0120073759
06-11-2010
Carol A. Garner, Complainant, v. Gary Locke, Secretary, Department of Commerce (Bureau of the Census), Agency.
Carol A. Garner,
Complainant,
v.
Gary Locke,
Secretary,
Department of Commerce
(Bureau of the Census),
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120073759
Agency No. 06-63-00181
DECISION
On August 28, 2007, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's July
24, 2007 final decision concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO)
complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e
et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation
Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.
The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). For the
following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final decision.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented is whether complainant was discriminated against
because of her age (67), disability (Crohn's Disease and Irritable Bowel
Syndrome), and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when: (1) in June 2006,
she was no longer authorized to take her lunch break at the end of the
work day; (2) on July 29, 2006, her work schedule was changed from the
Alternate Work Schedule (AWS) to the Flexitime work schedule; (3) on
August 16, 2006, her request for reasonable accommodation was denied;
(4) on August 16, 2006, she was denied two days of Leave Without Pay
(LWOP); (5) on August 25, 2006, her duties as point of contact for the
Xerox contract were removed; and (6) on August 28, 2006, she was placed
on leave restriction.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked
as a Secretary (GS-0218-5/10) at the agency's Database Management
Systems Branch, Systems Support Division facility in Suitland, Maryland.
On October 6, 2006, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that
she was discriminated against as stated above.
Complainant attested that she was diagnosed with Crohn's Disease around
1990. She underwent surgery for the condition, which has assisted in
containing some of the symptoms. Complainant contends that her symptoms
are now triggered by stress. Complainant was diagnosed with Irritable
Bowel Syndrome (IBS) approximately seven years ago.
Complainant stated that for the entire time she has worked in DMSB,
spanning approximately fifteen (15) years at the time that the agency
issued its final decision, she has been provided an "accommodation."
She stated that if she came in late she just would not take lunch so
that she could leave her normal time in the evening. Complainant noted
that she never officially asked for permission to skip lunch for this
purpose but that it was an "accepted practice" in the office, and that
everyone did this unofficially. Complainant added that with these
"accommodations," her Crohn's disease and IBS have never rendered her
unqualified or unable to perform the requirements of her position.
During the investigation, complainant attested that while her supervisor
was on vacation, another employee in the office skipped lunch twice
and wanted to use the extra time as compensatory time. Shortly upon
his return to the office, complaint's supervisor sent out an email to
everyone in the office stating that he would not be allowing employees to
work through lunch in order to leave work an hour early. Concerned about
how this would impact her current work schedule arrangement, complainant
went to her supervisor to address this concern. Complainant asserts
that her supervisor told her that the email did not apply to her.
Approximately one week later, the same supervisor sent out another email
referencing his previous email and again informing employees that the
practice of working through lunch was not permitted.
Following this series of emails, complainant submitted a letter to the
agency from her doctor stating that as a result of her medical condition,
complainant should be allowed to leave work early. Agency officials took
it upon themselves to schedule a meeting with complainant to address this
matter and titled the meeting "Medical Accommodations." On June 26, 2006,
complainant attended a meeting with her first and second-line supervisors.
At this meeting complainant was presented with a memorandum addressing
her frequent absences from work, late arrivals, and early departures.
The letter requested that complainant provide medical evidence to assist
the supervisors in better understanding her medical situation and make an
informed decision regarding an appropriate accommodation. Complainant
was advised that after this information was received and evaluated, she
would be notified of any accommodation the agency was able to provide.
Complainant stated that during this meeting, her second-line supervisor
suggested that she work part-time because of her leave usage. Complainant
advised that she was not interested in a part-time schedule. On June 28,
2006, two days after this meeting, complaint received a copy of an email
sent to her timekeeper by her (complainant's) supervisor, advising that
she was switching to an from an Alternative Work Schedule (AWS) to a
Flexitime schedule. In this email, complainant was asked to choose a
tour of duty between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. by the end
of the business day. Complainant responded with an email indicating
that she was not interested in a Flexitime schedule and provided the
reasons why AWS was more conducive for her. Complainant's supervisor
advised her that the Flexitime schedule was the option available to
her at this time. About a week later, complainant submitted another
letter to the agency from her doctor regarding her condition and the
need to have a shorter workday. See Counselor's Report, Attachment 5.
In this letter complainant's doctor expressed his understanding that
complainant had been provided this accommodation for 10 years. Again,
complaint emailed her supervisor requesting AWS and was advised that it
was not an option for her at this time.
On August 16, 2006, the agency responded to complainant's request for a
medical accommodation to work through her lunch and end her work day an
hour early. Citing to 5 U.S.C. 6101(a)(3)(F), complainant's second-line
supervisor advised her in this response that the agency would be unable
to offer her this accommodation. See Counselor's Report, Attachment 2.
On this same date, complainant submitted a request for "leave without
pay" (LWOP) for two full days. Her request was subsequently denied
for a failure to accrue annual leave. Complainant was advised on
August 21, 2006 that her supervisor would not approve any additional
leave request, unless they were for medical reasons and complainant
provided a medical note. On August 28, 2006, complainant received a
memorandum informing her that she had been placed on leave restriction.
See Counselor's Report, Attachment 3. Complainant was advised that:
(1) she would no longer be advanced sick leave and that her supervisor
would consider approving accrued sick or annual leave and LWOP only;
(2) all of her annual leave requests were to be submitted two days prior
to the requested off day, and in the case of an emergency, a subsequent
form was to be submitted with an explanation within two working days of
her return; and (3) all emergency leave requests were to be submitted
no later than one hour after the start of her tour of duty, on the first
day of her return from the absence. Id.
Complainant stated that in 1989, there was a sexual harassment claim at
the agency involving an Associate Director, and that she was interviewed
by the Inspector General and gave a signed statement. She also noted that
she appeared on the television program "Inside Edition" about that matter.
While her name and face were not disclosed on the program, her voice was
un-garbled. Complainant attested that in approximately 1996, she filed
an EEO age discrimination and retaliation (and possibly disability)
complaint over not being formally designated as a Contracting Officer's
Technical Representative for a particular contract. She says that the
matter was resolved via alternate dispute resolution. She indicated
that her supervisors were with the agency at the time and that she is
confident that they knew about the incident. Complainant also alleged
retaliation for her placing her supervisor on notice in October 2005
that his comments to another employee were inappropriate. These facts
form the basis of complainant's retaliation claim.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). In accordance with
complainant's request, the agency issued a final decision pursuant to
29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that complainant failed
to prove that she was subjected to discrimination as alleged.
Specifically, the agency found that complainant failed to establish a
prima facie case of disability discrimination, age discrimination, and
reprisal. The agency reasoned that complainant failed to establish that:
(1) she was substantially limited in a major life activity at the time
of the events in question; (2) the agency regarded her as disabled; or
(3) she had a record of a disability. Additionally, the agency found
that because complainant failed to establish that she was a person with
a disability under the Rehabilitation Act, she failed to show that she
was entitled to reasonable accommodation. The agency further found that
complainant failed to identify any younger employee who was treated more
favorably than herself, as well as failed to show that her supervisor
was aware of her prior EEO activity.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
On appeal, complainant contends that the agency has erred in not issuing
a finding of discrimination. Complainant contends that the agency is
aware of her disability and in fact has record of her disability dating
back to 1990. Complainant also alleges that the agency allowed her to
work under the requested accommodations up until 2006. She submits
that she provided the necessary medical documentation and that the
agency is simply denying her request now because of her disability.
Additionally, complainant argues that there is evidence in the record to
support her contention that her schedule was also changed in reprisal
for her engagement in prior EEO activity. Complainant argues that her
accommodation was not challenged until after she engaged in EEO activity.
Complainant requests that the Commission reverse the Final Agency Decision
and make a finding of discrimination in her favor.
In response to complainant's appeal, the agency argues that the medical
documentation in the record does not support a finding that complainant
was "substantially limited" in the performance of a major life activity at
the time in question, nor does the evidence show that due to complainant's
claimed disability a significant restriction exists as to the condition,
manner, or duration she can perform a particular life activity as compared
to the average person in the general population. The agency argues that
the medical documentation of record does nothing more than establish
that the agency was aware of complainant's alleged disability.
Further, the agency contends that agency officials' silence regarding
complainant's abuse and misuse of leave is not identical to providing
her with reasonable accommodations. Further, the agency submits that
complainant failed to establish sufficient evidence to permit retaliatory
motive to be inferred on the part of the agency. The agency argues that,
in addition to complainant's supervisor being unaware of her prior EEO
activity, the time lapse between complainant's protected activity and
the actions complained of is too great to support a causal connection.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Standard of Review
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant
to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo
review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management
Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999) (explaining that
the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine
the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the
previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements,
and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions
of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's
own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
Disparate Treatment
In analyzing a disparate treatment claim under the Rehabilitation Act,
where the agency denies that its decisions were motivated by complainant's
disability and there is no direct evidence of discrimination, we apply
the burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Heyman v. Queens Village
Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, 198 F.3d 68
(2d Cir. 1999); Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 933-34 (D.C.Cir. 1999).
Under this analysis, in order to establish a prima facie case, complainant
must demonstrate that: (1) he is an "individual with a disability"; (2)
he is "qualified" for the position held or desired; (3) he was subjected
to an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding
the adverse action give rise to an inference of discrimination.
Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2001). The burden
of production then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. In order
to satisfy his burden of proof, complainant must then demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency's proffered reason is a
pretext for disability discrimination. Id.
The agency articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the
adverse employment actions. Specifically, the record indicates that,
at the direction of the Human Resources Specialist, complainant's
supervisor prohibited the all branch employees from skipping their lunch
hour to shorten their work day in violation of OPM policy. Further,
complainant's supervisor advised complainant to submit a medical statement
that he would pass on to Human Resources in order to attempt to have her
exempted from this policy, which was subsequently denied. The record
indicates that there were several discussions amongst management
regarding complainant's leave usage, and the deficit in both her annual
and sick leave. The record reflects that a leave usage analysis for
complainant was conducted and reviewed. Complainant's supervisors had
a meeting with Human Resources' employees following the review and were
"pressed" to take action. This resulted in complainant being placed on
a leave restriction. The record reflects that complainant's supervisors
offered her the opportunity to work a part-time schedule, in order to
rehabilitate her leave, but complainant refused this offer. Finally,
the record reflects that the removal of complainant's duties regarding
the Xerox copiers was done at her request.
Complainant must now prove by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the agency's articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for its actions are pretext for discrimination. The record reflects
that complainant had exhausted her leave balances to a point where the
agency was left with very few alternatives for managing this situation.1
Although complainant, along with other branch employees, was prohibited
from skipping lunch and shortening her work day, complainant was given
the option to work a Flexitime schedule, which would have permitted
complainant to leave work daily as early as 4:30 p.m. We find, even
assuming arguendo that complainant is a qualified individual with a
disability, the agency proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for its actions, and complainant failed to establish that these proffered
reasons were pretext for disability discrimination.
Failure to Accommodate
Complainant alleges that the agency failed to reasonably accommodate
her physical disability of Crohn's Disease. On two separate occasions,
complainant submitted written requests to be exempted from the OPM
policy and allowed to skip lunch and shorten her work day by one hour.
Complainant also wanted to continue on an AWS schedule in order to have
one day per week to take care of medical appointments.
An agency is required to make reasonable accommodations to the known
physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would
cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. � 1630.9. Reasonable accommodation
includes modifications to the manner in which a position is customarily
performed in order to enable a qualified individual with a disability to
perform the essential job functions. Enforcement Guidance - Reasonable
Accommodation. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination
against qualified disabled individuals. See 29 C.F.R. � 1630. In order
to establish disability discrimination, complainant must show that:
(1) he is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. �
1630.2(g); (2) he is a qualified individual with a disability pursuant to
29 C.F.R. � 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency failed to provide a reasonable
accommodation. Enforcement Guidance-Reasonable Accommodation.
Upon a complainant's request for reasonable accommodation, an employer
may require that documentation about the disability and the functional
limitations come from an appropriate health care or rehabilitation
professional. See EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation
and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Number
915.002, Question 6, (as revised October 17, 2002). When an employee's
disability or need for an accommodation is not known or obvious, an
employer may ask an employee for reasonable documentation about his or her
disability, limitations, and accommodation requirements. See Enforcement
Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of
Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, (July 27, 2000)
(web version) at 14.
A reasonable accommodation must be effective. See U.S. Airways v. Barnett,
535 U.S. 391, 400 (2002). "[T]he word 'accommodation' ... conveys the need
for effectiveness." Id. "An ineffective 'modification' or 'adjustment'
will not accommodate a disabled individual's limitations." Id. In the
context of job performance, this means that a reasonable accommodation
enables the individual to perform the essential functions of the position.
Enforcement Guidance - Reasonable Accommodation.
The record indicates that Complainant requested a modified schedule as a
reasonable accommodation. Specifically, complainant asked that she be
permitted to work through her lunch hour and end her work day an hour
earlier. An employer must provide modified or part-time schedules when
required as a reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship, even if
it does not provide such schedules for other employees. See Enforcement
Guidance - Reasonable Accommodation. The agency states complainant
provided insufficient medical documentation for her request because the
letter complainant provided from her doctor in support of her request
indicated no medical reason for why she should be provided with this
accommodation. ROI, Exhibit 3, Pages 15-16. Under these circumstances,
the agency was legally prohibited by the laws and regulations of
OPM, from allowing complainant to work through her lunch period, but
nonetheless it did offer complainant a Flexitime part-time schedule.
See Counselor's Report, Attachments 10,11, and 14.
For the purposes of analysis, the Commission assumes, but does not so
find, that complainant is a qualified individual with a disability
within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. We find that even
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to complainant, she did
not establish that the agency failed to reasonably accommodate her.
Complainant rejected the agency's offer to switch to a part-time,
Flexitime schedule. See Counselor's Report, Attachments 14, 15, and 16.
The agency found after conducting a leave analysis, that complainant
was already essentially working a part-time schedule of hours very
close to 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. Complainant's supervisors proffered that
had complainant agreed to this as an official part-time schedule,
she could have met her work requirements and resumed earning sick and
annual leave. FAD, Page 43. While protected individuals are entitled
to reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, they are not
necessarily entitled to their accommodation of choice. See Staropoli
v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 0120062924 (March 26,
2008) citing Castaneda v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 01931005 (February 17, 1994). Thus, we find that complainant failed
to prove that the agency did not meet its burden of providing complainant
with reasonable accommodations.
Age Discrimination
Under the ADEA, it is "unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." 29
U.S.C. � 623(a)(1). When a complainant alleges that he or she has been
disparately treated by the employing agency as a result of unlawful
age discrimination, "liability depends on whether the protected trait
(under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer's decision."
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000)
(citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,610 (1993)). "That is,
[complainant's] age must have actually played a role in the employer's
decision making process and had a determinative influence on the
outcome." Id.
We find that complainant failed to demonstrate that the agency's actions
were the result of unlawful age discrimination. Complainant presented no
evidence to raise an inference that age motivated the agency's decisions
in any of the employment decisions that were made.
Reprisal
Complainant can establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination
by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to
an inference of discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Admin.,
EEOC Request No. 05960403 (Dec. 6, 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Specifically, in a reprisal
claim, and in accordance with the burdens set forth in McDonnell
Douglas, Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology,
425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976),
and Coffman v. Department of Veteran Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960473
(November 20, 1997), a complainant may establish a prima facie case of
reprisal by showing that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity;
(2) the agency was aware of the protected activity; (3) subsequently,
he or she was subjected to adverse treatment by the agency; and (4) a
nexus exists between the protected activity and the adverse treatment.
Whitmire v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00340
(September 25, 2000). The Commission has stated that adverse actions
need not qualify as "ultimate employment actions" or materially affect
the terms and conditions of employment to constitute retaliation.
EEOC Compliance Manual Section 8: Retaliation, No. 915.003, at 8-15
(May 20, 1998); see Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53 (2006) (finding that the anti-retaliation provision protects
individuals from a retaliatory action that a reasonable person would
have found "materially adverse," which in the retaliation context means
that the action might have deterred a reasonable person from opposing
discrimination or participating in the EEO process).
We are satisfied that complainant has established that she participated in
a protected activity and was the subject of an adverse action imposed by
the agency after she participated in this protected activity. However,
we find insufficient evidence in the record to establish that a nexus
exists between the adverse action and the protected activity because
record evidence fails to establish that: (1) the adverse action
occurred shortly after the protected activity, and (2) that the person
who undertook the adverse action was aware of the complainant's protected
activity before taking the action. Typically, in the absence of direct
evidence of retaliation, as is the case here, the nexus is demonstrated
through this type of evidence.
In the instant case, the protected activities complainant participated
in occurred in 1989 and 1996, while the claimed adverse actions took
place almost ten years later in 2006. The Commission has held that where
complainant's previous EEO activity is too far removed temporally from
the claimed adverse action, nexus cannot be established. See Calloway
v. Department of Vetrans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120080458 (September
29, 2009) (no nexus established where prior EEO activity occurred more
than six years before non-selection at issue); see also Koch v. Securities
and Exchange Commission, EEOC Appeal No. 0A03888 (December 21, 2001);
Holmes v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 018422592 (July
8, 1986). We find that the time lapse of ten years between complainant's
last participation in protected EEO activity and the alleged adverse
action is too remote to establish a nexus.
Complainant's supervisor attests to having no knowledge of complainant
participating in any protected EEO activity. The Commission
has previously determined that the "awareness" or "knowledge"
element of a prima facie case of reprisal, can only be established
if complainant shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the
official specifically responsible for the adverse action in question had
knowledge of complainant's participation in prior protected EEO activity.
Spector v. Department of Labor, EEOC Appeal No. 01840559 (May 29, 1985).
We find that complainant failed to meet her burden of establishing that
her supervisor had knowledge of her prior EEO activity. Thus, we find
that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of reprisal.
CONCLUSION
Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on
appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we find that
complainant failed to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that
he was discriminated against as alleged. Accordingly, the final agency
decision is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1208)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time
limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 11, 2010
Date
1 Between January 8, 2006 and August 28, 2006, complainant had used 96.3
hours of annual leave; 75 hours of sick leave; and 261.2 hours of LWOP.
At the end of the pay period which coincided with the agency's August
28, 2006 correspondence to complainant, her leave balances were: 0 hours
of annual leave and -239 hours of sick leave. See Counselor's Report,
Attachments 3 and 8.
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0120073759
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
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0120073759