Carlos Moran, Complainant,v.Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Immigration and Naturalization Service), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionDec 21, 2000
01986573 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 21, 2000)

01986573

12-21-2000

Carlos Moran, Complainant, v. Janet Reno, Attorney General, Department of Justice (Immigration and Naturalization Service), Agency.


Carlos Moran v. Department of Justice

01986573

December 21, 2000

.

Carlos Moran,

Complainant,

v.

Janet Reno,

Attorney General,

Department of Justice

(Immigration and Naturalization Service),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01986573

Agency Nos. I-94-6410,

I-94-6443, I-94-6527

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the final

agency decision.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented herein is whether complainant has established, by

preponderant evidence, that he was discriminated against on the bases

of race (Hispanic), national origin (Mexican), sex (male), and reprisal;

and subjected to sexual harassment.

BACKGROUND

Complainant, formerly employed as a Special Agent (GS-1811-12) at

the agency's Wichita, Kansas facility, filed three formal complaints;

the first one on March 14, 1994; the second one on July 9, 1994; and

the third one on October 9, 1994. In the first complaint, complainant

alleged that he was discriminated against based on national origin and

reprisal when he was required to submit, in person, documents supporting

his use of sick leave and placed under administrative arrest during an

agency interrogation. In the second complaint, complainant alleged that

he was discriminated against on the bases of race, national origin, sex,

and reprisal when he was subjected to unwelcome sexual remarks by his

supervisor. Finally, in the third complaint, he alleged discrimination

based on race, national origin, sex, and reprisal when management

officials provided the Department of Human Resources with derogatory

information in an attempt to deprive him of unemployment compensation

to which he was entitled. The agency accepted all three complaints for

investigation and, after consolidating them pursuant to our regulations,

issued a single decision finding no discrimination. It is from that

decision that complainant appeals.

The record indicates that, in 1993, the agency initiated an investigation

against complainant regarding whether he improperly used a government

vehicle and credit card while engaged in an inappropriate relationship

with a woman who worked for the Catholic Social Services (CSS), a

Qualified Designated Entity (QDE) that dealt with the agency. The

agency charged that the alleged relationship with the CSS employee was

inappropriate because agents of the agency were prohibited from getting

involved with employees of QDEs. Specifically, the agency contended

that because the employee worked for the CSS and complainant worked as

a Special Agent assigned to investigate the CSS, the relationship was

improper. The investigation also concerned whether complainant broke

any government rules by obtaining life insurance for the child that he

fathered with the CSS employee.

Regarding his first formal complaint, complainant stated that, on

January 10, 1994, his supervisor informed him that the Supervisory

Special Agent from the Kansas City District Office (SSA-KC) had some

papers for him to sign. After complainant entered his supervisor's

office, the SSA-KC presented him with two letters dated January 7, 1994.

One of the letters was from the SSA-KC; the other one was from the

Assistant District Director for Investigations. Both letters directed

him to travel to Kansas City on January 23, 1994, for interrogation.

The SSA-KC asked complainant to sign the letters. When complainant

indicated that he did not want to sign the letters until after he

consulted an attorney or union representative, the SSA-KC indicated that

he did not have a right to either and ordered him to sign the letters.

Complainant stated that he complied with the order under duress.

After the meeting with the SSA-KC, complainant contacted his supervisor

and asked him to contact the District Director to ascertain whether he

could drive his personal vehicle to Kansas City. His personal vehicle

provided him the opportunity to visit his attorney. The supervisor

later informed complainant that he was told by the Deputy Director that

the request to drive his personal vehicle had been denied and, as such,

he would be required to drive a government vehicle.

The next day, January 11, 1994, complainant reported to work for a couple

of hours and then went home on sick leave. He stated that his doctor

had placed him on sick leave for ten days. Later that day, complainant's

supervisor called him at home and indicated that he (supervisor) had been

informed by the District Director that complainant could no longer carry

firearms. After the call, complainant and his wife met his supervisor

at the agency's local field office where he surrendered his weapon.

At the office, complainant's supervisor informed complainant that the

District Director had received information from the CSS employee which

indicated that complainant was suicidal.

Complainant stated that on January 12, 1994, his supervisor came

to his house and gave him a memorandum from the District Director.

The memorandum placed him on administrative leave, reminded him that

his firearm privileges were suspended, and required him to see a police

psychologist.

At the end of complainant's ten day sick leave period, his doctor placed

him on sick leave for an additional ten days. Therefore, he was not

required to report back to work until January 30, 1994. Complainant

called his supervisor and informed him of the additional sick leave.

According to complainant, he was required to go into the office at 6:45

a.m. in order to fax a sick leave request to the District Director.

The request was approved approximately 45 minutes later. On January 25,

1994, complainant was again required to go into the office although he

was still on sick leave. According to him, he was required to go into

the office to pick up a letter from the SSA-KC informing him that the

interrogation scheduled for January 25, had been rescheduled to February

1 and 2, 1994.

On January 31, 1994, one day after the second sick leave period expired,

complainant reported to the agency's Kansas City office as directed

by the SSA-KC. Specifically, he reported to the Supervisory Criminal

Investigator (SCI). The SCI asked the complainant if he had any weapons

and where he would be staying. Afterwards, complainant was allowed

to leave. The next day, complainant reported to the Kansas City office

again. This time, he was instructed not to leave the building until

4:00 p.m. Complainant believes that the agency's actions constituted an

administrative arrest because his movements were restricted by lawful

authority. Complainant also believes that requiring him to report to

Kansas City a day after being medically cleared to return to work is

evidence of the District Director's racial and reprisal discrimination.

During the second day of the interrogation, which occurred on February 2,

complainant began suffering chest pains. He immediately called his doctor

and scheduled an appointment for the next day. That day, the Immigration

and Naturalization Service (INS) flew him back to Wichita before the

interrogation was complete. When he saw his doctor on February 3,

he was placed on two weeks sick leave. He did not have to return to

work until February 18, 1994. On February 15, complainant received

a letter from the Deputy Director requiring him to get a statement

from his doctor regarding when he could complete the interrogation.

Because the statement was due by February 17, complainant was required

to deliver the statement physically. Complainant believes that the fact

that he had to report to work again while on sick leave is an example of

the discrimination to which he was subjected. Particularly in light of

the fact that, to his knowledge, no White Special Agents were ordered to

produce medical documentation while on sick leave or fax in sick leave

requests for personal approval.

Regarding his second complaint, complainant alleged that he was

discriminated against when he was subjected to unwelcome sexual remarks.

Specifically, complainant stated that during the February 1 interrogation,

the SSA-KC accused him of having sexual relations with a CSS employee.

During the interrogation, the SSA-KC also read aloud, in the presence of

a female employee (complainant's union representative), a love letter

written by complainant that he had procured from the CSS employee.

Complainant stated that although there was nothing sexually explicit

in the letter, the SSA-KC made it sound as if there was. Complainant

believes that these acts were unwelcome, insensitive, and totally

unprofessional; and therefore constitute sexual harassment. He also

believes the investigation regarding his relationship with the CSS

employee was done in retaliation for prior EEO activity. To support

this belief, he stated that the District Director had known since 1989

about his relationship with the CSS employee because he had introduced

them and when a child was born out of the relationship, the Director

refused to add the child to complainant's insurance benefits.

On March 9, 1994, complainant informed the SSA-KC, District Director,

and Deputy Director of the unwelcome sexual remarks and innuendos.

Complainant stated that the SSA-KC showed the letter to his union

representative calling it �hilarious.� Complainant also stated that

the District Director and the Deputy Director failed to take immediate

corrective action; and, in fact, encouraged further acts of sexual

harassment. He stated that, on April 7, 1994, the SSA-KC flooded his

home with pornographic materials. He did not elaborate on what those

materials contained.

In the third complaint, the one filed on October 9, 1994, complainant

alleged that he was discriminated against when agency officials provided

derogatory information to the Kansas Department of Human Resources in

an attempt to deprive him of unemployment compensation. The evidence

of record indicates that complainant was discharged from his position

as a Special Agent on May 4, 1994.<2>

On June 7, 1994, complainant filed an application with the Kansas

Department of Human Resources, Division of Employment Security (ESD)

for unemployment benefits. Ten days later, an agency Labor Relations

Specialist (LRS) submitted a letter to the KDHR indicating that

complainant had been removed for misconduct. On July 2, 1994, the ESD

ruled in complainant's favor and awarded him unemployment benefits.

Four days later, the LRS appealed the ESD's findings. A hearing was

held on August 16, 1994 to determine if complainant was eligible for

unemployment compensation. On September 6, 1994, the ESD reversed its

earlier decision. As a result, complainant's application for benefits

was denied. Complainant stated that the agency provided derogatory

information to the ESD. He also stated that the information provided

was confidential and not public information.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Disparate Treatment (First and Third Complaints)

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of

burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging

discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973); see Hochstadt v. Worcestor Foundation

for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1976),

aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to

retaliation cases). First, complainant must establish a prima facie

case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination; i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Next, the agency must articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason(s) for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the agency

is successful, then the complainant must prove, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that the legitimate reason(s) proffered by the agency was

a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 256.

To establish a prima facie case of reprisal discrimination, complainant

must show that (1) he engaged in prior protected activity; (2) the

acting agency official was aware of the protected activity; (3) he was

subsequently disadvantaged by an adverse action; and, (4) there is a

causal link. Simens v. Department of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05950113

(March 28, 1996) (citations omitted). . The causal link may be shown

by evidence that the adverse action followed the protected activity

within such a period of time and in such a manner that a reprisal motive

is inferred. Id. Generally, the Commission has held that a link

may be established if events occurred within one year of each other.

Patton v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950124 (June 27,

1996).

Although the initial inquiry of discrimination in a discrimination

case usually focuses on whether the complainant has established a

prima facie case, following this order of analysis is unnecessary when

the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. See Washington v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition

No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). In such cases, the inquiry shifts from

whether the complainant has established a prima facie case to whether

he has demonstrated by preponderance of the evidence that the agency's

reasons for its actions merely were a pretext for discrimination. Id.;

see also United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983). In this case, we find that the agency

has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Regarding the first complaint, the agency stated that unlawful employment

discrimination played no role in requiring complainant to provide

doctors' statements regarding his sick leave requests. The agency

further stated that over the past two years, 14 employees were required

to submit such statements in connection with their sick leave requests.

The agency noted that of those 14 employees, ten were White, one was

Black, and three were Hispanic (including complainant). The agency

also stated that complainant was not placed under administrative arrest

during the February 1, 1994 interrogation. The agency explained that,

although complainant's presence was required, he was not restrained from

leaving the area. The agency further explained that government employees

are required to cooperate in an investigation; and that if complainant

had chosen not to cooperate, he would have been subjected to penalties

applicable under the Schedule of Disciplinary Actions.

Regarding the third complaint, the agency denies that it was motivated by

unlawful discrimination when it provided the ESD with information that

prevented complainant from receiving unemployment benefits. The agency

stated that it routinely appeals determinations awarding unemployment

benefits to former employees who were discharged for misconduct<3> because

although unemployment benefits is a state program, the state bills the

employer for the cost of benefits if they are awarded. The District

Director stated that he testified at the unemployment benefits hearing

held on August 16, 1994. He stated that complainant asserted on his

application that he did not know why he was discharged when in fact

he did. He also stated that his appearance at the hearing was necessary

because he was the deciding official and the person who ordered the

pre-action inquiry of misconduct against complainant. Finally, the

District Director stated that he appeared at the unemployment benefits

hearing of six other employees; two were Black, two where White, and

the race of the other two were unknown.

Because the agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for the alleged discriminatory events, complainant now bears the

burden of establishing that the agency's stated reasons are merely a

pretext for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration,

EEOC Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Complainant can do this

by showing that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason.

Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).

In this case, complainant has failed to meet that burden. In attempting

to prove pretext, complainant presented no evidence tending to prove that,

more likely than not, the agency's articulated reasons are a pretext

for unlawful discrimination. For that reason, we find that he failed

to prove that the agency's actions constitute discriminatory animus.

Sexual Harassment (Second Complaint)

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion is

unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive. McKinney v. Dole,

765 F.2d 1129, 1138-1139 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A single incident or group

of isolated incidents will not be regarded as discriminatory harassment

unless the conduct is severe. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355,

1358 (11th Cir. 1982). Whether the harassment is sufficiently severe to

trigger a violation of Title VII must be determined by looking at all of

the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct,

its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,

or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes

with an employee's work performance. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,

510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).

In order to establish a prima facie case of such harassment, the

complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence

of five elements: (1) that he is a member of a statutorily protected

group; (2) that he was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests

for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature;

(3) that the harassment of which he complained is based on sex;(4) that

the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the

purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with his work environment

and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment;

and (5) that there is a basis for imputing liability to the employer.

Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 987, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982).

The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint

of a reasonable person in the victim's situation. Enforcement Guidance on

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994).

In this case, complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of

sexual harassment. Complainant alleged that he was sexually harassed

when an agency official accused him of having an improper relationship

with a CSS employee and read a love letter, which the complainant

admits was not sexual in nature, aloud in front of a female co-worker.

Those actions, however, do not amount to conduct of a sexual nature.

Complainant also alleged that he was sexually harassed when the agency

sent pornographic materials to his home. But we note that he failed to

elaborate as to what those materials were and how they were pornographic.

Information in the file indicates that complainant was sent the materials

used by the SSA-KC to determine whether complainant had engaged in an

inappropriate relationship with a CSS employee. After examining those

materials, the Commission concludes that they were not pornographic

in nature. For those reasons, we find that complainant cannot prevail

on his sexual harassment claim.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the final agency

decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

December 21, 2000

__________________

Date

1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's

federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations

apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in

the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply

the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.

2Complainant's termination is not an issue in this case. Therefore,

it will not be addressed in this decision.

3Information in the evidentiary file indicates that complainant was

discharged for falsifying a travel voucher; falsifying a time and

attendance report; falsifying a material fact concerning a U.S. government

investigation; unauthorized use of a government vehicle; failure to

timely honor just debts; non-compliance with service policy; and failure

to fulfill the duties of his position.