Cashway Lumber, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 18, 1972

196 N.L.R.B. 1135 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

CASHWAY LUMBER, INC. 1135
Cashway Lumber , Inc. and Local 135, International
Brotherhood of Chauffeurs , Teamsters, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America . Case 25-CA-4590
May 18, 1972
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND PENELLO
facilities in the States of Ohio, Michigan, and Indiana. This
case is concerned only with its lumberyard located at Mun-
cie, Indiana. During the past year, a representative period,
the Respondent purchased and caused to be delivered to its
Muncie facility goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 which were transported to said facility directly from
States other than the State of Indiana. During the same
period it sold and distributed products valued in excess of
$500,000. I find that the Respondent is engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectu-
ate the policies of the Act to exercise jurisdiction herein.
On March 22, 1972, Trial Examiner Thomas A.
Ricci, issued the attached Decision in this proceeding.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a sup-
porting brief, and General Counsel filed a brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the Trial
Examiner's Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the Trial Examiner's
rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt his
recommended Order.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby orders that
Respondent, Cashway Lumber, Inc., its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's recommended Order.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THOMAS A. Ricci, Trial Examiner: A hearing in the above-
entitled proceeding was held before the duly designated
Trial Examiner on February 15, 1972, at Muncie, Indiana,
on complaint of the General Counsel against Cashway
Lumber, Inc., herein called the Respondent or the Compa-
ny. The issues presented are whether the Respondent dis-
charged three employees in order to curb a union
organizational campaign, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act, and whether management agents made coercive
statements to the employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
Briefs were filed by the General Counsel and the Respon-
dent.
Upon the entire record and from my observation of the
witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Cashway Lumber, Inc., an Indiana corporation, is en-
gaged in the wholesale and retail sale and distribution of
lumber and related products ; its principal office and place
of business is at Kent , Ohio, and it operates a number of
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that Local 135, International Brotherhood of
Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, herein called the Union, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. A Picture of the Case
At the Muncie, Indiana, lumberyard of this multistate
company, there are about 12 rank-and-file emplo ees. They
started to join the Union, three signing cards on September
30, 1971, three more on October 18, and one or two others
a few days later. On October 21 Carl Wagner, business
representative of the Union, called on John Geib, the yard
manager and top company official there, to demand recog-
nition for the Union on behalf of the employees. Wagner
gave Geib a letter formalizing the request, stating that a
majority had authorized the Union, and precisely defining
the bargaining unit sought. Geib was noncommittal, an-
swering only he would forward the letter to the Company's
central office in another city. The next day, October 22, the
Company discharged Frank Robertson, a yardman, and on
the 23rd it discharged Nicholas Rucker, also a yardman. On
November 17 it discharged Jeffrey Tuttle, a regular part-
timer also working in the yard.
The complaint alleges these discharges were made in re-
taliation against the employees' activities aimed at
achieving collective bargaining through the Union, and
were therefore in each instance violative of Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act. The Respondent denies the charge, and in its
answer sets out an affirmative defense of discharge for
cause in the following language: "Denies paragraph 6 of the
complaint and avers further that the layoffs were in the
ordinary course of business caused by the seasonal slow
down of lumber sales beginning in October."
B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
There is evidence that Manager Geib and a man named
Joe Kane, called foreman by the employee witnesses, made
coercive and therefore unlawful statements to the employ-
ees, indicative of the Respondent's antiunion state of mind.
The Respondent contends that Kane is not a supervisor, did
not speak for management, and is only a rank-and-file em-
ployee.
The Union filed a petition (Case 25-RC-4820) requesting
a Board-conducted election among these employees, and a
hearing on the petition was duly held. On the evidence there
adduced, where, among other things, Kane's alleged super-
visory status was specifically disputed, the Regional Direc-
tor found that he is a supervisor within the meaning of
Section 2(11) of the Act. The Company appealed this deci-
sion to the Board and the appeal was denied. In addition
196 NLRB No. 174
1136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
there is direct and uncontradicted testimony in this case
establishing Kane's supervisory status.
Three witnesses-Rucker, Hines, and Robertson-all at
one time regular employees in the yard, said that Kane was
their foreman and regularly gave them their work assign-
ments. Tuttle testified he went directly to Kane when ap-
plying for a job, that Kane told him he did need a man, and
then directed him to start working. Tuttle talked to no one
other than Kane in connection with his hire. Robertson
testified that when he came looking for a job he started by
going to the office, where someone told him to see the
foreman, Kane. Kane was not in that day, and Robertson
returned to see him the following day. Now Kane asked
what his experience was and then instructed him to come to
work the next day. Without asking for it, Robertson once
received a raise; he first learned about it when Kane in-
formed him of the fact. When Tuttle was discharged it was
Kane who told him. When Robertson was discharged it was
Kane who told him.
All this testimony stands uncontradicted, although Kane
was present in the hearing room while the story was being
told; he was not called as a witness. Manager Geib, in
defense, said he is the only person in the shop who exercises
any supervisory authority. As to Kane and another man
called Drayer: "Well, I will tell like either Joe [Kane], who
usually most of the guys come to, he's been there since I've
been at Cashway, he's one of the older men, has quite a bit
of experience, in the lumber business, and I usually tell him
or Drayer ... something to do, or ... Yeah, I'd say, `Joe,
get such-and-such and put him on a box car to start sorting
out the screens."' Responding affirmatively to completely
leading questions by his attorney, Geib tried to create the
impression that while Kane gives the instructions to the
employees, even being the sole voice that hires or discharges
them, all of this is predetermined down to every minute
detail by Geib himself, who is constantly making the mental
decisions for the foreman to implement. I find that Kane is
a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, and that the
Respondent is responsible for the antiunion statements by
its foreman.
Tuttle, the part-time student employee, signed a union
card on October 18; he testified that a few days later Fore-
man Kane asked him, in the yard, had he "heard about the
boys trying to get a union in,' and that he answered he had
heard of it. Tuttle continued to testify that Kane then "said
something about having to let maybe all of the part-time
help go if this thing ... he said he didn't know, it depended
a lot on how this thing turned out."
Paul Hines, a yardman still in the Respondent's employ,
also signed a card on October 18. He testified that on the
day Business Representative Wagner came to the plant to
see the manager, Foreman Kane called him aside from work
and asked "if I had heard anything about a Union." Hines
said yes, and Kane then asked: "Do you know who started
it?" To this Hines said no. Kane persisted: "Well, who
talked to you about it?" Hines answered: "Well, all of them
talked to me." With this, Kane cut off the conversation.
As already explained, Kane was not called in defense. I
credit Tuttle and Hines and I find that by threatening Tuttle
with discharge in the event the employees persisted in their
union activities, and by interrogating Hines concerning the
union activities of the employees, Kane committed unfair
labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
chargeable to the Respondent. More important, in terms of
the major issues presented in this case, there is revealed in
Kane's conduct a deliberate plan by the Respondent to
learn the identity of employees who had taken steps to
organize the plant.
Gail McCord is also still an employee, and he also had
signed a union card. Called as a witness in support of the
complaint during the General Counsel's case-in-chief, he
was revealed as a very reluctant witness. He could hardly be
heard and spoke in virtually disjointed phrases. His testimo-
ny at that stage of the hearing nevertheless tells how late in
November or early December Manager Geib and an em-
ployee named Bartling approached him in the yard and
asked him to sign some kind of a document having to do
with the Union. " ... they talked they would like me to sign
an affidavit ... I guess for the company ... Bartling was
mostly doing the talking at that time. Q: What did Mr.
Bartling say? A: That they would close up ... maybe later
on close up the place." Again from McCord's first testimo-
ny: "Bartling talked about that he was convinced that they
would shut the place up, and they wanted me to go with
them, with the company. That's all I know. By Mr. Winkler:
What do you mean, to go with them, or the company; what
does that mean? I don't understand. A: To agree with their
ideas, so I could have a job, that's the only thing I know."
"Q: And what did Mr. Geib say, if anything? A: He didn't
hardly say anything. He just said, `Make up your mind, do
you agree that you withith us or with them,' that's all."
McCord also said: "At that time they wanted me to go with
him on the affidavit, or something like that. They ap-
proached me in the back room warehouse of Cashway and
they gave me a day to think it over, and I went home to my
wife and told her about it, and we both agreed that we
would sign this affidavit. Q: What did they say to think
over? What did they tell you to think over? A: That-Well,
all I know, the next day, that week, or sometime we went
to Eaton, and that's when I signed that affidavit." The next
day McCord and Bartling went to the town of Eaton, 12
miles away, during paid working time , where McCord
signed a paper saying he "would not go along with the
Union."
At the close of his direct testimony, McCord was shown
the union card bearing his signature. Asked had he signed
it, he denied the card bore his signature.
Four witnesses testified for the General Counsel after
McCord. Before the General Counsel rested, McCord ex-
pressed the desire to return to the stand to alter part of his
testimony. Now he admitted he had signed the union card
received in evidence. He was shown his earlier affidavit,
dated December 13, 1971. The witness then admitted he had
read it, signed it, and that it stated the truth of what had
happened during his experience with the antiunion state-
ment he had signed 2 weeks before giving the sworn affida-
vit.
Manager Geib testified in defense after McCord, but
made no mention of this entire incident. Bartling did not
testify.,On the basis of McCord's oral testimony, with which
his earlier affidavit is fully consistent, I find that Manager
Geib, on the threat of loss of employment, induced him to
sign a statement rejecting the Union, and thereby violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
C. The Discharges
All three of the discharged employees-Robertson,
Rucker, and Tuttle-were dismissed without advance no-
tice. Robertson and Tuttle were told the reason was because
work was "slack," and Rucker because he had come to work
late that morning. It is a small complement of employees
and there is evidence the men talked about this business of
signing union cards while at work. The foreman's interroga-
tion of Hines, the very day the Union's demand for recogni-
tion was received, and his like interrogation of Tuttle at or
CASHWAY LUMBER, INC. 1137
about the same time prove the Respondent was attempting
to learn the identity of the individual unioneers . Robertson
had been the original instigator, and all three of the men had
signed cards. When Geib induced McCord to reject the
Union in writing, he must have known the man personally
favored the Union. There is also persuasive evidence the
Company knew about Tuttle's attitude, for shortly after he
was fired, Foreman Kane told the young man's father, a
regular customer in the yard and a nei bor of Kane's, that
the son had been released "because he was having union
activities . . . I was ordered to let him go." It is a fair
inference from all of this, considering the direct evidence
and the total circumstances, that the Respondent knew
Robertson and Rucker were among those who had joined
forces with the Union one way or another. This knowledge
of the Respondent, coupled with the direct evidence as to
why Tuttle was released and the timing of the other two
discharges-l and 2 days immediately following the union
agent's visit to the manager, suffice to prove a prima facie
case of illegal antiunion motivation in support of the com-
plaint. I
D. The Affirmative Defense
In its answer to the complaint the Respondent gave a
single reason for discharge of all three of the men: "the
seasonal slowdown." It adhered to this position with respect
to Tuttle, but, as to Robertson and Rucker, at the hearing
Manager Geib offered additional reasons for the discharges.
With respect to his primary assertion of "slow down' to
explain the discharges, Geib said it is reflected in two ways:
declining volume of daily sales and declining amounts of
supplies being received daily into the yard for storing as
stock. Geib also said clearly, more than once, that the Com-
pany keeps daily records on both these aspects of the busi-
ness, showing daily sales and daily receipt of stock, and that
he looked at the current such records at the time he decided
to release the men. Despite his assertion that this was the
fundamental reason for the action taken, and despite sub
as served by the General Counsel upon the Company Zrfo
production of many records, the only record produced by
the Respondent at the hearing is a summary statement set-
ting forth volume of sales by the week for the calendar year
1971. Beyond this, the evidentiary "proof" offered in sup-
port of the affirmative defense consists entirely of repeated
conclusionary statements by Geib that business was going
down and that the phenomenon is an annual occurrence in
this yard and in this business generally. In reality he did no
more at the hearing than repeat the conclusionary assertion
set out in the answer.
In thousands of dollars, the Company's weekly sales, for
the months of September and October, were as follows:
September 4, 44; September 11, 36; September 18, 40; Se
tember 25, 43; October 2, 33, October 9, 41, October 16, 43;
October 23, 40; and October 30, 38. Robertson was dis-
charged on October 22 and Rucker on October 23. It simply
is not true that business was declining in terms of sales at
the time, and Geib's sworn testimony that he looked at the
1 No witness contradicted Robertson's testimony that he was dismissed on
the 22nd. His assertion is supported by a document offered by the Respon-
dent; it is a copy of his application for unemployment benefits, dated Octo-
ber 28, and sets out his last day of work for the Respondent as October 22.
The charge in this proceeding was filed on October 26, and states that
Robertson was discharged on the 22nd. For the purpose of supporting its
contention the man was released because of lack of work the Respondent
placed in evidence a termination slip bearing his name , with the notation lack
of work was the reason ; this slip says he was terminated on November 20.
Whatever the reason , this last slip is not a reliable document.
"records," saw declining daily sales, and therefore fired the
men must be rejected. When Geib said at the hearing that
there do exist records of daily receipt of stock into the yard,
and that the records are available, the General Counsel
asked him to produce them. Geib said he would do so, but
his attorney interjected an objection to the suggestion on the
ground that the General Counsel's purpose was "to harass
the witness." The Respondent never did produce those rec-
ords.
Nor did the Respondent produce any records to prove its
concomitant assertion that what it said was the slowdown
of the moment represented no more than a recurring annual
condition in its business. During November and December,
as the sole summaries received also show, the weekly sales
volume did decline, as follows; November 6, 35; November
13, 25; November 20, 34; November 27, 23; December 4,
35; December 11, 19; December 18, 23; and December 25,
15. All of this came after Robertson and Rucker had been
discharged. If Geib had reason to anticipate the drop in
sales, his assertion now of " seasonal slow down" would
appear in a different light. But his failure to produce records
o prior experiences-which he also said he does have-
suggests they would prove otherwise if examined in open
court. In his cross-examination of Geib, at one point the
General Counsel asked how many employees had been laid
off the previous winter-from 1970 to 1971. Again counsel
for the Respondent objected, and the General Counsel with-
drew the question. But the burden to prove seasonal slow-
downs in the past rested upon the Respondent, not upon the
government. However viewed-either as a refusal to honor
a government request for production of pertinent records or
as failure to produce available primary evidence in support
of an affirmative defense-the Respondent' s entire conten-
tion of discharge for just cause stands entirely discredited.
Compare International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
& A ricultural Implement Workers of America (UA W) v.
N.LI.B., 459 F.2d 1329 (C.A.D.C.).
In a tangential attempt to prove that employees had in the
past been laid off for lack of work the Respondent offered
into evidence a number of individual notations relating to
employee discharges. Of the 28 such notices-the only ones
that could be found, according to Geib-8 carry indications
the reason was "lack of work, ' but not one bears any date.
Moreover, all of the slips reading "lack of work" are signed
by a manager named Van Fossen, apparently Geib's prede-
cessor, for Geib has been the manager the past 2 years. It
would thus appear that nobody was discharged for lack of
work by Geib at any time . Such records, therefore, give no
substantive support to the asserted affirmative defense.
More revealing, perhaps, is Manager Geib' s answer when
asked at the hearing had he received the October 21 demand
letter of which the union agent witness spoke. Geib re-
sponded: "At that time of the year we're so busy I can't tell
you, really." The statement further weakens the
Respondent's contention that business was slow.
Geib's testimony as to his additional reasons for dis-
charging Robertson and Rucker are no more convincing. As
to Robertson, he said "it seemed like he was just not doing
what he should have been doing . . .he may take too long
loading a truck, talked to customers too long ." He said
nothing about this when discharging the man, and then
admitted he could not remember ever reprimandin g or
warning him about poor performance. Robertson testiied,
credibly in the light of Geib's admission, he had never been
criticized at all about his work.
Rucker, an employee for about I year,.came to work at
9 instead of 7:30 on the morning of October 23 and was
fired summarily. He knew the employees were required to
1138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
advise the Company if they were coming in late , and a week
earlier had been late and warned about it. He also admitted
he had been late four or five times before that in the course
of his employment, but except for once when he was 3 or
4 hours late, had only delayed arriving "just a matter of
minutes." Rucker also testified that on the morning in ques-
tion his automobile would not start and he asked his wife
to telephone the office and report he would be late. Mrs.
Rucker testified she did that, that a man answered "Cash-
way," that she gave her name as Mrs. Rucker, and that she
told the man her husband-Nick-would be late because of
car trouble; the man answered, according to her, "Ok."
Geib told a more grievous story of Rucker's history of
tardiness, saying he was late 2 or 3 times a month, and
adding "sometimes he would call in at noon ...... Geib said
the workcards maintained by the Company reveal the num-
ber of hours worked by each employee, but again he did not
produce them to support his version of how bad Rucker's
record had been. The question arises whether Mrs. Rucker
did call in that day to report her husband's delay. Hines, an
employee then, said he heard Drayer, a man who works at
the counter, say that day that a woman had called. I have
no reason to doubt the wife's word that she did telephone
and did talk to someone who answered "Cashway," and I
think it highly likely the word did get to the manager. But
even absent a positive finding Geib in fact received the
message, I nevertheless do not believe his story that the real
reason for the discharge was Rucker's tardiness that day.
Certainly it was not the sole reason, for on his own testimo-
ny Geib tied all three discharges to a pervasive assertion of
seasonal slowdown that cannot be believed. His total testi-
mony, and the Respondent's failure to produce the primary
evidence that was clearly available, casts too great a doubt
upon the entire affirmative defense.
I find on the entire record that Respondent discharged
Robertson, Rucker, and Tuttle because of their union activ-
ity and thereby violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with its operations as de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and sub-
stantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening
and obstructing the free flow of commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of
Section 2(2) of the Act and is engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By discharging Frank Robertson , Nicholas Rucker,
and Jeffrey Tuttle, because of their union activities, the
Respondent has interfered with , restrained , and coerced its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act, and thereby en aged in unfair labor practices
proscribed by Section 8(a)(3).
4. By the foregoing conduct , by coercively interrogating
employees concerning their union activities and the union
activities of other employees , by threatening to discharge
employees for engaging in self-organizational activities, and
by inducing employees to sign antiunion statements under
threat of discharge, the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact , conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and ursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:2
ORDER
The Respondent, Cashway Lumber, Inc., Muncie, Indi-
ana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating its employees concerning
their union activities and the union activities of other em-
plo ees, threatening to discharge employees for engaging in
self organizational activities, and inducing employees to
sign antiunion statements under threat of discharge.
(b) Discouraging membership in Local 135, International
Brotherhood of Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, or any other labor organization, by
discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees
in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or other
conditions of employment.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will
effectuate the purposes of the Act:
(a) Offer to Frank Robertson, Nicholas Rucker, and Jef-
frey Tuttle immediate and full reinstatement to their former
positions or, if those positions no longer exist, to substan-
tially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their senior-
ity or other rights and privileges.
(b) Notify immediately the above-named individuals, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States,
of the right to full reinstatement, upon application after
discharge from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training
and Service Act.
(c) Make whole Frank Robertson, Nicholas Rucker, and
Jeffrey Tuttle for any loss of pay or other benefits they may
have suffered by reason of the Respondent's discrimination
against them.
(d) Preserve and, upon request, , make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll
records, social security payment records, timecards, person-
nel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
recommended Order.
(e) Post at its place of business in Muncie, Indiana, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix."3 Copies of said
notices, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec . 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its
findings , conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
3 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read "Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
CASHWAY LUMBER, INC. 1139
Region 25, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme-
diately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ-
ing all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(f) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have been
taken to comply herewith.'
In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board after
exceptions have been filed , this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify
the Regional Director for Region 25, in writing, within 20 days from the date
of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL offer to Frank Robertson, Nicholas Rucker,
and Jeffrey Tuttle immediate and full reinstatement to
their former positions or, if those positions no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privi-
leges, and make them whole for any loss of pay they
may have suffered by reason of our discrimination,
against them.
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of their rights to self-organiza-
tion, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all
such activities.
WE WILL notify immediately the above-named indi-
viduals, if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon
application after discharge from the Armed Forces, in
accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act.
WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees about
their union activities or about the union activities of
other employees.
WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge employees for the
purpose of stopping their union activities.
W E WILL NOT Induce employees to sign antiunion
statements under threat of discharge.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against employees because they join, assist, or give sup-
port to Local 135, International join, of Chauf-
feurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, or any other labor organization.
Dated By
CASHWAY LUMBER, INC.
(Employer)
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with
its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 614
ISTA Center, 150 West-Market Street, Indianapolis, Indi-
ana 46204, Telephone 317-633-8921.