer has a chilling and coercive effect, and thus
violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Sprain Brook Manor, 351
NLRB 1190, 1205 (2007); Clock Electric, Inc., 328 NLRB 932
(1999); F.W. Woolworth Co., 310 NLRB 1197 (1993). Accord-
ingly, and in the absence of any valid justification for the taking
of such photograph, I conclude that Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act by the conduct of the security officer in
the bike.
C. Respondent’s Conduct During the February 20, 2014
Meeting with Employee Reyes
As described in the Facts section, on February 20, 2014, after
apparently watching Reyes on a security video passing out
flyers by the time clock area shortly before her work shift end-
ed on January 14, 2014, HR Director Lerner held a Weingarten-
type investigatory interview with Reyes.24 Lerner asked Reyes
if she was authorized (or who had authorized her) to pass out
information in “the casino.” The General Counsel asserts that
this question posed of Reyes violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
because it was a coercive interrogation regarding Reyes’ union
activity. For the following reasons, I disagree.
It is well settled that in determining whether a statement is
coercive and thus unlawful, the test is whether such statement,
from the standpoint of the employee, has a reasonable tendency
to interfere with, restrain or coerce the employee in the exercise
of protected rights. American Freightways Co., 124 NLRB
146, 147 (1959); Double D Construction Group, Inc., 339
NLRB 303 (2004); NLRB v. Okun Bros. Shoe Store, Inc., 825
F. 2d 102, 105 (6th Cir. 1987). As the General Counsel cor-
rectly points out, in making this determination the Board looks
at the totality of the circumstances. Among the factors that the
Board considers are the following: the employer’s history of
hostility (toward the union); the nature of the information
sought; the identity and position of the questioner; the place
and method of interrogation; and whether the interrogated em-
ployee was an open union supporter. Rossmore House, 269
NLRB 1176, 1178 (1978), affd. 750 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1985).
While it is true that the questioner in this case was a high-
ranked official of Respondent (its HR Director), and that ques-
tioning took place in her office, the other factors discussed
above do not favor the General Counsel’s position. First, con-
trary to the General Counsel, who argues that Respondent had
no legitimate reason to question Reyes, I conclude that Re-
spondent did in fact have a legitimate reason to question her
about the circumstances surrounding the events of January 24.
Respondent has a valid no-solicitation/distribution rule, to the
extent that it prohibits employees from distributing literature in
working areas during working time, and General Counsel has
not alleged, nor contends, that such rule is invalid. At the time
Lerner questioned Reyes, there were legitimate questions as to
whether Reyes had complied with Respondent’s valid rule.
Lerner was not aware that Reyes had been on “break,” at the
time she distributed the flyers, because this information was not
provided by Reyes until later in the interview. Thus, potential-

24 Also present at this meeting was Food and Beverage Director Jorg
Limper and HR Assistant Maria Perez, who is fluent in Spanish and
translated for Lerner and Reyes. Neither Lerner nor Limper testified.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
ly, Reyes could have been in violation of a valid rule, and Re-
spondent therefore had valid reasons to inquire about her status
at the time. Moreover, the employees to whom she distributed
the flyers might arguably have been on “working time” as well,
since they had not yet “clocked out,” and Respondent could
therefore have reasonably inquired about their status and about
the location where Reyes distributed the flyers.25 Thus, Re-
spondent was clearly conducting a legitimate investigation of
conduct that might have violated a valid work rule. According-
ly, it is incorrect to argue that Respondent had no valid reason
to ask Reyes about the circumstances surrounding her distribu-
tion of literature.26
Secondly, the manner of the interrogation was not inherently
coercive. Lerner did not ask Reyes about her views or support
for the Union, or about others’ support for the union, or any-
thing directly regarding her motives or about the union cam-
paign.27 Rather, Lerner asked Reyes if she had been authorized
to pass out “information” at that time and in that area—the
“casino.” If, for example, a supervisor had authorized Reyes’
activity (unlikely as that might be), and Reyes so informed
Lerner, that might have provided a valid explanation for her
conduct that would have undermined any potential discipline
and satisfied the purpose of the disciplinary interview. To be
sure, Lerner’s question was phrased awkwardly, perhaps as a
result of a poor translation, but if the question had been phrased
slightly differently, such as “were you authorized to distribute
flyers while working,” or “did a supervisor authorize you to
pass out information at that time (or place),” such question
would not have been coercive, in my view. I conclude this is
what Lerner was trying to establish. Thirdly, as the General
Counsel concedes—and indeed points out in its argument—
Reyes was a well-known an open union supporter, which is
another factor weighing against the General Counsel’s theory.
Simply put, Respondent had little to gain by specifically inter-
rogating Reyes about her union activities, activities that were
no secret and unlikely to be deterred.
Finally, I disagree with the General Counsel’s characteriza-
tion of Respondent as having a “history of hostility” toward the
Union or its supporters, at least not in the manner that such
term is generally defined when taking this factor into considera-
tion. In Casino Pauma, supra, the Board found that Respond-
ent had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by enforcing an
invalid rule concerning the wearing of union pins, and by issu-
ing a warning to an employee who was wearing one. In the
present case, I have similarly found that Respondent was un-
lawfully enforcing an overly broad no-solicitation/distribution

25 This issue will be discussed further below.
26 Whether or not I ultimately conclude that Reyes violated Re-
spondent’s valid rule does not affect the legitimacy of Respondent’s
inquiry at the time.
27 Thus, the cases cited by the General Counsel, including Observer
& Eccentric Newspapers, Inc., 340 NLRB 124, 125 (2003), enfd. 136
Fed. Appx. 720 (6th Cir. 2005); Dealers Mfg. Co., 320 NLRB 947, 948
(1996); and Cumberland Farms, 307 NLRB 1479, 1479–1480 (1992),
enfd. 984 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1993), are clearly distinguishable. In each
of those cases, the employees were specifically asked about their views
about the union, or other employees’ views, or asked how the union
campaign was going.
rule. Thus, the disputes so far have centered on the validity and
enforcement of work rules and other similar issues, rules that
were in place long before the Union’s campaign. Although
Respondent has been found to have violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by maintaining and enforcing some of these rules, such
conduct does not represent evidence of a virulent reaction
against union organizing. While it can hardly be said that Re-
spondent has embraced the Union, its conduct has not been
egregious or represented the type of “hallmark” or significant
violations that would render all of its conduct inherently sus-
pect.28 It is therefore not accurate or valid to characterize Re-
spondent as having a “history of hostility” toward the union or
union activity.
Accordingly, considering all the above factors and the totali-
ty of the circumstances, I conclude that Lerner’s questioning of
Reyes during the February 20 2014 interview about the January
24 events was not coercive, and did not violate Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. I thus recommend that this allegation of the com-
plaint be dismissed.
With regard to the complaint’s allegation that on the same
meeting Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
directing Reyes to keep everything discussed at this meeting
confidential, it is well settled that this conduct would violate the
Act, if indeed that is what occurred. The right of employees to
discuss these types of matters, such as disciplinary problems,
amongst themselves goes to the very core of Section 7, which
guarantees employee rights to act in concert for mutual aid and
protection. See, e.g., Westside Community Mental, 327 NLRB
661 (1999), and cases cited therein. As discussed in the Facts
section, however, I have credited Maria Perez’s testimony as to
what occurred at this meeting. Perez, who acted as the transla-
tor during the meeting, testified that what Lerner said at the
meeting was that the HR Department would keep what was
learned during the meeting as confidential, not that Reyes was
directed to do so. Indeed, Perez credibly testified that this is
something that is routinely said to employees at meetings where
she has served as translator, which is apparently often. While I
do not discredit Reyes, who was generally a credible witness, I
believe she misunderstood the import of what Lerner said, per-
haps because of the hazards of translation or because she was
understandably anxious given the circumstances. Inasmuch the
General Counsel bears the burden of proof in establishing that
the Act was violated, I conclude that it has not met its burden of
proof in this regard. Accordingly, I recommend that this alle-
gation of the complaint be dismissed.

28 Indeed, the evidence indicates, for example, that even as Re-
spondent’s security personnel were stopping the distribution of union
flyers at the front or “public” entrance to the casino, they informed the
employees that they could distribute such flyers in the “back” side of
the casino, at the employee entrance. This suggests that Respondent
was primarily concerned with enmeshing customers in its labor dispute
and perhaps trying to avoid embarrassment, rather than being virulently
opposed to any type of union activity. Moreover, I note that there is no
evidence of a history of interrogations of employees regarding their
union or protected activity, which has now been taking place for a
couple of years.
CASINO PAUMA 11
D. The disciplinary Warning Issued to Reyes on
March 6, 2014.
On March 6, 2014, apparently as the result of what it learned
at the February 20 investigatory meeting with Reyes, Respond-
ent issued her a disciplinary warning for violating its no-
solicitation/no-distribution rule on January 24, 2014. As de-
scribed earlier, Reyes’ conduct consisted of distributing union
flyers to three employees, who along with Reyes, were waiting
by the time clock getting ready to clock-out at the end of their
work shifts at 4 p.m. As also described earlier, Reyes was on
her afternoon 30-minute break at the time, not having had the
chance to take her break earlier, and her distribution of the
flyers—which was captured by a security video—occurred
within the last 30 seconds or so prior to the employees clocking
out for the day.
Since Reyes was indisputably on her break at the time, the
question of whether she violated a valid work rule—and there-
fore the lawfulness of the discipline itself--must turn on wheth-
er the employees whom she distributed the flyers to were on
“working time” and/or were in a “working area.” With regard
to the issue of “working time,” I first note that in the very pre-
amble of Respondent’s “No Solicitation or Distribution Policy”
it states that “Casino Pauma wants to protect its Team Members
form annoying interruptions, and to promote a proper and litter
free work environment.” (Jt. Exh. 4, emphasis supplied.) Ac-
cordingly, it is reasonable to presume that the intent behind
Respondent’s rule is not to have its employees’ work disrupted
or interrupted by solicitations or distribution of literature or
other materials, which is a reasonable and perfectly valid goal.
By that standard, however, it cannot be said that the employees
who received the flyers from Reyes were working or perform-
ing work under any reasonable definition of such terms. In-
deed, they had completely ceased working and were lined up at
the time clock ready to “punch out” at their quitting time,
which was 4 p.m. The evidence shows that Reyes and all three
employees who received the flyers clocked out within 30 se-
conds or so of the time when the flyers were handed out. Thus,
the perfunctory act of clocking out, under the circumstances,
should not serve as the rigid demarcation line for determining
whether the solicited employees were actually on “working
time” pursuant to Respondent’s rule. I conclude they were
not.29 Eastex, Inc., 215 NLRB 271, 274-275 (1974), enfd. 550
F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1977), affd. 437 U.S. 556 (1978); Essex In-
ternational, Inc., 211 NLRB 749 (1974); ESB, Inc., 177 NLRB
778, 785 fn. 25 (1969).
Likewise, the area where the distribution of the flyers took
place, by the time clock, cannot reasonably be considered to be
a “working area.” The time clock is immediately outside the
employee break room/cafeteria, in an area removed from the
gaming areas or other places that customers or clients have
access to, and where no “work” is apparently performed. Ac-
cordingly, I conclude that this was not a “working area” under
any reasonable definition of the term, and that by distributing

29 Nor was the intent or spirit of the rule, as stated in the preamble,
of maintaining a litter-free work environment violated, since there is no
evidence that any of the employees in question littered by throwing out
the flyers.
flyers in that area Reyes did not violate Respondent’s rule.
Eastex, Inc., supra. Accordingly, Respondent’s defense—that
it issued Reyes a warning because she breached a valid work
rule—is both factually and legally invalid. Thus, Reyes was
engaged in activity protected by Section 7 when she handed out
union flyers to fellow employees on January 24, an activity that
was the sole basis of the warning issued to her by Respondent
on March 6, 2014.
In light of the above, it is clear that by issuing Reyes a writ-
ten warning on March 6, 2014, for engaging in union activity
on January 24, 2014, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act, as alleged in the complaint.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Casino Pauma (Respondent) is an employer within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. By maintaining and enforcing a rule in its employee
handbook prohibiting the distribution of literature in “guest
areas;” by interfering with the distribution of Union literature
by employees in these areas, including the public or guest en-
trances to its casino; by threatening to discipline employees
who distributed Union literature in these areas; and by photo-
graphing employees who distributed Union literature in these
areas, Respondent, has interfered with, restrained and coerced
employees in the exercise of their rights, in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. By issuing employee Audelia Reyes a written disciplinary
warning on March 6, 2014, for distributing Union literature on
a non-working area during non-working time, Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
4. Respondent did not otherwise violate the Act as alleged in
the consolidated complaint.
REMEDY
The appropriate remedy for the Section 8(a) (1) and (3) vio-
lations I have found is an order requiring Casino Pauma (Re-
spondent) to cease and desist from such conduct and take cer-
tain affirmative action consistent with the policies and purposes
of the Act.
Specifically, Respondent will be required to rescind the rule
in its employee handbook prohibiting distribution of literature
in its “guest areas,” and to notify employees that this language
in the handbook has been rescinded and is no longer valid.
Additionally, Respondent will be required to stop enforcing this
rule by interfering with distribution of literature by employees
in these areas, and to cease and desist from engaging in surveil-
lance or the appearance of surveillance of employees, by taking
photographs of such employees or other such activity. Re-
spondent will also be required to rescind the disciplinary warn-
ing issued to employee Audelia Reyes on March 6, 2014, and to
expunge all references to such warning from Reyes’ personnel
records. Moreover, Respondent will be required to post a no-
tice to employees, in both English and Spanish, assuring them
that it will not violate their rights in this or any other related
matter in the future. Finally, as Respondent communicates with
its employees by email, it shall also be required to distribute the
notice to employees in that manner, as well as any other elec-
tronic means it customarily uses to communicate with employ-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
ees.
Accordingly, based on the forgoing findings of fact and con-
clusions of law, and on the entire record, I issue the following
recommended30
ORDER
The Respondent, Casino Pauma, Pauma Valley, California,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining or enforcing a rule in its employee hand-
book that prohibits the distribution of literature in “guest are-
as;”
(b) Interfering with the distribution of literature by employ-
ees in these areas including the public or guest entrance of its
casino;
(c) Threatening employees with discipline for distributing
literature in these areas;
(d) Engaging is surveillance or in creating the impression of
surveillance by taking photographs of employees engaged in
the distribution of literature;
(e) Issuing disciplinary warnings to employees for distrib-
uting literature in nonwork areas during nonworking time.
2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the rule prohibiting the distribution of literature
by employees in guest areas;
(b) Furnish all current employees with inserts for their cur-
rent employee handbooks that will (1) advise that the unlawful
rule has been rescinded, or (2) provide a lawfully worded rule
on adhesive backing that will cover the unlawful rule; or pub-
lish and distribute to all current employees revised employee
handbooks that (1) do not contain the unlawful rule, or (2) pro-
vide a lawfully worded rule.
(c) Within 14 days of the Board’s order, rescind and remove
from its files any reference to the March 6, 2014 disciplinary
warning issued to its employee Audelia Reyes, and within 3
days thereafter, notify Reyes in writing, in both English and
Spanish, that this has been done and that such warning will not
be used against her in any way.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment rec-
ords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
and/or other compensation due under the terms of this Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all its
facility in Pauma Valley, California where notices to employees
are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix” in both English and Spanish.31 Copies of the no-

30 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
31 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States court
of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted By Order of the
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 21,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. In addition
to physical posting of paper notices, the notices shall be distrib-
uted electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or
an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respond-
ent customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facilities involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the notice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at any time since December 14,
2013.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 21, a sworn certification of a
responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting
to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated: Washington, D.C. June 4, 2015
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain rules prohibiting employees from dis-
tributing literature in “guest areas at any time.”
WE WILL NOT prohibit our off-duty employees from distrib-
uting union-related literature to patrons in nonworking areas of
our facility, including outside the customer main entrance.
WE WILL NOT threaten you with reporting you to human re-
sources, discipline and discharge for your activities related to
Unite Here International Union or any other union.
WE WILL NOT photograph employees engaged in union ac-
tivity without proper justification.
WE WILL NOT discipline you for engaging in union and/or
other protected concerted activity.

National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
CASINO PAUMA 13
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind and/or revise the rule prohibiting employees
from distributing literature in “guest areas at any time,” and WE
WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify our employees in writing
that this has been done.
WE WILL remove from our files all references to the warning
of Audelia Reyes and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify
her in writing that this has been done and that the warning will
not be used against her in any way.
CASINO PAUMA