01970002
01-29-1999
Carolyn S. Meeks, Appellant, v. Craven H. Crowell, Jr., Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, Agency.
Carolyn S. Meeks v. Tennessee Valley Authority
01970002
January 29, 1999
Carolyn S. Meeks, )
Appellant, )
)
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01970002
) Agency No. 0511-94064
) Hearing No. 250-94-8268X
Craven H. Crowell, Jr., )
Chairman, )
Tennessee Valley Authority, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Appellant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (Commission) from the final decision of the agency concerning
her allegation that the agency discriminated against her in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e
et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. Section 791 et seq. This appeal is accepted by the Commission
in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960.001.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Whether appellant has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the agency discriminated against her on the bases of physical disability
(kidney disorder-idiopathic stone disease and back injury-bulging disk)
when, on or about March 15, 1994, she was forced to violate her medical
restrictions; and reprisal (prior EEO activity) when, on March 4, 1994,
she received an unfavorable performance evaluation.
BACKGROUND
In a formal complaint filed on May 11, 1994, appellant alleged that
the agency discriminated against her as referenced above. The agency
accepted appellant's complaint and conducted an investigation. At the
conclusion of the investigation the agency notified appellant of her
right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) or
a final decision by the agency without a hearing. Appellant requested
a hearing. On November 29, 1995, a hearing was held before an EEOC AJ.
Thereafter, on July 22, 1996, the AJ issued his Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law finding no discrimination. On September 3, 1996, the
agency issued a final agency decision (FAD) adopting the AJ's finding of
no discrimination. It is from this decision that appellant now appeals.
At the time of appellant's complaint, she was employed by the agency as
a Custodian, SF-1, at the Tennessee Valley Authority's Sequoyah Nuclear
Plant. The record reveals that appellant filed a prior EEO complaint in
1992, which was resolved through a settlement agreement in 1993. In the
present complaint, appellant alleged that the Responsible Official (RO)
from her 1992 complaint issued her an unfavorable quarterly service review
by rating her a "Meets Some"in the area of teamwork. Appellant further
alleged that she was required by management to do work which violated her
work restrictions in relation to lifting, bending, and climbing stairs,
which were placed on her as a result of both a 1989 and 1994 back injury.
With respect to appellant's disability claim, the AJ found that
appellant failed to present any evidence regarding her alleged disability.
He also found that appellant failed to identify how her alleged disabling
condition substantially limited any major life activity. Furthermore,
the AJ found that appellant's claim that she was forced to violate her
medical restrictions was without credible merit in that appellant was at
all times in control of whether she violated any restrictions. The AJ
also found that she never identified herself as disabled to management,
nor did management perceive appellant as a person with a disability.
Similarly, in regards to appellant reprisal claim, the AJ found no
connection, or nexus, between appellant's prior EEO complaint and her
unfavorable performance evaluation.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Disability Discrimination
Appellant can establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination
by establishing that: (1) she is an individual with a disability as
defined by EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.203(a); (2) she is a qualified
individual with a disability as defined by 29 C.F.R. �1614.203(a)(6); and
(3) she was subjected to an adverse personnel action under circumstances
giving rise to an inference of disability discrimination. See Prewitt
v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.203(a) states that an individual
with a disability is one who has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such individual's major life
activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having
such an impairment. Major life activities include caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working.
We find, as did the AJ, that appellant has not established that she is
a person with a disability as defined by the regulations. The record
is devoid of any medical evidence in support of her claim of physical
disability. Further, there is no evidence that the agency considered
appellant as having a physical impairment which substantially limited
a major life activity.
Reprisal Discrimination
Appellant's allegation of reprisal discrimination constitutes a
claim of disparate treatment which is properly analyzed under the
three-tiered order and allocation of proof as set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Hochstadt v. Worcester
Foundation for Experimental Biology, 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.),
aff'd., 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976).
The McDonnell Douglas analytical paradigm need not be adhered to in all
cases. In appropriate circumstances, when the agency has established
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct, the trier of fact
may dispense with the prima facie inquiry and proceed to the ultimate
stage of the analysis, i.e., whether the complainant has proven by
preponderant evidence that the agency's explanations were a pretext for
discrimination. See United States Postal Service Board of Governors
v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-14 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of
Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990). Since the
agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action, the Commission will consider whether the agency's explanations
for its actions were a pretext for discrimination. The agency stated
that appellant needed to be more team oriented and needed to get along
with others. Appellant has failed to show that the agency's reason for
its action was pretext for discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is the decision of the EEOC to AFFIRM the agency's final
decision finding no discrimination.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �l6l4.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,
YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE
OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS
OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the
Court. Both the request and the civil action must be Filing a request for
an attorney does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right
to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
Jan 29, 1999
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations