Candace C.,1 Complainant,v.Daniel M. Tangherlini, Administrator, General Services Administration, Agency.Download PDFEqual Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 29, 20160120151046 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 29, 2016) Copy Citation U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Federal Operations P.O. Box 77960 Washington, DC 20013 Candace C.,1 Complainant, v. Daniel M. Tangherlini, Administrator, General Services Administration, Agency. Appeal No. 0120151046 Hearing No. 520-2015-00013X Agency No. GSA-14-R2-Q-0023 DECISION On January 12, 2015, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s December 16, 2014, final order concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) et seq. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order. BACKGROUND At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant was a Student Trainee, GS-05, in the Agency’s Federal Acquisition Service (FAS) Transportation Department and Supply Operations Branch located in New York, New York. Complainant was first appointed as a Student Trainee (Supply) effective March 26, 2012. Complainant was terminated from her position effective January 29, 2014. On April 9, 2013, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her. The Agency defined Complainant’s complaint as alleging: 1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website. 0120151046 2 1. Complainant was subjected to discrimination on the bases of race (Pacific Islander), color (non-white), and national origin (Filipino) when on December 12, 2013, Complainant was notified that the Agency was not going to convert her to a term or permanent employee and she would be terminated effective January 28, 2014. 2. Complainant was subjected to discrimination based on sex (female) when she performed duties equivalent to a GS-11 and GS-12 from October 2012 to December 2013, while Complainant was employed at the Agency as an intern. 3. Complainant was subjected to discrimination based on disability and in reprisal for prior EEO activity when on December 24, 2013, Complainant was accused by her supervisor of cursing in an electronic mail message Complainant wrote to him explaining the duties she performs in the branch. 4. On January 14, 2014, Complainant learned Agency Counsel submitted an exception request, on behalf of management, not to participate in mediation regarding her claims. On February 13, 2014, the Agency accepted claims (1) and (2) for further processing. The Agency dismissed claim (3) for failure to state a claim. In addition, the Agency dismissed claim (4) for mootness. The Agency noted that mediation concerning all of Complainant’s EEO claims was held on February 3, 2014. At the conclusion of the investigation on the accepted claims, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely requested a hearing. The AJ assigned to the case determined sua sponte that the complaint did not warrant a hearing and over Complainant's objections, issued a decision without a hearing on December 8, 2014. At the outset, the AJ addressed the Agency’s dismissal of claims (3) and (4). The AJ determined the Agency properly dismissed claim (3) for failure to state a claim. The AJ stated that with regard to claim (3), Complainant alleged she was accused of doing something negative, namely cursing in an electronic mail message. The AJ found this allegation failed to state a claim. In addition, the AJ found the Agency properly dismissed claim (4) relating to Agency counsel’s request to not have management participate in mediation. The AJ noted the Agency dismissed this claim as moot, since mediation was held on February 3, 2014. The AJ stated an Agency’s decision not to engage in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) may not be the subject of an EEO complaint. The AJ noted that Complainant was terminated from her position as a Student Trainee (Supply) effective January 29, 2014. The AJ stated because Complainant did not receive a positive recommendation, she was not hired as a full-time employee. The AJ noted that concerns regarding Complainant’s conduct while she was an intern trainee were well documented. 0120151046 3 Specifically, the AJ cited concerns identified in Complainant’s performance plan and appraisal for rating period October 1, 2012, through September 30, 2013, and numerous memos from different people all addressing concerns about Complainant. The AJ noted that nine interns were hired as full-time employees at the completion of their internship program. The AJ noted that four of those interns were white and five were non-white. The AJ stated there was no evidence that any of them had any issues with their conduct. The AJ noted Complainant also claimed that the Agency violated the EPA when she allegedly performed duties equivalent to a GS-11 and GS-12 from October 2012 to December 2013, while employed as an intern. Specifically, the AJ noted that Complainant contended that from October 2012 through February 2013, she performed “Air Clearances, G3’s for pending orders, and made spreadsheets for [her] former branch manager.” The AJ noted that Complainant also added that “Since February 2013, I have done Sea Vans and still did spreadsheets and helped out with Air Clearances.” The AJ noted that Complainant claimed that she did this type of work, while her female Branch Manager (S1) and S2 [male, Supply Chain Management Branch Chief] did not know how to do this work. The AJ noted that Complainant contended that she did work that both a male and female employee at higher grade levels (S1 and S2) could not do. The AJ also stated Complainant’s evidence was confusing because although she was trying to argue sex discrimination, she also pointed to a female comparative who was apparently paid more than Complainant but allegedly was doing the same level of work as Complainant. The AJ stated Complainant’s true argument appeared to be that she should not have been fired, because, in her opinion, she was doing work that her superiors were incapable of doing. The AJ found Complainant’s argument missed the larger point that she was terminated largely due to her conduct and inability to work in a team setting. The Agency subsequently issued a final order on December 16, 2014. The Agency’s final order fully implemented the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged. On appeal, Complainant challenges the AJ’s dismissal of two of her claims. With regard to claim (3), Complainant states she never wrote an electronic mail message to S2. Rather, Complainant states S2 falsely accused her of cursing, which she claims is harassment. Additionally, with regard to claim (4), Complainant states that the Agency did not want to resolve this matter in good faith as evidenced by management not wanting to participate in mediation. Complainant also contested the Agency’s finding of no discrimination with regard to claims (1) and (2). With regard to claim (1), Complainant avers she was terminated without a valid reason. Complainant states she received successful mid-year and final ratings from S2 and claims there was no reason to fire her. With regard to the concerns regarding her conduct, Complainant states that the Former Center Director, ordered S2, S1, Person A, and Person B to write language strong enough to remove her from government service. Complainant alleges 0120151046 4 the Former Center Director and S2 were friends and that the Former Center Director knew that S2 did not like her and sided with S2. Complainant also points out that S2 was not even her supervisor at the time, but she states that S1 was her supervisor. Finally, Complainant alleges she did not receive proper training, while the other student trainees in Contracting and Engineering were given proper training and all nine were eventually converted into federal employment. With regard to claim (2), Complainant claims the Agency violated the EPA. Complainant alleges the EPA was violated when she performed GS-11 work from October 2012 to December 2013, by doing Air Clearances. Complainant also states the EPA was violated when she performed GS-12 work from February 2013 to January 2014, including Sea Vans. She states that S2 and S1 delegated the duty of Sea Vans, a GS-12 job to her at the beginning of February 2013. Complainant states that for the last 10 years, all male Agency employees, including Comparative X and Comparative Y earned salaries equivalent to a GS-12 while performing Sea Vans. In contrast, Complainant states she was a student on a GS-05 pay grade doing such work. In addition, Complainant states the Agency violated the Pathways Student contract because Sea Vans was not indicated on the contract as a student duty. Complainant claims that S1 and S2 were supposed to know how to do Sea Vans but they did not. Complainant states that S1 and S2 tried to conceal their incompetence by passing the Sea Vans and training duties to their subordinates, Person A and Person B. Complainant alleges that Person A and Person B were upset because they knew it was the Acting Branch Chief’s job to do this duty, and they did not want to train Complainant on this duty. Complainant states she has more education than S1 and S2. Complainant states S1 and S2 became more hostile to her after she received her Master’s Degree. Complainant notes she finally learned Sea Vans on her own after seeking help from another colleague who knew Sea Vans. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b), the agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R.§ 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD- 110), at Chap. 9 § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law”). At the outset, we note that Complainant challenges the Agency’s dismissal of claims (3) and (4) of her complaint. With regard to claim (3), Complainant states she did not write the subject electronic mail message to S2. Rather, Complainant claims that S2 falsely accused her of cursing. A review of the record reveals that on November 26, 2013, after receiving her rating, Complainant sent S2 an electronic mail indicating she did not agree with the comments 0120151046 5 in her rating. Thereafter, on December 24, 2013, S2 sent an electronic mail message stating, in part, that “Your team witnessed you making disparaging remarks about your supervisor and management to the people in your branch and sometimes outside the branch on several occasions. Your team also heard you belittling others and questioning the capability of your supervisor. They even heard you cursing and screaming while talking on the phone which was disruptive to the section.” Upon review, we find that claim (3) by itself does not state a claim. However, we find that claim (3) should be considered as part of claim (1) concerning Complainant’s non-conversion. Thus, we will consider this claim below in our analysis of claim (1). Additionally, we find claim (4) was properly dismissed. Agencies have discretion to determine whether a dispute is appropriate for ADR such as mediation, and an agency’s decision not to engage in ADR may not be the subject of an EEO complaint. See EEO MD-110 at Chap. 3, §III.H (August 5, 2015). Upon review of the record, we find that the AJ properly found that the present complaint was suitable for summary judgment. We note that the record is adequately developed and there are no disputes of material fact. We first address Complainant’s claim that she was subjected to discrimination when on December 12, 2013, she was notified that the Agency was not going to convert her to a term or permanent employee and she would be terminated effective January 28, 2014. Despite Complainant’s contention that the Agency did not present a reason for its actions, we find the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision not to convert Complainant. Specifically, the Agency noted that a favorable recommendation from a supervisor was a prerequisite to conversion. The Agency explained that Complainant did not receive a favorable recommendation from her supervisor due to her performance and her attitude. In his affidavit, S2 stated Complainant was given adequate training in the Sea Vans process; however, she was unable to master the task to the necessary level. S2 noted that Complainant also repeatedly disagreed with the processes and procedures in place to process Sea Vans. In addition, S2 stated that the Supply Operation and Transportation Team witnessed Complainant make disparaging remarks about her supervisor and management to people in her branch and sometimes outside the branch. The record also contained an affidavit from Person C who became the Center Director on September 1, 2013. The Center Director stated that Complainant was not converted since she did not collaborate well with others on her team, did not take well to directions and assignments from her supervisor, and sometimes jumped the chain of command. Further, the record reveals the concerns regarding Complainant’s conduct while she was an intern trainee were also documented in Complainant’s performance plan as well as in numerous Memoranda from S2, S1, Person A and Person B, both of whom trained Complainant during the relevant time frame. 0120151046 6 In addition, we note that there is no evidence to support Complainant’s contention that the Former Center Director discriminated against her by ordering S2, S1, Person A, and Person B to write language strong enough to remove her from government service. We acknowledge the record does contain a July 2, 2013 electronic mail message from the Former Director requesting S2 to obtain detailed statements from Person A, Person B, and S2 explaining Complainant’s attitude and how “she plays like she does not know and the way that she does not cooperate with the team.” However, we also note that in his affidavit, the Former Director stated that he was in Complainant’s supervisory chain of command when she first entered the intern program. He noted that he had spoken to Complainant on numerous occasions in reference to her work performance and negative attitude towards her team peers. The Former Director stated that every time Complainant was told to do a job that she did not want to do, she went to the Deputy Director to complain about the work and how she did not want to do it. The Former Director stated that he was concerned with Complainant’s abilities and her interactions with others at work. We find Complainant has not shown that the July 2, 2013 electronic mail was anything other than an attempt by management to document their concerns about Complainant’s performance and attitude. Additionally, we note Complainant failed to produce any evidence that her training was inadequate. We note Complainant has not shown that any other interns who were converted suffered from conduct or performance issues. Upon review, we find the Agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions which Complainant failed to show were a pretext for discrimination. Moreover, we find Complainant failed to show she was subjected to discriminatory or retaliatory harassment with regard to the Agency’s actions. Next we address Complainant’s contention that the Agency violated the EPA. The United States Supreme Court articulated the requirements for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the EPA in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan. 417 U.S. 188 (1974). To establish a prima facie case of a violation under the EPA, a complainant must show that she or he received less pay than an individual of the opposite sex for equal work, requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, under similar working conditions within the same establishment. Sheppard v. EEOC, EEOC Appeal No. 01A02919 (September 12, 2000), req. for reconsideration denied, EEOC Request No. 05A10076 (August 12, 2003). All forms of pay are covered by the EPA, including salary, overtime pay, bonuses, stock options, profit sharing and bonus plans, life insurance, vacation and holiday pay, cleaning or gasoline allowances, hotel accommodations, reimbursement for travel expenses, and benefits. See EEOC Compliance Manual, Section 10: Compensation Discrimination (Dec. 5, 2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.10. Once a complainant has met the burden of establishing a prima facie case, an employer may avoid liability only by showing that the difference in pay is justified under one of the four affirmative defenses set forth in the EPA: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production of work (also referred to as an incentive or piecework system); or (4) a differential based on any factor other than sex. Id. We note that the EPA is limited to certain sex-based differentials in wages. The EPA does 0120151046 7 not prohibit discrimination in other aspects of employment, even those that have compensation- related consequences, such as hiring, firing, promotion, transfer, or other issues. Wiley v. Department of the Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01972118 (June 27, 2001) (citing Schnellbaecher v. Basking Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 130 (7th Cir. 1989) (a claim of discriminatory promotions is beyond the scope of the EPA but actionable under Title VII)). In the present case, Complainant alleges the EPA was violated when she performed GS-11 work from October 2012 to December 2013, by doing Air Clearances. Complainant also states the EPA was violated when she performed GS-12 work from February 2013 to January 2014, including Sea Vans. She states that S1 and S2 delegated the duty of Sea Vans, a GS-12 job to her at the beginning of February 2013. Complainant alleges that despite Sea Vans being part of S1 and S2’s job requirements, neither of them knew how to do Sea Vans work. We note that in her affidavit, when asked to identify any other interns who performed GS-11 and GS-12 duties, Complainant identified Person B. Complainant stated that Person B was also an intern in the Transportation Department who did Air Clearances, Sea Vans, and G3s. Complainant states she did not know Person B’s grade. Complainant also states that for the last 10 years, all male Agency employees, including Comparative X and Comparative Y earned salaries equivalent to a GS-12 while performing Sea Vans. In contrast, Complainant states she was on a GS-05 pay grade doing such work. In the present case, we note that to the extent Complainant is attempting to establish a prima facie EPA violation by comparing herself to S1 and S2, she has not established that she received less pay than an individual of the opposite sex for equal work, requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility, under similar working conditions. Specifically, we note that S1 was the same sex as Complainant. In addition, we note that S2 was a GS-14 Supply Chain Management Branch Chief. Complainant also claims that Comparative X and Comparative Y earned salaries equivalent to a GS-12 while performing Sea Vans. In contrast, Complainant states she was a student on a GS-05 pay grade doing such work. We find the record shows that as a student intern Complainant was not assigned one specific set of job duties, but rather she was moved around to learn the organization’s different functions. In the present case, we find Comparative X and Comparative Y were not appropriate comparatives as they were not GS-05 student trainees as Complainant. S2 stated in his affidavit that Comparative X was not an intern. In addition, S2 stated that Comparative Y retired before S2 joined the Agency in August 2011. The record contains an SF-50 for Comparative Y showing that he retired on April 1, 2011, as a GS-11 Supply Management Specialist. The record contains an SF-50 showing Comparative Y retired as a GS-09 General Supply Specialist on May 31, 2013. In addition, Complainant states that Person B did the same Air Clearances, Sea Vans, and G3s work that she did. The record reveals that Person B was an intern trainee during the relevant time frame. We note the record contains a SF-50 showing that effective April 7, 2013, Person B was converted from a GS-5 Student Trainee (Supply) to a GS-9 Supply Management 0120151046 8 Specialist in FAS. To the extent Complainant is alleging that Person B was a comparative, we note that Person B is a female and thus, not an appropriate comparative. In addition, we note that in her affidavit S1 states that Person B was an intern who was required to do Air Clearances, G3’s, and pending orders; however, she was not paid at the GS-11 or GS-12 level. Additionally, assuming arguendo Complainant has established a prima facie case of a violation under the EPA, we find that the Agency has shown the difference in pay was justified based on a factor other than sex. The record shows that as an intern Complainant was not assigned one specific set of job duties, but she was moved around to learn the organization’s different functions. We find the record shows that any pay difference is justified under a differential based on a factor other than sex - it was based on participation in the Student Intern Program. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Agency’s decision dismissing claim (4) and finding no discrimination with regard to claims (1), (2), and (3) is AFFIRMED. STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL RECONSIDERATION (M0416) The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that: 1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or 2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency. Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The requests may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. 0120151046 9 Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c). COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610) You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint. RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815) If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits). FOR THE COMMISSION: ______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature Carlton M. Hadden, Director Office of Federal Operations April 29, 2016 Date Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation