Capital One Services, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 31, 2020

2020004679 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
16/002,943 06/07/2018 Abdelkadar M'Hamed BENKREIRA 0104-0097 9267
122571 7590 12/31/2020
Harrity & Harrity, LLP
11350 Random Hills Road Suite 600
Fairfax, VA 22030
EXAMINER
NELSON, FREDA ANN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docket@harrityllp.com
mpick@harrityllp.com
ptomail@harrityllp.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ABDELKADAR M'HAMED BENKREIRA,
JOSHUA EDWARDS, and MICHAEL MOSSOBA
Appeal 2020-004679
Application 16/002,943
Technology Center 3600
Before JEFFREY N. FREDMAN, RACHEL H. TOWNSEND, and
MICHAEL A. VALEK, Administrative Patent Judges.
TOWNSEND, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involving claims to a
device that can cause an electric vehicle to provide power to a parking meter
as payment for use of the metered space. Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject the claims as obvious. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm in part.

1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Capital One
Services, LLC. (Appeal Br. 3.)
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Application 16/002,943
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
“In some instances, parking a vehicle requires payment of a fee (e.g.,
to a parking meter) that depends upon a time period the vehicle is parked.”
(Spec. ¶ 1.) Payment for parking usually involves use of “coins, credit
cards, and/or mobile applications tied to a transaction card and/or a
transaction account.” (Id.) An electric vehicle, however, may have as an
option to pay for parking “by providing power to the parking meter from the
electric vehicle.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Appellant’s invention is directed to a device that
determines parking payment options for an electric vehicle. (Id.)
Claims 1–20 are on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative
of the claimed subject matter:
1. A device, comprising:
one or more memories; and
one or more processors configured to:
communicate with a parking meter associated with
a parking space to be used for parking by an electric
vehicle,
the electric vehicle being associated with the
device;
receive vehicle power information, vehicle profile
information, and vehicle location information,
the vehicle profile information including
information indicating at least one
destination of the electric vehicle,
the at least one destination being
different from a current location of the
electric vehicle and different from a
parking meter location of the parking
meter;
determine parking payment options based on the
vehicle power information, the at least one destination
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indicated in the vehicle profile information, and the
vehicle location information;
receive a selection of a particular parking payment
option of the parking payment options,
the particular parking payment option
including an option to pay for parking by
providing power to the parking meter from
the electric vehicle;
cause the electric vehicle to connect to the parking
meter based on the particular parking payment option; and
cause the electric vehicle to provide power to the
parking meter based on the particular parking payment
option.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Genschel et al. US 2010/0274656 A1 Oct. 28, 2010
Fisher et al. US 2013/0179057 A1 July 11, 2013
Gadh et al. US 2013/0179061 A1 July 11, 2013

REJECTIONS
The following grounds of rejection by the Examiner are before us on
review:
Claims 1–3, 5–8, 10–11, 15, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Genschel and Fisher. (Final Action 3.)
Claims 4, 9, 12–13, 14, 16–17, and 19–20 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Genschel, Fisher and Gadh. (Final
Action 12.)

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DISCUSSION
A. Obviousness of Claims 1–3, 5–8, 10, and 11 over Genschel and Fisher
Except as discussed below with respect to the “communicating
limitation of claim 15,” Appellant focuses its arguments on the limitations as
recited in claim 1. (See Appeal Br. 8–15.) Although Appellant notes that
“claims 8 and 15 recite features similar to, yet possible of a different scope
than, the features of claim 1,” Appellant “submits that the rejection of claims
1, 8, and 15, and the claims that depend thereon, are improper” for the
reasons based on the discussion of the rejection with respect to claim 1. (See
id. at 11, 14, 15.) Thus, the claims are not separately argued, with respect to
the specific arguments set forth below in this section. We will address the
one separate argument as to claim 15 in section B below.
In pertinent part, claim 1 requires a processor that performs several
functions. It communicates with a parking meter for a space to be used by
an electric vehicle. The processor receives three pieces of information about
the vehicle: (1) power information, (2) profile information that includes at
least one destination of the vehicle (e.g., work, brick and mortar store), and
(3) location information. The processor determines payment options for
parking based on (a) vehicle power information, (b) at least one destination
indicated in the profile, and (c) location information. The processor receives
a selection of a particular parking payment option “including an option to
pay for parking by providing power to the parking meter” from the vehicle,
and causes the vehicle to connect to the parking meter based on the selected
payment option received and causes the vehicle to provide power to the
meter based on the payment option.
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The Examiner finds that Genschel teaches a device associated with an
electronic vehicle whose processor receives information about the vehicle,
determines payment options based on information received, and receives a
selection of a payment option including an option to provide power to the
parking meter based on information received. (Final Action 3–4 (citing
Genschel ¶¶ 19, 272; Ans. 4–7 (citing Genschel ¶¶ 19, 201).) The Examiner
explains that Genschel does not disclose that the payment option is based on
a destination indicated in the vehicle profile. (Final Action 4.) The
Examiner relies on the teachings of Fisher in this regard. (Id.)
In particular, the Examiner explains that Fisher teaches a processor
associated with an electric vehicle that collects vehicle profile information,
including destinations to which the vehicle visits via an application screen.
(See Final Action 5; Ans. 8.) In addition, the Examiner explains that Fisher
teaches the ability to reserve a charging station in advance, where there
would be no charge for parking. (Ans. 8–9.) And, Fisher teaches a feature
of the device associated with the electric vehicle in which Eco-Charge
profiles may be set up such that at certain predetermined locations that the
vehicle travels to, the vehicle will only charge when electricity pricing is less
expensive. (Id.) Thus, the Examiner explains that there are payment options
in Fisher linked to information in the vehicle profile with respect to

2 The Examiner also inadvertently cites paragraph 21, meaning to cite to
paragraph 201 that provides an example where Jane’s smartphone wirelessly
connects with the electric energy exchange system, where a processor
having access to Jane’s profile determines information about her vehicle
electric power level and asks if Jane would agree to discharge her battery to
60% from 90% and receive a credit to a particular store account in return for
a certain duration of time to park. (See Ans. 4–7 (explaining the mistake in
the Final Action).)
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destination locations to which the vehicle may be headed. The Examiner
concludes that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
to include the vehicle data collection/profile taught by Fisher in Genschel in
order to “determine various statistics and inform[] the user on readiness of
the EV to complete a proposed trip before recharging the EV batteries.”
(Final Action 5; Ans. 8–9.) We understand the Examiner’s position to be
that the processor of Genschel as modified to include the data collection and
profile applications of Fisher would receive vehicle power information
(Genschel), vehicle profile information including information indicating at
least one destination of the electric vehicle (Fisher), and vehicle location
information (Genschel). Moreover, the processor would determine parking
payment options (1) based on the vehicle power information (Genschel), (2)
the at least one destination indicated in the vehicle profile information
(Fisher), and (3) the vehicle location information (Genschel). (Ans. 8–9.)
We agree with the Examiner’s factual findings and conclusion of
obviousness.
As the Examiner explained, the Eco Charge profile taught by Fisher
permits the user to automatically select to charge the vehicle at a predefined
destination location only when the prices for electricity are at an acceptably
low price. (See Fisher Fig. 10, ¶ 81.) We conclude that such a profile
setting, i.e., opting to only pay for charging the vehicle when prices are low,
provides the processor with the ability to determine a parking payment
option (pay for charging only when electric power is at an acceptably low
price) based on at least one destination indicated in the vehicle profile
information. Similarly, the option to reserve a charging time at a particular
station in advance of being there, where a price for the charging session is
also provided in advance (see id. ¶ 93), provides the processor with the
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ability to determine a parking payment option based on at least one
destination indicated in the vehicle profile information (price for reserved
space determined based on a destination). Additionally, the capability of
searching for and selecting charging stations with the best pricing including
those that are free that are near a current location of the vehicle, which is
taught by Fisher (id. at Fig. 22, ¶ 87), provides the processor with the ability
to determine a parking payment option based on vehicle location
information (price for available spaces determined based on a current
vehicle location). That these determinations by the processor are not the
determinations described by Appellant’s Specification (Spec. ¶ 26 (the
vehicle device recommends paying for parking with electrical power, rather
than money, because it would be cheaper)) does not establish that the
determine limitation is not met. That is because, for example, there is no
requirement by the claim that the determination must involve consideration
of power information, vehicle profile information, and vehicle location
information at the same time. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA
1982) (“[A]ppellant’s arguments fail from the outset because . . . they are
not based on limitations appearing in the claims.”). Even if these limitations
were required to be roughly simultaneous, that order of steps would be
obvious “in the absence of any proof in the record that the order of
performing the steps produces any new and unexpected results.” In re
Burhans, 154 F.2d 690, 692 (CCPA 1946).
There is also not a requirement by the claim that a payment option is
associated with payment for a parking space that has a parking meter
associated with it, unless the electric vehicle is providing power to a parking
meter associated with a parking space to be used. Consequently, we
conclude that the determination by a processor that charging in a parking
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spot is permitted or not based on prices for electricity at a particular
destination specified in advance by a user which the user will pay for meets
the determine requirements of the claim.
Genschel’s teaching that an owner of an electric vehicle can opt to
discharge the vehicle battery given the current state of battery charge at a
vehicle parking space in exchange for a certain amount of time to park and a
credit to a store account (Genschel ¶ 201) evidences that the processor of a
device taught by Genschel has the ability to determine a parking payment
option based on vehicle power information, i.e., the option to provide power
to the charging station in exchange for a duration of time to park in the
space. And exchanging consideration for permission to park is the essence
of a parking meter, however physically structured. We note further that the
system of Genschel provides for a processor that receives a selection of
payment agreeing to provide power from the vehicle to the exchange
station—the selection is made when the vehicle operator responds by
pressing the “‘yes, I agree’ button in her message, thus confirming the
transaction.” (Id.)
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection is in error because the
Examiner does not provide an analysis of how the combination of reference
teachings achieves the claimed invention. (Appeal Br. 9; Reply Br. 3.) We
disagree that the Examiner did not provide the necessary analysis. The
Examiner has pointed out where each of the limitations are taught by the
prior art. And, the Examiner has provided a reason to combine Fisher’s
vehicle data collection/electric vehicle profile with the Genschel system, as
explained above. Appellant’s disagreement with the Examiner’s position
that the limitations of the claim are met based on the combination does not
establish a lack of analysis.
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Appellant also argues that Genschel does not disclose determining
payment options, much less regarding how the option of discharging battery
is determined based on the vehicle power information. (Reply Br. 3–4; see
also Appeal Br. 11, 14–15.) According to Appellant, in paragraph 201 of
Genschel, mall management offers a parking incentive to attract customers
to the mall, there is no disclosure of determining “even a single option to pay
for parking, let alone . . . based on the vehicle power information . . . and
the vehicle location information.” (Reply Br. 4.) Appellant further argues
that the portions of Fisher cited by the Examiner do not disclose or suggest
determining parking payment options; they “have nothing to do with parking
and have nothing to do with determining options to pay for parking.” (Id. at
5–7; see also Appeal Br. 13–14.) Appellant’s argument rests on reciting the
claim language in dispute, reciting the language of the references relied on
by the Examiner and asserting that the determine parking payment option
limitation is not met without further explanation. (Id.) We do not find
Appellant’s arguments persuasive in light of our discussion above of the
requirements of this limitation and how the references’ teachings meet the
claimed requirements.
Claim 7 requires the payment option for display via a user interface
and that the selection received for the particular payment option occur via
the user interface. Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection is in error,
not because paragraph 201 does not teach a user interface, but because the
example states that Jane “is being paid to discharge her battery” not that Jane
is “paying for parking.” (Reply Br. 10–11.) We disagree for the reasons
discussed above, namely, that regardless of whether Jane is being paid
additional money to discharge her battery, the example teaches that she is
also providing power to the charging station in exchange for being allowed
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to park in the parking space for a designated period of time. In short, this
agreed upon transaction is a payment for the space based on vehicle power
discharge, among other things, which Jane has selected to effect, when she
“presses the ‘Yes, I agree!’ button in her message.” (Genschel ¶ 201.)

B. Non- Obviousness of Claim 15, 17 and 18 over Genschel and Fisher
Claim 15 is a method claim that requires the device that
communicates with a parking meter to be “integrated within” the electric
vehicle and that the device perform the recited steps. Claim 1 only requires
that the device is “associated with” electric vehicle and that the processor of
the device be configured to communicate with a parking meter, determine
payment options, receive a selection and cause the electric vehicle to
connect with the meter and provide power to the meter. Appellant argues
that the Examiner’s rejection is in error because she fails to address the
requirements of the device recited in claim 15.
Appellant’s Specification describes “integrated within” as being
different from a smart phone that is simply in the vehicle. (Spec. ¶ 12.) The
Examiner indicates that Genschel teaches the system for the described
electric energy exchange station is enabled to communicate with an electric
vehicle for the exchange with a “direct vehicle-to-server or vehicle-to-cloud
communication” as well as a key card/smart card embedded mobile
consumer device like a cell phone. (See, e.g., Ans. 12–13 (citing Genschel
¶ 17); see also Final Action 3 (citing Genschel ¶ 27 (noting that the park pod
communicates with the user through a smart card or registered vehicle).)
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not adequately
established how the fact that the exchange station described in Genschel “is
enabled to charge or discharge an electric vehicle . . . using a direct vehicle-
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to-server . . . communication” demonstrates that the vehicle has a device
integrated therein that receives vehicle power information, vehicle profile
information, and vehicle location, determines parking payment options,
receives a selection of a particular parking payment option. Nor has the
Examiner established with evidence that cars available at the time had on-
board computers with the foregoing capabilities. “[T]he examiner bears the
initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of
presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Consequently we do not affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 15,
17, and 18 as being obvious over Genschel and Fisher.
Because Gadh is not relied upon by the Examiner to address this
deficiency, we also do not does not affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims
16, 19, and 20 as being obvious over Genschel, Fisher, and Gadh.

C. Obviousness of Claims 4, 9, 12–13, and 14 over Genschel, Fisher, and
Gadh
Appellant does not argue claims 9, 12, or 14 separately. Thus, they
stand or fall with claim 8, the independent claim from which they depend for
the reasons discussed in section A above. In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
With respect to claim 4, the Examiner relies on Gadh for its teaching
of alerts being sent to electric vehicle operators when battery capacity falls
below a certain level while one is traveling to a destination and showing
near-by charging stations (including how far away they are from the current
location) and the energy costs based on the time of day if one were to charge
the vehicle there. In other words, Gadh teaches providing payment options
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(various prices one could pay at various charging stations) for charging
one’s vehicle based on the power level of the vehicle. (Ans. 19; Final
Action 12–13.) The Examiner concludes that “it would [have] been obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the
claimed invention to modify the electric energy exchange system of
Genschel et al. and Fisher et al., to include the vehicle profile information
and battery data as taught by Gadh et al. in order to provide the user with
price/payment options based on the battery data.” (Final Action 13.)
With respect to claim 13, the Examiner relies on Gadh for its teaching
of making a charging profile for a vehicle that includes setting a maximum
price and maximum time for charging the vehicle. (Final Action 15–16;
Ans. 21.) The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to
provide in the system of Genschel as modified by Fisher, a charging profile,
so that payment options (displays of price at a charging station when a
vehicle has a low battery) based on the battery data would be provided to the
user consistent with how much the vehicle operator would pay to charge the
vehicle.
We agree with the Examiner’s findings regarding Gadh and
conclusions of obviousness.
Regarding claim 4, Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection is
in error because Gadh does not teach determining payment options and does
not determine the options based on power level, the first distance, and the
second distance. (Appeal Br. 22.) We do not find Appellant’s argument
persuasive. We have discussed above with respect to claim 1, that
Appellant’s arguments regarding the requirements of determining payment
options do not match what is actually required by the claim. Furthermore,
we agree with the Examiner that Gadh teaches determination of various
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charging stations and their rates while the driver of an electric vehicle is on
route to a destination when the vehicle battery is below a threshold. (Gadh
¶¶ 27, 60, 62, 74, Fig. 4.) That information provides the driver with
payment options, the rate to be paid at various stations, and the information
is based on the power level, a first distance (i.e., the destination) and second
distance (i.e., the distance between the current location and the charging
station).
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection with respect to claim
13 is in error because it does not focus on the claim language that the
processor determines parking payment options based on the information
indicating how much is paid to charge the electric vehicle. (See Reply Br.
15.) We do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive for the reasons just
discussed, namely that the charging profile sets a maximum charge that the
vehicle owner will pay. As such, the options that would be displayed in the
alerts, would be based on how much is paid to charge the vehicle, which
must fall within the user defined maximum charge that the owner is willing
to pay.
Thus, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 9, 12–13, and
14 as being obvious from Genschel, Fisher, and Gadh.

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 5–8,
10–11, 15,
17, 18
103 Genschel, Fisher 1–3, 5–8,
10–11
15, 17, 18
4, 9, 12–13,
14, 16, 17,
19–20
103 Genschel, Fisher,
Gadh
4, 9, 12–13,
14
16, 17, 19,
20
Overall
Outcome
1–14 15–20

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART