CANTOR INDEX, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Mar 3, 2020

14456113 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 3, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/456,113 08/11/2014 Christopher John Davie 04-6187-C3 4103
63710 7590 03/03/2020
INNOVATION DIVISION
CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P.
110 EAST 59TH STREET (6TH FLOOR)
NEW YORK, NY 10022
EXAMINER
OJIAKU, CHIKAODINAKA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3696
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/03/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
lkorovich@cantor.com
patentdocketing@cantor.com
phowe@cantor.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CHRISTOPHER JOHN DAVIE
and GUY IAIN OLIVER RICHES
____________

Appeal 2019-002850
Application 14/456,113
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before KALYAN K. DESHPANDE, CHARLES J. BOUDREAU,
and SHARON FENICK, Administrative Patent Judges.

BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 28–47, which are all of the pending
claims. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.2

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Cantor Index, LLC as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 3.
2 This Decision refers to the Examiner’s Final Office Action mailed April 5,
2018 (“Final Act.”); Appellant’s Appeal Brief filed September 10, 2018
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s invention relates to “a system and a method for wagering
in a financial market environment.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Claims 28, 43, and 47 are independent. Claim 28, reproduced below,
is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
28. An apparatus, comprising:
at least one processor; and
at least one memory having instructions stored thereon
which, when executed by the at least one processor, direct the at
least one processor to:
receive a request for wagering information; and
generate an electronic command to cause to render
a graphic interface screen, to be displayed at a user
interface, at least one betting line having a value correlated
to a value of a financial indicator that changes over time
and that is displayed on the interface screen during a
betting session, in which the at least one betting line
comprises a first betting line having a value that is equal
to a current value of the financial indicator;
generate an electronic command to cause to render
on the graphic interface screen, to be displayed at a user
interface, a first graphic object selectable during the
betting session for submitting an up bet request for
wagering on the value of the financial indicator achieving
a level at a later time that is above the value of the financial
indicator at a first time, in which the first graphic object
can be selected by a single user multiple different times
during the betting session to make a corresponding
multiple different wagers on the value of the financial
indicator achieving a level at the later time that is above

(“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed January 4, 2019 (“Ans.”);
Appellant’s Reply Brief filed February 28, 2019 (“Reply Br.”); and the
original Specification filed August 11, 2014 (“Spec.”).
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respective different values of the financial indicator at a
plurality of different times corresponding to the multiple
different times; and
generate an electronic command to cause to render
on the graphic interface screen, to be displayed at the user
interface, a second graphic object selectable during the
betting session for submitting a down bet request for
wagering on the value of the financial indicator achieving
a level at the later time that is below the value of the
financial indicator at the first time, in which the second
graphic object can be selected at a variety of different
times during the betting session.
Appeal Br. 22–23 (Claims App.).
REJECTIONS
Claims 28–47 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed
to non-statutory subject matter. Final Act. 2–16.
Claims 28–47 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
being anticipated by Sireau (US 2001/0032169 A1; pub. Oct. 18, 2001).
Final Act. 2, 17–24.
Claims 28–47 stand rejected on the ground of nonstatutory
obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1–20
of U.S. Patent No. 8,805,732. Final Act. 24–34.
OPINION
Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or [a] new and useful
improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court
has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to “contain[] an important implicit
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exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)).
In Alice, the Supreme Court reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The first
step in this analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed
to one of those patent-ineligible concepts,” e.g., to an abstract idea. Id.
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas include certain methods of
organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (id.
at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)); mathematical
formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental
processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). If it is determined
that the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second step of
the analysis requires consideration of the elements of the claims
“individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there
are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 78, 79). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. at 221 (alterations in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). In other words, the claims must contain an
“inventive concept,” or some element or combination of elements “sufficient
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to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the [abstract idea] itself.” Id. at 217–18 (quoting Mayo, 566
U.S. at 72–73). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
at 221.
In January 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”).3 “All
USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected
to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1.
Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as fundamental economic
practices, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong 1”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)
(9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong 2”).4
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.

3 In response to received public comments, the Office issued a further
memorandum on October 17, 2019, clarifying the Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (“October 2019
Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
4 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (Section
III.A.2).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, and conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner determines that the claims are “directed towards the
abstract idea of wagering [in] a financial market environment,” i.e., a
fundamental economic practice. Final Act. 3. The Examiner further
determines that the claim elements, considered both individually and in
combination, do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount
to significantly more than the abstract idea. Id. at 3, 5. For example, the
Examiner finds that the claim limitations “are merely instructions to
implement the abstract idea on a computer and require no more than a
generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-
understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the
industry.” Id. at 7.
Appellant argues that the claims integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application and provide an inventive concept because they are
“directed to improvements in a computer system by generating a user
interface that includes graphic objects for displaying information and
selectable for submitting information which may help reduce the amount of
transactions over the network.” Appeal Br. 10 (emphases omitted); see
Reply Br. 3, 6. According to Appellant, the claims recite an improved user
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interface comparable to that which was found to be patent-eligible in Core
Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2018). Appeal Br. 12–13; Reply Br. 4–5. Appellant further argues that the
Examiner does not adequately support the determination that the additional
elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Appeal Br. 11–12;
Reply Br. 6. Finally, Appellant argues that the claims “do not preempt all
ways of achieving the intended result because the claimed recitations are
very specific and do not cover all possible approaches.” Appeal Br. 14
(emphasis omitted).
Step 2A, Prong 1
Viewing the Examiner’s rejection through the lens of the Revised
Guidance, we agree with the Examiner that the claims recite a judicial
exception, i.e., an abstract idea. See Final Act. 3. Specifically, we agree
with the Examiner that the claims recite fundamental economic practices,
one of the certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the
Revised Guidance as a judicial exception, in the form of wagering. See id.
For example, independent claim 28 recites a “betting session,”
“submitting an up bet request for wagering on the value of the financial
indicator achieving a level at a later time that is above the value of the
financial indicator at a first time,” “make a corresponding multiple different
wagers on the value of the financial indicator achieving a level at a later time
that is above respective different values of the financial indicator at a
plurality of different times corresponding to the multiple different times,”
and “submitting a down bet request for wagering on the value of the
financial market indicator achieving a level at the later time that is below the
value of the financial indicator at the first time.” These limitations (as do
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corresponding limitations in independent claims 43 and 47) relate to
wagering, which is a fundamental economic practice. Indeed, independent
claims 28, 43, and 47 as a whole recite a fundamental economic practice in
that the claimed invention is a “system and a method for wagering in a
financial market environment.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Accordingly, the claims recite one of the certain methods of
organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance, and, thus, an
abstract idea.
Step 2A, Prong 2
Because the claims recite an abstract idea, we next look to whether the
claims recite additional elements that integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Limitations
that are indicative of integration into a practical application include
additional elements that reflect an improvement in the functioning of a
computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field. Id.
at 55. When a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the
exception into a practical application, the claim is “directed to” the judicial
exception. Id. at 51.
We determine that the additional limitations recited in the claims on
appeal do not integrate the recited judicial exception into a practical
application. For example, claim 1 additionally recites “receive a request for
wagering information.” This limitation is recited at a high level of
generality (i.e., as general means of receiving an input request associated
with wagering transactions) and amounts to insignificant pre-solution
activity. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(g).
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We agree with the Examiner that the claims otherwise merely recite
generic computer components that similarly fail to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Final Act. 7, 13, 16; Ans. 6.
For example, independent claim 28 recites “at least one processor” and “at
least one memory having instructions stored thereon which, when executed
by the at least one processor, direct the at least one processor to” perform all
of the recited steps. Claim 28 further recites “generate an electronic
command to cause to render a graphic interface screen, to be displayed at a
user interface.” Claim 28’s recited “processor,” “memory having
instructions,” “graphic interface screen,” and “user interface” are recited at a
high level of generality, i.e., as generic computer components performing
generic functions of computer processing (including generating electronic
commands), storing and displaying data, and interfacing with the user. As
the Examiner points out, these generic limitations merely apply the abstract
idea using generic computer components and indicate a field of use or
technological environment (i.e., computer network) for the wagering
activity. See Final Act. 7; Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; MPEP
§ 2106.05(f), (h). The claim limitations do not include any particular
machine that is integral to the claim. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(b).
Appellant argues that the claims are “directed to improvements in a
computer system by generating a user interface that includes graphic objects
for displaying information and selectable for submitting information which
may help reduce the amount of transactions over the network.” Appeal
Br. 10 (emphases omitted). According to Appellant, the recited user
interface provides advantages over prior art systems, similar to that which
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was patent-eligible in Core Wireless. Appeal Br. 10–13; Reply Br. 3–5
(citing Spec. ¶¶ 49–51).
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree with the
Examiner that the claims do not recite a technological improvement in
addition to the abstract idea. See Final Act. 6; Ans. 14, 16. As discussed
above, the recited “user interface” and “graphic interface screen” are merely
generic computer components performing generic functions of displaying
data and interfacing with the user. The claims “do not require an arguably
inventive set of components or methods, such as measurement devices or
techniques, that would generate new data. They do not invoke any
assertedly inventive programming.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Furthermore, as the Examiner points
out, Appellant’s argument and the cited portions of the Specification fail to
demonstrate how the recited user interface provides a specific improvement
over prior art systems, i.e., how it “may help reduce the amount of
transactions over the network and reduce computer workload including
computer resources such as memory resources, processor resources, and
network resources such as network bandwidth.” See Appeal Br. 11; Ans. 14,
16. Thus, the claims do not reflect an improvement in computer
functionality or to any other technology or technical field. See Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55; MPEP § 2106.05(a). Even in combination,
the additional limitations do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical
application because they do not impose any meaningful limits on practicing
the abstract idea.
Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that the claims are directed
to an abstract idea.
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Step 2B
Turning to Step 2B of the Revised Guidance, we agree with the
Examiner that there are no specific limitations beyond the judicial exception,
i.e., the abstract idea, that are not “well-understood, routine, and
conventional” in the field. See Final Act. 7, 11–13, 16; MPEP § 2106.05(d).
For example, we agree with the Examiner that the additionally recited
“processor,” “memory having instructions,” “graphic interface screen,” and
“user interface” (see independent claim 28) are mere recitations of generic
computer structures performing generic computer functions that are
well-understood, routine, and conventional, and thus do not amount to
significantly more than the abstract idea. See Final Act. 11–13 (citing Spec.
¶¶ 33, 35, 41, 42). As discussed above, those additional elements amount to
no more than mere instructions to apply the abstract idea using generic
computer components. Mere instructions to apply an abstract idea on a
generic computer do not provide an inventive concept. Alice, 573 U.S.
at 223–24.
Independent claim 28 additionally recites rendering on the graphic
interface screen the following elements:
at least one betting line having a value correlated to a value of a
financial indicator that changes over time and that is displayed
on the interface screen during a betting session, in which the at
least one betting line comprises a first betting line having a value
that is equal to a current value of the financial indicator;
. . . a first graphic object selectable during the betting session for
submitting an up bet request . . . in which the first graphic object
can be selected by a single user multiple different times during
the betting session to make a corresponding multiple different
wagers . . . and
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. . . a second graphic object selectable during the betting session
for submitting a down bet request . . . in which the second
graphic object can be selected at a variety of different times
during the betting session.
These limitations of rendering a “betting line,” “first graphic object,” and
“second graphic object” on the graphic interface screen simply append
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract idea.
Although Appellant argues that they include an inventive concept (Reply
Br. 6), we find that the limitations merely recite graphic elements displayed
at the user interface to facilitate performance of the abstract idea on a
computer, i.e., as the Examiner notes, to “[p]rovide an end user an
opportunity to submit a wager that is above or below the moving market line
at a designated time and monitor[] to determine whether the financial market
value was above or below the moving market line at the designated time.”
Final Act. 6; see also Spec. ¶ 33 (“User interface 16 is operable to receive
and to process requests associated with transactions relating to a wager. . . .
Accordingly, user interface 16 may include any suitable hardware, software,
personnel, devices, components, elements, or objects that may be utilized or
implemented to achieve such operations and functions in a gaming
environment.”); Sireau ¶¶ 11–12, 19, 21–22, 50–54, 63 (cited at Final
Act. 17–19) (teaching user terminal that accepts user input and is connected
to live data feed for betting on a financial market, common bets including
“up/down” bets).
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection “merely provides
conclusory statements” and is not adequately supported in accordance with
the Office’s “Berkheimer Memo,” which clarifies that an examiner’s
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conclusion that an element represents well-understood, routine, conventional
activity must be based upon a factual determination supported in writing.5
Reply Br. 6; Appeal Br. 11–12. In determining that the additional elements
are “computer functions [that] are ‘well understood, routine, conventional
activities’ previously known in the industry,” the Examiner cites the
Specification. Final Act. 11–13 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 33–35, 37–44). The
Specification generally describes and discloses various examples of a
processor (¶ 41), memory (¶ 42), and user interface (¶ 33) including a
display (¶ 35). We determine that the disclosure of the Specification
supports, and we thus find no error in, the Examiner’s determination that the
additional elements recited in claims 28–47 are well-understood, routine,
and conventional.
Reevaluating the extra-solution activity of “receiv[ing] a request for
wagering information” (see Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (stating
that a conclusion under Step 2A that an additional element is insignificant
extra-solution activity should be reevaluated in Step 2B)), we find nothing
unconventional in this step of receiving an input request associated with
wagering transactions.
Appellant further argues that the claims “do not preempt all ways of
achieving the intended result because the claimed recitations are very
specific and do not cover all possible approaches.” Appeal Br. 14 (emphasis
omitted). This argument is unavailing, as the absence of complete

5 “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter
Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP,
Inc.)” (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
memo-berkheimer-20180419.pdf.
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preemption is not dispositive. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“While preemption
may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”); Ultramercial, Inc. v.
Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court
has stated that, even if a claim does not wholly pre-empt an abstract idea, it
still will not be limited meaningfully if it contains only insignificant or token
pre- or post-solution activity—such as identifying a relevant audience, a
category of use, field of use, or technological environment.”) (citations
omitted), vacated and remanded, WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC,
573 U.S. 942 (2014) (remanding for further consideration in light of Alice).
Thus, even if the claims do not preempt the abstract idea, that alone is
insufficient to render the claims patent-eligible.
Appellant has not shown that the claims on appeal add any specific
limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine,
and conventional in the field. Appellant also provides no evidence of how
the ordered combination is unconventional or amounts to significantly more
than the abstract idea to which the claims are otherwise directed.
Accordingly, considering the claim elements individually and as an
ordered combination, we agree with the Examiner that there are no
meaningful claim limitations that represent sufficiently inventive concepts to
transform the nature of the claims into a patent-eligible application of the
abstract idea.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 28–47 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
The Examiner maps the disclosure of Sireau to each limitation of
claims 28–47. Final Act. 17–24. With respect specifically to the steps of
generating electronic commands to cause to render “a first graphic object
selectable during the betting session for submitting an up bet request . . .”
and “a second graphic object selectable during the betting session for
submitting a down bet request . . .” of independent claims 28, 43, and 47, the
Examiner cites paragraphs 50–59, 63–64, 73, and 92 of Sireau. Id. at 18–21,
24.
Addressing independent claims 28, 43, and 47, Appellant quotes
paragraphs 50–54 of Sireau and argues that “the cited portions of Sireau . . .
do[] not describe processing of up bet requests and down bet requests.”
Appeal Br. 15–17 (emphases omitted). As explained above, however, the
Examiner also cites, inter alia, paragraph 63 of Sireau, which teaches that
common bets that might be placed in the betting system include “an
‘up/down’ bet that a given market will be above or below a given level on a
given date,” as evidence of Sireau’s disclosure of the contested elements.
See, e.g., Final Act. 18–19. Appellant does not address the disclosure of
paragraph 63 of Sireau, either in the Appeal Brief or in the Reply Brief. We
review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues identified by
Appellant and in light of the produced arguments and evidence. Ex parte
Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). In the absence of
argument with respect to the disclosure of paragraph 63 of Sireau cited in the
Final Action, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection. See
id. at 1075–76 (explaining that if Appellants fail “to present arguments on a
particular issue—or, more broadly, on a particular rejection—the Board will
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not, as a general matter, unilaterally review those uncontested aspects of the
rejection”).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 28, 43, and 47, as well as dependent claims 29–42 and 44–46 not
separately argued by Appellant, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Sireau.
Double Patenting Rejection
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s nonstatutory obviousness-type
double patenting rejection is improper because it is not supported by any
analysis consistent with MPEP § 804(II)(B). Appeal Br. 19–20.
Specifically, Appellant argues that the Examiner fails to compare or show
any correspondence between the limitations of the claims on appeal and
those of the reference patent and that the Examiner also fails to perform the
factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
Id.
Appellant’s argument is persuasive, as the extent of the Examiner’s
rejection is to state that the claims on appeal “substantially recite[]” the
claim limitations of the reference patent and that “[t]he subject matter
claimed in the instant application is fully disclosed in the referenced patent
and would be covered by the patent granted since the referenced patent and
the instant application are claiming common subject matter.” Final Act. 25.
The Examiner merely reproduces the claims on appeal and those of the
reference patent without presenting any mapping between their respective
claim limitations. Id. at 26–34. This is insufficient to establish a prima facie
case.
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Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s nonstatutory
obviousness-type double patenting rejection of claims 28–47.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 28–47 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 28–47 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b).
We reverse the Examiner’s nonstatutory obviousness-type double
patenting rejection of claims 28–47.
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 28–47 is
affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
28–47 101 Eligibility 28–47
28–47 102(b) Sireau 28–47
28–47 Nonstatutory
Obviousness-type
Double Patenting
28–47
Overall
Outcome
28–47
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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED