Care Ambulance Service, Inc.Download PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge OpinionsOct 17, 200721-CA-037610 (N.L.R.B. Oct. 17, 2007) Copy Citation JD(SF)-32-07 (Orange, CA) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DIVISION OF JUDGES CARE AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC. and Case 21-CA-37610 ELIZABETH TELLO, An Individual Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Esq., for the General Counsel. Holger G. Besch, Esq., (Seyfarth Shaw, LLP) of Los Angeles, California, for Care Ambulance. DECISION Statement of the Case WILLIAM G. KOCOL, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Los Angeles, California, on August 27, 2007. The charge was filed January 16, 20071 and the complaint was issued May 4, 2007. The complaint alleges that Care Ambulance Service, Inc., violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging Elizabeth Tello because she engaged in protected, concerted activities. Care Ambulance filed a timely answer that admitted the allegations of the complaint concerning the filing and service of the charge, commerce, and jurisdiction but denied the remaining allegations. Care Ambulance contends that Tello was not engaged in activity protected by the Act and that it terminated Tello for using profanity in the workplace. On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Care Ambulance, I make the following. Findings of Fact I. Jurisdiction Care Ambulance, a corporation, is engaged in the business of providing emergency and non emergency medical and ambulance services at its facility in Orange, California, where it annually derives gross revenues in excess of $500,000 and purchases and receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of California. Care Ambulance admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices A. Facts In November 2000 and again in March 2003 Care Ambulance signed stipulated election agreements for elections to determine whether employees desired to be represented by a union; on both occasions the employees voted against union representation. Elizabeth Tello worked at Care Ambulance as an insurance verifier from August 7 until January 3, 2007. Tello collected tickets as they were called in 1 All dates are 2006 unless otherwise indicated. JD(SF)-32-07 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 2 from the EMTs. Coworker Shirley Jennings sorted the tickets, totaled the charges, and completed a packet of information. Tello then received the packet of information and verified the insurance and added more information to the packet and passed it on to another worker. Tello completed a ninety day probationary period. During that period Tello did not receive any discipline of any sort. After the probationary period Tello received a $1 per hour wage increase. Nicole Weber, assistant business office manager, was Tello’s immediate supervisor. Weber, in turn, reported to Laura Vartanian, business office manager. Tello worked in an office area that has rows of cubicles. Tello worked in the middle cubicle of a row of three cubicles each separated by a wall. The row was also separated by a wall the other side of which likewise had a row of three cubicles. Depending on volume the employees could hear each across the cubicles; as such employees were expected to keep their voices low so as not to disturb other workers in the performance of their tasks. As Tello described the work atmosphere, except for occasional telephone calls the office was silent. Indeed, employees were allowed to bring earphones to listen to the radio but there otherwise no radio sound. However, employee Diana Graves was consistently loud. Facing into the cubicle Graves worked at cubicle to Tello’s right; at Tello’s left was Shirley Jennings. Graves was frequently on the telephone and would loudly giggle and laugh. Graves also loudly talked to her son, her husband, and another man. Tello and Jennings found this distracting because these loud conversations continued for a long period of time. Graves would get personal calls on her mobile telephone and walk away with the mobile telephone for a half an hour and then nonetheless take the scheduled breaks. Tello and Jennings verbally complained to each other Graves’ conduct and how she was not “called out on it” by Weber. They also complained to each other via email messages that Graves was loud and that she was talking about non work related matters. At 11:16 a.m. on November 29, Jennings sent Tello an email message that referred to Graves and another employee that stated: I guess they don’t realize there are other people trying to work here … they are really loud. And not talking about work. At 11:24 a.m. Tello replied: OH I KNOW. BUT THEY NEVER NOTICE THAT, DO YOU THINK OUR BOSS NOTICES THAT? AND THE LONG BREAKS AND JUST KEEPS QUIET? At 11:25 a.m. Jennings answered “I DON’T KNOW ANYTHING ANYMORE …” to which Tello retorted at 11:29 a.m.: THAT REALLY SUCKS THOUGH THE PEOPLE THAT DO ACTUALLY WORK AND DO SOMETHING WRONG FOR ON[E] TIME GET CALLED ON IT AND THE ONES THAT DON’T DO SHIT AND SMELL THEIR ASS ALL DAY LONG WALKING BACK AND FORTH ON PERSONAL CALLS FOREVER AND DON’T DO MUCH PRODUCTIVITY DON’T GET CALLED OUT ON ANYTHING. The facts in the preceding paragraphs are based on Tello’s credible testimony. At the trial Jennings confirmed that Graves was regularly loud and disruptive of the work atmosphere, but claimed that she and Tello had never discussed that matter until the email string set forth above. But for reasons described more fully below, to the extent that Jennings testimony conflicts with Tello’s I do not find Jennings to be very credible. I instead find Tello to be both more credible and her testimony more probable. In that regard I note that it was Jennings who initiated the email string and the general tone of the email exchange suggests both a comfort in discussing the subject of the email as well a sense that both Tello and Jennings shared a common view on the matter of Graves’ conduct. Care Ambulance has access to the email messages of its employees, and for reasons unexplained by Weber she discovered the email string set forth above. The next day Tello noticed that Jennings was away from her work station for a long period of time. When Jennings returned to her cubicle she told Tello “No more emailing.” Later that day Jennings told Tello that Weber had called her JD(SF)-32-07 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 3 into Weber’s office and discussed the email exchange. Tello expected to be called in to Weber’s office the next day, but nothing happened. Weber explained at the trial that after she read the email string she consulted with Vartanian and they considered firing Tello because, according to Weber, “It was the negative, hostile attitude. It was just the negativity factor, and of course, the language was unacceptable, also.” Vartanian, in turn, consulted with her superior. Together Weber and Vartanian decided to fire Tello, but to wait until after the holidays to do so. Vartanian credibly explained that she had fired an employee in past during the holiday season and had been chastised by her superior for doing so. Care Ambulance has a written “Professional Standards/Conduct” that it applies to employees. Under those standards employees “are expected to conduct themselves in a professional, courteous manner when interacting with other employees . . . .” The standards contain a list of critical offenses that “may justify immediate termination without regard to the employee’s length of service or prior record of conduct.” Among the examples of critical offenses is “Unauthorized use or abuse of Company communication systems, including . . computers . . . .” Also included in the written standards are a list of serious offenses that “justify disciplinary action.” That list includes “Use of obscene or abusive language, malicious gossip or the spreading of rumors.” Care Ambulance’s employee handbook describes a progressive disciplinary process involving a verbal counseling, then a written counseling, next a suspension, and finally termination. The process, however, does not apply “to incidents or events which, in the judgment of management, require immediate termination.” Employees were advised not to send email messages that were not work related. However, Weber thanked the employees for a birthday gift they had given her via an email message. Weber also emailed the employees a joke about their boss. Weber and Vartanian fired Tello on January 3, 2007. The termination letter they gave to Tello read, in pertinent part: On November 29th, I came across the attached email that was exchanged between you and your peers. I consider your participation within this email to be a display of inappropriate behavior, as well as poor use of company time. I see the content discussed in this email as an attempt to create drama and stir the pot amongst the employees within our office. This is something that I find intolerable. The email string described in the preceding paragraph was attached to the termination letter. Weber testified that at the termination meeting she “discussed some of the previous events [involving Tello] that had transpired, and that, you know, my hope was that we could have worked through them, but it doesn’t seem that we were able to, and so, we have decided to sever the relationship.” She claimed that Tello was upset and “just slamming the papers around and stuff.” Vartanian could not recall discussing these other matters at Tello’s termination meeting, thereby confirming Tello’s testimony that little was said at the meeting concerning the reasons for her termination. Weber prepared the termination letter. She explained that the “inappropriate behavior” referred to in Tello’s termination letter meant “the pot-stirring that went on between [Tello] and her peers, and the profanity, and just the inappropriate conduct as a whole.” By “pot-stirring” Weber meant Tello’s “constant rallying of the employees, seems like trying to get the employees to gang up on each other.” With regard to the “poor use of company time” referenced in the termination letter, Weber testified she meant “I feel like in her e-mail, she could have let me know if there was a problem, instead of, you know, sending e- mails back and forth to complain about it.” In response to leading questions Weber testified that upon reading the email string although it was the first time that she had first hand knowledge of Tello using profanity it confirmed that Tello used profanity in the past. Weber testified about four incidents involving Tello that preceded the discharge. The first event occurred after Tello had trouble finding a parking space and so she parked near a fire hydrant. A coworker pointed that out to Tello when they arrived together at the office. Tello replied “I don’t give a shit. Let them tow it.” Tello told the coworker that the curb near the fire hydrant was not painted red and she would fight the matter if her car was towed. The coworker complained to Weber about the matter and Weber, in turn, talked to Tello about the matter. Tello explained to Weber what had happened. Weber advised Tello to try and avoid the coworker because the coworker was “on thin ice.” The foregoing facts are again based on Tello’s credible testimony. Weber testified that the coworker JD(SF)-32-07 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 4 complained to her that after the coworker told Tello that Tello had parked near a fire hydrant Tello remarked something along the lines “I don’t give a shit; let them tow my f-ing car; I will fight it. The curb is not painted red.” Weber testified that she talked to Tello about the matter within a day or two and that Tello denied using profanity but Tello “was very defensive and she still was very angry.” Tello indicated to Weber that she felt she had the right to park where she did because the curb was not painted red. Weber testified that “I felt, you know, a sense of animosity coming from [Tello] and “I just explained to her that profanity or not, that the behavior was unacceptable.” To the extent that Weber’s version of this conversation conflicts with Tello’s I do not credit it. Weber appeared to be exaggerating the matter after the fact to support the decision to discharge Tello. According to Weber another incident involving inappropriate behavior by Tello occurred in November. A worker charged with distributing faxed paperwork complained to Weber that Tello seemed angry or irritated in that Tello would “grab the paperwork out of her hands and kind of sling it across the desk , … she was mentioning something under her breath … .” Weber testified that she was concerned about the “vibe” that Tello was creating and so she spoke to Tello about the matter. Weber asked Tello if she had a problem with the worker; Tello said no but that she thought the worker had a problem with her. Weber told Tello to be the bigger person and ease the tension by saying hello. Tello took Weber’s advice, greeted the coworker and the issue dissipated. The next incident involving alleged inappropriate behavior by Tello occurred after she completed her probationary period and received a wage increase. Tello’s new wage rate, contained on a personnel action form, somehow was circulated to other employees. She complained to Weber that everyone now knew her wage rate. Weber testified that Tello “seemed overly upset” by the matter and “she just wouldn’t let it go.” Weber claimed that Tello raised this matter four or five times during the course of her employment with Care Ambulance, but Tello gave no details to support the circumstances under which Tello continued to raise this matter. I conclude, based on the conclusory nature of the testimony as well as Weber’s demeanor, that Weber exaggerated this matter to suit Care Ambulance’s litigation strategy. Weber testified that she brought this matter to Vartanian’s attention, but Weber’s testimony is not clear whether she told Vartanian of the misdirected personnel action form, Tello’s alleged inappropriate response to it, or both. Vartanian testified that she learned of this incident from Weber. Vartanian’s testimony echoed Weber’s that the concern was not the inappropriate circulation of Tello’s wage information but instead that Tello “just wouldn’t let it go.” Vartanian repeated this refrain, in one form or another, on several occasions in her testimony. Again, this testimony strikes me as contrived and exaggerated. The final incident, according to Weber, involved Tello “kind of pot-stirring, trying to motivate [another employee], kind of join forces with her, … .” On that occasion Weber recounted that Tello apparently threw a paper clip at Graves to get her attention. Graves got upset at having a paper clip thrown at her. Although the record is not clear, apparently Tello involved a third worker in this matter. Upon being asked “Did you have any concerns that this kind of behavior would have a negative effect on morale?” and “And you said that you had learned that it was Ms. Tello in an employee’s face, is that right?” Weber again unsurprisingly twice answered “Yes.” But Weber did not speak to Tello about this incident and the record does not reveal when this incident happened. Concerning the use of foul language in the office, in the incident more fully described above after Tello complained to Weber that everyone now knew her wage rate Weber replied “Oh my fucking god. This is payroll.” On another occasion she heard Weber say “Oh shit. I’m sorry.” Other employees used profanities in the office, but there is no evidence that management heard them. Weber denied using these profanities in front of Tello and denied that “it ever came to her attention that an employee was using profanity in the workplace, other than [Tello].” I do not credit that testimony for several reasons. First, Weber worked for Care Ambulance for six years including three years in her current position. It strikes me a highly unlikely that during those many years that she never heard any profanities uttered. On cross-examination when questioned about this Weber backpedaled some and answered that she did not recall hearing profanities during her 6-year tenure at Care Ambulance. Finally, Weber’s demeanor was not at all convincing. JD(SF)-32-07 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 5 At trial Weber gave many reasons that she claimed played a part in the decision to terminate Tello. When asked by counsel to give the one or two main reasons that caused Tello’s termination Weber testified “The main reason was the discomfort that she created amongst the staff.” When asked what the “discomfort” was based upon, Weber answered “Just her interactions with them. She was just very angry, and you know, her profanity was a problem.” Weber labeled Tello’s profanity as “filthy.” Weber did admit, however, upon questioning by counsel, that she could not recall Care Ambulance ever terminating anyone before without following the progressive disciplinary process. Vartanian testified that the main reasons for Tello’s termination were “Her profanity, obviously, and she had just an aggressive, hostile type of personality and interaction with other employees.” Unlike Weber, she basically identified only the foregoing as reasons for the Tello’s discharge and disputed Weber’s testimony that other reasons entered into the discharge decision.2 She recounted an employee who was terminated without resort to the progressive disciplinary system; that employee was selling insurance on company time while using Care Ambulance’s computer. Vartanian also testified about an incident involving an employee and a carpet knife. Vartanian asked what the carpet knife was doing in the cubicle and the employee answered “Oh, it is there in case I want to slit someone’s throat.” The employee thought it was funny but Vartanian did not; she suspended the employee for three days. According to Vartanian “[the employee] has been a good girl ever since.” Care Ambulance presented Jennings as a witness. Jennings testified that she heard Tello use vulgar language from time to time, but she never reported this to Weber. Obviously, Care Ambulance never learned of this additional alleged profanity until after it discharged Tello. When asked if she ever used vulgarity at work, Jennings unconvincingly answered “Not that I recall.” Jennings testified that she was just “venting” in the email string with Tello. When asked by Care Ambulance’s attorney whether she was looking to engage in group action with Tello, Jennings answered emphatically “Absolutely not.” Given that Jennings was still employed by Care Ambulance and that Tello was terminated for allegedly having more in mind than mere “venting” in the email exchange, Jennings testimony while not surprising is not particularly credible. B. Analysis Among other things, Section 7 of the Act assures employees that they have the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. I first address whether the email messages exchanged by Tello and Jennings were concerted activity and then I address whether those messages were for the purpose of mutual aid and protection. I then address whether contents of the message sent by Tello deprived it of the protection it would otherwise have under Section7. In Meyers Industries, 268 NLRB 493 (1984) the Board stated: In general, to find an employee’s activity to be “concerted”, we shall require that it be engaged in with or the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself. Id., at 497. It is well settled that concerted activity may involve only a speaker and a listener. As early as 1951 the Board recognized: Manifestly, the guarantees of Section 7 of the Act extend to concerted activity which in its inception involves only a speaker and a listener, for such activity is an indispensable preliminary to employee self-organization. 2 This, in turn, is different from the statement of position submitted by Care Ambulance; this asserted that Tello was terminated for, among other things, “continuous tardiness to work, excessive absenteeism, taking numerous sick-days within a short employment period.” No evidence of these asserted reasons was presented at the trial. JD(SF)-32-07 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 6 Root-Carlin, Inc., 92 NLRB 1313, 1314 (1952). In the case at hand more than a speaker and a listener were involved; Jennings and Tello were both speakers and listeners and each addressed the same concerns. Their activity in exchanging the email messages falls comfortably with the definition of concerted activity. Not all concerted activity is covered by Section 7. To fall within the purview of Section 7 concerted activity must be for the purpose mutual aid or protection; mere “griping” does not fall within the Act’s protection. Adelphi Institute, 287 NLRB 1073 (1988). In this regard I note that the email exchange involved shared concerns aboutl working conditions. First, Tello and Jennings shared the concern that Graves was disrupting their ability to perform their work with her loud and nonwork related comments. The ability to perform ones job is an essential condition of work. Tello and Jennings also shared the concern that Graves was receiving preferential treatment from management. Fair and equal treatment of employees is also a fundamental condition of employment. The comments in the email string indicate that both Jennings and Tello were making common cause in objecting to those working conditions. Moreover, the remarks were not a passing comment that might be quickly dismissed as obvious “venting;” instead the comments were a back and forth conversation that spanned several minutes. I conclude that Jennings and Tello were voicing their concerns for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. Jhirmack Enterprises, 283 NLRB 609 (1987). Weber’s own testimony supports the conclusion that a purpose of the email exchange was for mutual aid or protection as her testimony reveals that she perceived it as such. As outlined above, Weber repeatedly criticized Weber for trying to “rally the workers” or “pot-stirring.” While Weber attempted to give these comments a benign meaning by claiming that they referred to attempts to turn employees against one another, I reject that explanation based on my observation of her demeanor and her general attempts to exaggerate the alleged shortcomings in Tello’s work performance. Care Ambulance argues that Tello’s conduct lost whatever protection it might have because of the vulgarity. As set forth above, Tello referred an employee or employees who “don’t do shit and smell their ass all day long” in describing what she perceived to be unequal treatment. As the Board stated in Honda of America Mfg., 334 NLRB 751, 752 (2001): The Supreme Court has placed its imprimatur on the principle that our Act protects language during protected activity that “might well be deemed actionable per se in some state jurisdictions.” Linn v. Plant Guards Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966). “Both labor and management often speak bluntly and recklessly, embellishing their respective positions with imprecatory language.” Id. (citation omitted). Such “freewheeling use of the written and spoken word . . . has been expressly fostered by Congress and approved by the NLRB.” Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 272 (1974). The protection that our Act provides employee verbal and written expressions during the course of protected activity is not without limitation. Otherwise protected activity may become unprotected “if in the course of engaging in such activity, [the employee] uses sufficiently opprobrious, profane, defamatory, or malicious language.” American Hospital Assn., 230 NLRB 54, 56 (1977). Nonetheless, “[T]he most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls short of a deliberate or reckless untruth.” Linn, supra at 63. Under the circumstances of this case I apply Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814 (1979) in assessing whether Tello’s conduct remained protected notwithstanding the use of coarse language. I note the place of the use of the challenged language occurred in what otherwise likely would have been a private email exchange between two employees; so far as this record shows the employee at whom the crude remarks were directed never heard them. The language was used to describe the very problem under discussion; it was not a gratuitous, unnecessary invective. The nature of the language was similar to the type Weber had used in front of Tello; indeed Weber had used the f-word, a word that could be of an even higher level of obscenity. And while Care Ambulance did not do anything unlawful that directly provoke the use of the crude language, Tello seemed genuinely upset that Care Ambulance tolerated was she felt was obviously disruptive working conditions. Under these circumstances I conclude that Tello’s use of crude language in the email exchange did not remove it from the protections of the Act. Care Ambulance points to Aluminum Co. of America, 338 NLRB 20 (2002). But that case involved repeated, sustained, ad hominem profanity directed at management; none of that is present in this case. JD(SF)-32-07 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 7 While both Care Ambulance and the General Counsel suggest that I apply the analysis in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), that analysis is used in case involving motivation. Here Care Ambulance admits that it fired Tello because of her email exchange with Jennings and I have concluded above that this conduct was concerted activity protected under Section 7 of the Act.3 Under these circumstances a Wright Line analysis is unnecessary. Honda of America Mfg. id., at 753 (2001). I conclude that Tello engaged in protected concerted activity, Care Ambulance was aware of the concerted nature of the activity and discharged Tello for engaging in that activity. It follows that Care Ambulance thereby violated Section 8(a)(1). Conclusions of Law By discharging Elizabeth Tello because she engaged in protected concerted activity, Care Ambulance has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Remedy Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged Elizabeth Tello, it must offer her reinstatement and make her whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from date of discharge to date of proper offer of reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended4 ORDER The Respondent, Care Ambulance Service, Inc., Orange, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from a. Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee for engaging in concerted activity protected by the Act. b. In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. 3 I note that while Care Ambulances points to other alleged misconduct by Tello prior to her discharge, it does not argue that Tello was terminated for that alleged conduct. Rather, it appears that Care Ambulance points to the earlier incidents to place the decision to terminate Tello in context. Indeed, Care Ambulance highlight’s in its brief “Tello Was Terminated As A Result Of Her Hostile And Profane Email Barrage” 4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. JD(SF)-32-07 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 8 (a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer Elizabeth Tello full reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed. (b) Make Elizabeth Tello whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against her, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision. (c) Within 14 days form the date of this order, remove from its files any reference to the unlawful discharge, and within 3 days thereafter notify the employee in writing that this has been done and that the discharge will not be used against her in any way. (d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Orange, California, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”5 Copies of the notice6, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 31, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent at any time since January 3, 2007. (f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. Dated, Washington, D.C., October 17, 2007. ____________________ William G. Kocol Administrative Law Judge 5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” 6 In the remedy portion of his brief the General Counsel indicates that notices should also be posted in Spanish. He makes no argument why this is necessary, and there is no evidence in the record to support the need for this additional posting. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this Notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against any of you for engaging in protected concerted activity. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, Elizabeth Tello full reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed. WE WILL make Elizabeth Tello whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from her discharge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest. WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlawful discharge of Elizabeth Tello, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify her in writing that this has been done and that the discharge will not be used against her in any way. Care Ambulance Service, Inc. (Employer) Dated By (Representative) (Title) The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts secret ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov. 888 South Figueroa Street, 9th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017-5449 (213) 894-5200, Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 pm THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAY FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONDERNING THIS NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S COMPLIANCE OFFICER (213) 894-5229. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation