Carpenters Local 944

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 13, 1978

239 N.L.R.B. 241 (N.L.R.B. 1978)

CARPENTERS LOCAL 944
Carpenters Local No. 944, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFLCIO; and
Carpenters Local No. 235, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO and
Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. Cases 21-CB
6196 and 21 CC-1922
November 13, 1978
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon charges filed by Woelke & Romero Fram-
ing, Inc. (herein called Woelke or Charging Party).
on August 11, 1977.' and duly served on Carpenters
Local No. 944, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; and Carpenters
Local No. 235, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (herein collective-
ly called Respondents), the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board, acting through the
Regional Director for Region 21, on September 23,
issued and served on Respondents an order consoli-
dating cases, consolidated complaint, and notice of
hearing. The complaint alleged that Respondents (I)
violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, by, among other
acts, picketing Woelke at various jobsites in southern
California with an object of forcing Woelke to enter
into an agreement prohibited by Section 8(e) of the
Act, and (2) violated Section 8(b)(I)(B) of the Act by,
among other acts, bargaining to impasse and striking
Woelke with an object of forcing Woelke to include
within the bargaining unit of employees represented
by Respondents foremen of Woelke who are super-
visors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act
and Woelke's selected representatives for purposes of
collective bargaining or adjustment of grievances
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(l)(B) of the Act.
On October 3 Respondents filed, and duly served on
Woelke and the General Counsel, their answer to the
consolidated complaint in which they denied the
commission of any unfair labor practices.
Thereafter, on October 19, Respondents. Woelke,
and counsel for the General Counsel entered into a
stipulation of facts and a motion to transfer the pro-
ceedings to the Board wherein they agreed that the
charges, the order consolidating cases, consolidated
complaint, and notice of hearing, the answer to com-
plaint, and the stipulation of facts, including the ex-
hibits attached thereto, shall constitute the entire rec-
ord herein and that no oral testimony is necessary or
desired by any of the parties. The parties further sti-
pulated that they waive a hearing before an Adminis-
IUnless otherwise indicated, all dates are in 1977.
trative Law Judge, the making of findings of fact and
conclusions of law by an Administrative Law Judge,
and the issuance of an Administrative Law Judge's
Decision and desire to submit these cases for find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law, and Order directly
by the Board. The parties, however, expressly limited
the stipulation of facts for the purposes of this pro-
ceeding only. In addition, the parties reserved the
right to object to the relevancy, materiality, or com-
petency of any of the facts stated in the stipulation.
On December 13 the Board issued an order ap-
proving the stipulation and transferring the proceed-
ing to the Board and set a date for the filing of briefs.
Thereafter, Respondents, Charging Party, and Gen-
eral Counsel filed briefs in support of their respective
positions. In addition, briefs amici curiae were filed
on behalf of the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Building
and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO,
and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America.2
Pursuant to a notice of hearing issued by the
Board on February 8, 1978, oral argument in this and
related proceedings 3 was held before the Board in
Washington, D.C., on February 23, 1978. In addition
to arguments presented by the parties involved in the
several proceedings, permission to argue orally as
amici curiae was granted to the Chamber of Com-
merce of the United States of America, the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations, the Building and Construction Trades
Department, AFL-CIO, and the Laborers' Interna-
tional Union of North America, AFL-CIO.
The Board has considered the entire record herein
as stipulated by the parties, as well as the briefs filed
by the parties and the amici curiae and the oral argu-
ments made to the Board, and hereby makes the fol-
lowing findings and conclusions:
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYERS
Woelke, as described more fully below, is a fram-
ing subcontractor in the building and construction
industry in southern California which, at relevant
2 Although the Chamber's brief is directed principally to 239 NLRB 264 it
is also addressed to the issues posed in this proceeding.
3 Colorado Building & Construction Trades Council (Utlilties Services Engi-
neering. Inc.), 239 NLRB 253 (1978)}; Los Angeles Building and Construction
Trades Council; and Local Union No. 1497, United Brotherhood of Carpenters
& Joiners of America (Donald Schriver, Inc. and Sullivan--Kelleyv Associ-
ates), 239 NLRB 264 (1978); and International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, Local No, 701. AFL-CIO; Oregon-Columbia Chapter, The Associated
General Contractors ofAmerica, Inc (Pacific Northwest Chapter of the A ssoci-
ated Builders & Contractors, Inc.), 239 NLRB 274 (1978).
241
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
times, had subcontracts with the following subcon-
tractors:
Vanguard Builders, Inc., herein called Vanguard,
is now, and at all times material herein has been, a
corporation engaged in the building and construction
industry in southern California as a general contrac-
tor. At all times material herein, Vanguard has been
engaged as the general contractor on construction
projects located at Columbia and Main Streets, Riv-
erside, California, herein called the Columbia jobsite,
and at Lynwood and Rockford Avenue, San Bernar-
dino, California, herein called the Rockford jobsite.
Birth Development Company, Inc., herein called
Birth, is now, and at all times material herein has
been, a corporation engaged in the building and con-
struction industry in southern California in the con-
struction and sale of single-family residences. At all
times material herein, Birth has been engaged in the
construction of a single-family residence tract locat-
ed at Alessandro Boulevard and Via Vista in River-
side, California, herein called the Alessandro jobsite.
Woodhaven Developers, Inc., d/b/a Woodhaven
Enterprises, herein called Woodhaven, is now, and at
all times material herein has been, a corporation en-
gaged in the building and construction industry in
southern California as a general contractor. At all
times material herein, Woodhaven has been engaged
as the general contractor in the construction of a sin-
gle-family residence tract located at Lincoln and
Mary Streets in Riverside, California, herein called
the Lincoln jobsite.
Woelke, with a place of business located in San
Bernardino, California, is engaged in the building
and construction industry in southern California,
specializing in framing. As stated, at all times mate-
rial herein, Woelke has been engaged, pursuant to
subcontracts with Vanguard, Birth, and Woodhaven,
in performing framing work at the Rockford and Co-
lumbia jobsites, at the Alessandro jobsite, and at the
Lincoln jobsite, respectively. During the normal
course and conduct of its business operations de-
scribed above, Woelke annually purchases and re-
ceives goods and products valued in excess of
$50,000 from suppliers located within the State of
California, each of which purchases and receives said
goods directly from suppliers located outside the
State of California. The parties stipulated, and we
find, that Woelke is, and has been at all times mate-
rial herein, an employer engaged in commerce and in
a business affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and a person engaged
in commerce and in an industry affecting commerce
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) of
the Act. The parties further stipulated, and we find,
that Vanguard, Birth, and Woodhaven are, and each
of them is, and have been at all times material herein,
persons engaged in commerce or in an industry af-
fecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) of the Act.
11. IHE LiABOR OR(ANIZA1 IONS INVOLVED
The parties stipulated, and we find, that Respon-
dents are, and each of them is, and at all times mate-
rial herein have been, labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
11l. I1HE Al.l.t(.EDI) INFAIR LABOR PRA('TII(ES
A. The Issues
1. Are the subcontracting provisions in Respon-
dents' contract proposal proscribed by Section 8(e)
of the Act so as to render Resp by Section 8(e)
of the Act so as to render Respondent's picketing of
Woelke to obtain these proposals violative of Section
8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) of the Act?
2. Did Respondents violate Section 8(b)(1)(B) of
the Act by bargaining to impasse with and striking
Woelke over the inclusion of foremen within the col-
lective-bargaining unit, when such foremen are sup-
ervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the
Act and the selected representatives of Woelke for
purposes of collective bargaining and the adjustment
of grievances within the meaning of Section 8(b)(l)
of the Act.?
B. The Stipulated Facts
As stated, Woelke at all times material herein has
been engaged as a framing contractor in southern
California, performing work under subcontracts for
Vanguard at the Columbia and Rockford jobsites,
Birth at the Alessandro jobsite, and Woodhaven at
the Lincoln jobsite. At no times material herein have
Respondents, or either of them, been engaged in a
labor dispute with Vanguard, Birth, or Woodhaven,
or any of their subcontractors other than Woelke. At
all times material herein, Respondents, and each of
them, have been engaged in a labor dispute with
Woelke.
Woelke has been party to a collective-bargaining
agreement with the United Brotherhood of Carpen-
ters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, its various
district councils and local unions, including Respon-
dents, in the II southern California counties since
July 5, 1974, by virtue of the execution on that date
of a memorandum of agreement with Respondent
Local No. 944. The memorandum of agreement,
which by its terms was due to expire on or about
June 15, 1977, provided, inter alia, that Woelke
would be bound by the 1974-77 Master Labor
Agreement (herein called the 1974 MLA) of the Car-
242
CARPENTERS LOCAL 944
penters Union when the 1974 MLA was agreed to by
the Carpenters Union and the various contractor as-
sociations which negotiated the MLA. On July 27,
1974, the Carpenters Union and the various contrac-
tor associations agreed to the 1974 MLA. Conse-
quently, Respondents and Woelke have been party
to the 1974 MLA since that time. The 1974 MLA
contained a union recognition clause and certain
other clauses which, in effect, obligated Woelke to
recognize the Carpenters Union and Respondents as
the collective-bargaining representative of Woelke's
employees, including those foremen to whom
Woelke had given supervisory and grievance adjust-
ment authority.4 That agreement also contained, in
article 1, paragraph 103, subcontracting provisions
similar to those involved here, set out infra.5
From on or about June 3 to on or about August 4,
1977, Respondents, through their agent, Joseph Eick-
holt, 6 pursuant to notice, engaged in six collective-
bargaining sessions with Woelke for the purpose of
negotiating a successor collective-bargaining agree-
ment. On or about August 4 Respondents and
Woelke agreed that further negotiations should be
postponed indefinitely, since Respondents and
Woelke agreed that they had reached impasse over
various proposals of Respondents. Among the issues
which resulted in the impasse was Respondents' de-
mand for, and Woelke's refusal to agree to, a propos-
al to include within the unit of employees whom Re-
spondents will represent for purposes of collective
bargaining foremen of Woelke who do not regularly
perform bargaining work and who are supervisors
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act and
who are also Woelke's selected representatives for
purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment
of grievances within the meaning of Section
8(b)(l)(B) of the Act.'
Another issue on which the parties reached im-
passe was Respondents' subcontracting proposal
which included all the provisions of article 1, para-
graph 103, and all its subparts, set forth below:
4Art 11 union recognition sec. 201 reads
The ( ontractor hereb! recognizes the Union as the sole and exclusive
collective bargaining representatise of all emplocees and persons em-
ploed to perform work covered bh this Agreement nmplosees
and persons employed to perform ssork covered hs this Agreement
specially include Craft Foreman. A superintendent shall not use Aork.
ing tools
The validity of the subcontracting clauses in the 1974 MI.A is raised in
Los Angeles Building and ( onstruc in rTrades ( ltnci. i nd Local tIon o,
1497. Carpenters (Donald Schrioer. Inc. , supra, issued this da.
' The parties stipulated that Joseph Eickholt has been and is no', a repre-
sentative of Respondents, acting on their behalf. and at all material times
has been, and is nov. an agent of Respondents slithin the meaning of Sec
2(13) of the Act
7Art 11 union recognition. and sec 1612 of Respondents contra.ll pro-
posals are set forth infra
103. The purposes of this paragraph 103 are
to preserve and protect the work opportunities
normally available to to employees and work-
men covered by this Agreement, maintenance
and protection of standards and benefits of em-
ployees and workmen negotiated over many
years, and preservation of the right of union em-
plovees, employed hereunder, from being com-
pelled to work with non-union workmen.
103.1 In the event that enforcement of para-
graph 103.2 is restrained by issuance of an in-
junction by a United States District Court upon
the petition of a Regional Direction [sic] of the
National Labor Relations Board, or otherwise,
such provision shall be suspended pending its
final adjudication, and the provisions set forth
in paragraph 103.3 shall be applicable pending
final adjudication thereof.
103.1.1 Definition of Subcontractor. A sub-
contractor is defined as any person (other than
an employee covered by this Agreement). firm
or corporation holding a valid state contractor's
license where required by law who agrees orally
or in writing to perform, or who in fact performs
for or on behalf of an individual Contractor, or
the subcontractor of an individual Contractor,
any part or portion of the work covered by this
Agreement.
103.2 The Contractor agrees that neither he
nor any of his subcontractors on the jobsite will
subcontract any work to be done at the site of
construction, alteration, painting or repair of a
building, structure or other work (including
quarries, rock, sand and gravel plants, asphalt
plants, ready-mix concrete plants, established on
or adjacent to the jobsite to process or supply
materials for the convenience of the Contractor
for jobsite use) except to a person, firm or cor-
poration, party' to an appropriate, current labor
agreement with the appropriate Union, or sub-
ordinate body signatory to this Agreement.
103 3 Because of the close relationship be-
tween individual Contractors and subcontrac-
tors at the jobsite and the close community of
interests of the employees on the jobsite with
respect to on-site work covered by this Agree-
ment, that is, work done at the site of construc-
tion, alteration. painting or repair of a building.
structure or other work (including quarries,
rock. sand and gravel plants, asphalt plants,
ready-mix concrete or batch plants, established
on or adjacent to the jobsite to process or supply
materials for the convenience of the Contractor
for jobsite use), herein called "jobsite work",
and because of the Union's concern that sub-
243
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
contractors who are not subject to the same total
labor costs as those who are party hereto will
deprive Union members employed hereunder of
work opportunities because of lower labor costs,
it is agreed as follows:
103.3.1 The Contractor and his subcontrac-
tors shall not subcontract any jobsite work, ex-
cept to a contractor whose employees on that
job are members of a bona-fide labor organiza-
tion, and whose labor costs on such job, at all
times during the term of his subcontract here-
under are not less than those of contractors per-
forming similar work to that covered by this
Agreement, including, but not limited to, costs
of subsistence, vacation, holiday, medical, hos-
pitalization, wages, premiums, dental, life insur-
ance and retirement benefits as provided by this
Agreement.
103.3.2 The Contractor shall require each
such subcontractor to weekly supply to the Con-
tractor, who will then upon request make avail-
able to the Union a copy of the subcontractor's
certified labor costs for such job, and to submit
to an audit of those labor costs by a certified
public accountant upon request of the Union to
confirm compliance with 103.3.1.
103.3.3 Failure to comply with the foregoing
subparagraph 103.3.1 and 103.3.2 shall entitle
the Union, notwithstanding Article V, to seek
judicial relief, upon written notice to the Con-
tractor and the subcontractor, to compel the sus-
pension of such subcontractor's work until there
has been compliance, together with attorney's
fees for the bringing of such action. In any such
court proceeding, the court shall, if it is thereaf-
ter in dispute, determine whether there has been
compliance.
103.5 All work performed by the Contractors
or subcontractors and all services rendered for
the Contractors or subcontractors, as herein de-
fined, shall be rendered in accordance with each
and all of the terms and provisions hereof.
103.6 If the Contractor or subcontractors
shall subcontractjobsite work covered under the
jurisdiction of the United Brotherhood of Car-
penters and Joiners of America, including the
furnishing and installation of material, perfor-
mance of labor, and the operation of equipment.
provision shall be made in written contract for
the observance and compliance by his subcon-
tractors with the full terms of this Agreement.
Since August 4 no further collective-bargaining
sessions have been held, and neither Respondents
nor Woelke has requested further negotiations. In
furtherance and support of Respondents' aforemen-
tioned labor dispute with Woelke, and in support of
Respondents' demand for the contract provisions de-
scribed above, Respondent Local No. 235 picketed at
the Columbia, Alessandro, and Lincoln jobsites on
August 10, September 21, and October 5, respective-
ly, with signs reading:
Information
WOELKE & ROMERO
Operating
NONE [sic] UNION
Carpenters
On August 28 Respondent Local No. 944 picketed at
the Rockfordjobsite with picket signs identical to those
described above. As a consequence of the acts and
conduct of Respondent Local No. 235 set forth above,
individuals employed by various subcontractors of
Vanguard and Birth engaged in work stoppages and
refusals to perform services for their respective em-
ployers at the Columbia and Alessandro jobsites.
C. Contentions
1. The subcontracting proposals
The General Counsel and Woelke contend essen-
tially that Respondents' subcontracting proposals set
forth in paragraphs 103.2, 103.3.1, 103.5, and 103.6,
supra, are proscribed by Section 8(e) of the Act and
that Respondents' picketing in support of these pro-
posals therefore violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A)
of the Act. Specifically, General Counsel and Woelke
argue that the proposed subcontracting provisions
are secondary union signatory clauses and, as such,
are presumptively unlawful unless privileged by the
construction industry proviso to Section 8(e). Gener-
al Counsel and Woelke further argue that the clauses
here are not privileged by the proviso because they
do not comport with the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of that proviso in Connell Construction Co., Inc.
v. Plumbers & SteamJfiters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975). Accordingly, General Counsel and
Woelke contend that the picketing by Respondents
to compel Woelke to agree to these clauses violated
Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) of the Act.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the
proposed subcontracting provisions are lawful pri-
mary clauses because they are designed to preserve
traditional bargaining unit work for bargaining unit
employees and to maintain economic standards at
jobs performed by union members. Respondents also
argue that the provisions in issue, even if deemed to
be secondary in nature, are lawful in any event be-
cause they are protected by the construction industry
244
CARPENTERS LOCAL 944
proviso to Section 8(e) of the Act. Respondents argue
that Connell, supra, is not applicable to the instant
dispute because, unlike the critical facts in that case.
Respondents here have a lawful collective-bargaining
relationship with Woelke.
The amici curiae briefs of the American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations,
the Building and Construction Trades Department,
AFL-CIO, and the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America provide additional argu-
ment in general support of the positions taken by
Respondents and by General Counsel and Woelke,
respectively.
2. The proposal to include foremen in unit
The General Counsel and Woelke contend that
Respondents' insistence to impasse upon, and picket-
ing in support of, their proposal to include within the
collective-bargaining unit Woelke's foremen who are
supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of
the Act, and whom Woelke has selected as its collec-
tive-bargaining and grievance-adjusting representa-
tives within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the
Act, constitutes unlawful restraint and coercion with-
in the meaning of Section 8(b)(l)(B) of the Act. Nei-
ther Respondents' brief nor the briefs filed by amici
curiae addressed this issue.
D. Discussion and Conclusions
I. The subcontracting proposals
The gravamen of the complaint is that Respon-
dents' proposed subcontracting clauses quoted above
are violative of Section 8(e) of the Act and that Re-
spondents' picketing in support thereof violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) of the Act.8 Respondents
' Sec. 8(e) of the Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and
any employer to enter into any contract or agreement. express or im-
plied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or
refrain from handling. using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing
in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such
extent unenforceable and void: Provided. That nothing in this suhbsec-
tion (e) shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and
an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or
subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction. alter-
ation. painting, or repair of a building, structure. or other work.
Sec. 8(bX4Xi) and (iiXA) provides.
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-(4X(i) to engage in. or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affect-
ing commerce to engage in. a strike or refusal in the course of his
employment to use, manufacture, process, transport. or otherwise han-
dle or work on any goods, articles, matenals. or commodities or to
perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce. or restrain any person
contend that the clauses are primary in nature be-
cause they seek to preserve traditional bargaining
unit work for bargaining unit employees and because
they are designed to maintain economic standards on
jobs at which union members work. Respondents
further contend that, in any event, the clauses are
protected by the construction industry proviso to
Section 8(e). With the issues thus joined, our first
area of inquiry is whether the disputed clauses, nota-
bly paragraphs 103.2, 103.3, 103.5, and 103.6, are pri-
mary or secondary in scope. If they are primary, then
Respondents' picketing to obtain these clauses would
clearlv be lawful. If, however, the clauses are second-
ary in nature, we must determine whether they are
nevertheless privileged by the construction industry
proviso to Section 8(e) of the Act. IP this connection
we must determine to what extent, if any, the Su-
preme Court's decision in Connel, .supra, narrowed
the scope of that proviso as previously interpreted by
the Board and courts, particularly as it relates to the
facts stipulated here. If we conclude that the disputed
clauses are privileged under the proviso, then Re-
spondents' picketing of Woelke to obtain these claus-
es also would be lawful. If, on the other hand, the
clauses are not so privileged, then, of course, the
picketing by Respondents violated Section 8(b)(4)(i)
and (ii)(A) of the Act.
It is well settled that contract clauses which are
limited to primary considerations, such as the preser-
vation or protection of the traditional work of em-
ployees in the bargaining units represented by a
union, are not proscribed by Section 8(e) of the Act.
National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v.
N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612 (1967). As the Court stated in
that decision, at 644-645:
The determination of whether the [challenged
contract provision] . . . violated Section 8(e)
and Section 8(b)(4)(B) cannot be made without
an inquiry into whether, under all the surround-
ing circumstances, the Union's objective was
preservation of work for [the contracting em-
ployer's] employees, or whether the agreements
. . .were tactically calculated to satisfy union
objectives elsewhere. Were the latter the case
[the contracting employer] . . . would be a neu-
tral bystander, and the agreement . . . would,
within the intent of Congress, become second-
ary. There need not be an actual dispute with
the boycotted employer . . . for the activity to
fall within this category, so long as the tactical
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in
either case an object thereof Is:
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to
join any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement
which is prohibited by section 8ie).
245
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
object of the agreement and its maintenance is
that employer, or benefits to other than the boy-
cotting employees or other employees of the pri-
mary employer thus making the agreement or
boycott secondary in its aim. The touchstone is
whether the agreement or its maintenance is ad-
dressed to the labor relations of the contracting
employer vis-a-vis his own employees. [Citations
omitted.]
The ultimate question in each case, therefore, is
whether the thrust of the clause in question is pri-
mary and, therefore, lawful or whether it is second-
ary and, accordingly, unlawful.
The distinction between primary and secondary
clauses was succinctly spelled out by the Board in
California Dump Truck Owners Association ' as fol-
lows:
Section 8(e) of the Act makes it an unfair la-
bor practice for an employer and a union to en-
ter into an agreement, express or implied, where-
by the employer agrees to cease dealing in the
products of any other employer or to cease
doing business with any other person. A literal
construction of this section suggests the illegality
of any agreement which results in preventing the
employer from establishing a business relation-
ship with another employer, or which causes
him to break off a relationship already estab-
lished. The section, however, has not been con-
strued to outlaw all agreements which produce
such results.
Contract clauses which purport to limit sub-
contracting to employers who are signatories to
union contracts, so-called union signatory claus-
es, and contract clauses which purport to ac-
quire for bargaining unit employees work which
has traditionally been performed by employees
of other employers, so-called work acquisition
clauses, have been held to violate the Act. Such
clauses are viewed as not being designed to pro-
tect the wages and job opportunities of unit em-
ployees covered by the contract, but as directed
at furthering general union objectives and un-
dertaking to regulate the labor policies of other
employers. Absent a direct relationship to pro-
tection of the work of unit employees, such
clauses are considered as having an unlawful
secondary effect and are proscribed by Section
8(b)(4) and (e).
On the other hand, however, contract clauses
9Heavy, Highway, Building and Construction Teamsters Committee for
Northern California, et al. (California Dump Truck Owners Association). 227
NLRB 269, 272 (1976) (then-Member Fanning and Member Jenkins dis-
senting in part).
whose basic aims are to limit subcontracting so
as to preserve for unit employees work which
has customarily been performed by them, or in
some instances to recapture work regarded as
fairly claimable, so-called unit protection claus-
es, and contract clauses designed to limit sub-
contracting of unit work to employers who
maintain the same standards of employment,
thus minimizing the economic incentive to sub-
contract, so-called union standard clauses, have
been held to be lawful. The underlying rationale
for the lawful character of unit protection and
union standard clauses is that the union has a
primary interest in preserving unit work for unit
employees and to insure that negotiated stan-
dards will not be undermined. [Citations omit-
ted.]
It is equally well settled, as reflected in the fore-
going quotations, that contract clauses which permit
subcontracting only to subcontractors who pay their
employees at least the equivalent of the economic
terms negotiated in the union's contract are also pri-
mary clauses which do not contravene the prohibi-
tion of Section 8(e). In Construction Materials Truck-
ing, Inc.,'° the Board, adopting the opinion of its
Trial Examiner, explained at 1038 the underlying
reasoning supporting the area or union standards
clauses as follows:
A union has a legitimate interest in preventing
the undermining of the work opportunities and
standards of employees in a contractual bar-
gaining unit by subcontractors who do not meet
the prevailing wage scales and employee bene-
fits covered by the contract. Thus, its contract
with an employer may require the employer, if it
subcontracts, to subcontract to another em-
ployer who agrees to observe "the equivalent of
union wages, hours, and the like" provided for
in the bargaining agreement. Such a provision,
generally referred to as a union standards
clause, does not violate Section 8(e) because it
has a primary object: to aid the employees in the
work unit. Where, however, the object is not to
protect or preserve the working standards of em-
ployees in the unit, but to control the employ-
ment practices of firms which seek to do busi-
ness with the employer and to aid and assist
union members generally, such object is second-
ary and unlawful. [Citations omitted.]
Respondents' proposed paragraph 103.2 requires
the contractor to agree "that neither he nor any of his
10 General Teamsters Local 386, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs. Wbarehousemen and Helpers of America (Construction Matertais
Trucking. Inc ), 198 NLRB 1038 (1972).
246
CARPENTERS LOCAL 944
subcontractors on the jobsite will subcontract any
work to be done at the site of construction . . . ex-
cept to a person, firm or corporation, party to an
appropriate, current labor agreement with the appro-
priate Union, or subordinate body signatory to this
Agreement." This clause, contrary to Respondents'
contentions, goes far beyond protecting traditional
bargaining unit work for bargaining unit employees.
For the clause does not prohibit Woelke from sub-
contracting work which Woelke's employees perform
or could perform, but, rather, expressly permits such
subcontracting, albeit only to employers who are sig-
natory to a "current labor agreement with the appro-
priate Union, or subordinate body signatory to this
Agreement."
Similarly, proposed paragraph 103.2 also does not
limit subcontracting to firms which pay their employ-
ees the equivalent of the economic provisions of Re-
spondents' contract, but, instead, requires that all
subcontracting be to employers or firms who are
"signatory to this Agreement." Therefore, the fore-
going provision is neither a valid work preservation
clause nor a valid union standards provision. Rather,
the provision is a classic union signatory clause of the
type which the Board has consistently found to be
secondary in nature because it is not concerned pri-
marily with the labor relations of the contracting em-
ployer-Woelke here-vis-a-vis its employees, but
with the labor relations of other employers or firms
with whom Woelke might choose to do business."
Thus, we find that paragraph 103.2 is a union signa-
tory clause which is proscribed by Section 8(e) of the
Act, unless it is saved by that section's construction
industry proviso.
Before discussing whether the construction indus-
try proviso saves paragraph 103.2 from unlawfulness,
we address briefly Respondents' alternative propos-
al-paragraph 103.3.1-which, under Respondents'
total subcontracting proposal, would become opera-
tional in the event that paragraph 103.2 is enjoined
by a court or is found unlawful by the Board.
Paragraph 103.3.1 provides that the employer
(Woelke) may subcontract jobsite work only to em-
ployers whose employees "are members of a bona
fide labor organization" and whose total labor costs
on the jobsite "are not less than those of contractors
performing similar work to that covered by this
Agreement, including . . . [enumerated benefits] as
provided by this Agreement." General Counsel and
Woelke contend that this is but a thinly disguised
union signatory provision. General Counsel argues
II General Teamsters, Chauffeurs. Warehousemen and Helpers. Local 2.
IBT(J.K. Barker Trucking Co.). 181 NLRB 515. 519-520(1970); Local 437,
Internaional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. A FL-CIO (Dimeo Consiruc-
tion Co.), 180 NLRB 420 (1969).
that the secondary objective of this clause is evi-
denced by its requirement that subcontractors pay
their employees the specifically enumerated benefits
"as provided by this Agreement" and the further re-
quirement that employees of subcontractors be mem-
bers of a bona fide labor organization. Respondents,
on the other hand, contend that this clause is a lawful
area standards provision.
Contrary to Respondents' contention, we find that
the clause exceeds the permissible bounds of a lawful
area standards provision." Thus, it is not limited to
assuring that subcontractors pay their employees the
cost equivalent of Respondents' contract, but it addi-
tionally requires that the subcontractors' employees
be "members of a bona-fide labor organization." It is
the latter requirement which, in our view, removes
the clause from the sphere of lawful area standards
provisions. For the union membership or nonmem-
bership of the subcontractor's employees can have
no legitimate bearing on whether the subcontractor
pays the equivalent of the economic costs provided
in Respondents' contract. N.LR.B. v. Bangor Build-
ing Trades Council (Davison Constr. Co.), 278 F.2d
287, 290 (Ist Cir. 1960); Building and Construction
Trades Council of San Bernardino and Riverside Coun-
ties etal., (Gordon Fields) v. N.L.R.B., 328 F.2d 540,
541 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Having found that Respondents' proposed sub-
contracting provisions are neither primary work pres-
ervation nor area standards clauses, we turn now to
whether these clauses, although secondary in their
thrust, are nevertheless protected by the construction
industry proviso. In this connection, we must de-
termine first whether such contract provisions as
those here in dispute were held to be protected by the
proviso to Section 8(e) before the Supreme Court's
decision in Connell, supra, and, if so, whether they no
longer enjoy such protection since Connell.
Since the enactment of the 1959 amendments to
the Act, the Board and courts have consistently up-
held contract provisions between employers and
unions in the construction industry which permit the
employer to subcontract work to be performed at the
site of the construction only to subcontractors who
are signatory to contracts either with a particular
union or with unions having jurisdiction over the
type of work involved. Although the Board initially
held that picketing to obtain such union signatory
contracts violated Section 8(bX4)(A) of the Act, such
holdings were denied enforcement in several courts
of appeals.'3 Subsequently, in Northeastern Indiana
12 Dimeo Construction Co. supra.
13 Construction, Production & Maintenance Laborers' Union, Local 383,
AFL-ClO d& United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local
1089, AFL-CIO (Colson & Stevens Construction Co.), 137 NLRB 1650
Continued
247
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Building and C'onstruction Frades Council, el al. (('ent-
livre Village Apartments), 148 NLRB 854 (1964), the
Board acquiesced in the courts' views and held that
the union signatory clauses are not only protected by
the proviso to Section 8(e) but also that picketing to
secure such clauses was not unlawful under Section
8(b)(4)(A) of the Act. Thus, the Board has upheld
clauses, such as those herein, which are not limited to
particular existing jobsites or to the duration of par-
ticular jobs. The only limitation on union signatory
clauses was that they could not be enforced by union
"self-help" measures.' 4
As can be seen from the foregoing cases, as well as
others too numerous to cite, the Board, with court
approval, has construed the construction industry
proviso literally to protect "any agreement" between
qualified parties which limits subcontracting of work
to be performed at the site of construction to em-
ployers who are signatory to a specific union agree-
ment or to an agreement generally with the "appro-
priate union" (meaning, generally, an affiliate of a
building and construction trades council). Remain-
ing at issue, then, is whether and to what extent the
Supreme Court's decision in Connell has limited the
scope of the proviso from its previous broad interpre-
tation.
General Counsel and Woelke argue that the scope
of the proviso has been "significantly narrowed" by
the Connell decision. Thus, General Counsel argues
that, based upon the Supreme Court's rationale in
Connell, a contractual provision which is otherwise
violative of Section 8(e) of the Act will not be privi-
leged by the construction industry proviso thereto
unless: (I) a valid collective-bargaining relationship
exists between the labor organization and the em-
ployer. (2) the contractual clause is operational only
at times when the employer has employees repre-
sented by the labor organization, (3) the clause ap-
plies only to sites at which the employer has employ-
ees represented by the labor organization, and (4) the
clause does not require that the employer have col-
(1962k enfd. in part 323 F.2d 422 (9th (Cir. 1963): Orange Belr Distrirc
Council of Painters No. 48 ((alhoun Driywall Compano, 139 NLiRB 383
(1962), vacated and remanded 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964): The .ires
('ountv and Vicinity District Council of Carpenters. etc. ( The Assroiazed Con-
tractors of Essex County, Inc). 141 NLRB 858 (1963), enforcement denied
332 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1964); Building and Construction Trades Council of San
Bernardino, err (Gordon Fields), 139 NLRB 236 (1962). enforcement denied
328 F.2d 540 (D.C. Citr. 1964). See also Local Union No. 48 of Sheet Metal
Workers International Association v. The Hard)> Corporation, 332 F.2d 682
(5th Cir. 1964)
14 Eis-Hokin Corporation. 154 NLRB 839, 842 (1965), and cases cited
therein, enfd. sub nom. NL. R.B. v. International Brotherhood ifs Electrical
Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Union No 769, 405 F.2d 159. 162-163 (9th ('ir
1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 921 (1969): Heavy, Highway. Building and (on-
struction Teamsters Committee for Northern California, et a.l iCalifornia
Dunmp Truck Owners Association), 227 NLRB 269 (1976) (then-Member Fan-
ning and Member Jenkins dissenting in part).
lective-bargaining relationships with particular
unions.
General Counsel and Woelke concede that Re-
spondents and Woelke have a lawful collective-bar-
gaining relationship and, therefore, do not contend
that any collective-bargaining relationship require-
ment of Connell is wanting. General Counsel argues,
however, that Respondents' proposed clauses 103.2,
103.3.1, 103.5, and 103.6 are not privileged by the
construction industry proviso, pursuant to Connell,
because said clauses (I) are operational at all times
and at all jobsites whether or not Woelke employs
employees working within the craft jurisdiction of
Respondents and (2) require that Woelke must sub-
contract only to particular labor organizations. Re-
spondents, on the other hand, argue that Connell is
inapplicable here because, among other reasons, a
lawful collective-bargaining relationship exists be-
tween Respondents and Woelke, a factor which the
Court found was critically lacking in Connell. For the
reasons discussed below, we reject General Counsel's
contention and find, instead, that the subcontracting
provisions here involved are protected by the con-
struction industry proviso. Such conclusion, we are
persuaded, is fully consistent with the teachings of
Connell.
The relevant facts in Connell, an antitrust action,
are simple and straightforward. Local 100 picketed
certain general contractors in the Dallas, Texas, area,
including Connell. for the sole purpose of compelling
such contractors to agree that, in letting subcontracts
for the performance of mechanical work, they would
deal only with firms that were parties to that union's
current collective-bargaining agreement. The avowed
purpose of this contract was to assist Local 100 in its
efforts to organize the mechanical subcontractors in
the area. Local 100 had no contract with Connell,
Connell employed no workers of the type whom Lo-
cal 100 exists to represent, and, significantly, Local
100 expressly disclaimed any interest in representing
Connell's employees. Local 100 did not seek a com-
plete bargaining contract with Connell, but only a
subcontracting agreement. Connell succumbed to the
picketing and, thereafter, filed suit in a Federal dis-
trict court to annul the resulting agreement as an ille-
gal restraint on competition under sections I and 2 of
the Sherman Act. Local 100 defended on the ground
that the subcontracting agreement was protected by
the construction industry proviso to Section 8(e) of
the Act. Connell, on the other hand, argued that, de-
spite the unqualified language of the proviso, Con-
gress intended only to allow subcontracting agree-
ments within the context of a collective-bargaining
relationship; that is, Congress did not intend to per-
mit a union to approach a "stranger" contractor and
248
CARPENTERS LOCAL 944
obtain a binding agreement not to deal with non-
union subcontractors for the purpose of organizing
such nonunion subcontractors from the "top down."
The specific question before the Court was wheth-
er the existence of a collective-bargaining relation-
ship constituted a prerequisite to or, as the Court
phrased it, a limitation on the applicability of the
construction industry proviso to clauses restricting
the subcontracting of work on a construction site.
The Court's interpretation of the legislative history
and the policies underlying the proviso was conduct-
ed solely with a view toward determining whether the
proviso was so limited. Thus, the Court stated at the
outset of its decision:
On its face, the proviso suggests no such limita-
tion. This Court has held, however, that § 8(e)
must be interpreted in light of the statutory set-
ting and the circumstances surrounding its en-
actment.'5
The Court's subsequent construction of the provi-
so led to the conclusion that, in the absence of a
collective-bargaining relationship between Connell
and Local 100, the proviso did not immunize Local
100's subcontracting agreement from Federal anti-
trust laws.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court examined the
legislative as well as decisional history of the 1959
amendments, including Section 8(b)(4) and 8(e). It
noted that Congress, in enacting Section 8(e), was
concerned essentially with plugging certain technical
loopholes in Section 8(b)(4) under which it was un-
lawful for a union to coerce an employer to agree to
or enforce a hot cargo agreement but not unlawful
for a union and employer voluntarily to execute such
hot cargo agreement. Local 1976, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of Armerica. A FL, etc. /Sand
Door and Plywood Company] v. N.L.R.B.. 357 U.S.
93, 106-107 (1958). Thus. Section 8(e) was designed
in 1959 to close that loophole by making it an unfair
labor practice to enter into a hot cargo agreement. At
the same time, however, Congress was also consider-
ing legislation that would have overruled N.L. R.B. v.
Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675 (1951), by treating all employers working on
the same construction site as a single employer. The
attempt to overrule that case failed. The Court sur-
mised that the construction industry proviso was
adopted "as a partial substitute" for an outright re-
versal of Denver Building Trades. The Court noted
that the legislative discussions of "special problems"
in the construction industry focused on the close re-
lationship between contractors and subcontractors at
( onnell. supra, 421 t S at 628
the jobsite and the friction that is created when union
and nonunion employees are required to work side
by side. Thus, Congress limited the construction in-
dustrs proviso exclusively to work to be done at a
construction site. Quoting from National W ood work
Manufacturers Association, supra, 386 IU.S. at 638-
639, the Court stated that it has interpreted the con-
struction industry proviso as
a measure designed to allow agreements pertain-
ing to certain secondary activities on the con-
struction site because of the close community of
interests there, but to ban secondary-objective
agreements concerning nonjobsite work, in
which respect the construction industry is no
different from any other.
T he Court noted that other courts have suggested
that the proviso serves an even narrower function of
alleviating frictions that may arise between union
and nonunior employees working together at the
same construction site.l'
Thus, the Court identified certain policies underly-
ing the enactment of the proviso which are relevant
to determining the applicability of the proviso to sub-
contracting clauses disputed between parties who do
not have a collective-bargaining relationship. It con-
cluded that the Connell clause was not related to
these policies in that Local 100 did not claim to be
protecting Connell's employees from having to work
alongside nonunion workers and was not seeking to
organize any nonunion subcontractors on the jobsite
it picketed: instead, the union admittedly sought the
subcontracting agreement solely as a means of pres-
suring mechanical subcontractors in the Dallas area
to recognize it as the representative of their employ-
ees.
In these circumstances, the Court found that ex-
tending the protection of the proviso to the clause
sought by Local 100 would undermine one of the
major aims of the 1959 Act, which was to limit "top-
down" organizing campaigns in which unions used
economic weapons to force recognition from an em-
ployer regardless of the wishes of its employees. The
Court reasoned in Connell, 421 U.S. at 631 632:
If we agreed with Local 100 that the construc-
tion-industr F proviso authorizes subcontracting
agreements with "stranger" contractors, not lim-
ited to any particular jobsite, our ruling would
give construction unions an almost unlimited or-
ganizational weapon. The unions would be free
to enlist any general contractor to bring eco-
i ( tnmc,] u.pr,. 421 l S 5at i31 1. ting l),raT,. Sah'nlemn ,Il.fir hmtttl n,
idt A I.',.. .. ,. ( :nnirl. [lir i ) ,, 1 ,,i 'l. and H1elpc , , I- a I ,ti n N,
(,, IBI tlrc (tHnIl u(tlr, ( ,w, .fI t 'I KR A. At 1 I 2] 541 (D(
( 'r 19{661
249
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
nomic pressure on nonunion subcontractors, as
long as the agreement recited that it only cov-
ered work to be performed on some jobsite
somewhere.
The Court rejected Local 100's argument that the
Board had already decided this issue in Los Angeles
Building and Construction Trades Council (Joseph
Freed & Benjamin H. Weber, d/b/a B & J Investment
Company), 214 NLRB 562 (1974), wherein the Board
held at 563 that "a union has the right to picket to
compel an employer to execute a labor agreement
containing a subcontracting clause valid under the
construction industry proviso to Section 8(e), as long
as it does not have the additional objective of forcing
an employer to cease doing business with 'an existing
and identified nonunion subcontractor.' " The Court,
at 631, footnote 10, of its opinion in Connell, noted
that the "agreement in question [in B & J] may have
been a prehire contract under § 8(f). and it is not
clear that the contractor argued that it was invalid
for lack of a collective-bargaining relationship."
Thus, the Court's entire decision is cast in terms of
the impact of the absence of a collective-bargaining
relationship upon the applicability of the proviso to a
subcontracting clause which comes within the literal
language of the proviso. That this is the heart of the
Connell decision is evident from the Court's conclud-
ing statement:
[W]e are unwilling to read the construction in-
dustry proviso as broadly as Local 100 suggests.
Instead, we think its authorization extends only
to agreements in the context of collective-bar-
gaining relationships and, in light of congres-
sional references to the Denver Building Trades
problem, possibly to common-situs relationships
on particular jobsites as well."
Contrary to the General Counsel's contention, we
find nothing in our analysis of Connell which com-
pels a narrower interpretation of the proviso as sug-
gested by General Counsel. The bottom line of the
Court's opinion, as we construe it, is that the con-
struction industry proviso to Section 8(e) permits
subcontracting clauses such as those here in the con-
text of a collective-bargaining relationship, and pos-
sibly even without such a relationship if the clauses
a-te aimed at avoiding the Denver Building Trades
problem.
Inasmuch as Respondents' proposed contract pro-
visions here were advanced in the context of a collec-
tive-bargaining relationship between Respondents
and Woelke, we find that the clauses are privileged
by the construction industry proviso to Section 8(e)
17 Connell, supra. 421 U.S. at 633.
of the Act. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the com-
plaint to the extent that it alleges that Respondents'
picketing of Woelke in support of the subcontracting
proposals violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(A) of the
Act.
2. The 8(b)(l)(B) issue; Respondents' proposal to
include foremen in unit
It is clear from the stipulated facts that Respon-
dents and Woelke bargained to impasse over the in-
clusion of foremen within the bargaining unit repre-
sented by Respondents.' 8 It also stipulated that these
foremen are supervisors within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(11) of the Act and Woelke's selected represen-
tatives for purposes of collective bargaining and the
adjustment of grievances within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(b)( )(B). It is further stipulated that these fore-
men do not perform bargaining unit work. Finally, it
is stipulated that an object of Respondents' picketing
was to compel Woelke to agree to include these fore-
men in the unit. General Counsel contends that, by
the foregoing conduct, Respondents violated Section
8(b)(l)(B) of the Act.
Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act makes it an unfair
i The text of Respondents' contract proposals concerning foremen reads
as follows:
ARTIIC L II tI lO10 RE(OCNIIION
201 The Contractor hereby recognizes the Union as the sole and
exclusive collective bargaining representative of all employees and per-
sons employed to perform work covered by this Agreement. It is under-
stood that the Union does not at this time. nor will it during the term of
this Agreement. claim jurisdiction over the following classes of employ-
ees: executives. civil engineers and their helpers, superintendents, assis-
tant superintendents. master mechanics. timekeepers. messenger boys.
office Aorkers or any employees of the Contractor above the rank of
craft foreman. Emplo)ees and persons employed to perform work cov-
ered by this Agreement specifically include Craft Foreman. A Superin-
tendent or assistant superintendent shall not give work instructions to
journey men carpenters or apprentices.
1612. Foremen: The selection of the individual who will be craft
foremanl is at the sole discretion of the Contractor. It is understood that
a craft foreman shall be an employee employed under the terms of this
Agreement and shall receive the foreman's differential. Such craft fore-
man may work with the tools of the trade in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph 403. Only craft foremen who normally work with
the tools of their trade during straight-time periods may work with the
toiols of their trade during overtime periods. Whenever there are two or
more journeymen employees one must be designated as a foreman.
When a carpenter Is designated as a foreman and is assigned the re-
sponsibility of supervision of five or more journeyman he shall not be
allowed to work as a journeyman. In case more than two foremen are
employed on the same shift on the same job. it shall be designated a
general foreman whose duty shall be to convey orders from the con-
tractor to the foreman. No carpenter foreman shall supervise a crew of
more than ten men. not including himself. A carpenter foreman can
supervise a crew on one jobsite only. The need for any number of craft
foremen required for the performance of the work shall be determined
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 402. It is understood
that in certain cases. bs reason of custom and practice established by
the parties, a craft foreman may direct the work and employees of more
than one craft. Whenever the employer assigns supervisory authority to
an employee covered bh the terms of this Agreement. the employee will
he paid at the foreman's rate.
250
CARPENTERS LOCAL 944
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to
restrain or coerce an employer in the selection of its
representatives for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing or the adjustment of grievances. Since enactment
of this provision in 1947, the Board has consistently
held that strikes to compel employers to select their
foremen from within the ranks of the union are clear-
ly proscribed.'9 More recent Board decisions confirm
that the mere attempt by unions to compel inclusion
of statutory supervisors within the collective-bargain-
ing unit is, without more, violative of Section
8(b)( I )(B) of the Act.20 In view of the stipulated facts
and the applicable laws and Board precedent in this
area, we find and conclude that Respondents vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act by bargaining to
impasse and by striking Woelke with an object of
forcing Woelke to agree to include its statutory sup-
ervisors within the bargaining unit represented by
Respondents.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Welke & Romero Framing, Inc., is an employer
within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act, en-
gaged in commerce and in a business affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
2. Carpenters Local No. 944, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO:
and Carpenters Local No. 235, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO,
are labor organizations within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
3. By bargaining to impasse, striking, or picketing
Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc., for the purpose of
requiring the inclusion in the collective-bargaining
unit of any foremen of Woelke & Romero who are
supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of
the Act and Woelke & Romero's selected representa-
tives for purposes of collective bargaining or adjust-
ment of grievances, Respondents have violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
4. The above unfair labor practices are unfair la-
bor practices affecting commerce and the free flow of
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
I9 nternational Tvpographital lnion. and Baltimore Tpygraphc.al (:n I.n
No. 12 (Graphic Arts League). 87 NLRB 1215. 1218 (i949): Interatornlial
Tipographical Union. AFL(CIO (laierhdil Ga:etie Compani) 123 NI.RB
806 1959). enfd. 278 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir 1960i
2o International Organization of Masters. Maltei and Pilots. 4FL ('10
(Cove Tankers Corporation}, 224 NLRB 1626 ( 19761) International Organm:a.
lion of Masters. Mates and Pilotr. Marine Division. etc (14 esi hecuer Marine
Shipping Co.. Inc.. el al.) 219 NLRB 26 119751 See alslo i ,rdlua P,,er &
Light Co. v. International Brotherhoeod of Elc -rtical 14orAier . I. rll/ OI.4 417
U.S. 790 (1974). VN L R B . Bell 4erospacp e (ClompalnL. 1)ilrrlon of Iewoircn,
Inc. 416 U.S. 267 (1974)
5. Respondents have not violated the Act in any
other manner.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondents have 'violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(I)(B) of the Act, we shall order that the)
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action which we find will effectuate the purposes
of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board hereby orders that the Respondents,
Carpenters Local No. 944, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, San
Bernardino, California: and Carpenters Local No.
235, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America, AFL CIO, Riverside, California, their
officers, agents, and representatives, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Bargaining to impasse, striking, or picketing
Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc., or any other em-
ployer, for the purpose of requiring such employer to
agree to include within the bargaining unit any fore-
men who are supervisors within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(11) of the Act and who are such employers'
selected representatives for the purposes of collective
bargaining or the adjustment of grievances within the
meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or
coercing Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc., in the se-
lection of its representatives for purposes of collec-
tive bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.
2. Take the following affirmative action:
(a) Post at their offices and meetings halls copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 2i Copies
of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 21, after being duly signed by
Respondents' authorized representatives, shall be
posted by Respondents immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to members are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon-
dent Unions to insure that said notices are not al-
tered. defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 21, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order,
:l In Ihe event that Ihi, Order is enforced hb a judgment of a U nied
States (Court f Arppeals. the *ords In the nctice reading "Posted bh Order
o)f he National Labhor Relaticons Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the L niled StatesC (C)iourl o)f ppeals Enforcing an Order of the
\N.aui nal lhabor Relations Board."
251
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
what steps Respondents have taken to comply here-
with.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILl. NOT bargain to impasse, strike, or picket
Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc., or any other em-
ployer, for the purpose of requiring such employer to
agree to include within the bargaining unit any fore-
men who are supervisors within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act and
who are such employers' selected representatives for
the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjust-
ment of grievances within the meaning of Section
8(b)(l)(B) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc., in the se-
lection of its representatives for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or the adjustment of grievances.
CARPENTERS LOCAL No. 944, UNITED BROTHERHOOD
OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO
CARPENTERS LOCAL No 235, UNITED BROTHERHOOD
OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO
252