Carlisle Engineered Products

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 28, 2000

330 N.L.R.B. 1359 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

CARISLE ENGINEERED PRODUCTS 1359
Carlisle Engineered Products, Inc. and International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agri-
cultural Implement Workers of America
(UAW), AFL–CIO, Petitioner. Case 7–RC–21333
April 28, 2000
DECISION AND DIRECTION
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS FOX AND
HURTGEN
The National Labor Relations Board, by a three-
member panel, has considered objections and determina-
tive challenges in an election held June 25, 1998, and the
hearing officer’s report recommending disposition of
them. The election was conducted pursuant to a Stipu-
lated Election Agreement. The tally of ballots shows 90
for and 76 against the Petitioner, with 21 challenged bal-
lots, a number sufficient to affect the results.
The Board has reviewed the record in light of the ex-
ceptions and briefs, and has adopted the hearing officer’s
findings1 and recommendations only to the extent consis-
tent with this Decision and Direction.
The hearing officer found that 10 persons classified as
processors and another classified as a process engineer
were supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of
the Act because he concluded that they assign work to
the Employer’s operators, grant their time-off requests,
have the authority to discipline them, and substitute at
certain times for undisputed supervisors. He therefore
recommended sustaining the challenges to ballots cast by
these individuals. The Employer excepts, contending
that these individuals do not exercise independent judg-
ment with respect to any of the statutory indicia of su-
pervisory status. For the reasons set forth below, we find
merit in the Employer’s exceptions.2
The Employer manufactures plastic component parts
which are used in the automotive industry. The stipu-
lated appropriate bargaining unit consists primarily of
production and maintenance employees. The processors
are experienced production equipment operators whose
primary responsibilities include starting up production
equipment, shutting the equipment down, and monitoring
and adjusting the equipment to ensure that it is working
properly. They also frequently perform manual produc-
tion and repair functions.
Although several witnesses testified that the processors
have assigned work and directed employees to change
their duties, there is no evidence that the processors use
independent judgment in exercising this authority. In
general, it is admitted statutory supervisors who prepare
work schedules before each shift specifying the machine
and part each operator is to work on. The processors
may direct operators to move to another machine or to
sweep up if the processor needs to be adjusted or re-
paired. However, the processors’ exercise of this author-
ity to assign work is simply based on commonsense effi-
ciency and job priorities set by the Employer. We find
that their assignment of work on this basis is routine and
insufficient to establish supervisory status.3

1 In the absence of exceptions, we adopt, pro forma, the hearing offi-
cer’s recommendation to overrule the challenges to the ballots of Val-
erie Chambers, Vicki Ann Coon, Lynette Germaine, and Tina Turner.
2 We note that in our discussion we shall refer to the employees col-
lectively as processors, although employee Mark Lieber has the title of
process engineer.
Furthermore, we find no support in the record for the
hearing officer’s finding that processors independently
grant time off. The Petitioner introduced into evidence
several leave request forms which were signed by proc-
essors under the heading “Advisor.” The hearing officer
credited the testimony of Plant Manager Allen Hibbler
and Human Resources Manager Patti Carpenter-Shelly
that the Employer’s established policy is to grant time off
to the first six eligible employees on each shift to request
leave on a particular day. Thus, Hibbler and Shelly testi-
fied that employees submit leave request forms to proc-
essors, who sign the forms and then forward them to
clerical Renee Gingell. Gingell checks the employees’
time records to verify that they have leave available and
she then signs, under the heading “Approval,” the first
six leave requests on each shift submitted for a particular
day. She then forwards the leave requests to the employ-
ees’ immediate supervisors for final approval and distri-
bution back to the employees.
The hearing officer found inherently improbable the
testimony that processors sign leave request forms
merely to verify date of receipt and not to indicate ap-
proval. He noted that the employees could submit their
requests directly to Gingell if a processor’s signature was
not required for approval. In so finding, the hearing offi-
cer overlooked the fact that the Employer operates three
shifts a day, 7 days a week, and Gingell is not present
throughout all shifts. Even assuming, however, that a
processor’s signature is required for approval, the record
fails to establish that the processors’ role in approving
3 J. C. Brock Corp., 314 NLRB 157, 158 (1994); Clark Machine
Corp., 308 NLRB 555, 555–556 (1992); Esco Corp., 298 NLRB 837,
839 (1990). In contending that processors have the same discretionary
authority to assign work as admitted supervisors, our dissenting col-
league posits a view of the processors’ duties that the record does not
support. He suggests that once original assignments have been set, the
processors have unlimited authority to change them. The record, how-
ever, shows that a processor has occasionally directed an operator to
move to another machine or to clean up in the single, limited circum-
stance dictated by the processor’s need to adjust or to repair that opera-
tor’s machine. Contrary to the dissent, this limited and routine assign-
ment function is not comparable to the general assignment authority
exercised by admitted supervisors when making initial work assign-
ments.
Although the record is clear that employees are required to obey the
processors’ instruction to move to a different machine or to sweep up,
the discipline for failing to obey emanates from the human resources
manager and the employees’ undisputed supervisor, not from the proc-
essor. As found below, the processors do not have authority to disci-
pline employees. Cf. J. C. Brock Corp., 314 NLRB at 158 fn. 7.
330 NLRB No. 189
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1360
leave requests involves the exercise of independent
judgment. An employee’s eligibility for leave is deter-
mined by Gingell, subject to final approval by an admit-
ted statutory supervisor. Contrary to the dissenting opin-
ion, there is no evidence that a processor has ever refused
to sign a leave request, that a processor has the authority
to do so, or that a processor’s refusal would bar an em-
ployee from obtaining leave. Accordingly, we find that
the processors’ perfunctory role in signing leave requests
does not indicate that they have supervisory authority
within the meaning of Section 2(11).
Similarly, we find no support for the hearing officer’s
finding that processors exercise independent judgment in
disciplining employees. The record reflects that the
processors have signed warning forms for absenteeism,
and in two instances, have produced written reports of
employee misconduct. Regarding the warnings for ab-
senteeism, the record is clear that processors merely act
as conduits, relaying to employees written warnings
which have already been approved by Human Resources
Manager Shelly. Shelly testified without contradiction
that when an employee fails to show up for a scheduled
shift, clerical employee Sam Sehnert investigates
whether the absence is excused and determines how
many points, on a preset scale, the employee has accu-
mulated for unexcused absences. Sehnert then prepares
and signs a written warning and forwards it to Shelly for
approval. Shelly rechecks the employee’s time records
to verify that the absence is unexcused and to verify the
number of points the employee has accumulated. She
then forwards the warning to the employee’s supervisor,
or if the supervisor is not available, to a processor. The
supervisor or processor signs the warning and distributes
it to the employee. Sehnert is also present when the
warning is distributed to answer questions about the Em-
ployer’s attendance policy.
The record also shows that, on two occasions, proces-
sor Billy Thomas produced written reports of employee
misconduct. Although Thomas’ reports contained no
recommendation of discipline, the employee involved in
both instances received written warnings for violating
company rules. Human Resources Manager Shelly pre-
pared and signed the written warnings. The warnings
were also signed by the employee’s undisputed supervi-
sor, but they were not signed by Thomas.
Shelly, Plant Manager Hibbler, and the processors’ di-
rect supervisor, Kraig McInally, testified that Shelly in-
dependently investigates all reports of employee miscon-
duct before determining whether to issue discipline. The
hearing officer specifically credited Shelly’s testimony
that she is the individual responsible for administering
the Employer’s disciplinary policy. He nevertheless
found Thomas (and, by corollary, all other processors) to
be a supervisor because, in his view, the nature of the
incidents reported by Thomas indicated that Thomas
exercised supervisory authority over the employee in-
volved. We disagree. The first incident reported by
Thomas came about when Thomas asked operator Gary
McComb to move to another machine while Thomas
adjusted the machine McComb was working on and
McComb replied, with an obscenity, that he was not go-
ing to do it. The second incident came about when
McComb asked Thomas to move him to another machine
because his arm hurt and then subsequently left work
without notifying Thomas before Thomas was able to
accommodate his request. We note that both incidents
occurred on a weekend and the record indicates that
Thomas may have been substituting for a supervisor on
those occasions. Even assuming, however, that Thomas
was acting in his normal capacity as a processor, we find
that his incident reports do not warrant the conclusion
that he is vested with statutory supervisory authority. As
noted above, the incident reports contained no recom-
mendation by Thomas with respect to discipline, and the
record established that it was Shelly, and not Thomas,
who determined whether to impose discipline. Under
these circumstances, we find that Thomas’ role is merely
to report incidents and does not amount to statutory su-
pervisory authority. See Ten Broeck Commons, 320
NLRB 806, 812 (1996).4
The hearing officer also relied on the fact that the
warnings prepared by Shelly referred to Thomas as a
supervisor. We also are not persuaded that Shelly’s use
of the title “supervisor” in referring to Thomas in the
written warnings requires a finding that he and other
processors are statutory supervisors. It is well estab-
lished that rank-and-file employees cannot be trans-
formed into supervisors merely by being invested with
that title; rather, an individual’s actual powers, duties and
responsibilities control. NLRB v. Wilson-Crissman
Cadillac, 659 F.2d 728, 730 (6th Cir. 1981); Hallandale
Rehabilitation Center, 313 NLRB 835, 836 (1994);
Transit Co., 114 NLRB 617, 618–619 (1955).
The hearing officer also relied on evidence that proc-
essors sign requests for maintenance or tool repair and
parts status reports to support his conclusion that they are
supervisors. There is no evidence that the preparation or
signing of these forms involves any independent judg-
ment or discretion with respect to employee assignment
or direction of work. We therefore find that completing
these forms is merely a ministerial act which does not
endow them with statutory supervisory authority.
In concluding that the processors are supervisors, the
hearing officer also relied on evidence that the processors
substitute for acknowledged supervisors on the weekend

4 The dissent contends that an individual can effectively recommend
discipline, within the meaning of Sec. 2(11), without recommending the
specific degree of discipline to be imposed for reported misconduct.
The record here, however, indicates that Thomas did not recommend
discipline at all. He merely reported alleged misconduct, leaving mat-
ters of investigation and the determination of appropriate disciplinary
action entirely to the initiative and discretion of others.
CARISLE ENGINEERED PRODUCTS 1361
and during slow periods. The appropriate test for deter-
mining the status of employees who substitute for super-
visors is “whether they spend a regular and substantial
portion of their working time performing supervisory
tasks.” Latas De Aluminio Reynolds, 276 NLRB 1313
(1985); Hexacomb Corp., 313 NLRB 983, 984 (1994);
Gaines Electric Co., 309 NLRB 1077, 1078 (1992);
Canonie Transportation, 289 NLEB 299, 300 (1988). In
this respect, we find that the hearing officer greatly over-
stated the frequency with which processors substitute for
regular supervisors. The record establishes that proces-
sors substitute for admitted statutory supervisors only
during one shift on Saturdays and Sundays, and during a
1-week slowdown period each year.5 Assuming the sub-
stitution is evenly distributed among the processors, each
of the Employer’s 11 processors spend less than four
percent of their annual working time substituting for
statutory supervisors. Therefore, even assuming that the
processors exercise statutory supervisory authority when
substituting, we find that this occasional assumption of
supervisory duties is too insubstantial to transform what
are otherwise rank-and-file employees into statutory su-
pervisors. See Quality Chemical, Inc., 324 NLRB 328,
331 (1997).
Finally, the hearing officer relied on certain secondary
indicia of supervisory authority. In the absence of pri-
mary indicia as enumerated in Section 2(11) of the Act,
secondary indicia are insufficient to establish supervisory
status. See, e.g., SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 321
NLRB 111, 112 fn. 2 (1996); Northcrest Nursing Home,
313 NLRB 491, 498–500 (1993). In any event, we find
that secondary indicia do not support a finding of super-
visory status. The hearing officer stated that the proces-
sors are among the highest paid employees in the unit.
We note, however, that the processors are paid less than
maintenance employees, whom the parties agree are eli-
gible to vote. Moreover, other secondary indicators of
supervisory authority militate against a conclusion that
the individuals are supervisors. Thus, the processors are
paid on an hourly basis and receive no incentive bonuses,
whereas the acknowledged supervisors are paid on a sal-
ary basis and participate in a bonus pool. Additionally,
the processors punch a timeclock like the conceded non-
supervisory employees. Further, the processors do not
attend management meetings, whereas the acknowledged
supervisors do. These factors are supportive of the Em-
ployer’s argument that the individuals are leadmen, as
opposed to supervisors.
In sum, we conclude that the Petitioner has not met its
burden of establishing that the processors are supervisors
as defined in the Act. As both the Board and the courts
have recognized, an employee does not become a super-

5 The record does not support the hearing officer’s finding that proc-
essors substitute for supervisors during all three shifts on Saturdays and
Sundays.
visor merely because he or she has greater skills and job
responsibilities than fellow employees or because he or
she gives some instructions or minor orders. NLRB v.
Lauren Mfg., 712 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir. 1983); Chicago
Metallic Corp., 273 NLRB 1677, 1689 (1985), enfd. in
relevant part 794 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1986). The decisive
factor is whether the employee possesses the authority to
use independent judgment with respect to the exercise of
one or more of the specific authorities listed in Section
2(11). Id. In analyzing the processors’ role in assigning
work, granting time off, and disciplining employees, we
have found that in each instance the authority exercised
does not involve the use of independent judgment, but
rather involves routine decisions typical of leadman posi-
tions and other minor supervisory employees that are
found by the Board not to be statutory supervisors. See,
e.g., Hydro Conduit Corp., 254 NLRB 433 (1981); Jor-
dan Marsh Stores Corp., 317 NLRB 460, 467 (1995);
North Shores Weeklies, 317 NLRB 1128 (1995); and
Brown & Root, Inc., 314 NLRB 19, 21–22 (1994). We
find further that the processors’ infrequent substitution
for undisputed supervisors is insufficient to clothe them
with supervisory authority.
Accordingly, we overrule the challenges to the ballots
of Kathryn Clark, Edward Jay Fitfield, Richard Glenn,
Mark Lieber, Mark Mitchell, Jeffery Rude, Russell Ruth-
erford, Martin Schlak, Jeffrey Springsteen, Bradley
Stanley, and Billy Thomas, and shall direct that their
ballots be opened and counted.6
DIRECTION
IT IS DIRECTED that this proceeding be remanded to the
Regional Director for Region 7, who shall, within 14
days from the date of this Decision and Direction, open
and count the ballots of Valerie Chambers, Kathryn
Clark, Vicki Ann Coon, Edward Jay Fitfield, Lynette
Germaine, Richard Glenn, Mark Lieber, Mark Mitchell,
Jeffery Rude, Russell Rutherford, Martin Schlak, Jeffrey
Springsteen, Bradley Stanley, Billy Thomas, and Tina
Turner, serve on the parties a revised tally of ballots, and
issue the appropriate certification or, if the challenged
ballots of Earl Harmon and Brian Lightner remain de-
terminative, transfer this case to the Board for final reso-
lution of those challenges.

MEMBER HURTGEN, dissenting.
My colleagues have reversed the hearing officer’s
well-supported findings that the 11 processors are super-
visors.1 I would adopt the hearing officer’s findings. I
therefore dissent.
6 We shall hold in abeyance the challenges to ballots cast by Earl
Harmon and Brian Lightner, and we will resolve those challenges only
if they remain determinative after the revised tally of ballots.
1 The term “processors,” as used herein, refers to the 10 processors
and the process engineer.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1362
It is not necessary to repeat the findings of the hearing
officer. I shall only respond to the majority’s challenges
to those findings.
1. Assignments
It is undisputed that the original assignment to a ma-
chine is made by an admitted supervisor. However,
processors have the authority to direct an operator to
move to another machine (i.e., to change the assign-
ment). In my view, if the original assignment is an act of
supervision, it is inconsistent to say that a subsequent
assignment (essentially undoing the first one) is not an
act of supervision. My colleagues do not adequately
explain the inconsistency. They only say that the subse-
quent action is based on “common sense efficiency and
job priorities set by the Employer.” Of course, the
“common sense efficiency” exists in the mind of the per-
son who effectuates the action, i.e., in the independent
judgment of the processor. There is no instruction from
above, and no “job priority,” that would tell the proces-
sor how to exercise that judgment. In sum, this inde-
pendent reassignment is a clear indicium of supervisory
status.2
2. Discipline
The processors also exercise supervisory authority
with respect to discipline. Interestingly, the evidence of
discipline stems from employee refusals to follow a
processor’s order to move to another machine (precisely
the directive that is an indicium of supervisory author-
ity). My colleagues say that the processor’s role is not
supervisory because the decision to discipline is made by
someone else (Shelly). However, Section 2(11) covers
the authority to discipline and the authority to recom-

2 Contrary to the statement of my colleagues, I do not assert that the
processors have “unlimited” authority to change an assignment. And,
although the record establishes only several such assignments, this
clearly bespeaks, at least, the authority to make such assignments.
mend discipline. In the instant case, the processor rec-
ommended to Shelly that discipline be imposed because
the employee would not obey the processor’s directive.
I recognize that Shelly may perform some independent
inquiry before deciding on whether to discipline the em-
ployee. However, this is not inconsistent with the fact
that the processor makes a recommendation. The deci-
sion-maker is not a rubber stamp and therefore one
should expect some independent thought on his/her part.
Finally, the fact that the word “recommend” did not ap-
pear on the form sent to Shelly does not itself contradict
the fact that a recommendation was made.3
3. Requests for leave
The processors also play a role in granting requests for
leave. The employee submits a request to the processor.
If the processor agrees, he will sign it and forward it for
further handling. That is, a clerical must check to see if
leave is available, and another person must decide upon
“final approval.” However, the initial approval comes
from the processor. There is no suggestion that he is
required to give that approval. And, there is no credible
evidence to support my colleagues’ suggestion that the
processor’s signature connotes only the date of receipt.
Indeed, the hearing officer found this to be inherently
improbable.
4. Conclusion
Inasmuch as processors have powers with respect to as-
signment, discipline and time off, and inasmuch as any
one of these would give supervisory status, I conclude
that the processors are supervisors.
3 My colleagues assert that the processor makes no recommendation.
However, the record evidence establishes that the processor reports
employee misconduct to Shelly, and that Shelly then decides upon the
determination of appropriate discipline. In these circumstances, the
report is understood to be a recommendation to Shelly, and he acts
upon it as such.