Carolyn R. Gray, Petitioner,v.Robert M. Gates, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Commissary Agency), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 23, 2010
0420100001 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 23, 2010)

Cases citing this document

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2 Citing cases

0420100001

07-23-2010

Carolyn R. Gray, Petitioner, v. Robert M. Gates, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Commissary Agency), Agency.


Carolyn R. Gray,

Petitioner,

v.

Robert M. Gates,

Secretary,

Department of Defense,

(Defense Commissary Agency),

Agency.

Petition No. 0420100001

Appeal No. 0720080022

Agency No. 04-EA-HG-017

Hearing No. 120-2004-00619X

DECISION ON A PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT

On October 8, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or

Commission) docketed a petition for enforcement to examine the enforcement

of an Order set forth in Carolyn R. Gray v. Department of Defense, Appeal

No. 0720080022 (December 12, 2008). The Commission accepts this petition

for enforcement pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503. Petitioner alleged

that the Agency failed to fully comply with the above order.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was hired for the Agency's Little Creek Commissary store out

of Norfolk, Virginia, effective June 30, 2003, as a Commissary Support

Clerk (CAO). In Gray v. Department of Defense (Defense Commissary

Agency), EEOC Petition No. 0720080022 (December 12, 2008), Petitioner

claimed she was discriminated against in violation of Section 501 of

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. and

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq. The Commission found that Petitioner was discriminated

against in reprisal for prior EEO activity when she was not reasonably

accommodated from sometime after late July 2003 to on or about October

19, 2003; her telephone usage was restricted; she was monitored; and

she was terminated effective November 17, 2003, for misconduct.

The Commission ordered, in relevant part, that the Agency:

1. ...offer to retroactively reinstate Petitioner, effective November 17,

2003, to the position of Commissary Support Clerk (CAO), at the Little

Creek Commissary in Norfolk, Virginia,1 or another position agreeable

to the parties;

2. expunge all references of the termination from Petitioner's official

personnel file (OPF);

3. restore any leave taken as a result of the discrimination;

4. pay back pay, with interest and other benefits retroactive to November

17, 2009...pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501...; and

5. consider taking disciplinary action against those responsible for

the discrimination against Petitioner.

In January 2009, the Agency offered Petitioner the position of Store

Associate, GS-1101-4, at its Langley Air Force Base Commissary (which is

located in Hampton, Virginia).2 Petitioner accepted the position with a

start date of January 12, 2009. On behalf of Petitioner, prior to her

starting, the union local Vice President talked to the Store Director

and was told Petitioner's duties would be administrative only, i.e.,

training so she could fill in when needed for the duties of secretary,

supply technician, and time keeper.

On March 19, 2009, the Store Director and the local union Vice President

signed a paper indicting that in accordance with the Commission's order

Petitioner was being placed at the Langley Air Force Base Commissary as

a Store Associate, with duties limited to the administrative sections of

the store in a support role for the administrative office, which would

accommodate her prior on-the-job injury at the Little Creek Commissary.

In a letter dated April 9, 2009, the Store Administrator represented

that since starting work, Petitioner worked in the administrative office

and a few times in the cash office, and assisted a supply technician

and secretary, as applicable, with filing, copying, faxing, typing,

organizing folders, answering the telephone, assisting employees and

customers, and was training for timekeeping in payroll. According to

the Agency's attorney representative, the Store Director departed and

a successor Store Director took over on March 29, 2009.

By letter dated May 11, 2009, the successor Store Director advised

Petitioner that her current duties were only temporary, that she was not

performing the full duties of Store Associate, and he needed medical

information on her limitations for management to consider continued

accommodation and appropriately identify duties for her. In a letter

to her Congressman dated June 22, 2009, Petitioner wrote that on May 27,

2009, she was involuntarily reassigned to her old position of Commissary

Support Clerk (CAO), which she could not perform. In a letter to

Petitioner that was copied to the Commission, the Agency wrote that

Petitioner was asked as a Store Associate to perform the identical duties

she was formerly assigned, has not been asked to perform anything more

than her former position description required, but she contended that

she could only do administrative duties, and the Agency had no such

position available.

Petitioner does not dispute that all references to her removal were

expunged from her OPF, but contends other documents which should not

have been expunged are missing. She writes that she was told her OPF

was destroyed and had to be rebuilt.

In its compliance report, which the Agency copied to Petitioner and her

attorney, the Agency avers that it provided Petitioner all leave owed

and back pay with interest and other benefits. In support of leave, the

compliance report has a "Master Leave History," which we are unable to

decipher. In support of back pay wages and other benefits, it contains a

"Master Pay History," which we are largely unable to decipher. It also

contains spreadsheets showing from pay period ending November 29, 2003

though February 16, 2008, on a bi-weekly basis the hourly rates and hours

(64 hours every two weeks) at which back pay was calculated, as well as

deductions for life and health insurance. An email in the compliance

report indicates that the spreadsheets do not contain the amounts used

to offset Petitioner's outside earnings of $81,330, nor interest paid

of $7,212.54.

In a June 11, 2009, email that was forwarded to the Commission's

Compliance Officer on this case, the Agency's Supervisory Financial

Analyst/Payroll wrote that the Agency restored 333 hours of sick leave

and 539 hours of annual leave to Petitioner. She wrote that for the pay

periods ending November 29, 2003 through February 16, 2008, including the

$7,212.54 interest payment and offset of $81,330 (and Petitioner's regular

pay for March 28, 2009), Petitioner's gross pay was $22,401.01, and her

net pay was $18,894.62, after taxes and deductions. She wrote that for

the pay periods ending March 1, 2008 though January 3, 2009, and including

25.50 hours of retroactive pay and Petitioner's pay for pay period ending

March 14, 2009, Petitioner's gross pay was $23,234.81, and her net pay

after taxes and other deductions was $12,393.38. The record does not

indicate that this email was sent to Petitioner or her representative.

The Agency orally counseled Petitioner's former grocery manager, her

lead, had her sign a memo acknowledging such, and verbally admonished

Petitioner's former Store Director about his actions with Petitioner.

CONTENTIONS ON PETITION

In her June 1, 2009, petition, Petitioner contends that she accepted the

position of Store Associate at the Langley Commissary because she was

told her former position had been abolished. She contends that the Store

Director agreed that her duties would be restricted to the administrative

section of the store in a support role for the administrative office,

and this was memorialized in writing on March 19, 2009. She writes

that the successor Store Director violated this, and on May 27, 2009,

informed her that effective June 8, 2009, she was being changed to a

Commissary Support Clerk (CAO). Petitioner writes that in accordance

with the Commission's order, she only agreed to be a Store Associate,

and asks to be reinstated to that position with administrative duties

as agreed on March 19, 2009.

The Agency counters that on January 9, 2009, human resources offered

Petitioner the position of Store Associate at the Langley Commissary,

and she accepted. It argues that duties of Store Associate are nearly

identical to those Petitioner performed in her former position, and she

has not been asked to do anything more than her former position required.

It argues that due to her present medical condition, Petitioner now

claims she can only perform administrative duties, but no such position

is available. The Agency refers to a letter its former attorney sent

to Petitioner's union attorney contending that they were the designated

representatives and the Store Director and the union Vice President

had no authority to sign the March 19, 2009 paper. The former Agency

attorney argued that in compliance with the Commission's order, the Agency

offered Petitioner the position of Store Associate, which she accepted,

and that her former position had been abolished.

Petitioner contends that documents which should not have been removed from

her OPF have been expunged. She also argues that a SF-50 Notification

of Personnel Action, which was a reconstruction of her June 30, 2003,

appointment at the Little Creek Commissary, incorrectly has an effective

date of January 4, 2009, rather than June 30, 2003; incorrectly has

a service comp. date of June 4, 1995, rather than September 14, 1992;

and an education level of 04 INST-HI DEG-YR rather than 07. She writes

that she did not get her service pin and certificate for 10 years of

federal government service.

Petitioner argues that the Master Leave History does not explain how

sick and annual leave were calculated, and she believes she is still

owed at least 43 hours of additional annual leave. She asks that the

Agency provide a detailed calculation worksheet explaining how sick and

annual leave were calculated.

Petitioner writes that for the pay period ending March 14, 2009, her

earnings and leave statement reflects retroactive earnings of $22,251.33

for 1,497.50 hours of back pay for pay periods ending March 1, 2008

through December 20, 2008. She contends that she was entitled to holiday

premium pay for holidays she would normally have been scheduled to work.

Petitioner writes that the Agency provided no clear explanation of

how interest on back pay was calculated, and also asks for a detailed

calculation of how her back pay was calculated.

Petitioner writes that while the Agency retroactively paid $9,489.16

for health benefits from 2003 through 2008, she still has approximately

$44,000 in medical bills which were not paid. She writes that when she

submitted medical bills to the health insurance company they were denied

on the grounds that they were received past the contracted filing date.

She argues this is a compliance issue with back pay and other benefits.

She requests compensation for the medical bills with interest.3 In

opposition to the petition, the Agency argues that the claim for

unpaid medical bills is unsupported by an affidavit from Petitioner,

and they should be filed with her insurance company through the Federal

Health Benefits (FEHB) program. The Agency argues that it retroactively

restored Petitioner's medical benefits making appropriate payments for

them, and if she believes her claims were inappropriately denied she

should appeal the denials with her insurance carrier. It argues it has

no authority to approve or disapprove claims for medical benefits.

Petitioner argues that the Agency did not take sufficient disciplinary

action against the Agency officials who discriminated against her.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission ordered the Agency to retroactively reinstate Petitioner

to the position of Commissary Support Clerk (CAO) at the Little Creek

Commissary or another position agreeable to the parties. Agency human

resources offered Petitioner the position of Store Associate at the

Langley Commissary, and Petitioner accepted. It is unclear whether

the union Vice President talked to the Store Director before or after

Petitioner accepted the position. There is no question, however, that the

Store Director only intended to give Petitioner office type administrative

duties, and memorialized this in writing on March 19, 2009, shortly before

departing, indicating it was in accordance with the Commission's order and

to accommodate Petitioner. Petitioner was already working as such since

January 12, 2009, and gave no consideration in exchange for this writing.

We find that the Agency's placement of Petitioner in the position of

Store Associate complies with the Commission's order.4 The position

was agreeable to the parties. Sometime after the successor Store

Director arrived, he expressed that he wanted to assign Petitioner

different Store Associate duties, and according to Petitioner, decided

to assign her to her former position of Commissary Support Clerk (CAO).

Petitioner does not dispute the Agency's contention that the duties of

Store Associate are nearly identical to those Petitioner performed in

her former position and she has not been asked to do anything more than

her former position required. Her contention that the Store Director

decided to assign her to the position of Commissary Support Clerk (CAO)

is consistent with this. Placing Petitioner in this position (regardless

of its official title) is consistent with and substantially complies with

the Commission's order, even if this was not agreeable to Petitioner.5

Petitioner's claim about missing documents in her OPF is not addressed

by the Commission's order, and hence we do not address the matter.

The SF-50 Notification of Personnel Action, which was a reconstruction

of her June 30, 2003, appointment at the Little Creek Commissary, was

approved for processing on January 15, 2009. We agree that it should

reflect an effective appointment date of June 30, 2003, since this is

when Petitioner was appointed to the Little Creek Commissary, not January

4, 2009. This will be addressed in the Order, below. We find that the

SF-50's recording of a Service Comp. date of June 4, 1995, and education

level of 04 INST-HI DEG-YR, comply with the Commission's Order because

they are an exact match with the SF-50 Notification of Personnel Actions

for Petitioner's hiring and termination at the Little Creek Commissary.

If Petitioner believes these SF-50 fields are inaccurate, she should

address this using another avenue. On Petitioner's request for a 10 year

service pin, we find that the Commission's order that she be provided

back pay with benefits pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501

does not require an award that merely honors tenure with the Agency,

but has no other value.

It is the Agency's obligation to ensure that its back pay calculations

are clear, including calculations of interest on back pay. Daniel

v. Tennessee Valley Authority, EEOC Petition No. 0420070004, 2006 WL

3832943 (December 19, 2006). The compliance report contains a "Master

Leave History" that is independently undecipherable. Petitioner asks for

a detailed calculation worksheet that explains how the Agency calculated

the restoration of her sick and annual leave. She is entitled to this.

She requests the same for back pay and interest.

While the Agency provided spreadsheets showing how back pay was calculated

for pay periods ending November 29, 2003 though February 16, 2008,

it does not explain how it calculated an offset of $81,330 in outside

earnings, and we cannot decipher how interest on back pay was calculated.

We note that some outside earnings can be offset, while others should

not be.6 The Agency, with the exception of deductions for health and

life insurance on the spreadsheets, also did not show how it calculated

regular deductions.

Petitioner is entitled to back pay calculations from the Agency that

will permit her to independently determine, to the extent reasonably

feasible,7 whether the Agency properly calculated back pay and interest.

The order below will require this so Petitioner will have an opportunity

to review the calculations and challenge alleged errors.

Nevertheless, based on the record, there are some back pay matters that

can be resolved now. On life insurance, 5 U.S.C. � 8706(e) provides:

If the insurance of an employee stops because of separation from the

service or suspension without pay, and the separation or suspension

is thereafter officially found to have been erroneous, the employee is

deemed to have been insured during the period of erroneous separation

or suspension. Deductions otherwise required by section 8607 of this

chapter shall not be withheld from any back pay awarded for the period

of separation or suspension unless death or accidental dismemberment of

the employee occurs during such period.

Therefore, the Agency incorrectly deducted life insurance premiums

from Petition's back pay. Wrigley v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Petition No. 04950005, 1996 WL 77400 (February 15, 1996).

With regard to the question of back pay, when a finding of discrimination

has been made, an agency is required to make the individual whole by

placing her "as near as may be, in the situation he would have occupied

if the wrong had not been committed." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,

422 U.S. 405, 418-419 (1975). Accordingly, an appellant is entitled to

premium pay for holidays she would have worked but for the discrimination.

Carney v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Petition No. 04970018,

1998 WL 91964 (1998). The order below will address this.

With the exception of arguing that she did not receive premium pay for

holidays, Petitioner does not dispute the rates of pay or hours (64

hours every two weeks) on the Agency back pay calculation spreadsheets

covering pay period ending November 29, 2003 though February 16, 2008.

Accordingly, we find the hourly rates of pay and hours Petitioner would

have worked, with the exception of holiday premium pay, are as set out

thereon. Further, since Petitioner does not contend her hours would

have changed during the back pay period, we find it is proper for the

Agency to calculate Petitioner's hours as 64 every two weeks during the

entire back pay period.

Health insurance premiums are included in an award of back pay.

Williams v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 01A01421, 2002

WL 1426292 (June 19, 2002). To be made whole, an individual must be

placed in he same position regarding his share of the medical costs as

nearly as possible to the situation she would have been in if she was

not unlawfully terminated. Huyck v. Department of Defense (Department

of Defense Dependents Schools), EEOC Appeal No. 01952015, 1997 WL 690256

(October 31, 1997). Applying this principal, the Commission found that

if the appellant would have received a higher reimbursement rate for

medical expenses under the government provided insurance policy than

his private insurance, the agency was obligated to reimburse him for

the difference in the amounts of reimbursements between the private and

government provided insurance policies. Id.

An award of back pay should compensate a prevailing complainant for loss

of health insurance coverage by either: (1) reimbursing her for health

insurance premiums paid to continue in an agency-sponsored insurance

plan or to secure alternate coverage; or (2) paying her for uninsured

medical expenses incurred during the relevant period up to the amount

the agency would have contributed to her health insurance premiums.

Wrigley v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04950005,

1996 WL 77400 (February 15, 1996).

While an appellant may seek reimbursement of her uninsured medical

expenses for a portion of the back pay period while also seeking

reimbursement for paid health insurance premiums during another portion

of her back pay period, we note that an appellant is not entitled to

reimbursement of both her uninsured medical costs and her paid health

insurance premiums during the same period. Accordingly, during the

period when an individual did not have any health insurance coverage,

she would be entitled to her uninsured medical costs. In addition,

during the period when an appellant paid for her own health insurance,

she could seek reimbursement for the health insurance premiums.

Dropka v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A12087, 2002 WL

31781275 (December 6, 2002). The Commission has ordered agencies to pay

medical expenses incurred due to the loss of health insurance coverage.

Dropka v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 0420060010,

2007 WL 1393637 (May 3, 2007), Lang v. Department of Veterans Affairs,

EEOC Appeal No. 0120081699, 2009 WL 1529529 (May 22, 2009).

Petitioner writes that when she submitted medical bills to the health

insurance company they were denied on the grounds that they were received

past the contracted filing date. Applying the above principals, we

find that Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for medical expenses

that were denied by her FHBP insurance for being received beyond the

contracted filing date, to the amount they would have been reimbursed

if they were timely filed, so long as she acted with due diligence in

filing her medical expense claims with the insurance company and acted

with due diligence in pursing reimbursement. The reimbursement amount

is not limited to what the Agency paid in premiums since denial on the

grounds of late filing, so long as Petitioner acted with due diligence, in

effect means she was not secured retroactive insurance (even though it was

paid for). Further, for the period the Agency secured health insurance

which was not actually active, Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement

of the deductions from her health insurance premiums. The record does

not show that Petitioner had or used alternate health insurance, but if

she did, the Agency should apply the above legal principals.

Petitioner is entitled to interest on additional out-of-pocket medical

expenses she incurred, if any, which occurred as a result of any alternate

health insurance reimbursing at a lower rate than what her FHBP would have

covered. Huyck v. Department of Defense (Department of Defense Dependents

Schools), EEOC Appeal No. 01952015, 1997 WL 690256 (October 31, 1997).

Petitioner contends that the Agency did not take sufficient disciplinary

action against the Agency officials who discriminated against her.

The Commission's order directed the Agency to consider discipline, and

the record shows it did so. Accordingly, the Agency complied with this

portion of the Commission's order.

The Agency is out of compliance with portions of the Commission's Order.

The Agency shall take the actions below.

ORDER

The Agency is ordered to take the following remedial actions:

1. To the extent it has not already done so, the Agency shall

complete a SF-50 Notification of Personnel Action, superseding the

prior reconstruction SF-50, reflecting an effective appointment date

of June 30, 2003, at the Little Creek NAB Commissary, and place it in

Petitioner's OPF;

2. The Agency shall reimburse Petitioner for all life insurance premiums

it deducted from her back pay;

3. To the extent Petitioner would have earned holiday premium pay had

she not been terminated, the Agency shall add this to her back pay,

with interest;

4. The Agency shall provide Petitioner and her representative with a

detailed accounting of how it calculated the restoration of Petitioner's

annual and sick leave, wage back pay, and all deductions (except

deductions for outside earnings) on a pay period to pay period bases;

5. The Agency shall provide Petitioner with a detailed breakdown of the

$81,330 in outside earnings it deducted from her back pay;

6. The Agency shall provide Petitioner with the formula it used to

calculate interest on back pay, the regulation and interest rate(s)

it used, and the amount of back pay on which interest was paid;

7. The Agency shall complete the actions in above items 4, 5 and 6 within

90 calendar days after the Agency's receipt of this decision in a way

that can readily be understood by a person not familiar with Agency,

governmental, or private payroll or human resource systems; and

8. The Agency shall conduct a supplemental investigation on Petitioner's

claim that medical expenses were not paid as a result of her loss of her

FEBH insurance. The Agency shall offer to assist Petitioner in filing

her medical expenses incurred during the back pay period with her FEBH

insurance, including assisting her with how to file retroactive claims

and making the retroactive insurance active in practice. After giving

the FEBH insurance a reasonable amount of time to process the claims,

the Agency shall pay the medical expenses that were denied by her FHBP

insurance for being received beyond the contracted filing date, to

the amount they would have been reimbursed if they were timely filed,

so long as Petitioner acted with due diligence in filing her medical

expense claims with the insurance company and acted with due diligence

in pursing reimbursement.8

After receiving the calculations referenced in items 4, 5, 6 and 7,

of this order, Petitioner shall make written requests to the Agency's

attorney representative on this case for further clarification, if

necessary, and identify calculation errors, if any, in writing to

the Agency's attorney representative on leave, back pay and interest

calculations, if any.9 The parties shall then endeavor to resolve these

matters.

The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of all the

actions ordered above, and be copied with all attachments to Petitioner

and her representative.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0610)

If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29

C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable

attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency.

The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency --

not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal

Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming

final. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in

accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington,

DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the complainant.

If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the complainant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407,

1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant

has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in

accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil

Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).

If the complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of

the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney

with the

Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time

limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 23, 2010

__________________

Date

1 The record in EEOC Petition No. 0720080022, shows that the store was

physically located in Virginia Beach, Virginia.

2 We note that the Langley Air Force Base Commissary is significantly

closer to Petitioner's residential address than the Little Creek

Commissary.

3 Petitioner indicated that the Department of Labor, Office of Workers'

Compensation Programs (OWCP) pays medical bills related to her prior

on-the-job injury at the Little Creek Commissary, but not unrelated

bills which she was submitting.

4 Petitioner does not raise the location of the Commissary as an issue.

5 Petitioner alleges that since her return the agency ceased reasonably

accommodating her alleged disability and repeatedly retaliated against

her. These are new claims that are unrelated to compliance with the

Commission's prior order. The record reflects that Petitioner has

filed an EEO complaint, which the Agency characterized as alleging she

was discriminated against based on disability, race and reprisal, as

applicable, when, among other things, on April 3, 2009, she was taken out

of her administrative position; her job duties were changed on May 27,

2009; the Store Director requested medical information; she was given

work outside her medical restrictions; and she received a letter by the

Store Director dated September 17, 2009, that he could not accommodate

her and was sending her home.

6 For example, while unemployment compensation may not be deducted from

a back pay award, Department of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation

(OWCP) wage loss compensation can be deducted. McCann v. Department

of the Air Force, EEOC Petition No. 04990041, 2000 WL 1616326 (October

20, 2000) (unemployment compensation must not be ducted from back pay),

Perez v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Petition No. 04A40041, 2005

WL 578595 (March 3, 2005) (may deduct wage loss workers' compensation

benefits).

7 The Commission recognizes that precise measurement of back pay

cannot always be made, and inherently involves a degree of speculation.

Uncertainties in the back pay determination should be resolved in the

favor of the Petitioner. Sanders v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Petition No. 04990018, 2001 WL 427467 (April 23, 2001).

8 The Agency may, if it chooses, make these payments to the health care

providers or bill collectors, as appropriate. Also, while the record does

not show that Petitioner had or used alternate health insurance during

the back pay period, if she did and would have had less out-of-pocket

medical expenses with FEBH insurance, the Agency shall make payment

for the increased out-of-pocket expenses to Petitioner, with interest,

to the extent Petitioner already paid them. To the extent she did not

pay such out-of-pocket expenses, the Agency may, if it chooses, make

these payments directly to the health care providers or bill collectors,

as appropriate.

9 We have already determined, however, that the hourly rates of pay

and hours Petitioner would have worked (64 every two weeks), with the

exception of holiday premium pay, are accurately set forth in back pay

calculation spreadsheets in the compliance report covering pay period

ending November 29, 2003 though February 16, 2008. Further, we find

that Petitioner would have worked 64 hours every two weeks during the

entire back pay period.

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0420100001

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

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0420100001