Casey Manufacturing Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 17, 1967

167 N.L.R.B. 89 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

CASEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY 89
Casey Manufacturing Company and United Shoe
Workers of America , AFL-CIO. Case
14-CA-3981
August 17, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS BROWN , JENKINS , AND ZAGORIA
On April 27, 1967, Trial Examiner Sydney S.
Asher, Jr., issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision.
Thereafter, the Respondent and the Charging Party
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision
with supporting briefs.' Respondent additionally
filed a brief in support of certain portions of the
Trial Examiner's Decision and in answer to the ex-
ceptions and brief filed by the Charging Party. No
exceptions were filed by the General Counsel.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and finds
merit in the Charging Party's exceptions for the
reasons set forth below. Accordingly, the Board
hereby adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and
recommendations3 of the Trial Examiner, except as
modified herein.
The record shows that on the day preceding the
election in Respondent's Casey, Illinois, plant, Wil-
liam Willinborg, Respondent's president, read a
prepared speech, otherwise unobjectionable, in op-
position to the Union, to the assembled employees.
The Charging Party has excepted to the Trial Ex-
aminer's fa.lure to find that Willinborg's spontane-
ous remarks, following the reading of his speech, in
which he admittedly said, "that we had to maintain
the same working conditions in all our plants
because of their close proximity," constituted an
unlawful promise of benefits. The Charging Party
contends, and we agree, that Willinborg, thereby,
impliedly promised the employees that if the Union
were rejected at the scheduled election, they would
receive two additional paid holidays and all other
benefits contained in a collective-bargaining con-
tract with the same Union, executed approximately
2 weeks previously by Respondent covering em-
ployees in Respondent's Greenup, Illinois , plant.
The Trial Examiner found that Willinborg's re-
marks, quoted above, were no more than a reminder
to the employees of Respondent's longstanding pol-
icy, known to the Casey employees, of extending
uniformly to employees in all of its plants the
benefits granted to those in any one plant, and that
its reiteration, even though coming when it did, did
not constitute a promise of a benefit in violation of
the Act. In our view, Willinboig's statement, in the
circumstances prevailing at the time it was made, in
effect, was an announcement that the Casey em-
ployees would receive all the benefits of a union
contract without a union , and was, therefore, by
clear implication, a promise of benefits made for the
purpose of coercing the employees into rejecting
the Union and in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
ACt.4
THE REMEDY
The Trial Examiner, having recommended that
Respondent cease and desist from granting or an-
nouncing increased benefits for its employees, in
light of other findings of such violations, we find it
unnecessary to provide a separate, similar remedy
applicable to the additional violation found herein
with respect to the promise of two additional paid
holidays.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, Casey Manufacturing
Company, Casey, Illinois, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, as
modified herein:
Delete from paragraph 2(a) that part which reads
"to be furnished" and substitute therefor "on forms
provided."
3 Respondent's exceptions were limited to the Trial Examiner's
findings, conclusions, and recommendations with respect to the violation
found arising out of the announcement of a pension plan, made March 4,
1966, at the height of the organizational campaign
2 Member Zagona adopts the finding as to unlawful enforcement of the
valid no-solicitation rule only in the absence of exceptions thereto
' We note that the Trial Examiner, in his Decision, has included his
discussion of the appropriate remedy under the heading "Recommended
Order," rather than in a separate section entitled "Remedy" as is custo-
mary Accordingly, in adopting the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order, we refer specifically to that portion, at the end of the Decision,
which specifies the precise conduct from which the Respondent, its of-
ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall cease and desist and the affir-
mative action which they shall take
" Member Zagona agrees with the Trial Examiner, for the reasons set
forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision, that this statement did not violate
the Act
167 NLRB No. 13
90 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
SYDNEY S. ASHER, JR., Trial Examiner: On May 25,
1966, United Shoe Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
herein called the Union, filed charges against Casey
Manufacturing Company, Casey, Illinois, herein called
the Respondent. Amended charges were filed on June 10,
1966. On July 29, 1966, the General Counsel issued a
complaint alleging that, since on or about January 17,
1966, the Respondent, by certain specified conduct, has
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in
the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C.
Sec. 151, et seq.), herein called the Act. It is alleged that
this conduct violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed an answer admitting cer-
tain jurisdictional facts, but denying the commission of
any unfair labor practices.'
Upon due notice, a hearing was held before me on
November 29 and 30, 1966, at Marshall, Illinois. All
parties were represented and participated fully in the
hearing. During the hearing the General Counsel was per-
mitted to make two specific amendments to the com-
plaint. At the close of the hearing the Respondent moved
to dismiss certain parts of the complaint for lack of proof.
Rulings on these motions were reserved; they are now
disposed of in accordance with the findings and conclu-
sions herein. After the close of the hearing all parties filed
briefs. These have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record in this case, and from my obser-
vation of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and it is
found that the Respondent is, and at all material times has
been , an employer engaged in commerce as defined in the
Act, and its operations meet the Board 's jurisdictional
standards ;2 and that the Union is, and at all material times
has been , a labor organization within the meaning of the
Act. -
A. The Setting
Ettelbrick Shoe Company, an Illinois corporation, is
engaged in the same business as Respondent, and the two
corporations have common stockholders. Nicholas Ettel-
brick is chairman of the board of both, and William Wil-
lenborg is president of both. At all material times, Ettel-
brick Shoe Company operated plants at Robinson, Il-
linois, and Greenup, Illinois. Robinson is approximately
35 miles from Casey. Greenup and Casey are about 9
miles apart and news travels between those two plants
very rapidly.3
i I n its answer, the Respondent "prays that this Complaint be dismissed
with prejudice and that the Union and the General Counsel be barred
from relitigating the matters contained herein in this or any other proceed-
ing "This motion lacks merit and is denied
2 The Respondent is, and at all material times has been , an Illinois cor-
poration with an office and place of business in Casey, Illinois, where it is
engaged in the manufacture , sale, and distribution of shoes During the
year poor to July 29, 1966, the Respondent shipped products valued at
more than $50,000 from its Casey plant to destinations outside the State
of Illinois
Since March 23, 1966, when the Union won a Board-
conducted election at the Greenup plant (Case
14-RC-5373), the employees at Greenup have been
represented by the Union. A 2-year collective-bargaining
contract covering these employees was executed by the
Respondent on May 23, 1966, and by the Union approxi-
mately 4 weeks later.
At the Casey plant, union organizing efforts began in
late November 1965, and became known to the Respond-
ent's officials at least by the end of January 1966." The
Union lost a Board-conducted election held among the
employees of the Casey plant on June 7, 1966 (Case
14-RC-5457). We are here primarily concerned with
events which occurred at the Casey plant from the
beginning of 1966 until the election of June 7 of that year.
B. The Pay Increase
1. Facts
For some years Ettelbrick Shoe Company has followed
a policy of treating the employees alike in all its
plants -including the Respondent's plant at Casey. As
testified by Willenborg:
We have to maintain the same working conditions in
all plants. . . . If we grant a pay increase in one plant
we can't pass up the other plant[s] because the word
would get around very quickly and we would have
problems in all of our plants.
Accordingly, in August 1957 a wage increase of 5 cents
per hour was given- Simultaneously to the employees of
the Greenup, Robinson, and Casey plants. Again in
December 1959 another raise of 5 cents per hour was
granted to employees of all three plants at the same time.
It is against this background that we must view the events
of 1966.
Early in January 1966, a committee representing the
employees of the Greenup plant requested that Willen-
borg meet with them. Willenborg did so on January 11,5
at which time the employees' representatives made cer-
tain demands -among them, a wage increase of 10 cents
per hour. In the negotiations which followed, Willenborg
pointed out (according to Greenup employee Hazel Ed-
wards, who attended):
. he'd have to take into consideration the other
factories too, if he raised us [the employees at
Greenup] ten cents an hour, of course, he'd have to
raise them [the employees at Robinson and Casey]
ten cents an hour.
An agreement was reached between Willenborg and the
Greenup committee upon a cost-of-living bonus of 5
cents per hour. This was put into effect at all three plants
(Greenup, Robinson, and Casey) on January 22. At this
time , as mentioned above, the Union was attempting to
3 On August I, 1966, after the events related herein but before the hear-
ing, Ettelbnck Shoe Company opened another plant at Newton , Illinois,
approximately 20 miles from Casey
" The finding as to the Respondent officials' knowledge of these activi-
ties by late January is based upon the testimony of Joe Schull, plant su-
perintendent of the Respondent
5 All dates hereafter refer to the year 1966, unless otherwise noted
CASEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY
organize the employees at the Casey plant; the record
contains no mention of union activities at the Robinson
plant; and-although it is not entirely clear-the em-
ployees at Greenup apparently had not yet begun union
activities."
2. Contentions of the parties
The complaint alleges that, on or about January 17, the
Respondent "granted a pay increase to its employees in
order to induce [them] to cease their union or protected
concerted activities." In its answer the Respondent de-
nies this allegation in its entirety. However, at the close
of the hearing, the Respondent's attorney admitted that
in January there was a pay increase of 5 cents an hour in
all three plants simultaneously.
The General Counsel, in his brief, maintains that the
Respondent's officials were aware of organizing efforts at
the Casey plant before the wage increases were granted
and that "this pay raise was motivated by a desire of the
Respondent to discourage any union activities on behalf
of its employees ... it was the intention of the Company
to discourage the organizing campaign . granting
benefits with such intention during an organizing cam-
paign is violative of the Act."
On the other hand, the Respondent in its brief urges
that management had no knowledge of union activities at
any of its plants at the time the wage raises became effec-
tive. It contends that the wage increases were motivated
by the increased cost of living, the competition for labor
in the area reflected in the high labor turnover, and the de-
mand of the Greenup employees for better wages. It ar-
gues "The existence of a long-time company policy was
merely the vehicle which respondent used to solve the
economic problem at all of its plants."
3. Conclusion
The Board majority opinion in American Freightways
Co., Inc., stated:
It is well settled that the test of interference,
restraint, and coercion under Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act does not turn on the employer's motive or on
whether the coercion succeeded or failed. The test is
whether the employer engaged in conduct which, it
may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the
free exercise of employee rights under the Act.7
6 Hazel Edwards, an employee of the Greenup plant for 35 years and a
member of the committee which negotiated the wage increase , testified as
follows:
Q. Do you know whether the Greenup Manufacturing plant was
being organized at the time of this meeting?
A. No; no.
° 124 N LRB 146, 147. On the same day the Board , in Armstrong Coun-
ty Line Construction, 124 N LRB 132, 139, held that a wage increase dur-
ing a union campaign did not violate the Act because the General Counsel
failed to prove that it was illegally motivated.
"Exchange Parts Co., 131 NLRB 806, 812. After American
Freight ways but before Exchange Parts, the Board in True Temper Cor-
poration, 127 NLRB 839, in effect repudiated the test set forth in
American Freightways. Later Board decisions indicate that the Board
looks upon True Temper as a momentary reversion to pre-American
Freightways tests, followed quickly in Exchange Parts by a return to the
principle enuniciated in American Freightways. See, for example, The J.
S. Dillion & Sons Stores Co., Inc, 144 NLRB 1235, 1243, fn. 28, en-
forcement denied 338 F.2d 395 (C.A. 10); and Reliance Fuel Oil Corp.,
91
Thereafter, in Exchange Parts Company, the employer
sought to prove that in granting economic benefits it was
not motivated by unlawful considerations. The Board
stated flatly: "However, motive is neither controlling nor
material" and then quoted from American Freightways,
as above." The United States Supreme Court affirmed."
The General Counsel, in his brief, citing, American
Freightways, contends that "motive is not the determin-
ing factor." The Respondent, conversely, takes the posi-
tion:
. that the Supreme Court does not adhere to the
Board's rejection of an employer's motive as ex-
pressed in American Freightways, supra, or as
reiterated in the Board decision in Exchange Parts.
Thus, the test is not solely whether the conduct tends
to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights
but also whether it is the intention AND motive of
respondent to interfere with the free exercise of em-
ployees' rights.
I cannot agree. The Respondent does not cite any
authority for its interpretation of the Supreme Court's
decision in Exchange Parts. A reading of that opinion
reveals no criticism by the Supreme Court of the reason-
ing applied by the Board therein. Moreover, court and
Board decisions since then indicate a belief that the Board
decision in Exchange Parts is still good law. Thus in
1965, a year after the Supreme Court's Exchange Parts
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit stated:
There is much in this record to indicate that Welch
acted in good faith . . . but we conclude that, if the
conduct complained of otherwise violated Section
8(a)(1), good faith is no defense. The cases clearly
demonstrate that it is the tendency of an employer's
conduct to interfere with the rights of his employees
protected by Section 8(a)(1), rather than his motives,
that is controlling.10
And as recently as 1966 the Board was still citing
American Freightways for the proposition that "a com-
pany's conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(1) where it
tends to interfere with the exercise by employees of their
rights under the Act."" I accordingly conclude that the
proper test to apply is that set forth in American
Freightways.
Let us now apply all this to the instant case. Here, the
Respondent did not choose the timing of the increases; on
the contrary the timing (and the raise itself) was the result
129 NLRB 1166, 1167, 1175, fn 27, affd. 371 U.S. 224, enfd on remand
February 26, 1963 (C A. 2).
° Exchange Parts Co., 375 U S. 405.
10 The Welch Scientific Co, Inc. v N.L.R.B., 340 F.2d 199, 203 (C.A
2).
" Hermann Equipment Manufacturing Company, Inc., 156 NLRB
716, 718, fn. 3. More recently, the Board has stated in Dan Howard Mfg.
Co., 158 NLRB 805: "The employer's legal duty is to proceed in these
matters (granting or withholding benefits] as he would have done had the
Union not been on the scene " In another recent case the Board held that
an employer 's granting a wage increase during a union campaign "raises
a strong presumption " of illegality. Ventre Packing Co., Inc, 163 N LRB
540 American Freightways was not cited in either Dan Howard or
Ventre. As recently as March 1967 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit , speaking of violations of Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act,
stated - "The test is. . whether the conduct in question had a reasonable
tendency in the totality of the circumstances to intimidate " Corrie Cor-
poration of Charleston v. N.L R.B., 375 F.2d 149, 153 (C.A. 4).
92 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
of collective bargaining initiated by the Greenup em-
ployees. It is also significant that at this time (January 22)
no representation petitions were pending before the
Board regarding the Respondent's employees at any of its
plants, nor was an election imminent. Moreover, the wage
increase took effect not only at the Casey plant where the
Union was active, but also at the Greenup and Robinson
plants, where there was no union activity. Finally, the
Respondent acted in accordance with is longstanding pol-
icy of maintaining the same working conditions in all its
plants -a policy which the General Counsel does not at-
tack as unlawful. Indeed, had the Respondent acted dif-
ferently and refused to apply the wage increase to its
Casey employees, in derogation of this longstanding pol-
icy, it might have run the risk of being charged with dis-
criminating against those employees because of their
union activities. Having lawfully committed itself to raise
the pay of the employees at Greenup, the Respondent
had no choice, under the circumstances, but to treat the
Casey employees in exactly the same fashion. And it
made this point clear to the Greenup employees during
their talk. To find a violation under such circumstances
would be tantamount to holding that all wages and other
working conditions in any of the Respondent's plants
must remain fixed while a union campaign is underway in
that plant, no matter how long that campaign may last,
even though meanwhile benefits may be legitimately
granted at the other plants. In short, it would require the
Respondent to abandon its policy of equality in all its
plants. To so hold would, in my opinion, be highly unreal-
istlc.12 I conclude that the General Counsel has failed to
establish that the wage increase granted to the Casey em-
ployees on January 22 reasonably tended to interfere
with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act.
In this posture of the case, I do not reach the issue
whether, by January 22 when the wage increase became
effective, the Respondent was aware of the employees'
organizing efforts at the Casey plant.
C. Interrogation
1. By Schull
As amended at the hearing the complaint alleges, and
the answer denies, that on or about January 25, February
4, and April 20 Joe Schull, superintendent at the Casey
plant, "coercively interrogated employees ... concerning
their union membership and activities." It is admitted
that, at all material times, Schull was a supervisor as
defined in the Act.
The record shows, and I find, that between mid-Janua-
ry and early February Schull approached John Rich, an
employee in the plant, and stated: "John, there is rumors
out that you have been passing out union cards." Rich de-
nied it and asked Schull who had told him. Schull declined
to reveal this, and left. About a half-hour later Schull
returned. Calling him over, Rich remarked that Schull
should "tell whoever told him that if they wanted [his]
job that bad they could have it." Schull advised Rich:
"Now, John, just don't think anything more about it. For-
get about it." 13
12 See Champion Pneumatic Machinery Co, 152 NLRB 300, 306, and
The Brearly Company, 163 NLRB 637, fn 2
13 The findings regarding these two conversations are based on a
synthesis of the testimony of Rich and Schull
14 The findings with regard to this conversation are based solely on Gil-
bert's undenied testimony Although Schull testified, he did not mention
the incident
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The record also shows, and I find, that Beverly Gilbert,
an employee at the Casey plant, signed a union applica-
tion card on February 2 or 3. On the next day, Schull ap-
proached her in the plant and asked: "May I ask you a
question?" When she assented, Schull stated: "I hear you
signed a union card yesterday at noon." Gilbert asked:
"Who said I did?" but Schull, shrugging his shoulders, did
not answer. Then Schull asked Gilbert: "What can they
offer you that we are not already giving you?" Gilbert
responded: "Better working conditions, better leather,"
and walked away. 14
From the above I conclude that between mid-January
and early February Schull attempted to elicit from Rich
information about Rich's union activities; namely,
whether he had assisted the Union by passing out cards.
Moreover, on February 3 or 4, Schull similarly sought to
find out from Gilbert whether she had signed a union
card. Such conduct reasonably tended to coerce the em-
ployees in the exercise of protected rights, and therefore
constituted interrogation proscribed by Section 8(a)(1).
It is not entirely clear exactly what the General Counsel
relies on as proof of illegal interrogation by Schull on or
about April 20 and consequently no finding regarding this
particular allegation of the complaint will be made herein.
In any event, such a finding would merely be cumulative
and would not materially affect the remedial order
hereafter recommended.
2. By Zarka
As amended at the hearing the complaint alleges, and
the answer denies, that on or about March 15 Joe Zarka,
assistant superintendent at the Casey plant, "interrogated
employees ... concerning their union membership and
activities." It is admitted that, at all relevant times, Zarka
was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.
In January, March, or April, the Union held meetings
on at least three evenings, a week apart. One of the em-
ployees who attended these meetings was Katherine
Reynolds. On the morning after the first of these, Zarka,
in the plant, asked Reynolds "if [the employees] had had
a nice meeting" and Reynolds answered: "Fine." Zarka
then asked "if [the employees] had got any cards
signed." Reynolds replied, "Yes." A week later, the
morning after the next union meeting, Zarka again asked
Reynolds "if [the employees] had had a good meeting"
and Reynolds again responded: "Fine." Zarka then asked
"if [the employees] had got any more cards." Reynolds
answered: "A few." A week after that, after still another
union meeting, Zarka told Lois Adkinson, another em-
ployee, that she "didn't have to worry about [the Casey
employees] getting a union in because [they] didn't have
enough cards signed." Later that day Zarka came to
Reynolds' workplace and asked: "Why didn't you tell me
we [sic] had enough cards signed?" Reynolds replied
that this was none of Zarka's business.
In mid-March, in the plant, Zarka engaged in a conver-
sation with Reynolds and Leota Winnett, another emplo-
yee.15 Zarka asked Reynolds what she hoped to gain by
having a union. She answered by listing specific benefits.
15 Reynolds testified that a third employee, Kenneth Sowers, was
present "after about half of the conversation " Winnett in her testimony
did not mention his presence and Sowers himself testified that he could
not recall the incident ,
CASEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY 93
Then Zarka turned to Winnett and inquired: "Well,
Leota, how about you?" Winnett likewise mentioned cer-
tain benefits. Zarka responded that he had been trying to
get such benefits for the employees. is
The Respondent, in its brief, refers to Reynolds'
"camaraderie with Zarka." It is true that the record
reveals the existence of "a very good relationship"
between Reynolds and Zarka. On one occasion Reynolds
asked Zarka what he thought of the Union and he replied
it made no difference to him. On another occasion she
asked whether he would hold her union activities against
her; he responded in the negative. But a friendly at-
mosphere does not license an employer to engage in il-
legal interrogation. Although rebuffed, Zarka continually
questioned Reynolds about the Union's strength. In the
context of other unfair labor practices found herein, such
persistent efforts to elicit information, in the face of obvi-
ous reluctance to reveal it, may reasonably be said to
have tended to coerce Reynolds. And I am also con-
vinced that Zarka's questioning of Reynolds and Winnett
in mid-March concerning their attitude toward the Union
likewise exceeded permissible bounds. He had no right
to inquire of their motives in supporting the Union. 17 It is
accordingly found that Zarka's interrogations of
Reynolds and Winnett described above violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
Toward the end of March Rich spent "a few nights" in
the company of a representative of the Union obtaining
signatures of employees on union authorization cards.
About April 1 Zarka approached Rich at his machine and
said: "John, I hear you have been putting in as many
hours at night working as you have in the daytime." Rich
replied: "Yes, I have. Do you want to argue with me?"
Zarka responded: "No. I am just ashamed of you."1e The
General Counsel, in his brief, maintains that Zarka "was
talking of Rich's visits with the Union organizer," and
therefore this constituted illegal interrogation. In support
of this, the General Counsel points to Zarka's failure to
testify at the hearing that in that conversation he referred
to something other than Rich's union activities. In the
light of Zarka's illegal interrogations of employees
Reynolds and Winnett, I consider the General Counsel's
interpretation reasonable and conclude that Zarka's state-
ment to Rich concerning the hours he put in at night was
designed to elicit information regarding Rich's union ac-
tivities and was therefore proscribed by the Act.
D. Alleged Threat
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on
or about February 16 Zarka "threatened an employee
with loss of earnings if the Union became the representa-
tive of the employees" at the Respondent's plant. This al-
legation of the complaint is based entirely upon a conver-
sation in the plant on February 16 between Zarka and
Reynolds, in the presence of two other employees,
Carolyn Livingston and Betty Masters.
According to Reynolds, Zarka said that Reynolds and
her husband, Don (also an employee of the Respondent),
"should consider [themselves] lucky because of the high
average" they had, as the workers in St. Louis were mak-
ing .$1.25 per hour; Reynolds answered "that the workers
in St. Louis must be fools then"; whereupon Zarka stated
Reynolds "wouldn't think they was fools if [she] was
starving to death, and that's what might happen." On
cross-examination, Reynolds admitted that a prehearing
written statement given by her to the Respondent's attor-
ney contained nothing about Zarka adding: "and that's
what might happen to you, too." Livingston, a witness for
the General Counsel, testified: "They was talking about
St. Louis, they just got a dollar and a quarter an hour, and
Katherine [Reynolds] said they were fools for working
for a dollar and a quarter an hour." Masters did not testi-
fy. Zarka testified that he told Reynolds: "Kathy, you and
Don are very fortunate to be earning the money that you
do"; in response Reynolds "made some remark about
somebody being suckers or fools or working for
something." He then testified as follows:
Q. Did you say anything after that?
A. No, sir, I don't remember saying anything.
Q. Did you say that she should feel very fortu-
nate, that she could be standing in a bread line and
starving to death?
A. No, I don' t think I made that statement.
Q. Did you make any statement , added onto that
statement with respect to you could be standing in a
bread line starving to death and that 's what might
happen to you?
A. That' s ridiculous.
Q. Well, did you make the statement?
A. No, sir.
I credit Zarka's version as more accurate than that of
Reynolds, and conclude that the General Counsel has
failed to prove by convincing evidence that Zarka added
the words : "and that ' s what might happen to you."
Without these alleged words at the end , his statement did
not constitute a threat of reprisal . Accordingly, the
Respondent 's motion to dismiss this allegation , made at
the close of the hearing , is granted.
E. Announcement of Retirement Plan
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on
or about March 4, 1966, the Respondent "announced a
retirement plan for its employees for the purpose of in-
ducing [them] to cease their union ... activities."
Prior to mid-1964 Ettelbrick Shoe Company had been
paying pensions to "four or five" retired former em-
ployees. In November 1964 Ettelbrick Shoe Company
requested its accountants "to discuss pension plans" with
Ettelbrick and Willenborg. This was done. Early in 1965
Willenborg, in connection with information supplied by
Ettelbrick Shoe Company's chief payroll clerk, prepared
"a ten-year projection" in order to obtain "some estimate
of what a pension plan would cost." Late in July 1965 the
board of directors of Ettelbrick Shoe Company agreed
with Willenborg 's suggestion that "the Company should
'S The findings regarding the conversations involving Zarka and
Reynolds are based on a synthesis of the testimony of Reynolds and Wm-
nett Zarka admitted that he had "several" conversations with Reynolds
with respect to the Union. He testified that he had seen her with union or-
ganizers and had "asked her what she expected to gain by having the
Union in the factory "
1' Compare Springfield Garment Manufacturing Company, 152
NLRB 1043, 1046
18 These findings are based upon Rich's undemed testimony Although
Zarka testified, he did not mention this incident
94 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
definitely establish a pension plan ." In September 1965,
Step Master Shoes, Incorporated, a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Ettelbrick Shoe Company described by Willen-
borg as "our selling division," announced the establish-
ment of a pension plan for its employees, who were
salesmen , effective January 1, 1966. Thereafter, accord-
ing to Willenborg, Ettelbrick Shoe Company "resumed
wcrk on other aspects of [its] pension plan." However,
this was delayed somewhat by an illness suffered by Et-
telbrick.
At the meeting between Willenborg and representa-
tives of the Greenup employees in January 1966, the em-
ployees' representatives included in their demands a
request for a pension plan. Willenborg informed them that
Ettelbrick Shoe Company was "working on a plan and
had one about ready to announce" and although it was
not "fully completed" it would be "before the year is up."
On March 4 the Respondent mailed a letter to each em-
ployee at the Casey plant. It read:
CASEY MANUFACTURING CO.
CASEY, ILLINOIS
March 4, 1966
TO OUR EMPLOYEES:
We are pleased to announce the start of a modest
pension plan for our employees. This plan will be
non-contributing (all costs paid for by the company).
To be eligible for the plan, an employee must have
at least 15 years consecutive service with the com-
pany. Retirement will be from ages 62 to 65 years,
this matter to be left to the discretion of the com-
pany. However, no employee will be asked to retire
at 62, if he or she does not have 15 years of service.
The primary reason for age 62 retirement would be
ill health and the elimination of jobs through new
machinery, certain jobs being eliminated through
technilogical advances, such as unisoles which do
not require edge trimming, rough rounding, etc.
There will be no pension paid due to disability
prior to age 62, however, if an employee is certified
disabled permanently by a registered physician prior
to 62, then , if at age 62 the employee has 15 years of
service including disability time , that employee
would go on pension at age 62. This pension would
be effective to January 1, 1966. In other words, any
employee who has reached the age of 65 since Janua-
ry 1, 1966 would be eligible to go on pension. Retire-
ment is not compulsary at age 65.
All pension checks will be mailed the 1st day of
each month.
Pension scales would be as follows: Time Workers
& Piece Workers $25 00 per month; Assistant
Foremen, Machinists, Maintainence Workers, & Of-
fice Employees $40.00 per month; Foremen $50.00
per month; and Superintendents and Executives
$100.00 per month.
This pension, as a supplement to social security,
will, we hope, make retirement a little more com-
fortable for our employees.
As we stated in the opening paragraph, this is a
modest start, let us not kid ourselves, a successful
pension plan has to come from a successful com-
pany. A successful company has a product well made
and well received by the customers. We can not ex-
press enough, the importance of production, in this
day and age of high overhead. The more production
we can achieve, the lower per pair our overhead will
be. We hope the future will allow us to increase the
amount of the pension.
CASEY MFG. COMPANY
Is/ W. Willenborg
President
On October 1, after the issuance of the complaint
herein, Ettelbrick Shoe Company entered into two agree-
ments with The First National Bank of Chicago. One
establishes a trust for employees represented by the
Union (namely, the employees of the Greenup plant) and
refers to "an Employees' Pension Plan [heretofore
established] with ... the Union ... for the exclusive
benefit of its employees and their beneficiaries, as therein
defined...." The other establishes a trust for employees
not represented by the Union (namely, the employees at
all other plants) and refers to "an Employees' Pension
Plan [heretofore adopted by the Company] for the exclu-
sive benefit of its non-union employees and their
beneficiaries, as therein defined...."
The General Counsel, in his brief, points out that "it is
admitted that supervisors of the Casey plant knew of
union activity at that location prior to March 4." How-
ever, under the doctrine of American Freightways, 124
NLRB 146, discussed above, in determining the legality
of the granting of benefits during a union campaign, the
employer's motive is immaterial. I therefore need not,
and do not, take into consideration the Respondent's al-
leged knowledge of the union campaign at the Casey
plant. The test is the tendency of the announcement of
March 4 "to interfere with the free exercise of employee
rights under the Act."
In evaluating the announcement of March 4, timing is
highly significant. Unlike the wage increases of January,
when the Respondent' s timing was dictated by the de-
mands of the Greenup employees, here the Respondent
had complete control of the timing of the announcement.
The Respondent, in its brief, emphasizes "that Respond-
ent's desire to give employees a pension plan arose ap-
proximately two years before the advent of the Union" at
either Greenup or Casey. But this does not lessen the im-
pact of the announcement in the midst of the Union's
campaign, especially when one considers the incomplete
stage of the pension plan on March 4. As to this, Ettel-
bnck testified:
Q. Were all of the terms and conditions of the
pension plan worked out on March 4 when you an-
nounced it to the employees?
A. N o.
Finally, we must consider the Respondent' s longstanding
policy of treating the employees of all its plants alike. As
noted above, that policy was followed in the wage in-
creases granted in January. But although letters went out
on March 4 to all employees of the Casey plant, there is
no showing that similar letters were sent to employees of
other plants-on March 4 or at any other time. Bearing in
mind this departure from the Respondent' s longstanding
policy, and the announcement before all the terms and
conditions of the pension plan had been fully worked out,
I conclude that the announcement of March 4, made to
the Casey employees alone, reasonably tended to inter-
CASEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY
fere with the exercise of their rights under the Act, and
therefore violated Section 8(a)(1).19
F. No-Solicitation Rules
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on
or about May 1, the Respondent "published a company
rule to its employees which prohibited solicitation for
union membership during working hours or at any time on
company property without the permission of the plant
manager."
In the fall of 1965 the Respondent distributed a rule
book to all its employees. 20 It contained the following:
11. Soliciting among employees for funds or con-
tributions for any purpose is prohibited during work-
ing hours or at any time on Company property
without permission of the Supt.
The Company considers the following as sufficient
reason for dismissal.
* * * * *
10. Soliciting for any purpose such as bets, or-
ganizations , charities , sale of tickets , operation of
pools, lotteries, etc.
In late March or early April 1966 the Respondent
posted on the bulletin board at the Casey plant the follow-
ing notice:
CASEY MANUFACTURING CO.
CASEY, ILLINOIS
...........
Date
TO:
You have violated Company Rule Number 11
which prohibits soliciting for any purpose during
working hours or at any time on company property
without the permission of the plant manager. This is
a warning letter.
A second violation of the above will result in a one
week layoff without pay.
A third violation of the company rule outlined in
paragraph one will result in a permanent discharge
from company work force.
A copy of this letter is being placed in your person-
nel file and will be a permanent part of the record of
your employment here.
CASEY MFG. COMPANY
Joe Shull
Superintendent
Soliciting has been going on and if not stopped im-
mediately, those responsible will be presented one of
these letters.
19 Good-All Electric Mfg Co, 117 NLRB 72, 74, cited by the Respond-
ent, is distinguishable on its facts There, the union had "raised the
matter of the trust as an issue in the campaign and the Employer was
simply countering " No such facts appear here Moreover, there the
announcement was of a benefit "which had been previously granted,"
while here the announcement was made before plans for the pension fund
had been fully worked out
95
It remained posted about 10 days or 2 weeks. Then a
representative of the Union wrote to the Respondent in
protest. Thereafter the Respondent removed the notice
in question and substituted in its place the following
notice:
CASEY MANUFACTURING CO.
CASEY, ILLINOIS
TO OUR EMPLOYEES:
Some time ago we issued to each of you a booklet
containing working rules here at the factory.
Recently, we have had some questions about certain
of those rules. In order to clear up those questions,
we will set out the rules involved. They are:
1. Employees are not to solicit other employees for
any purpose such as bets, organizations, charities,
sale of tickets, operation of pools, lotteries, etc., dur-
ing working time and employees are not to be sol-
icited for any purpose during their working time.
Working time is for work and employees cannot per-
form their work properly if interfered with by so-
licitation.
2. Employees are not to distribute literature,
pamphlets or papers for any purpose to other em-
ployees in any working area of the factory whether
during working time or otherwise and employees are
not to accept such materials for any purpose in the
factory's working areas, at any time. The working
areas around machinery must be kept clear and unlit-
tered and these areas can be dangerously cluttered if
literature, pamphlets or other papers are scattered
about them.
3. All employees are expected to be at their places
of work at the factory's starting time and to remain at
their places of work and continue to work until the
factory's quitting times except for brief reasonable
absences for personal reasons or when and if ex-
cused by foremen or other supervision.
/S/ JOE SHULL
JOE SHULL
PLANT SUPERINTENDENT
It is not clear from the record how long the last-quoted
notice remained on the bulletin board.
The General Counsel does not base any allegation of
unfair labor practices upon the original distribution of the
rule book. But he attacks the validity of the rule posted in
late March or early April, as an unwarranted infringement
on employee rights. I agree that the rule is too broad, as
it requires management permission for any employee to
solicit on the Union's behalf during nonworking time
anywhere on company premises. This renders it pre-
sumptively invalid on its face .21 And the Respondent has
20 The finding regarding the timing of the book's distribution is based on
a date it bears, September 13, 1965 Reynolds testified that she received
her copy "the last of December [ 1965] or the 1st of January [ 1966] "
Willenborg testified that the book was distributed "in late 1964 or early
1965 " 1 n view of the date imprinted in the book, I consider this testimony
inaccurate
21 Walton Manufacturing Company, 126 NLRB 697
96 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
shown no justification for the rule to overcome that pre-
sumption. Moreover, it is no defense that the offending
rule was rescinded after the Union's protest. Ac-
cordingly, I find that, by republishing its illegal no-sol-
icitation rule for about 10 days or 2 weeks in late March
or early April, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
The complaint further alleges, and the answer denies,
that on or about May 25 the Respondent "applied a com-
pany rule against solicitation on company premises in a
discriminatory manner so that all union solicitation was
prohibited, but solicitation for other purposes was per-
mitted during working hours...."
Late in March Schull walked up to Sheila Knifley, an
employee, at her desk and said: "Sheila, one of the girls
has reported that you have been trying to get her to sign
a union card.... Now, what you do on your own time is
your own business but while you are ... working for me
I expect you to work on shoes." Knifley denied having
passed out union cards on working time . Schull replied:
"It doesn't matter one way or the other, I am just telling
you what they reported." Knifley stated that if she "was
going to get fired [she would] just as soon get fired now
and get it over with," to which Schull responded that she
"had a right to [her] own opinion .... 1122
All parties apparently agree that the above-described
conversation constituted enforcement of the no-solicita-
tion rule posted in April, quoted above, and that, on its
face, this rule is presumptively valid. The General Coun-
sel, however, contends that this rule was discriminatorily
applied to prevent union solicitation during working
hours while at the same time the Respondent permitted
other types of solicitation (unrelated to the Union) to take
place on company time. To support this contention the
General Counsel relies on the uncontradicted testimony
of Reynolds that late in May, during worktime, she col-
lected a dollar from Norma Elkins (described by
Reynolds as a floorlady) for the birthday club23 in
Schull's presence, and that later, as Reynolds was count-
ing the birthday club money, Schull asked her: "What are
you doing, buying votes?" The General Counsel also re-
lies on the undenied testimony of Winnett that shortly be-
fore May 30, during working time, Helen Loehr, a floor-
lady, approached her and sold her a chance on the Indi-
anapolis 500-mile automobile race. He also relies on the
uncontradicted testimony of Kenneth Sowers, an em-
ployee, that there were 33 chances on the Indianapolis
"500," that Loehr sold him one of these chances during
lunchtime late in May, that she asked him to dispose of
the remaining 7 or 8 chances, and that he spent 5 or 10
minutes doing so; he was not certain whether he sold any
during working time.24 It is found that these incidents oc-
22 The findings regarding this conversation are based on a synthesis of
the testimony of Schull and Knifley
23 A club consisting of 26 members who contribute I dollar each for the
other members' birthdays.
24 Willenborg testified without contradiction, and I find, that Loehr has
authority to decide who is going to do what work, and that she did not vote
in the Board-conducted election at the Casey plant on June 7 It is found
that she is , and at all relevant times has been, a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act
25 The Wm H Block Company, 150 NLRB 341, Lou De Young's
Market Basket, Inc, 159 NLRB 854, Serv-Air, Inc, 161 NLRB 382,
Sparks Nugget, Inc, 161 NLRB 1195, Tyrone Hydraulics, Inc, 161
NLRB 1476, Gooch Packing Company, 162 NLRB 1, Priced-Less
Discount Foods, Inc dibla Payless, 162 N LRB 872, and Walker Process
Equipment, Inc , 163 NLRB 615. But compare Springfield Garment
curred substantially as related by Reynolds, Winnett, and
Sowers.
In the light of the permissiveness of the Respondent re-
garding open solicitation for the birthday club on com-
pany time and the involvement of a supervisor in selling
chances on the "500," which occurred (at least in part)
during working hours, I regard Schull's reprimand of
Knifley for supposed union activities on company time as
disparate treatment, which reasonably tended to inhibit
the employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.25
Accordingly, such discriminatory conduct, in my opinion,
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
G. Promise ofAdditional Holidays
The complaint alleges, and the answer denies, that on
or about June 6 Willenborg "impliedly promised two ad-
ditional paid holidays to [the Respondent's] employees
for the purpose of inducing [them] to cease their union
. activities."
All parties agree, and I find, that on June 6 Willenborg
delivered a prepared speech to the assembled employees
of the Casey plant in which he urged them to vote against
the Union in the Board-conducted election scheduled to
be held the next day. Willenborg admitted, and I find, that
at the end of the prepared speech he added a statement
"that we had to maintain the same working conditions in
all of our plants because of their close proximity."26 The
parties stipulated, and it is found, that the collective-bar-
gaining contract covering the employees at the Greenup
plant provided for seven paid holidays for the year 1966
(apparently one more than those employees had enjoyed
in 1965). That contract, as previously mentioned, had
been executed by the Respondent, but not yet by the
Union, at the time of the speech in question. It will be as-
sumed, without deciding, that the Casey employees at
that time knew that the Greenup contract contained an
additional paid holiday for the year 1966.27
The General Counsel does not base any allegation on
the delivery of the prepared speech. However, he asserts
that the later statement of Willenborg that the same work-
ing conditions would be maintained in all the Respond-
ent's plants was tantamount to informing them "that
they could receive all of the benefits of a union contract
without a union." As "most of the employees at Casey
knew" that the Greenup contract provided for an addi-
tional paid holiday, it follows, says the General Counsel,
"that the Respondent did promise its employees an addi-
tional paid holiday during Willenborg's speech of June 6.
Such a promise, so clearly intended to ward off union ac-
tivity, is violative of Section 8(a)(1)."
Let us analyze this argument. All that Willenborg did
Manufacturing Company, 152 NLRB 1043
26 Sowers, a witness for the General Counsel, generally corroborated
this To the extent that other employee witnesses (Reynolds, Gilbert,
Winnett, and Rich) vaned this statement in some respects , their testimony
is regarded as less accurate than that of Willenborg and Sowers.
27 On cross-examination Willenborg testified
Q Did the company have a policy of keeping employees at one
plant informed about what was occurring at other plants within the
company"
A Well, we really didn't have to, because the word traveled pretty
fast
On the other hand, Gilbert testified on direct examination
Q Did you know at that time [June 6] what holidays Greenup
[employees] had under their contract"
A No, I didn't
CASEY MANUFACTURING COMPANY 97
on June 6 was to remind his audience of the Respondent's
policy of treating the employees of all its plants alike,
thereby impliedly promising to continue to follow that
policy. As mentioned above, this was a longstanding pol-
icy, and its validity is not here attacked. Its reiteration at
a time when negotiations at Greenup had apparently
resulted in agreement for additional benefits was not the
disclosure of any new approach. On the contrary, it
served merely to underscore something of which the em-
ployees were already fully aware28-namely, that any
fruits of collective bargaining won by the Greenup em-
ployees through the efforts of their statutory bargaining
agent would automatically accrue to the Casey em-
ployees, in accordance with the Respondent's longstand-
ing commitment. It is therefore concluded that, by this
statement, Willenborg did not make a promise of benefit
to the Casey employees in violation of the Act. The
Respondent's motion to dismiss this portion of the com-
plaint, upon which ruling was reserved, is accordingly
granted.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon
the entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Casey Manufacturing Company is , and at all
material times has been , an employer within the meaning
of Section 2(2) of the Act , and is engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. United Shoe Workers of America , AFL-CIO, is,
and at all material times has been , a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act , the Respondent has engaged in and is engag-
ing in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce , and constitute unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law , and upon the entire record in this case, I
make the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
It has been found that the Respondent illegally inter-
rogated its employees, announced a pension plan to its
employees under circumstances where such announce-
ment reasonably tended to interfere with their rights,
republished an unduly restrictive no-solicitation rule, and
enforced its no-solicitation no-distribution rules in a dis-
criminatory manner. It will accordingly be recommended
that the Respondent cease and desist from such con-
duct,29 and any like or related conduct. N othing contained
herein shall, however, be construed as forcing or requir-
ing the Respondent to vary or abandon any employee
benefits currently in effect at any of its plants. In view of
the repeal of the illegal no-solicitation rule promptly upon
the Union's protest, and the bargaining to an agreement
between the Respondent and the Union at the Greenup
plant, I perceive here no rejection of the principle of col-
lective bargaining. Accordingly I am of the opinion that
a broad cease-and-desist order would not be appropriate.
During the hearing the Union filed a written motion
requesting that, if the Respondent were found guilty of
violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, it be required "to bar-
gain with the Union in the same terms applicable upon a
Board finding that an employer has violated Section,
8(a)(5) of the Act." The Union in its brief makes other
requests regarding the appropriate affirmative remedy, all
going beyond mere posting of notices, and all granting it
some kind of bargaining rights. The Respondent, in its
brief, resists these suggestions. I find no merit in the
Union's motion. As the record here affords no proof of
the Union's majority status among the Respondent's em-
ployees, I am not convinced that the "strong medicine"
of a bargaining order30 is warranted.31 Moreover, I per-
ceive here no "unique circumstances" requiring "an ex-
ceptional remedy." I conclude that the posting of the
usual notices will adequately remedy the unfair labor
practices found to have been committed by the Respond-
ent herein. The Union's motion is therefore denied.
It is accordingly recommended that Casey Manufactur-
ing Company, Casey, Illinois , its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating its employees with regard to their
own or other employees' union sympathies, affiliations,
or activities in a manner constituting interference,
restraint, or coercion.
(b) Granting or announcing increased benefits for its
employees where such conduct reasonably tends to inter-
fere with the exercise of their rights under the Act.
(c) Prohibiting its employees from soliciting on behalf
of United Shoe Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization, on company property during
their nonworking time.
(d) Discriminatorily maintaining or enforcing its no-
solicitation or no-distribution rules in such a manner as to
restrain or impede its employees in their organizational
activities.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any
labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, to engage in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any
or all such activities, except to the extent that such rights
2e On direct examination Reynolds, speaking of herself and other em-
ployees of the Casey plant who heard Willenborg's speech on June 6,
testified "we knew he had to give us what they [the employees of the
Greenup plant] received " [Emphasis supplied.]
11 The Respondent , in its brief, urges "SINCE RESPONDENT 'S INVALID
NO-SOLICITATION RULES WERE RESCINDED AT THE REQUEST OF THE
UNION APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS PRIOR TO THE ELECTION AND PRIOR
TO THE FILING OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGES, AND, SINCE THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE RULES IMPEDED THE UNION'S ORGANIZA-
TIONAL EFFORTS, NO PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY ORDERING A
REMEDY WITH RESPECT TO THE RESCINDED RULES " I do not agree The
mere republication of the illegal rule, even absent enforcement , inherently
inhibited employees in the exercise of protected rights The Great Atlan-
tic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 162 NLRB 1182 Therefore remedial
action is necessary (although the offending rules have meanwhile been
rescinded ) to prevent repetition of the proscribed conduct
3° N.L R.B v Flomatic Corp, 347 F 2d 74,78 (C A 2)
31 H. W Elson Bottling Company , 155 NLRB 714, 715-716, and J P
Stevens Co , Inc, 157 NLRB 869
98 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which it is
found will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant in Casey, Illinois, copies of the at-
tached notice marked "Appendix."32 Copies of the said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 14, after being duly signed by Respondent's
representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon
receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(b) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps have
been taken to comply herewith.33
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint
herein be dismissed, insofar as it alleges that the Re-
spondent committed any other violation alleged in the
complaint but not found herein.
it In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the
Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further
event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States
Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Ap-
peals Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order "
3' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Ex-
aminer of the National Labor Relations Board and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our em-
ployees that:
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL NOT question our employees about their
own or other employees' union sympathies, affilia-
tions, or activities in a manner constituting inter-
ference, restraint, or coercion.
WE WILL NOT grant or announce increased
benefits for our employees where such conduct
reasonably tends to interfere with the exercise of
their rights under the Act.
WE WILL NOT prohibit our employees from solicit-
ing on behalf of United Shoe Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other union, on company property
during their nonworking time.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily enforce our no-sol-
icitation or no-distribution rules in such a manner as
to restrain or impede our employees in their union
activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the ex-
ercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist any union, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to
refrain from such activities, except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
union membership as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as amended.
CASEY MANUFACTURING
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board 's Regional Office, 1040 Boat-
men's Bank Building, 314 North Broadway, St. Louis,
Missouri 63102, Telephone 622-4167.