Capitol Chrysler-Plymouth of Montgomery

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 19, 1979

242 N.L.R.B. 1274 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Capitol Chrysler-Plymouth of Montgomery and Mark
E. Wade, and Roger A. Blake, and Edward F. Stan-
ley and Raymond M. Barron, and Gary Wayne Ed-
wards, and Local Lodge 2639 of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO. Cases 9 CA 11931-1, 9-CA 11931 2,
9 CA 11931 3, 9 CA-11931-4, 9 CA-11931 5,
9-CA 11966, and 9 RC 1224
June 19, 1979
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND TRUESDAIl
On July 11, 1978, Administrative Law Judge James
L. Rose issued the attached Decision in this proceed-
ing. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, 2 and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.)
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified be-
low, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Capitol
Chrysler-Plymouth of Montgomery, Montgomery,
I The name of the Respondent is amended to reflect the change in the
corporate name from Town & Country Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. It is now
doing business as Capitol Chrysler-Ply mouth of Montgomery.
2 Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule
an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless
the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the
resolutions are incorrect. Standard D') Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the
record and find no basis for reversing his findings.
' In his recommended Order and notice the Administrative Law Judge
inadvertently failed to include provisions to reflect his findings that Respon-
dent threatened closure of its business if the Union came in. we shall modify
the Order and notice accordingly. As noted by the Administrative Law
Judge, the building which housed the body hop has been sold. The Admin-
istrative Law Judge's recommended Order, which we are adopting in rel-
evant part, does not require reopening of the shop. Since the record is silent
as to what alternatives are available, we leave to the compliance stage the
matter of what other steps Respondent must take to comply fully with our
Order.
Member Jenkins would require reopening of the body shop. However, the
body shop was unprofitable and was to be closed shortly in any event, and
the building has since been sold. In these circumstances, it would be unduly
burdensome to require that the body shop e reopened. Great Chinese
American Sewing Company, 227 NLRB 1670 (1977).
West Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and as-
signs, shall take the action set forth in the said recom-
mended Order, as so modified:
I. Insert the following as paragraph l(c) and re-
letter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
"(c) Threatening to go out of business if the Union
becomes the collective-bargaining representative of
its employees."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
II IS FURTHERED ORDERED that the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 9, pursuant to the Rules and Regula-
tions of the Board, shall, within 10 days of this Deci-
sion and Order, open and count the ballots of Edward
F. Stanley, Mark Wade, Roger Alan Blake, Raymond
Anthony Barron, and Gary Wayne Edwards and pre-
pare and cause to be served on the parties a revised
tally of the ballots, including therein the count of the
above-mentioned ballots, and issue the appropriate
certification.
MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting:
I agree with the findings of the Administrative Law
Judge and my colleagues that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating employees
about union activity and threatening closure and lay-
offs in the event of union victory. I also agree with the
finding that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) by
discriminatorily discharging and laying off employees
and by closing its body shop in order to deprive the
body shop employees of the opportunity to vote in
the forthcoming representation election. However, I
dissent from the majority's failure to provide a mean-
ingful order to remedy all of Respondent's unfair la-
bor practices.
For some unexplained reason, the Administrative
Law Judge and my colleagues have not fashioned the
normal make-whole remedy which would require Re-
spondent to reopen the body shop. Although they
properly order reinstatement of the body shop em-
ployees, it appears that they are ordering these em-
ployees reinstated to positions which do not exist.
The majority's statement, that "[s]ince the record is
silent as to what alternatives are available, we leave
to the compliance stage the matter of what other steps
Respondent must take to comply fully with our Or-
der," further obfuscates the Order.
Therefore, I would order Respondent to reopen the
body shop, for, without this resumption, Respon-
dent's unfair labor practices would not be completely
remedied. This is entirely consistent with the well-
established principle that, in cases involving discrimi-
natory conduct, the restoration of the status quo ante
is the proper remedy unless the wrongdoer can dem-
onstrate that the normal remedy would endanger its
continued viability. R & H Masonry Supply, Inc., 238
242 NLRB No. 178
1274
CAPITOL ('IRYSIER-PLYMOt I() OF M(ON)1 ()Oi RYR '
NLRB 1044 (1978). See N. C. (ostil Motor .in's.
Inc.. 219 NLRB 1009 (1975). entd. 542 .2d 637 (4th
Cir. 1976): Tw0nhouse T V. & 4pplian(mces, 213 N I.RB
716 (1974). entrcement denied 531 F.2d 826 (7th Cir.
1976). The record does not even suggest that the re-
opening of the body shop would endanger Respon-
dent's continued viability. As the Board stated in
Townhouse T. . & Appliances. "if there is hardship
caused by this remedy, it is only fair that the wrong-
doer rather than the wronged should hear it." The
majority has, sub silentio, departed from this well-es-
tablished and necessary principle, and I therefore dis-
sent.4
' The majoritf's reliance on Great Chines, 4Amlrcon 5ening (oe painm. il-
pra, is misplaced. hat case inolved unusual facts notr present here. and ;
unique make-w hole remed) as t.lshioned.
APPENDIX
No lICE To EPI.(OII;S
POSI ED) Y ORDIR ()1-I Eti
NATIONAl. LABOR RELAIIONS BOARD
An Agency of the Unites States Government
After a hearing at which all parties were represented
by counsel and accorded the opportunity to examine
and cross-examine witnesses, it has been determined
by the National Labor Relations Board that we have
violated the National Labor Relations Act. as
amended. We have been ordered to post this notice
and to comply, with its terms.
WE WIl.L NOT interrogate or threaten our em-
ployees concerning their interest in or activity on
behalf of Local Lodge 2639 of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Work-
ers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with ter-
mination in the event that thev select that Union
or any other labor organization.
WE WVIL. NOT threaten to go out of business if
the Union becomes the collective-bargaining
representative of our employees.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discrimi-
nate against our employees because of their in-
terest in or activity on behalf of the Union or any
other labor organization.
WE WIlt. NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the Act.
Wt: WIi. offer immediate and full reinstate-
ment to Edward F. Stanley. Mark Wade, Roger
Alan Blake, Raymond Anthony Barron. and
Gary Wayne Edwards to their former jobs or, if
those jobs no longer exist. to substantially equiv-
alent positions, without prejudice to their senior-
itN or any other rights or pri ileges previously
enjo ed. and wi xvnl make them whole for an
losses the, may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against them. with interest.
CAPI I) ( CIIRYSI I!R-PI YM)l i t II MO)N -
(i(OM RY
)IE('ISI(N
Sl.\i1:11:N1 () [ItI ('s~S:
.J11us 1.. Rosli. Adinistra.ti e Lass Judge: This matter
was heard helbtre me at ('harleston, \Vest Virginia. On April
II. 1978. I'he General (Counsel's consolidated complaint al-
leged. in substance. that live emplosees were discharged in
violation of'Section 8a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act. 29 L S.(. §151. c1 ceq. and that the Respondent en-
gaged in certain actliits iolaib.e of' Section 8a)(I ). ('on-
solidated for hearing as the matter inkolxing the chal-
lenged ballots of' the discharged individuals.
Respondent generallN denies that it engaged in an' ac-
ti it', violative of' the Act and afirnltisel , claimsl that tihe
one discharge was for cause vwhile economic factors necessi-
ta ted the other fur.
Ipon the record as a whole including brielH and argu-
ments of' counsel. I herebs make the fi)llos ing:
FIsI)iN(;s (i FA( I ssI) CoN('I t SIONs (i I.N
1. J RISI)I( IION
The Respondent is a \West Virginia corporation engaged
in the sale and service of a;utomobiles and trucks at its facil-
ity in Montgomer. West irginia. It annualls receives
goods, products and materials alued in excess of, $50,000
directl from p(ints outside the State of \Vest Virginia. and
annuall, receives goods and revenues in excess of $50,000.
The Respondent admits and I tind, that it is an emploser
engaged in commerce ithin the meaning of Section 2(2).
(h). and 7) of the Act.
11. ilt I AOR OR(iANI/AII()N IN\. O LI)
Local Lodge 2639 of' the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers. AF:I . ('10. is admitted
to he, and I find is a labor organization ithin the meaning
of Section 2(5) of' the Act.
111. lill- N AIR I ABOR PRA('II( IS
. Fticltual/ RBacgroioid
Until 1973. the principle owner and general manager oft
Respondent was Jack Fuentes. operating under the st le of
"Jack's Auto Sales." In 1971 Fuentes obtained a dealership
in Charleston ahbout 40 miles from MontgomerN. and in
1973 he arranged t'r eventual sale of' Respondent to Sam
Scalise and his brother D)ann. Sam Scalise became pres-
ident and general manager o Respondent. ad Fuentes.
Ai Ihis tie he husiness st\ie became the corpora.te n.lme. lolsn &
(oiunlr (hr sler-P'nmouth. Inc he Respondent nros dwoe, busines as
(apitol (hrsler-Plmoiulh ot Mlintgomer
1275
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
while participating to some extent in major management
decisions, generally was not thereafter involved.
In 1975 the Scalise brothers bought a building 3 or 4
miles from the dealership and determined to open a body
shop in conjuction with their dealership. They leased the
building to Respondent for $300 a month plus taxes and
hired Edward F. Stanley to be the body shop foreman.
Shortly after hiring Stanley, they also hired Roger Alan
Blake and Mark Wade, and from time to time others
worked in the body shop.
Fuentes testified that he was never particularly happy
with the body shop operation, feeling that it was not pro-
ductive. He said he urged the Scalise brothers to get rid of
it. However, according to Fuentes, they felt they could
make the body shop profitable. One move in this direction
occurred on September 1, 1977,2 when Stanley was made a
commission employee, with a $150 per week guarantee,
rather than a $250 per week salaried supervisor.
Later in September, apparently as part of an effort by the
Union to organize car dealerships throughout the area, the
body shop employees were approached by union agents.
Authorization cards were signed, the Union was discussed
among employees, and meetings were held with union
agents.
On October 15 a petition was filed in Case 9-RC- 12244.
A hearing was set for November 10, at which time the par-
ties executed a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent
Election, and an election was held on December 15.
On November 7 Sam Scalise discharged Stanley because,
according to Scalise, he had been advised by a customer
(and had heard before but was unable to prove it) that
Stanley had urged the customer to let Stanley do the body
work at his home. Stanley allegedly told the customer he
would do the work for a lower price than Respondent
would charge.
On November 11 Scalise terminated the remaining body
shop employees, Blake and Wade, after having determined
to sell the building and close down the body shop opera-
tion.
On November 18, Scalise terminated Respondent's two
lot boys, Raymond Anthony Barron and Wayne Edwards,
although Edwards was not informed of this until the follow-
ing Monday, November 21. Again the Respondent con-
tends that the termination of the lot boys was necessitated
by its poor economic condition at the time and was an
effort to reduce operating costs.
The testimony of Fuentes, along with Respondent's fi-
nancial records, suggests that during 1977 Respondent was
in a poor financial situation. This Fuentes blames on poor
management, and indeed he and the Scalise brothers came
to a parting of the ways, although the Scalises still have
ownership interest in Respondent. Fuentes, however, con-
tinued to be the majority stockholder and, since early De-
cember, has reassumed the presidency. The Scalises are no
longer actively involved in the management of Respondent,
having bought into another dealership. Respondent's man-
ager since December 18 has been Bob Haning.
2 All dates hereafter are in 1977 unless otherwise indicated.
B. A nalysis and Concluding Findings
1. Discharge of Edward F. Stanley
It is fundamental that an employer may discharge an
employee for any reason (good or bad) or no reason at all.
However, if the termination of an employee is motivated
even in part by his union activity, union activity in general,
or to discourage union activity, then that discharge violates
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Such, I believe was the case here.
It is clear from the testimony of Fuentes, which I gener-
ally credit, as well as the documentary evidence, that the
Company had developed an adverse financial posture as a
result of what Fuentes considered to be bad management
practices by the Scalise brothers.
Involved in this was an inventory check Fuentes made in
July which showed an approximate $26,000 in lost inven-
tory in the parts department and some $6,500 in material
loss in the body shop. In addition, Fuentes felt that the
body shop was not profitable, particularly when the Com-
pany was paying Stanley a salary of about $1,000 a month.
I believe he had long urged the Scalise brothers to dis-
continue the body shop operation. They had resisted, in
part, apparently, because they felt they could make money
with the body shop, and because they personally owned the
building. If the body shop were closed then they would lose
the rent money.
Thus, it appears that Fuentes' dissatisfaction with the
Scalises was a growing problem coincidentally occurring
about the time of the organizational campaign. However, it
is also clear that the decisions concerning the termination of
the five individuals in question were motivated at least in
part by the union activity and a determination to affect the
results of the forthcoming election.
Even though Respondent may very well have had a le-
gitimate economic reason to discontinue the body shop and
lay off the lot boys, I nevertheless conclude that these deci-
sions were motivated at least in part by the union activity. I
also conclude that the reason advanced by Sam Scalise to
discharge Stanley was an outright fabrication. This conclu-
sion is based on Scalise's negative demeanor and the inher-
ent implausibility of his testimony; e.g., if he had actually
had a written statement from a customer he would have
produced it, having failed, as he claims, to get the customer
to the hearing. Of course, if the customer existed, he could
have been subpenaed.
Even before going to work for Respondent, Stanley oper-
ated a small body shop out of his two-car garage at home.
This, according to his testimony, was known to both Sam
and Danny Scalise; in fact, he had done some work for
Danny. This was undenied by them. Stanley, however, de-
nied that he ever solicited business from customers of Re-
spondent. And there is no proof he did. Further, he was
never told by either Scalise that he could not do body work
at his home.
The testimony of Sam Scalise to the effect that a cus-
tomer had told him that Stanley, solicited him and that
Scalise had a written statement to that effect I find not to be
trustworthy. For instance, Scalise admitted that, during the
termination interview of Stanley, he did not advise Stanley
who the customer was supposed to have been nor allow
Stanley to see the alleged statement. Nor did Scalise bring
1276
CAPITOL CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH OF MONTGOMERY
the alleged statement with him to the hearing. Though Sca-
lise is no longer involved in operating Respondent. he is still
a stockholder and still must be considered to have an inter-
est in the outcome of this proceeding. The alleged statement
is a document the Respondent thus could have produced,
and would have, I believe, had it existed. I conclude that it
does not exist and never did. I further conclude that Scalise
determined late in the organizational campaign to dis-
charge one whom he apparently felt was the leader in the
organizational campaign. The patently pretextual reason.
not supported by any credible evidence, indicates that the
true motive lies elsewhere than Stanley's alleged solicitation
of customers from the Respondent. From this I infer that
the true motive was his union activity and that his dis-
charge was violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Shattuck
Denn Mining Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466 (9th
Cir. 1965).
That Scalise singled out Stanley is demonstrated by his
admission that the Friday before Stanley's discharge on
Monday, Scalise heard from another dealership that em-
ployees planned to have a union meeting at his body shop
that evening. He confronted Stanley with this, and, accord-
ing to Stanley, "shaking his finger in my face ... (he said) 'I
hear you're trying to have the Union meeting in my body
shop tonight.'" Also in mid-October Scalise interrogated
Blake about the organizational campaign and at that time
asked if he would continue to work should Stanley be fired.
Discussing the prospective discharge of an employee and
union activity at the same time suggests a causal connection
between the eventual discharge and the union activity. as
does the timing.
For these reasons I conclude that Respondent discharged
Edward Stanley in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Closing of the body shop
On November 10, the parties conferred in connection
with the representation petition. At that time. Respondent
took the position that the body shop employees should be
excluded from the unit, but ultimately agreed to include
them. Nothing was said about closing the body shop. The
next day, Scalise informed the remaining body shop em-
ployees that they were terminated and that he was going to
sell the body shop building.
Scalise testified that he in fact determined to sell the body
shop so that he and his brother could get some cash in order
to buy into another dealership. He stated however that the
building was not sold until early December, or some 3
weeks following the closure of the body shop.'
While the documentary evidence indicates that the body
shop operation was not profitable, the principal reason for
this in 1977 was the material loss which had been discov-
ered during the inventory. Thus. from the testimony of
Blake, it appears that the employees, who were on a 50
percent commission basis, were doing a sufficient amount of
work to make the operation reasonably profitable for Re-
spondent. And Blake testified that Danny Scalise on nu-
3 Following the close of the hearing, counsel for the General Counsel ad
vised me and the parties that he had independntly been able to verif, that
the deed of sale was filed on December I.
merous occasions during the summer of 1977 said this was
the case.'
It is clear for the record that Sam Scalise knew that the
source of the union activity was the body shop, and deter-
mined to close that operation prior to the election so that
those employees would not have a vote.
If in good faith Scalise had actually determined, as he
testified, early in November to discontinue the body shop
and sell the building, he surely would have mentioned it at
the conference on November 10. Rather, he first argued for
exclusion of the body shop employees, then recanted, then
announced the closure. I conclude that the determination to
close the body shop did not occur until after Respondent
agreed to include the body shop employees in the unit and
that this decision was made in part to keep those employees
from voting. Accordingly, I conclude that the decision to
close the body shop was violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act and that the employees thus discharged should be rein-
stated.
3. The layoff of the lot boys
The two lot boys, Raymond Barron and Gary Edwards.
both signed authorization cards and both were interrogated
by Sam Scalise in mid-October. During these meetings Sca-
lise advised them that Respondent could not afford to have
the Union come in and, if it did, layoffs would result.
While Scalise testified that he was "very careful" in what
he told employees. knowing that he could not threaten
them, he did admit this meeting took place.
There is no evidence that Scalise knew that these individ-
uals had signed authorization cards other than the inference
to be drawn from the smallness of the dealership: neverthe-
less, I find that such is not necessary in concluding that
their layoffs were violative of the Act.
Given the timing of the layoff with the organizational
activity and the pending election, I conclude that Scalise
determined to lay off these two employees in order to re-
duce the possibility that a majority of the votes in the elec-
tion would favor the Union.
Though Scalise testified that the layoff of the lot boys was
necessitated by the Respondent's poor economic posture,
their testimony is that they were busy with various chores
all the time. Their pay stubs show that they were working
some hours of overtime each week, which negates the con-
tention that their services were not needed. They were mini-
mum wage employees. Thus Scalise's assertion that he de-
termined to lay off the lot boys and have higher paid
mechanics do their work, because the mechanics were sen-
ior and it would not be fair to lay them off, is not credible.
Further, as noted above, I found Scalise not to be a credible
witness. I conclude that laying off the lot boys. similar to
closing the body shop, was an effort to reduce the number
of employees who might vote for the Union in the forth-
coming election. The layoffs therefore violated Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
4 It is noted that iDanny Scalise 'was present during the hearing, and does
retain an ownership interest in Respondent. but was not called by Respon-
dent to testify. I accordingly conclude that he would not have denied these
statements or denied that he knew that Stanle\ as doing body shop work at
his home E.g., Zaper Corporation, 235 NLRB 1236 (1978).
1277
I)l'( ISIONS )OF NAI lONAI LABOR RELAIIONS BOARD
4. The 8(a1)(I allegation
It is alleged that in meeting with the two lot hos. Scalise
coercively interrogated them concerning their union ac-
tivitv and threatened them should the employees vote for
the Union. While the testimony of Barron and Edwards is
somewhat vague on this point, it is clear that they were
asked hb Scalise if they knew about "this union going
around these garages." And Scalise did indicate that a laN-
off would he the result ift' the Union won the forthcoming
election. I find such a threat to he in violation of Section
8(a)( I ) of the Act. .g.. Spalding. DI)ii.ion f t'Questor (ot7,o-
ration, 225 Nl.RB 946 (1976). And Scalise's interrogation
was therefore coercive.
During the mid-October meeting Scalise had with Blake.
supra, Scalise said if the Union came in he would hat e to go
out of business and then asked what Blake's interest in the
Union was. I conclude that this also was a threat and coer-
cive interrogation and conclude that Respondent violated
Section 8(;a)(1 ) as alleged.
IV. lH (HIIA I fN ii:) 1IAtI ()IS
At the election held on Decembhe 15. one vote was cast
for the Union and five votes against it. and there were six
challenged ballots of individuals whose names did not ap-
pear on the voter eligibility lists.
No evidence was presented concerning the eligibility of
Jullian R. Woodrum. and accordingly the challenge to his
ballot is sustained.
The other five challenged ballots were those of Stanle.
Wade, Blake, and Edwards. Ilaving concluded that all
these individuals were terminated in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act, I conclude that they were eligible to
vote.' The challenges to their ballots should he overruled.
their ballots should he opened and counted, and a revised
tally of ballots should issue.
The Company contends that since the body shop would
have been closed for economic reasons prior to the election,
the ballots of the body shop employees should not be
counted even if their discharges are found to have been
violative of the Act. I reject this contention. The Respon-
dent will be ordered to reinstate these employees, whose
status as such is continuing.
V. II IFt I( I Of li t tNFAIR I.AB()R PRA(II( IS UPON
('O()MtR( 'l
The unfair labor practices found are unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce and the free flow of commerce,
within the meaning of Sections 2(6) and 2(7) of the Act.
Fil RI I-)Y
Having concluded that Respondent engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I will recommend that Respondent
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac-
tion including offering immediate and full reinstatement to
Fdward F. Stanley, Mark Wade, Roger Alan Blake, Ray-
mond Anthony Barron. and Gary Wayne E'dwards to their
former jobs. or if those jobs no longer exist, to substantiallN
Bonanno kmitil Foodi, Ia ., 230 NIRB 555 (1977)
equivalent positions of employ ment. and make them whole
for any losses they may have suffered as a result of the
discrimination against them in accordance with the formula
set forth in F. W B'olworth Compatn, 90 NLRB 289
(1950). with interest as prescribed in Florida Steel (Corpora-
ion., 231 NL.RB 651 (1977)."
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record in this matter. and pursuant to the
provisions of Section 10(c) of the Act I hereby issue the
following recommended:
ORDER'
The Respondent. Capitol Chrysler-Plymouth of Mont-
gomery. West Virginia, its officers. agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. ('ease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating employees concerning their interest in
or activities on behalf of the Union or any other labor or-
ga nization.
(h) Threatening employees with termination because of
their interest in or activity on behalf of the Union or any
other labor organization.
(c) ischarging or otherwise discriminating against em-
ployees because of their interest in or activitv on behalf of
the Union or any other labor organization.
(d) In any other manner interfering with. restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
2. ake the following affirmative action deemed neces-
s.ry to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer Fdward . Stanley Mark Wade, Roger Alan
Blake. Raymond Anthony Barron, and Gary Wayne Ed-
wards immediate and full reinstatement to their former
jobs. or if those jobs no longer exist to substantially equiv-
alent positions of employment. without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them
whole for any loss of earnings they may save suffered as the
result of the discrimination against them in the manner set
torth in "The Remed." above.
tb) Preserve and, upon request. make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying. all pay-
roll records. social security payment records. timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(c) Post at its premises in Montgomery. West Virginia.
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."' Copies
of the notice, on trms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 9. after being duly signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respon-
See. generall. Ii Plumbhing & Heeatn ( . 138 N.RB 716h (1962).
'In the event no exceptions are filed as provided b Sec 102.46 of' the
Rules and Regulations o,f he National labor Relations Board. the findings.
conclusions. and recommended Order herein shall, as proided in Sec. 02.48
of the Rules aind Regulations. he adopted by the Board and become its
findings. conclusions. and Order. and all objections thereto shall he deemed
wai ed lor all purposes
In the eent that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a I nited States
(ourt ot Appeals, the .ords in he notice reading Posted b Order of the
National .ahbor Relations Board" shall read "lPosted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the I'niled States Court l,1 Appeals Enforcing an ()rder of the National
Lahor Relations Board"
1278
CAPITOL CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH OF MONTGOMERY
dent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are custom-
arily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to insure that the notices are not altered. defaced.
or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respon-
dent has taken to comply herewith.
Ir Is FRTIER ORDERED that the ballots of Edward F.
Stanley. Mark Wade, Roger Alan Blake. Raymond An-
thony Barron. and Gary Wayne Edwards in Case 9-RC
12244 be opened and counted, and that the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 9 issue a revised Tally of Ballots.
11 Is FR ItIR ORDERE) that should the revised tally of
ballots show that a majority of votes has been cast for the
Union, then the Regional Director for Region 9 shall issue
a certification of representation.
1279