Candance C.,1 Complainant,v.Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (Headquarters), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Dec 13, 2018

0120172489 (E.E.O.C. Dec. 13, 2018)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Candance C.,1
Complainant,

v.

Kirstjen M. Nielsen,
Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security
(Headquarters),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120172489

Agency No. HSHQ025442015

DECISION

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) accepts
Complainant’s appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s June 1, 2017
final decision concerning an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint claiming
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.

BACKGROUND

During the period at issue, Complainant worked as an Attorney-Advisor, GS-905-14, at the
Agency’s Office of Chief Counsel at Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)
Headquarters in Glynco, Georgia.

On April 3, 2015, Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint. Complainant claimed that the
Agency discriminated against her and subjected her to a hostile work environment based on sex
(female), disability (back, neck, shoulder issues, and sacroiliitis), and in reprisal for prior
protected EEO activity when:

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
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1. on October 10, 2014, the Deputy Chief Counsel (DCC) informed Complainant
that she was not allowed to have a regularly scheduled telework day as a
reasonable accommodation, and that all telework for that week was cancelled;

2. during November 24-26, 2014, the DCC informed Complainant that she would
not be taking leave during the Thanksgiving holiday, and indicated that
Complainant was lying about her leave request being approved. The DCC
approved the request several months earlier, which was substantiated through
WebTA2;

3. on December 1, 2014, the DCC denied Complainant’s request to extend her
participation in a detail to another section within the Office of the General
Counsel;

4. on December 22, 2014, the DCC never responded to Complainant’s attempts to
contact her. Complainant sought, on numerous occasions, to contact the DCC to
request telework on December 23 and 29, 2014, in accordance with her
physician’s instructions to keep her toe/foot iced and elevated. The DCC never
responded to Complainant’s messages. Complainant then elevated the request to
Chief Counsel (CC), who informed Complainant to use sick leave;

5. on December 23, 2014, the DCC issued Complainant a text message stating that
Complainant could telework “tomorrow.” The text was prepared the day before
and purposely not sent until the morning of December 23, 2014;

6. during January 1-15, 2015, Complainant requested to telework multiple times.
Although Complainant is required to request telework on a case-by-case basis,
others in her office still have standing telework days and are not held to the same
standards as Complainant;

7. on January 13, 2015, the DCC asked to speak with Complainant due to
complaints about her availability while teleworking. As of February 11, 2015, the
DCC had not discussed this issue with her;

8. as of January 13, 2015, management had not issued Complainant her Performance
Work Plan for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, even though Complainant had mentioned
this matter to the DCC;

9. since Complainant’s April 2, 2015, EEO complaint filing, the CC has assigned
her to Serve as Acting General Law Division Chief only once;

2 WebTA is the Agency’s timekeeping system.
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10. on July 17, 2015, the DCC did not permit Complainant to change her telework
days so she could participate in the Sixth Annual Take Our Daughters and Sons to
Work Day, scheduled for July 23, 2015;

11. following Complainant’s filing of an EEO complaint, and requesting reasonable
accommodation for a disability, the DCC and the CC monitored Complainant’s
leave more closely than other employees. This action was evidenced by the CC
looking for Complainant’s vehicle in the parking lot on July 31, 2015, and when
he did not see it, he assumed Complainant had left work at 3:30 pm. In actuality,
she was at work until at least 4:08 pm, as evidenced by an email sent from
Complainant’s DHS email account regarding official business;

12. on an unspecified date, the DCC informed Complainant that she was cancelling
Complainant’s attendance at the Federal Dispute Resolutions (FDR) conference
held on August 3-6, 2015, even though the conference planners were providing
Complainant with reasonable accommodations for her disabilities. Neither the
DCC nor any supervisor attempted to find out if the FDR conference could
accommodate Complainant;

13. on January 28, 2016, the DCC denied Complainant’s request for a reasonable
accommodation, which would have allowed Complainant to teach the
“Employment and Labor Law Overview: Issue Spotting” class held on Tuesday,
March 15, 2016, during the week-long training course, HSLTP-601, scheduled to
be held March 14-18, 2016. Complainant requested that the DCC allow her to
alter her telework schedule for that one week out of the entire year, which the
DCC then denied in an email;

14. on February 20, 2016, the DCC approved only 20 hours of Complainant’s request
for 60 hours of official time to respond to the EEO Investigator’s questions,
gather and organize documents, and amend her EEO complaint;

15. on unspecified dates, the DCC has treated Complainant differently from the way
the DCC treated a male coworker, by instructing Complainant to inform the DCC
on Monday as to the assignments she would work on during a telework day. The
policy was to inform the DCC of the assignments the afternoon before a telework
day; and

16. on unspecified dates, the DCC treated Complainant differently from the way the
DCC treated a female coworker, by not responding to Complainant’s after-hour
messages. The DCC responded to the female coworker’s message almost
immediately.

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After the investigation of the claims, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report
of investigation and notice of the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative
Judge or a final decision within thirty days of receipt of the correspondence. Complainant did
not respond.

On June 1, 2017, the Agency issued the instant final decision, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), finding no discrimination and finding that it did not fail to provide Complainant a
reasonable accommodation.

The instant appeal followed. On appeal, Complainant does not provide any additional statements
for briefs.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Reasonable Accommodation

To establish that she was denied a reasonable accommodation, Complainant must show that: (1)
she is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is a “qualified”
individual with a disability pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the Agency failed to
provide her with a reasonable accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(Enforcement Guidance), EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002). A qualified person with a
disability is an individual who can perform the essential functions of the position with or without
an accommodation. We presume, without so finding, that Complainant is a “qualified individual
with a disability.”

The EEO Specialist testified that she processed Complainant’s requests for reasonable
accommodation covering periods April 23, 2013 to May 13, 2013; October 10, 2014 to January
23, 2015; and February 4, 2015 to March 22, 2016. The EEO Specialist further testified that the
DCC cooperated with the Reasonable Accommodation Team in the processing of Complainant’s
requests for reasonable accommodation.

The record reflects that Complainant requested a telework reasonable accommodation on
October 10, 2014 after the Deputy Chief Counsel (“DCC”) (female, no disability),
Complainant’s first-line supervisor, had emailed Complainant and another employee indicating
that there was be no telework approved for the following week. In an October 10, 2014 email,
the record indicates that the DCC instructed Complainant to forward her request to another
individual for processing.

The record also contains a July 16, 2015 memorandum indicating that Complainant was notified
on March 31, 2015 and May 5, 2015 by the Reasonable Accommodation Team that “interim
relief was being provided and [Complainant’s] request for reasonable accommodation was being
held in abeyance pending receipt of medical documentation.”
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The memorandum indicated that Complainant still had not submitted requested documentation,
but the Agency would continue to provide interim relief, including, among other
accommodations, continued telework 2 non-consecutive days per week.

Based on this evidence, we find that Complainant has not shown that the Agency failed to
provide her a reasonable accommodation.

Disparate Treatment – Claims 1-3, 8, 9, 12, and 14

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a complainant to prevail,
he or she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if
unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited
consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the
agency to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has
met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a
preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St.
Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally
consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases.
Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action
at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service
Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of
Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health
and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department
of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).3

The Agency articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons in response to these claims.

Claims 1 and 2: Telework and Leave

Regarding claim 1, the DCC stated that she suspended telework for one week “due to personnel
shortages in the office and an upcoming hearing of the of the attorneys.” The DCC explained
that she emailed Complainant and another employee about the suspension because these two
employees where the only employees at that time on a telework schedule.

3 We presume, for purposes of analysis only and without so finding, that Complainant is an
individual with a disability.
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The DCC testified that her division consisted of 2 support staff and 5 attorneys, and during the
week of October 13, 2014, most of her staff was out on leave for various days. The DCC
explained that her decision to suspend telework that week applied equally to both employees
who were on a telework schedule, and her decision was based on the needs of the office.

The record includes a copy of an October 10, 2014 email from the DCC to Complainant and
another employee indicating that there would be no telework next week. The email states
“[w]e’ve got a lot of folks on leave next week . . .”

Regarding claim 2, the DCC testified that on September 26, 2014, she approved all three of
Complainant’s leave requests covering the period November 24-28, 2014.

The record includes a copy of Complainant’s WebTA sheet indicates that the DCC approved
Complainant’s three leave requests covering the period November 24-28, 2014, on September
26, 2014.

Claim 3: Return from Detail Assignment

The DCC testified that Complainant accepted a detail, effective October 28, 2014, in the
Procurement Division that was not to exceed 30 days. The DCC explained that following a
November 19, 2014 meeting, she extended Complainant’s detail from November 28, 2014 to
Friday, December 12, 2014. The DCC states that Complainant returned to the Office of Chief
Counsel on December 15, 2014.

The record contains a copy of a Request for Personnel Action indicating that Complainant
accepted a detail in the Procurement Division effective October 28, 2014. The personnel action
indicates that the detail was not to exceed 30 days. The record also contains an October 20, 2014
email from the Procurement Division Chief, confirming Complainant’s 30-day detail beginning
on October 28, 2014.

Claim 8: Insurance of Performance Work Plan

The DCC explained that on January 29, 2015, she informed Complainant that she was waiting
for FLECT and the Office of General Counsel leadership to complete the FY 2015 goals and the
DCC would issue the performance plan in the future. The DCC testified that Complainant
received her FY 2015 performance plan on March 25, 2015.

A copy of Complainant’s FY 2015 performance plan indicates that she signed acknowledgment
of receipt of this document on March 25, 2015.

Claim 9: Serve in an Acting Position

The DCC and the Chief Counsel (“CC”) (male, no disability) testified that Complainant served
as Acting General Law Division Chief (“GLD”) twice since she filed her formal EEO complaint
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in April 2015. Specifically, the DCC stated that Complainant served as Acting GLD on
December 4, 2015 and February 26-29, 2016.

The CC explained that Acting Chief assignments determined by rank. The CC further explained
that the Agency would select a GS-15 employee over a GS-14 for an Acting Chief assignment.

The record contains a February 23, 2016 email announcing that Complainant served as Acting
Chief from February 26 – 29, 2016. The record contains a chart listing all Acting Chiefs. The
chart indicates that Complainant also served as Acting Chief on December 4, 2015. The chart
further indicates that

Email correspondence, dated February 24, 2016, from the CC to Complainant indicates that the
CC explained that he follows an order of succession when determining Acting Chief
assignments.

Claim 12: Cancellation of Conference Attendance

The DCC stated that the conference was not cancelled and Complainant attended the conference.
The DCC explained that soon after Complainant received her confirmation for the conference,
the DCC emailed Complainant a copy of the FLETC’s Interim Relief and Continued Abeyance
Regarding [Complainant’s] Request for Reasonable Accommodation. The document included
Complainant’s physician’s recommendation that Complainant should not work more than two
consecutive days from her office. The DCC stated that she consulted with the attorney assigned
to Complainant’s reasonable accommodation request. The DCC explained that she informed
Complainant that she could not allow Complainant to work outside of her limitations and attend
the conference. However, the DCC testified that Complainant provided documentation that she
spoke with the conference planners who agreed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation
approved by her physician so she could attend.

The record contains a copy of a memo, dated July 16, 2015, regarding Interim Relief and
Continued Abeyance Regarding [Complainant’s] Request for Reasonable Accommodation. The
document includes the recommendation of Complainant’s physician that Complainant not work
from the office more than 2 days in a row.

The record also includes a July 17, 2015 email from the DCC to Complainant informing
Complainant that she cannot attend the conference due to her work restrictions. The email
indicates that the DCC offered Complainant the opportunity to attend a one-day employment law
seminar as an alternative to attending the conference.

Email correspondence from Complainant indicates that she received confirmation from the
conference planners that they could provide her a reasonable accommodation for the duration of
the three-day conference which was reviewed and approved by Complainant’s physician.

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Claim 14: Official Time for EEO Complaint

The DCC testified that she has never granted any employee 60 hours or more of EEO official
time to respond to an EEO investigator’s questions. The DCC further testified that she approved
20 hours of official time but denied Complainant’s request to use this time to exclusively work
on her EEO complaint, given the size of the office and the nature of Complainant’s workload.
DCC explained that she consulted with the EEO Director to explain the nature of the task so that
she could determine an appropriate amount of time Complainant would need to complete this
task. The DCC stated that she indicated in her email to Complainant that she approved 20 hours
of official time “at the time” in the event Complainant “would renew her request if the 20 hours
provided was insufficient.”

The record includes a copy of Complainant’s February 3, 2016 email requesting that the DCC
approve 60 hours of official time for Complainant work “full-time” on completing her affidavit,
attachments, and amendments. The record also includes the DCC response, dated February 12,
2016, indicating that she currently approved 20 hours of official time. The DCC denied
Complainant’s request to exclusively work on her EEO complaint and due to staffing constraints
and because Complainant’s assignments could not be reassigned.

After careful consideration of the record, we conclude that neither during the investigation, nor
on appeal, has Complainant proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that these proffered
reasons for the disputed actions were a pretext for unlawful discrimination based on her sex,
disability, and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity. We also determine that the Agency
determination on official time was proper.

Hostile Work Environment – All Claims

To establish a claim of discriminatory hostile environment harassment, Complainant must show
that: (1) he belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) he was subjected to harassment in the
form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment
complained of was based on his statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or
condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the
work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and
(5) there is a basis for imputing liability. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.
1982).

In other words, to prove her harassment claim, Complainant must establish that she was
subjected to conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive that a “reasonable person” in
Complainant’s position would have found the conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant
must also prove that the conduct was taken because of her protected basis – in this case, sex,
disability, and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity. Only if Complainant establishes both of
those elements – hostility and motive – will the question of Agency liability present itself.
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Here, Complainant simply has provided inadequate evidence to support her claim that treatment
was the result of her sex, disability, and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity.

As discussed above, we found that Complainant did not establish, with respect to claims 1 - 3, 8,
-9, 12, and 14, a case of discrimination on any of her alleged bases. Further, we conclude that a
case of harassment is precluded for these claims based on our finding that Complainant failed to
establish that any of the actions taken by the agency were motivated by her protected bases. See
Oakley v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000).

As already noted, to establish a claim of harassment, the incidents must have been “sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Complainant's] employment and create an abusive
working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The harasser's
conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person in the victim's
circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., EEOC Notice No.
915.002 (Mar. 8, 1994) (Enforcement Guidance on Harris). The evaluation “requires careful
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its
target.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). The anti-
discrimination laws are not a “general civility code.” Id.

We find that remaining claims 4-7, 10-11, 13, and 15-16 also fail to support a finding that the
Agency subjected Complainant to discriminatory harassment.

Regarding claims 4 and 5, the DCC testified that she exchanged test messages with Complainant
on December 22, 2014, and expressed her concern for Complainant’s toe. The DCC further
testified that she also informed Complainant she was “out of the office with sick children.” The
DCC explained that she granted Complainant’s telework request via text message on December
23, 2014 at 6:01 am. The DCC stated that she could not respond sooner because she and her
husband and two children were sick with the flu.

Text messages between Complainant and the DCC indicate that on December 22, 2014, the DCC
stated DCC stated “fingers crossed it’s not broken. I’m out today with sick kids,” and on
December 23, 2014, the DCC approved Complainant’s telework request.

Regarding claims 6 and 15, the DCC testified that Complainant and another male Comparator
were “held to the same standard regarding requesting to telework and summary of work to be
performed while on telework.” The DCC explained that Complainant was held to the same
standards “prior to Complainant being granted telework as interim relief under the current
reasonable accommodation request.” The record includes email correspondence from December
30, 2014 through January 15, 2015, between Complainant and the DCC discussing the terms of
Complainant’s telework schedule as an interim reasonable accommodation.

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Regarding claim 7, the DCC explained that she asked to speak with Complainant after the DCC
had received complaints about Complainant’s “availability during her telework, her over reliance
on support staff on telework day, and her judgment on whether to telework at all when the
demands of her cases required her presence.”

Regarding claim 10, the DCC testified that she denied Complainant’s request to change her
telework days because the change would have resulted in Complainant being in the office for
two consecutive days which was inconsistent with Complainant’s physician’s reasonable
accommodation recommendation that she not work two consecutive days in the office. The
DCC explained that Complainant was scheduled to teach a training on July 24, 2015 and the
Annual Take Our Sons and Daughters to Work Day was scheduled for the day before.

Regarding claim 11, the DCC and the CC both denied that Complainant was monitored more
closely for leave purposes, and the CC stated that he did not recall the event of July 31, 2015.
The CC testified that on one occasion he was looking for Complainant to discuss a case and was
informed by other employees that Complainant had left for a medical appointment. The CC
explained that he spoke with the DCC regarding Complainant’s attendance after employees
inquired why Complainant could attend a medical appointment without taking leave.

Regarding claim 13, the DCC stated that she denied Complainant’s request because the request
occurred after the DCC had already scheduled two employees to co-teach the March 15, 2016
course. The DCC explained that she offered Complainant the opportunity to teach the same
course later in the fiscal year.

The record indicates that on January 27, 2016, Complainant and another co-worker were asked
whether they would be interested in co-training on March 15, 2016. The record further indicates
that in a January 28, 2016 email at 12:48 pm, the DCC indicated that the other co-worker had
agreed to teach the course. Subsequently, Complainant requested in a January 28, 2016 email at
1:14 pm, to alter her telework schedule so that she could conduct the training.

Regarding claim 16, the DCC testified that the co-worker Comparator Complainant referenced
had a different position than Complainant. The DCC explained that the co-worker was in a staff
support position, was relatively new, and had a tour of duty that began before the DCC arrived at
the office. The DCC stated that the co-worker is responsible for incoming call and “is often
aware of time-sensitive assignments from the Chief Counsel or the Department before [the
DCC’s] duty day begins.” In contrast, the DCC explained that Complainant was not a new
employee and her position, attorney-advisor, requires that she “act independently on the cases for
which she is assigned.”

We find that considering the allegations the remaining claims, even if true, Complainant has not
shown evidence that considerations of sex, disability, or retaliatory animus motivated
management’s actions toward Complainant. The incidents involved are of a type that typically
arise out of workplace conflicts or communications. However, EEO laws are not a civility code.
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Rather, they forbid “only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment.” Oncale, 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). After careful review of the record,
including Complainant's contentions on appeal, we find that Complainant failed to demonstrate
that the Agency discriminated against her as alleged.

We AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision because the preponderance of the evidence of record
does not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact
or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party
shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for
reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405;
Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the
Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC
20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a
legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The
agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal
(FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party.
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Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action,
you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or
department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do
so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may
request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The
court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter
the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to
File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

December 13, 2018
Date