Carpenters (DWA Trade Show & Exposition Services)

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 18, 2003

339 N.L.R.B. 1027 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

CARPENTERS (DWA TRADE SHOW & EXPOSITION SERVICES) 1027
Pacific Northwest District Council of Carpenters, a/w
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America and DWA Trade Show and Exposi-
tion Services. Cases 36–CC–1016–1 and 36–CC–
1017–1
August 18, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On February 4, 2003, Administrative Law Judge Clif-
ford H. Anderson issued the attached decision.1 The
issue in this case is whether the Respondent Union vio-
lated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act by engaging in
secondary picketing at a common situs. Despite finding
that the Respondent’s intent in choosing the language of
the picket signs was benign, the judge found a violation
based on the foreseeable effect of the signs, which was
sufficient to establish that the Respondent acted with the
unlawful object of forcing neutral employers operating at
the site to cease doing business with the Charging Party
Employer.
The Board has considered the decision and record in
light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to af-
firm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions only
to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order.
I.
The case proceeded on a stipulated record. The rele-
vant facts are as follows:
The Charging Party, DWA Trade Show and Exposi-
tion Services, provides trade show services, such as
erecting and dismantling trade show exhibits. The
Charging Party’s clients, the Oregon Dental Association
and Sysco Food Services, were scheduled to hold trade
shows at the Oregon Convention Center (Convention
Center) in April 2002.2 The Respondent Union, Pacific
Northwest District Council of Carpenters, represented
employees for several trade show contractors who
worked at the Convention Center. The Charging Party
was a not a signatory to a labor agreement with the Re-
spondent.
On April 10, the Charging Party began setting up ex-
hibits for the Oregon Dental Association’s Dental Show
(Dental Show) at the Convention Center. Several other
shows, which the Charging Party did not service, were

1 The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The Gen-
eral Counsel and the Charging Party filed answering briefs. The Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in
this proceeding to a three-member panel.
2 All dates hereafter are in 2002.
simultaneously being held at the Convention Center.
The Convention Center has several public entrances from
public streets and sidewalks that may be accessed by
persons attending any of the Convention Center’s events.
None of the public entrances is reserved for any particu-
lar show or event.
On April 11, the Respondent picketed outside the pub-
lic entrances to the Convention Center. The picketers
carried signs stating:

ATTENTION
DENTAL SHOW

DWA

DOES NOT PAY
AREA STANDARD
WAGES & BENEFITS

PACIFIC NORTHWEST
REGIONAL COUNCIL
OF CARPENTERS

The picketers also carried signs without the “Attention
Dental Show” language. The record indicates that organ-
izers for the Respondent, who were aware that other
events were occurring at the Convention Center at the
time of the Dental Show, placed the name of the Dental
Show on the picket signs to avoid confusion over
whether the message on the signs applied to events that
did not involve the Charging Party.
On April 14, the Charging Party began setting up the
Sysco Food Services Show (Sysco Food Show) at the
Convention Center. The Sysco Food Show was sched-
uled for April 14–16. Several other events were occur-
ring at the Convention Center during that time, and there
were no public entrances reserved specifically for the
Sysco Food Show. On April 16, the Respondent pick-
eted the public entrances to the Convention Center. The
picket signs stated:

ATTENTION
SYSCO FOOD SHOW

DWA

DOES NOT PAY
AREA STANDARD
WAGES &
BENEFITS

PACIFIC NORTHWEST
REGIONAL COUNCIL
OF CARPENTERS

Several picketers carried signs without the “Attention Sysco
Food Show” language. As with the Dental Show, the Re-
spondent’s organizers added the name of the show to the
339 NLRB No. 129
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1028
signs because they believed it would avoid confusion as to
which contractor at the Convention Center was involved in
the dispute.3
The complaint alleged that on April 11 and 16, the Re-
spondent improperly picketed at the Convention Center
and in so doing threatened, coerced, or restrained persons
engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com-
merce who were not engaged in any primary labor dis-
pute with the Respondent. The complaint further alleged
that the Respondent’s object in picketing was to force or
require such neutral parties to cease doing business with
the Charging Party, and that the Respondent’s actions
violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
II.
The judge found the violations as alleged. He agreed
with the General Counsel and the Charging Party that the
Respondent’s picketing, at the “common situs” of the
Convention Center, was unlawful under Sailors Union of
the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 NLRB 547, 549
(1950) (Moore Dry Dock), because that picketing failed
to “disclose[] clearly that the dispute [was] only with the
primary employer.” Specifically, the judge found that
because the picket signs did not state that the Respon-
dent’s dispute was solely with the Charging Party, and
did refer to the neutral Dental Show and Sysco Food
Show, those signs evinced a secondary object.
The judge credited the picketers’ testimony that the
references to the Dental Show and Sysco Food Show
were placed on the picket signs “in order to avoid confu-
sion,” and characterized this testimony as demonstrating
a “benign intention in wording the signs as they did.”
However, he found that the language on the signs did not
have the effect intended by the Respondent, and that the
language increased the possibility that the neutrals could
become enmeshed in the dispute. Thus, despite finding
that the Respondent’s intent was benign, the judge de-
termined that the Respondent should have known that the
language on the signs could reasonably be interpreted as
enmeshing the neutrals.
The Respondent Union excepts, arguing that it met the
standards established by the Board in Moore Dry Dock
and that it is therefore entitled to a presumption that its
conduct was lawful. The Respondent specifically ex-
cepts to the judge’s assertion that the Respondent’s intent
in picketing should be inferred from the foreseeable con-
sequences of its conduct, i.e., the picket sign language
used. The Respondent observes that the judge expressly

3 The Respondent did not picket at delivery entrances used for load-
ing and unloading exhibits for the Dental Show or the Sysco Food
Show.
credited evidence that it designed its picket signs to
avoid confusion and not to enmesh neutrals. It argues, in
turn, that its conduct should be evaluated based on the
judge’s finding as to its actual intent. Based on that find-
ing, the Respondent argues that its picketing cannot be
found unlawful, even were it shown to have had a secon-
dary effect, which is not established here.
For the following reasons, we find merit in the Re-
spondent’s exceptions, reverse the judge, and dismiss the
complaint.
III.
To establish a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) with
respect to common situs picketing, the General Counsel
must establish that the Respondent’s actions had the sec-
ondary object of causing neutral parties to cease doing
business with the Charging Party.4 The Respondent’s
intent, not the effect of the picketing, is determinative.
NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665,
672 (1951). As discussed above, the judge found that the
Respondent’s intent was benign.5 That finding of lawful
intent precludes the finding of a violation of Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), regardless of what the effect of the picket-
ing actually was, even if that effect was reasonably fore-
seeable. See NLRB v. Teamsters Local 968, 225 F.2d
205, 209–211 (5th Cir. 1955) (The “sole statutory test of
unlawfulness [is] the end or objective sought”; where
“the Board’s own evidence” shows that the “concerted
activity was solely for the lawful object of picketing
only” the primary employer, a violation of the Act cannot
be found, and “any adverse effect upon secondary, neu-
tral employees must necessarily be viewed as incidental
to the lawful exercise of [a] statutory right.”), cert. de-
nied 350 U.S. 914 (1955).
In light of the judge’s specific findings regarding the
Respondent’s intent, we find that Moore Dry Dock,
which provides an evidentiary aid for determining
whether a union’s picketing has an unlawful object, is
inapplicable here. See Teamsters Local 315 (Santa Fe),
306 NLRB 616, 625 (1992), enfd. 20 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir.
1994) (Moore Dry Dock “simply establishes an eviden-
tiary aid for the Board to determine the object of picket-
4 Sec. 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) makes it unlawful for a union to:
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce . . .
where . . . an object thereof is forcing or requiring any person . . . to
cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring
any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization
as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization
has been certified as the representative of such employees . . . Pro-
vided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to
make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or
primary picketing.
5 The parties have not excepted to the judge’s findings regarding the
Respondent’s benign intent.
CARPENTERS (DWA TRADE SHOW & EXPOSITION SERVICES) 1029
ing, where the other evidence is equivocal” (internal quo-
tations and citation omitted)). Under Moore Dry Dock, a
rebuttable presumption that the object of picketing at a
common situs is lawful arises if a union can show that it
has complied with the following criteria: (1) the picket-
ing was limited to times when the situs of the dispute
was located on secondary premises; (2) the primary em-
ployer was engaged at its normal business at the situs; (3)
the picketing took place reasonably close to the situs; and
(4) the picketing clearly disclosed that the dispute was
only with the primary employer. Moore Dry Dock, 92
NLRB at 149. Here, where it is clear from the credited
evidence that the picketing had no unlawful object, it is
unnecessary to apply those criteria and presumptions.
But even assuming that Moore Dry Dock is applicable
in these circumstances, we find that an analysis of the
evidence under its principles does not demonstrate an
unlawful object on the part of the Respondent. The par-
ties have conceded that the first three Moore Dry Dock
criteria are satisfied; therefore the only relevant inquiry is
whether, under the fourth criterion, the Respondent’s
picket signs clearly disclosed that the picketers’ dispute
was only with the Charging Party. Contrary to the judge
and our dissenting colleague, we do not find that the
picket signs demonstrate an intent to create confusion as
to which employer the Respondent intended to target
with its picketing.
The picket signs clearly stated that the Charging Party,
which is the primary employer in the dispute, does not
pay area standard wages. The signs did not include any
criticism of the neutral parties, the Charging Party’s cli-
ents. Indeed, the picket signs did not even contain the
names of the neutral parties; the signs referred only to the
“Dental Show” and the “Sysco Food Show,” not the Ore-
gon Dental Association or Sysco Food Services. Further,
the position of the word “Attention” in relation to “Den-
tal Show” and “Sysco Show” makes it clear, when the
message is read in context, that the Respondent did not
have a dispute with the neutrals. Contrary to the judge
and the dissent, then, we find no ambiguity in the mes-
sage conveyed by the signs.
This case is distinguishable from those where the
Board has found the fourth Moore Dry Dock criterion to
have been violated. For example, in Service Employees
Local 87 (Pacific Telephone), 279 NLRB 168, 174–175
(1986), and Service Employees Local 32B-32J, 250
NLRB 240, 244–245, 247–248 (1980), the Board found
that the fourth criterion was not met because the picket
signs failed to identify the primary target at all. See also
Laborers Local 389 (Calcon Construction), 287 NLRB
570, 573–574 (1987). Here, in contrast, the picket signs
expressly named the primary target of the picketing.
Our dissenting colleague maintains that an inference of
a secondary object can be drawn from the picket signs
because the Respondent did not specifically state that it
had no dispute with the Dental Show or the Sysco Food
Show. In support of his position, our colleague relies on
Electrical Workers Local 302 (ICR Electric), 272 NLRB
920 (1984), in which the Board held that an express dis-
claimer of an intent to target neutral employers on the
union’s picket signs satisfied the fourth Moore Dry Dock
criterion. Unlike our colleague, we do not read that case
as establishing a requirement that picket signs include an
express disclaimer in order to meet the fourth Moore Dry
Dock criterion.
We find that, in these circumstances, the General
Counsel has not demonstrated that the Respondent’s
picketing had a secondary object. Accordingly, we re-
verse the judge and dismiss the complaint.
ORDER
The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.

CHAIRMAN BATTISTA, dissenting.
Contrary to my colleagues, I agree with the judge that
the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, a union is pro-
hibited from putting pressure on employers with whom it
has no dispute (neutral or secondary employers), in order
to coerce them to cease doing business with an employer
with whom it does have a dispute (primary employer).
By placing the names of neutral employers at the top of
its picket signs without any disclaimer, the Respondent
indicated its object to enmesh those neutrals in its dispute
with the Charging Party.
Traditionally, where primary and neutral employers
conduct business at a common situs, the Board looks to
four factors to determine whether the picketing has an
unlawful secondary object:

(1) that picketing be limited to times when the situs of
dispute was located on the secondary premises, (2) that
the primary employer be engaged in his normal busi-
ness at the situs, (3) that the picketing take place rea-
sonably close to the situs, and (4) that the picketing
clearly disclose that the dispute was only with the pri-
mary employer.

Electrical Workers Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 677
(1961) (summary of criteria first established in Sailors Un-
ion of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 NLRB 547
(1950) (“Moore Dry Dock”)).
The Respondent prominently displayed the neutral
employers’ names on its picket signs. My colleagues
nonetheless argue that the Moore Dry Dock analysis is
inapplicable because, they say, the evidence here estab-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1030
lishes that the Respondent’s intent was lawful. Specifi-
cally, the majority argues that the judge found that the
Respondent had a “benign intent” in placing the neutral
employers’ names on the picket signs, precluding a find-
ing of an unlawful object. My colleagues overstate the
judge’s finding.
The judge credited testimony that the picketers in-
cluded the neutral parties’ names on the picket signs in
order to avoid public confusion between the shows of the
Charging Party’s clients and other shows. However, the
Charging Party is the only primary employer. The
Charging Party’s clients and the other shows are neutrals.
Thus, the testimony upon which the majority so heavily
relies establishes only that the Respondent sought to dif-
ferentiate between one set of neutrals and another set of
neutrals. It is difficult to see how this effort precludes a
finding of a secondary object. Accordingly, contrary to
the majority, analysis of the Respondent’s object pursu-
ant to Moore Dry Dock is appropriate.
Also contrary to the majority, I find that the Respon-
dent’s picketing failed the fourth Moore Dry Dock crite-
rion. As discussed by the majority, under the fourth
Moore Dry Dock criterion, a union must ensure that its
picketing clearly discloses that its dispute is only with
the primary employer. By prominently including the
names of the Charging Party’s clients (neutrals) on its
picket signs, the Respondent created confusion as to the
target of its picketing.1 The Respondent thereby failed to
clearly ensure that the public would understand that its
dispute was only with the Charging Party. See West
Kentucky Building Trades Council (Daniel Constr. Co.),
192 NLRB 272, 276 (1971) (picket signs that create con-
fusion as to the target of the dispute fail the fourth Moore
Dry Dock criterion).
As the Board explained in Plumbers Local 519 (H. L.
Robertson & Associates), 171 NLRB 251, 259 (1968),
enfd. 416 F.2d 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1969), when a union loses
the presumption of a lawful object that accompanies its
compliance with the Moore Dry Dock standards, the un-
ion is presumed to intend the foreseeable secondary con-
sequences of its actions. See also Service Employees
Local 525 (General Maintenance Co.), 329 NLRB 638
(1999), enfd. 52 Fed. Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 1999); Mine
Workers Local 29 (New Beckley Mining), 304 NLRB 71,
73 (1991), enfd. 977 F.2d 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The
Respondent has failed to rebut that presumption of
unlawful intent. I agree with the judge that the Respon-

1 Contrary to the majority, I do not find persuasive that the picket
signs named the shows, and not the actual corporate names, of the
Charging Party’s clients. The differences between the names of the
shows and the corporate names are slight, and this technical distinction
would not be meaningful to the general public.
dent should have foreseen that by actually naming the
neutral parties, without including any language expressly
excluding them from its dispute with the Charging Party,
there would be confusion as to the target of the picketing.
The cases support the proposition that picketing is
unlawful if it fails to clearly disclose that the dispute is
only with the primary employer. See, e.g., Service Em-
ployees Local 87 (Pacific Telephone), 279 NLRB 168
(1986); Service Employees Local 32B-32J, 250 NLRB
240 (1980). Concededly, in the instant case, the picket
signs mention the primary employer. However, the signs
do not clearly indicate that the dispute is only with the
primary employer. To the contrary, the picket signs
name the neutral employer, and they fail to state that
there is no dispute with the neutral employer.
My colleagues say that a disclaimer is not a require-
ment for a lawful picket sign. I would agree that where a
picket sign does not name a neutral, it is unnecessary to
state that there is no dispute with that neutral, even
though the neutral is on the site. However, where, as
here, the neutral employer is named, and there is no “dis-
claimer” language to indicate that there is no dispute
with that named neutral, an inference of secondary object
can be drawn.2
As noted above, it is axiomatic that a person is deemed
to intend the foreseeable consequences of its actions.
Where, as here, a union places the name of a neutral at
the top of a picket sign, and uses the phrase “attention”
with reference thereto, it is reasonably foreseeable that at
least some members of the public would associate the
neutral with the labor dispute.
My colleagues say that the position of the word “At-
tention” in relation to the naming of the neutral parties
makes clear that the Respondent did not have a dispute
with the neutrals. However, the very juxtaposition of
“Attention” and the names of the neutrals clearly shows
that the message is aimed at the patrons of the neutrals.
Thus, the record supports the inference that the Respon-
dent intended the foreseeable consequences of its con-
duct—confusion as to whether the Dental and Sysco
Food Shows were the target of its dispute. Therefore, I
agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.

2 Compare Electrical Workers Local 302 (ICR Electric), 272 NLRB
920 (1984) (union demonstrated that it lacked a secondary object by
expressly stating that its dispute did not involve any employer other
than the primary).
CARPENTERS (DWA TRADE SHOW & EXPOSITION SERVICES) 1031
Linda J. Scheldrup, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Richard H. Robblee, Esq. and Julia Stern McCarty, Esq.
(Rinehart & Robblee), of Seattle, Washington, for the Re-
spondent.
Lester V. Smith and Daniel R. Barnhart, Esqs. (Bullard Smith
Jernstedt Wilson), of Portland, Oregon, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CLIFFORD H. ANDERSON, Administrative Law Judge. I heard
the above-captioned case in trial in Portland, Oregon, on Octo-
ber 16, 2002, pursuant to a consolidated complaint and notice
of hearing issued by the Regional Director for Region 19 of the
National Labor Relations Board on July 16, 2002. The com-
plaint in relevant part1 is based on charges filed by DWA Trade
Show and Exhibition Services (the Charging Party), against
Pacific Northwest Regional Council of Carpenters, affiliated
with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America (the Respondent), in Case 36–CC–1016–1 on May 28,
2002, and in Case 36–CC–1017–1 on December 5, 2002.
The complaint, as amended, alleges, and the answer denies,
that on or about April 11 and 16, 2002, the Respondent improp-
erly picketed at the Oregon Convention Center in Portland,
Oregon, and in so doing threatened, coerced, or restrained per-
sons engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com-
merce who were not engaged in any primary labor dispute with
the Respondent. The complaint further alleges that an object of
the Respondent’s conduct was to force or require these persons
and other persons to cease handling or otherwise dealing in the
products of, and to cease doing business (directly or indirectly)
with the Charging Party. Finally, the complaint alleges that the
Respondent, in undertaking the actions described, violated Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act). The Respondent denies that it
has violated the Act.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On the entire record herein, including helpful briefs from the
Respondent, the Charging Party, and the General Counsel, I
make the following findings of fact.2
I. JURISDICTION
The Charging Party is a State of Oregon corporation, with
office and place of business in Portland, Oregon, where it is
engaged in the business of the setup and takedown of trade
shows and exhibitions in the States of Oregon and Washington.

1 Cases 36–CE–37 and 36–CE–38 were part of the consolidated
complaint, but were severed before hearing based on a settlement and
are not a part of this proceeding.
2 As a result of the pleadings and the substantial joint stipulations of
counsel at the trial, there were few disputes of fact. Where not other-
wise noted, the findings herein are based on the pleadings and the stipu-
lations. The record contains no substantive evidence other than the
formal papers and the stipulation of the parties with its associated ex-
hibits. The remainder of the record essentially comprises the receipt
into evidence of those documents and the setting of a posthearing brief-
ing schedule.
The Charging Party in the 12-month period preceding the issu-
ance of the complaint, a representative period, in the course and
conduct of its business operations, sold and shipped goods or
provided services from its facilities within the State of Oregon,
to customers outside the State, or sold and shipped goods or
provided services to customers within the State, which custom-
ers were themselves engaged in interstate commerce by other
than indirect means of a total value in excess of $50,000.
Based on the above, the pleadings establish and I find the
Charging Party is and has been at all times material, a person
and an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(1), (2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION
The pleadings establish, there is no dispute, and I find the
Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Stipulated Facts3
The Respondent is signatory to labor agreements with sev-
eral contractors that erect and dismantle trade shows at various
facilities including the Oregon Convention Center in Portland,
Oregon. The Charging Party also performs work in that mar-
ket. The Charging Party is signatory to a labor agreement with
District Council No. 5, UPAT (Painters Union), but is not sig-
natory to an agreement with the Respondent. Trade show con-
tractors, including the Charging Party and Respondent signa-
tory contractors, erect and dismantle common features such as
entranceways, registration areas, signage, information kiosks,
aisle carpeting, and handle miscellaneous service requirements
during the event itself.4
The Charging Party was contracted to provide work for at
least two shows at the Oregon Convention Center in April
2002.5 One was sponsored by the Oregon Dental Association
(Dental Show). Work setting up the Dental Show commenced
on April 10. The show was open on April 11, 12, and 13, and
was dismantled on April 13. Another show contracted to the
Charging Party was sponsored by SYSCO Food Services of
Portland (SYSCO Food Show). Work setting up the SYSCO
Food Show occurred on April 14 and 15. The show was open
on April 16 and dismantled on April 17.
The Oregon Convention Center has several public entrances
from public streets and sidewalks. All public entrances may be
accessed by persons attending any show, seminar or other
3 The language appearing in the stipulated facts section of this deci-
sion is taken essentially verbatim from the written stipulation of the
parties. The stipulation recites that the stipulation and the formal pa-
pers will comprise the entire record. The stipulation further provides
the parties reserved the right to object on brief to the relevance of any
of the stipulated facts.
4 The Respondent asserts that the Charging Party’s employee total
wages and benefit package is substandard to that provided by the Re-
spondent’s contracts and has conducted an area standards campaign
advertising that belief. The Charging Party disputes that assertion. The
accuracy of both parties’ assertions regarding the Charging Party is not
at issue in this proceeding.
5 All dates hereinafter occurred in 2002 unless otherwise noted.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1032
event, i.e., particular entrances are not reserved for particular
events.
More than one function may occur at the Oregon Convention
Center on a particular day. If called to testify, an official of the
Oregon Convention Center would testify that on April 11, the
show of the National Forum for Black Administrators was be-
ing dismantled by the Charging Party. Jackson Dawson Com-
munications, Inc., sponsored an event, the WVDO Crystal
Awards group had a committee meeting, and the Dental Show
occurred. He would further testify that on April 16, Kaiser
Permanente sponsored a seminar and the SYSCO Food Show
was held.
On April 11, the Respondent picketed outside the Oregon
Convention Center for about 4 hours. Several picketers held
signs stating:6

ATTENTION
DENTAL SHOW
DWA
DOES NOT PAY
AREA STANDARD
WAGES & BENEFITS
PACIFIC NORTHWEST
REGIONAL COUNCIL
OF CARPENTERS
Some other picketers held identical signs, save that the words
“Attention Dental Show” did not appear on the signs. The
reverse of at least one picket sign stated:

ATTENTION
DENTAL SHOW
PARTICIPANTS
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
REGIONAL COUNCIL
OF CARPENTERS
On April 16, the Respondent again picketed outside the Ore-
gon Convention Center for about 8 hours. Several picketers
held signs stating:

ATTENTION
SYSCO SHOW
DWA
DOES NOT PAY
AREA STANDARD
WAGES & BENEFITS
PACIFIC NORTHWEST
REGIONAL COUNCIL
OF CARPENTERS
Some other picketers held identical signs except that the words
“Attention SYSCO Show” did not appear on the signs.

6 Font proportion and bolding in this and all subsequent quotation of
picket sign language appear as stipulated by the parties.
On April 11 and 16, the Respondent’s picketing occurred
outside the various public entrances to the Oregon Convention
Center. The Respondent did not picket at delivery entrances
used for the loading and unloading of exhibit-related materials
for the Dental or SYSCO Shows. The Respondent did not
handbill on either April 11 or 16.
The Respondent has no dispute with the Oregon Convention
Center, the Oregon Dental Association, SYSCO Food Services
of Portland, Oregon, or other users of the Oregon Convention
Center on April 11 or 16.
If called to testify, union organizers Ben Embree and/or
Sheri Raven would state that the Union placed the name of the
show (Dental Show, SYSCO Show) on the picket signs in their
belief that patrons visit the Oregon Convention Center to pa-
tronize events other than those set up and dismantled by the
Charging Party, that the Respondent did not want to have its
message apply to Oregon Convention Center events not hiring a
trade show contractor or using a different trade show contrac-
tor, and that in order to avoid confusion, the Respondent placed
the name of the show (Dental Show, SYSCO Show) on the sign
along with the identification of the Charging Party.
If called to testify, Kristine Bowen, the senior director of
marketing for SYSCO Food Services of Portland, Inc., would
state that SYSCO is a distributor of food, supplies and equip-
ment to customers throughout Oregon and Southwest Washing-
ton. SYSCO has an annual trade show. The Carpenter’s Union
has picketed at SYSCO’s annual trade shows in 2001 and 2002.
During that time, the Carpenter’s Union sent SYSCO three
letters threatening to take action at SYSCO’s food shows if it
continued to contract with the Charging Party to set up and
decorate its show. SYSCO understood these letters as a direct
threat to picket SYSCO and enmesh it in its dispute with the
Charging Party.
B. Analysis and Conclusions
1. The issue narrowed
The complaint alleges the Respondent’s April 11 and 16
picketing violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. That sec-
tion provides:

Sec. 8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organi-
zation or its agents—

(4)(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person en-
gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,
where in either case an object thereof is—

(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease us-
ing, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise deal-
ing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees unless such labor or-
ganization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of section 9: Pro-
vided, that nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be
construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise
unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing;

CARPENTERS (DWA TRADE SHOW & EXPOSITION SERVICES) 1033
The Act thus prohibits forcing or requiring neutrals—persons
not involved in any primary dispute with the labor organization
involved—to cease handling or dealing in the products of or to
cease doing business with the primary employer. While the
secondary picketing prohibitions of the Act are perhaps dense
and complex, all parties agree that the issue herein turn on a
traditional analysis of picketing in a setting and situation where
multiple employers and employees and visitors are involved: a
common situs. Such common situs picketing has long been
considered in light of the teachings and enumerated tests of the
fountainhead case, Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry
Dock), 92 NLRB 547, 549 (1950).
In that case the Board held that common situs picketing is
presumptively legal if each of four criteria are met:

(1) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the
primary employer’s employees are on site;
(2) The primary employer is engaged in its normal
business at the site;
(3) The picketing is limited to places reasonably close
to where the primary employees are working, and
(4) The picketing disclosed clearly that the dispute is
only with the primary employer.

The parties further agree that the instant case turns on the
proper application of the fourth Moore Drydock rule requiring
common situs picketing to clearly disclose that the dispute is
only with the primary employer, the Charging Party on the facts
of this case. Indeed the General Counsel specifically asserts
that the Respondent’s complied with the first three rules. It is
appropriate then to turn to the argument respecting Moore Dry-
dock rule 4 as set forth above.
2. Arguments of the parties
The General Counsel argues that the Respondent failed to
meet the fourth criterion in that the picket signs used did not
clearly identify that the Respondent’s dispute was with, and
only with, the Charging Party. Thus, the Government argues
that the picket signs not only utilized the same size lettering to
display the letters “DWA” and the names of the stipulated neu-
trals “Dental Show” and “SYSCO,” but also put “Attention
Dental Show” and “Attention SYSCO Show” on the top of the
picket signs. The General Counsel argues that this presentation
was very likely to create the impression among the people at-
tending the shows and the employees of companies other than
the Charging Party that the Respondent has a dispute with the
Dental Show and SYSCO and “turn away.” (General Coun-
sel’s posthearing brief at 3.) The General Counsel argues fur-
ther that the Respondent’s signs are violative of the Act be-
cause they do not state that the Respondent’s dispute was only
with the Charging Party.
The Charging Party emphasizes that the Moore Drydock
fourth requirement is designed to avoid embroiling neutrals by
requiring open disclosure of the primary employer’s name on
the picket sign and that any vague or ambiguous language will
be found unlawful citing Daniel Construction Co., 192 NLRB
272 (1971). The Charging Party argues that the fact that the
Respondent put neutral person’s names on the picket signs
created confusion and ambiguity that is inconsistent with
Moore Drydock rule 4 and which clearly evinces a violation of
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
The Respondent emphasizes the “unusually narrow” theory
of the General Counsel’s case, which turns “solely on the letter-
ing appearing on the signs.” (Respondent’s posthearing brief at
7.) The Respondent notes that the language on the picket signs
drawing the picket sign readers’ “attention” to the Dental and
SYSCO shows was added by union agents to avoid confusion
and that the Respondent did not want to have its picket sign
message apply to Oregon Convention Center events not hiring a
trade show contractor or using a different trade show contractor
than the Charging Party, and, for that reason put the names of
the shows: “Dental Show” and “SYSCO Show” on the picket
signs. Counsel for the Respondent argues that such actions
follow the Board’s suggestion that unions should insulate neu-
trals from the effects of primary picketing at common sites.
The Union’s concern makes good sense: patrons alerted by
the “Attention” would know which part of the situs involved
the labor dispute and which did not. Those concerned about
such matters therefore would not have to guess, or inquire
whether the primary was working on the event they were pa-
tronizing. By providing an alert, the Union thought it could not
be accused of trying to enmesh all functions at the Convention
Center or the Center itself. And by taking the trouble it did, the
Union has learned the age-old lesson that no good deed goes
unpunished. (R. Br. at 8.)
The General Counsel concedes that “intent rather than the ef-
fect of the Union’s conduct forms the basis for an inquiry into
the lawfulness of the conduct, citing NLRB v. International
Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951). Counsel argues how-
ever that intent in this sense is measured as much by the neces-
sary and foreseeable consequences of its conduct as by its
stated object citing, Longshoreman ILA Local 799 (Allied In-
ternational), 257 NLRB 1075 (1981). Counsel argues that
placing the names of the Dental Show and SYSCO—neutral
persons on the picket signs—had the necessary and foreseeable
consequence of creating confusion respecting the identity of the
party or parties against whom the picketing was directed. This
confusion was exacerbated and made for likely by the absence
of any language on the picket signs indicating that the Respon-
dent had no dispute with any other employer than the Charging
Party. The General Counsel concludes: “[T]his confusion and
enmeshing of neutrals was exactly what [the] Respondent in-
tended and was the necessary and foreseeable consequence of
its action.” (GC Br. at 4.)
The Charging Party argues that the Respondent’s claim that
the Charging Party does not meet area standards is incorrect
and improper. Further, it argues that the Respondent’s letters to
SYSCO show the Union’s objective was to embroil SYSCO in
its dispute with the Charging Party. The Respondent meets the
Charging Party’s argument in two ways. First it notes that the
General Counsel’s complaint and theory of a violation are nar-
row and did not include the evidence and arguments relied on
by the Charging Party here. The Respondent correctly asserts
that a complaint and its theory of a violation may not be ex-
panded by a Charging Party. Second, the Respondent argues
that the letters relied on by the Charging Party are, as to two of
the three, directed to 2001 events that were not litigated at the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1034
hearing and, the third letter sent in 2002, simply describes the
Respondent’s possible “lawful but aggressive public informa-
tion campaign.”
3. Analysis and conclusions
While the parties are correct that the primary vehicle for
analysis of the instant case is Moore Drydock rule 4, the Board
has long held that the Moore Drydock criteria are evidentiary
standards that are not to be mechanically applied. While obser-
vance of the standards raises a presumption of legality, the
ultimate question—one of fact—remains: Does the Union’s
conduct disclose an illegal secondary objective? Electrical
Workers Local 302 (ICR Electric), 272 NLRB 920 fn. 2 at 920
(1984), see T. W. Helgesen, Inc. v. Iron Workers Local 498,
548 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1977). This critical finding is to be
based upon consideration of all the relevant circumstances.
Having considered the entire record, I find and conclude that
the language on the Respondent’s picket signs is sufficient
evidence of secondary object to overcome the testimony of the
drafting agents of the Respondent respecting their object in
drafting the signs as they did and is also sufficient to meet the
burden the General Counsel bears to establish a violation of the
Act. In essence I am persuaded by the arguments of the Gen-
eral Counsel and, discussed more fully below, do not rely on
the broader evidentiary arguments of the Charging Party.
Despite the protestations of the counsel for the Respondent
that the language on the picket signs was intended by the Union
to limit and focus the impact of the picketing to avoid enmesh-
ing neutrals, I find that the signs’ language simply did not do as
the Respondent’s drafters would have testified and rather sub-
stantially increased the risk of neutral involvement. Thus, the
language of the signs supports a finding of the Respondent’s
secondary intention. This is so because of the inclusion of the
names of neutral persons Dental Show and SYSCO Show on
the signs, coupled with the Respondent’s omission to include
any limiting language indicating that the Respondent’s dispute
was only with the Charging Party and not with any other person
and not with the Dental Show or with SYSCO. The ambigui-
ties of the signs’ intended target—that is the employer or per-
son with whom the Respondent maintained a dispute—and
hence the likelihood of neutral enmeshment are significant and
were not reduced by the self-proclaimed cautionary acts of the
picket sign drafters.
I do not specifically discredit the Respondent’s organizers
Ben Embree and/or Sheri Raven who would have testified to
their benign intention in wording the signs as they did. Rather,
I find that the Union is in at least in part the business of picket-
ing including picketing of common situs entities such as is
involved herein. As such the Respondent and its agents will be
held to the standard of a reasonable labor organization picket-
ing at a common situs. Under such a standard, the Respon-
dent’s agents should have known that the picket signs they
drafted would be likely to increase the confusion possible
among those who observed the picket signs at the Oregon Ex-
hibition Center on the days in question, and therefore would
have increased the likelihood that neutral parties would have
been enmeshed in the Respondent’s dispute with the Charging
Party. Further I am persuaded by the argument of the General
Counsel set forth supra, that the necessary and foreseeable con-
sequences of a labor organization’s picketing conduct may rise
to the level of intention. I specifically find such to be the case
here.
In reaching this conclusion, I did not rely on the arguments
of the Charging Party that the area standards position of the
Respondent is bogus or that the Respondent’s contacts with
SYSCO support the violation alleged. Nor do I address the
Respondent’s opposition to that evidence. My findings on the
critical fact that the Respondent, actually or constructively,
intentionally enmeshed neutrals by its picketing with signs
bearing the language quoted, supra, on April 11 and 16, does
not rely or depend on these contested elements of the stipula-
tion.
Based upon all the above and on the record as a whole, I find
that the Respondent on April 11 and 16, 2002, picketed the
Oregon Convention Center and threatened, coerced, or re-
strained neutrals and other persons with an objective to force or
require the neutrals and other persons to cease handling or oth-
erwise dealing in the products of, and to cease doing business
(directly or indirectly) with the Charging Party. I further find
that the Respondent through the described actions with the
noted objective has violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. I
therefore sustain the General Counsel’s complaint.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent violated the Act as set
forth above, I shall order that it cease and desist therefrom and
post remedial Board notices. Further the language on the Board
notices will conform to the Board’s recent decision in Ishikawa
Gasket America, Inc., 337 NLRB 175 (2001), that notices
should be drafted in plain, straightforward, layperson language
that clearly informs employees of their rights and the violations
of the Act found.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Charging Party is, and has been at all times material,
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent is, and has been at all relevant times, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. By threatening, coercing, and restraining the Dental
Show, the SYSCO Show, and SYSCO, and each of them, and
other neutral employers or persons engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, with an objective to force or
require the neutrals and other persons to cease handling or oth-
erwise dealing in the products of, and to cease doing business
(directly or indirectly) with the Charging Party, the Respondent
violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act.
4. The unfair labor practices described above are unfair la-
bor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]