Canal Electric Company

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 28, 1979

245 N.L.R.B. 1090 (N.L.R.B. 1979)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Canal Electric Company and Local 480, Utility Work-
ers Union of America. Case 1 -CA- 14907
September 28, 1979
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,3 and
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to
adopt his recommended Order.4
ORDER
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND TRUESDALE
On June 26, 1979, Administrative Law Judge Da-
vid L. Evans issued the attached Decision in this pro-
ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief. Subsequently, Respondent filed a
motion to reopen the record and the General Counsel
filed an opposition to Respondent's motion.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions2 and brief
' In its motion to reopen the record, Respondent asserts that it inadver-
tently failed to include in the record a statement that it had discontinued its
sick leave policy, allegedly made to the Administrative Law Judge in camera.
As such evidence could not preclude finding a violation based on the earlier
conduct (National Maritime Union, 198 NLRB 887 (1972)), and as this state-
ment does not constitute either newly discovered or previously unavailable
evidence, nor evidence which would require a different result if adduced and
credited, we deny Respondent's motion. See Sec. 102.48(d)(1), Board's Rules
and Regulations, Series 8, as amended.
2 In its exceptions Respondent contends, inter alia, that the Administrative
Law Judge was prejudiced against Respondent. In support of this conten-
tion, Respondent has attached to its exceptions an affidavit taken from John
Fillebrown, the director of employee relations for the New England Gas and
Electric Association, of which Respondent is a member. In essence, the affi-
davit states that the Administrative Law Judge, prior to the commencement
of the hearing, requested counsel to approach the bench and stated, "There
is no sense in your going forward with this, I have reviewed this case on the
plane coming out here, and I believe that the Company is at fault, and I am
going to find against the Company, whether the Company goes forward or
not. I suggest you discuss settlement with your client."
We find no merit in this contention. Careful review of the entire record
shows no statements or other evidence indicating any bias or prejudice
against Respondent on the Administrative Law Judge's part. Although the
comment allegedly made by the Administrative Law Judge is claimed to
have been directed to counsel for both Respondent and the General Counsel,
no protest was made by Respondent's counsel at that time.
In this connection, we note that, although Respondent's counsel was alleg-
edly a party to the discussion and was the attorney filing the exceptions brief,
the affidavit supplied in support of the present claim is made by a nonpartic-
ipant in the discussion. Furthermore, counsel for the General Counsel has
filed a motion for special permission to submit a statement denying the
alleged misconduct of the Administrative Law Judge. We deny the General
Counsel's motion inasmuch as no reason is asserted for the failure to file
cross-exceptions or a brief in answer to Respondent's exceptions within the
time period prescribed by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations,
Series 8, as amended.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Administrative Law Judge did make the
comment as alleged, it was incumbent upon counsel for Respondent immedi-
ately to request that the alleged statement be repeated on the record, make a
timely objection thereto on the record, and move that the Administrative
Law Judge disqualify himself. Not only did Respondent not avail itself of
this opportunity, but in fact no claim of impropriety was made until after the
Administrative Law Judge had issued his Decision herein, when the attack
was included as part of Respondent's exceptions to that Decision. Under
these circumstances, we find that Respondent's contention is not timely
raised.
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-
der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or-
ders that the Respondent, Canal Electric Company,
Sandwich, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
said recommended Order, except that the attached
notice is substituted for that of the Administrative
Law Judge.
In any event. the Administrative Law Judge's findings and conclusions are
fully supported by the record evidence and are in accord with applicable
precedent. Accordingly, there is no basis for finding prejudice by the Admin-
istrative Law Judge in making his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
recommended Order.
3 Respondent excepted, inter alia, to the following inadvertent errors in the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision: (I) the reference to the case being
heard pursuant to a charge filed on August 31, 1979, in the statement of the
case should be to an amended charge filed on September I 1, 1978; (2) in Sec.
Ill, A, of his findings of fact the Administrative Law Judge stated that the
appropriate bargaining unit was composed of, "All employees employed by
the Employer at its Freezer Road, Sandwich, Massachusetts, plant, exclusive
of office clerical employees, guards, professional employees, control room
supervisors and all supervisors as defined in the Act." The description of the
bargaining unit should be "All employees employed by the Employer at its
Freezer Road, Sandwich, Massachusetts, plant, but excluding office clerical
employees, guards, professional employees, control room supervisors, and
supervisors, as defined in the Act"; (3) the Administrative Law Judge also
stated in his findings of fact that John Fillebrown was Respondent's labor
relations manager, but the record establishes that he is the director of em-
ployee relations for New England Gas and Electric Association (of which
Respondent is a member); (4) the Administrative Law Judge in his findings
of fact erred in stating that Henry Lawrence posted the Union petition when
in fact it was posted by George Elliott; (5) the Administrative Law Judge
erred in his findings of fact by stating that Respondent offered the Union a
summary of unitwide absences from December 26, 1966, to July 26, 1977,
when the record establishes that Respondent offered the Union a summary
of unitwide absences from December 26. 1976, through December 1977.
Although we find merit in Respondent's aforementioned exceptions we
further find that these exceptions do not affect the final disposition of this
case.
'We have modified the Administrative Law Judge's notice to conform
with his recommended Order.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to supply Local
480, Utility Workers Union of America, with in-
formation relevant and necessary to enable the
labor organization to fulfill its obligations as bar-
gaining representative of our employees in the
unit described below:
245 NLRB No. 141
1090
CANAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
All employees employed at our Freezer Road,
Sandwich, Massachusetts plant, but excluding
office clerical employees, guards, professional
employees, control room supervisors, and su-
pervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees
in the exercise of their rights protected by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish Local 480, Utility Workers
Union of America with all 1977-78 absentee rec-
ords of employees employed in the unit de-
scribed above, including specifically all docu-
ments entitled "Daily Time Sheet," "Reporting
Absence," and "Absentee Calendar."
CANAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID L. EVANS, Administrative Law Judge: This case
was heard in Boston, Massachusetts, on April 9, 1979, pur-
suant to a charge filed on August 31, 1979, by Local 480,
Utility Workers Union of America, herein called the
Union; and a complaint issued thereupon by the General
Counsel alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act by withholding certain information from
the Union. The General Counsel and Respondent have filed
briefs which have been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case, including my observa-
tion of the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
All employees employed by the Employer at its
Freezer Road, Sandwich, Massachusetts, plant, exclu-
sive of office clerical employees, guards, professional
employees, control room supervisors and all supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
At the time of the hearing there were 68 employees in this
unit. The Respondent and the Union have been parties to
successive collective-bargaining agreements, the most re-
cent of which took effect June I, 1977, and expires on May
31, 1980. Relevant portions of the contract are:
ARTICLE II
MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS
Section 1. The Union recognizes that the management
of the Company and the direction of its working affairs
including the right to hire, discipline, suspend, dis-
charge, promote, demote, or transfer for sufficient and
reasonable cause, and generally to control and super-
vise the Company's operations and to exercise the
other customary functions of management in carrying
on its business remain with and are vested in the Com-
pany subject to the other provisions of this Agreement.
If the Union claims that the Company has exercised
the right to suspend, discipline, discharge, or demote
without just cause, such claim shall be subject to the
grievance procedure in Article XIX and arbitration un-
der Article XXI
If the Union claims that the Company has exercised
any of the other foregoing rights in a capricious or
arbitrary manner, then such claim shall be subject to
the grievance procedure in Article XIX and arbitration
under Article XXI.
*
ARTICLE XIII
Respondent, a Massachusetts corporation, is a public
utility with its principal office located in Sandwich, Massa-
chusetts. Annually its revenues exceed $250,000, and it pur-
chases goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from
sources outside Massachusetts. I find, as Respondent ad-
mits, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find
that Local 480, Utility Workers Union of America is a la-
bor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
In 1969 the Union was certified by the Board as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of the following group of
employees:
SICK BENEFITS
Section 2.
a. Prompt notification of sickness or disability is re-
quired, and a claim form prescribed by the Company
to be completed by a physician and the employee may
be required for one or more days of sickness and must
be furnished beginning with the eighth day of sickness
or the first day of disability as the result of non-occu-
pational accident.
d. Sick-pay benefits shall not be payable for any pe-
riod of disability for which the employee is not under
treatment by a legally qualified physician, except as
noted in Section 2. a. above.
The grievance procedure of article XIX referred to in article
II has no stated time limit for initial filings.
General Counsel called two witnesses, employees Henry
Lawrence and George Elliott. Lawrence was president of
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DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Union from September 1977 until September 19, 1978'.
when he resigned from the Union. Lawrence was succeeded
by Elliott, who was still union president at the time of the
hearing. Lawrence and Elliott testified about Respondent's
imposition of an absentee rule in 1978, the Union's griev-
ances over the rule and its applications, the Union's re-
quests for information regarding the rule and those griev-
ances, and Respondent's responses to those requests.
Although it filed a detailed answer, Respondent offered no
evidence which conflicted with the testimony of Lawrence
and Elliott, and, although the testimony is somewhat gener-
alized, I accept it as true.
On July 18, Elliott, as "union representative," accompa-
nied employee Gary Lucier to the office of Joseph Kuliga,
chief engineer. Present for Respondent were Kuliga, Tom
Davis, and Jim Greenwood. Kuliga informed Lucier that
he "had reached three incidents and 40 hours and that he
would be required to bring a doctor's certificate for the next
day or number of days of his next illness." Elliott asked
Kuliga if the Respondent was instituting a new policy. Ku-
liga responded "the incident (sic) of absenteeism is going up
and we must maintain control." Elliott requested the meet-
ing to be considered a first step grievance and Kuliga,
Greenwood, and Davis agreed.2
On July 26, the parties met in a meeting at which several
grievances were discussed. Although the context is not
clear, Lawrence testified that "some instances of the sick
policy (were) coming up." Respondent's representatives (in-
cluding Kuliga and John Fillebrown, labor relations man-
ager) responded "they felt that the absenteeism was becom-
ing abusive and that some people were abusing the sick
policy as stated in the contract." In support of this conclu-
sion Respondent's representatives recited statistics includ-
ing "the ratio of five point so many days per year on up to
September or October." Lawrence demanded to know what
type of absences were included in the oral recitations of
statistics and "a written letter on how the Company is going
to administer the new policy that they are talking about."
He told Respondent's representatives that he needed the
information "for individuals who are going to be called up
and told that they would have to bring in doctors' certifi-
cates whether they had accrued that amount of sick time,
how it was accrued, and to present a grievance formally, I
would have this information." No information other than
the recited statistics was provided at the meeting.
On August 14 Lawrence sent Respondent the following
letter:
Gentlemen:
Local 480 hereby requests the following information
pertinent to the sick policy by no later than Friday
August 18, 1978.
How the sick pay policy was administered before the
recent change was made, and a copy in writing of new
policy. Names of union employees and attendance rec-
ords from the commencing of the 1975 contract to pre-
sent date. In this period of time did the Company re-
quest any Doctors certificates and for what reason.
All dates are in 1978, unless otherwise specified.
It is not alleged that institution of this rule was a unilateral action in
violation of Sec. 8(aXS) of the Act.
According to Lawrence's testimony on cross-examina-
tion, by August 25 several grievances had been filed with
respect to the institution of the new policy, but none was
placed in evidence. On that date there was another general
grievance meeting. The Union reiterated its requests, in-
cluding specifically, according to Lawrence, "attendance
records of the employees, the information to whether it was
a non-occupational accident or occupational accident, what
determined the sickness, how we would determine sickness
and so forth and so on." Lawrence told Respondent's repre-
sentatives that he needed the information to "police the
contract."3 In the August 25 meeting Respondent's repre-
sentatives refused to provide any individual absentee rec-
ords on the grounds that they were "private." Lawrence
volunteered to get releases from all employees. After the
meeting he posted a petition with authorized the release to
the Union of the signatories' absentee records. There were
58 of the 68 employees who signed the petition which Elliot
presented to Kuliga, again requesting all absentee records.
Kuliga rejected the petition and denied the request.
Additional meetings were held between August 25 and
Lawrence's September 19 resignation. At one of the meet-
ings the Respondent gave a more detailed recitation of the
figures reflecting a rise in the rate of 1978 absenteeisms over
the preceding years' as a justification for the new policy.
The Union again demanded to see the records which sup-
ported the orally recited statistics; Respondent refused each
time.
On September 27 Respondent proffered the Union a
summary of unitwide absences from December 26, 1966,
through July 26, 1977. The Union demanded the individual
records supporting the summary: again the request was de-
nied.
The record discloses only one reason given the Union for
the refusals, confidentiality (or private). Specifically, the
record does not disclose that the Union was ever told that
its request for information was irrelevant to either actual or
potential grievances.
After imposition of the policy, Respondent did show Elli-
ott his records so he could ascertain which of his absences
he had been charged with under the policy. Respondent
also showed individual grievants their records after they
had been notified that their absences had brought them
within the purview of the new rule by accumulating 40
chargeable hours in three separate absences. However, until
the time of the hearing' the Union had not been furnished
either a written explanation of the policy or the absentee
records of all employees.
Respondent placed into evidence examples of three types
of records maintained for each employee. "Reporting Ab-
sence" slips are filled out by whoever takes a call from a
unit employee reporting that he will be absent. The slip
bears the reason stated by the caller such as "sick" or "flu."
I When asked what he meant by the term "police" Lawrence couched his
answers in terms of appraising individual grievances, However, there is no
evidence that Respondent asked for or was given a precise definition of the
term "police" as then used by Lawrence, and there is nothing in the answers
he gave Respondent which would limit the stated necessity to implementa-
tion of the policy as opposed to its institution.
' In its brief Respondent raises the contention that the case is moot since
the policy was withdrawn on January 5. 1979. This factual assertion is not
supported by the record.
1092
CANAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
The person who takes the call may be a unit employee or a
supervisor depending, apparently, on who is available when
the telephone rings. The slips are signed by the department
supervisor and forwarded to the payroll clerk. Stella Dvor-
sky, who testified on behalf of Respondent. Dvorsky rec-
ords all absences on a daily summary of absences entitled
"Daily Time Sheet." Each day's sheet(s) reflect who was
absent, whether it was a scheduled day off, and whether the
absence fell under "Accident (Work Comp.)" or "Personal-
Not Paid" or other categories. For each employee Respon-
dent maintains an "Absentee Calendar" which, in a color-
coded display, shows which days of the year the employee
was absent and the category to which the absence was as-
signed including "vacation," "sick," or "Work Comp. Acci-
dent," which are designated "Paid Absences" and "Person-
al,""Union Time" and "Other" which are designated as
"Not Paid." Whether all forms of paid sick leave were
being charged against employees under the new policy was
a concern of the Union and a stated basis for its requests for
documentation.
B. Concluding Findings
The General Counsel contends that by withholding from
the Union the documents upon which Respondent relied as
a justification for its implementation of the new policy, Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. As a remedy,
the General Counsel seeks all documents entitled "Report-
ing Absence," "Daily Time Sheet,"' and "Absentee Calen-
dar" for unit employees during 1977 and 1978. Respondent
produced examples of these forms and it is not in dispute
that these documents are those upon which Respondent
premised its new absentee policy and upon which it based
the figures given the Union as the reason for the policy.
Respondent contends that the records are irrelevant to any
pending grievance, and that, even if they are somehow rel-
evant to the Union's performance of its statutory obliga-
tions, they are of a confidential nature and it should not be
compelled to disclose the records.
In addition to the fact that Respondent never told the
Union it was denying the Union access to the documents
because they were irrelevant, they are obviously relevant to
pending grievances. As the testimony elicited by Respon-
dent discloses, by August 25 there were pending grievances
with respect to the institution of the new policy. There is no
record evidence that those grievances have been withdrawn.
It is beyond question that the new policy is a disciplinary
one. Article 11 of the contract prohibits "arbitrary" exer-
cises of the right to discipline employees. The records re-
quested by the Union may well demonstrate to an arbitra-
tor that the number and nature of the absences do not
justify Respondent's action and that institution of the pol-
icy was "arbitrary." Or an arbitrator may well decide that,
despite the records, article XIII permits this change in pol-
icy, as Respondent contends. But the disclosures of the rec-
ords may also convince the Union, short of arbitration, that
Respondent was justified by practical considerations,
I At the hearing, the General Counsel did not request the daily time sheet,
but does so in its bnef since the sheets do show, for each day, who was
absent and how it was recorded.
whether its action was consonant with article XIII or not.
Additionally, I am not prepared to say that the records
would be irrelevant to the pending grievances over the ap-
plications of the policy, especially since none of them are in
evidence. That is, agreement with Respondent on this point
would require a speculative analysis which is precisely the
type of inquiry which the Supreme Court found unneces-
sary and undesirable in N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Co.,
385 U.S. 432 (1967). 6
But even if there were no pending grievances over the
institution or applications of the policy to which the infor-
mation is relevant, my conclusion would be the same. No
pending grievance is required. As concisely stated by Judge
Schieder in his Decision affirmed by the Board in Ohio
Power Company, 216 NLRB 987, 991 (1975):
It is not required that there be grievances or that the
information be such as would clearly dispose of them.
The union is entitled to the information in order to
determine whether it should exercise its representative
function in the pending matter, that is, whether the
information will warrant further processing of the
grievance or bargaining about the disputed matter. As
the Supreme Court said in Acme Industrial at 438:
Arbitration can function properly only if the griev-
ance procedures leading to it can sift out unmerito-
rious claims. For if all claims originally initiated as
grievances had to be processed through to arbitra-
tion, the system would be woefully overburdened.
Yet, that is precisely what the respondent's restric-
tive view would require. It would force the union to
take a grievance all the way through to arbitration
without providing the opportunity to evaluate the
merits of the claim . . . nothing in Federal Labor
Law requires such a result.
In that case the Court further said, quoting The Fafnir
Bearing Co., 362 F.2d 716,721 (C.A. 2. 1966):
By preventing the Union from conducting these
studies [for an intelligent appraisal of its right to
grieve], the Company was, in essence, requiring it to
play a game of blind man's bluff.
In summary, as the Respondent suggests in its brief,
the results of the decided cases have been mixed, but
the basic principle remained quite consistent: a bar-
gaining representative is entitled to information rel-
evant to the performance of its obligations as such rep-
resentative. The differences in results in the decided
cases reflect, not differences over the applicable princi-
ple, but rather judgment as to the relevancy of the re-
quested information to the performance of the repre-
sentative obligation in the specific situation.
The Union has two representative obligations to which the
requested information is relevant. First, as just discussed, it
would be relevant to the function of processing extant
6 As stated therein, "The only real issue in this case. therefore, is whether
the Board must await an arbitrator's deterrnnation of the revelancy of the
requested information before it can enforce the Union's statutory right under
Section 8(a(5)." The Court found In the negative, as I do here.
1093
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
grievances or filing new' ones. Second, the Union may use
the information to attempt to secure modification or reci-
sion of the policy.' In either event, the Union has the statu-
tory right to challenge the imposed policy. This right would
be stultified if it had to be exercised from a position of
ignorance by blind acceptance of Respondent's recitations
of unsupported statistics. That is, the requested information
is relevant to the performance of the Union's statutory ob-
ligations, as I herein find and conclude.
Respondent contends that even if relevance is found,
considerations of confidentiality outweigh the Union's need
for the information, and therefore it should not be dis-
closed.
Respondent does not contend that the information re-
quested itself contains any confidential information.9 It con-
tends, however, that should the records be given to the
Union, the displayed pattern of absences could, in some
cases, be taken by the Union to reflect conduct symptoma-
tic of alcoholism, that the Union may "leak" its informa-
tion and deductions to other employees, and that the em-
ployees (who are correctly or incorrectly "accused" of
alcoholism) may be subject to ridicule. In support of this
argument Respondent only produced evidence that it is a
member of an employer group which maintains an alcohol
abuse treatment program. Respondent is to be commended
for its program. But assuming the existence of its professed
eagerness to protect its employees from the abuse which it
fears for them, Respondent is not stating a defense. The
hypothetical specter of ridicule of employees by fellow em-
ployees does not insulate Respondent from the statutory
requirement to produce upon demand information relevant
to the Union's functions as the employees' collective-bar-
gaining representative, and I so find and conclude.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent, by refusing to furnish the Union with ab-
sentee records of all unit employees for the years 1977 and
1978, including specifically all documents entitled "Report-
ing Absence," "Daily Time Sheet," and "Absentee Calen-
dar," has engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)( I) and (5) of the Act.
I As noted above, there is no stated time limit on invocation of the griev-
ance procedure.
'See Texaco, Inc., 170 NLRB 142 (1968), enfd. 407 F.2d 754 (7th Cir.
1969) where the union involved was held entitled to information regarding
previously effectuated unilateral changes because it was attempting to "bol-
ster its arguments and try to persuade Respondent to return to the status quo
ante, if it could, by checking the details upon which the Respondent therein
had premised the subject changesl."
'Therefore this case is immediately distinguishable from Detroil Edison
Co. v. N.LR.B., 435 U.S. 941 (1978), which is relied upon by Respondent.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
I shall recommend that Respondent cease and desist
from its unfair labor practices and take certain affirmative
action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon
the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the
entire record, pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby
issue the following recommended:
ORDER' °
The Respondent, Canal Electric Company, Sandwich,
Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Failing or refusing to supply Local 480, Utility
Workers Union of America with information relevant and
necessary to the performance by said labor organization of
its obligations as bargaining representative of the employ-
ees of the Respondent in the unit described in the current
contract between Respondent and said labor organization.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights protected by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action found necessary
to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Submit to the Union all 1977 and 1978 absentee rec-
ords of unit employees including specifically all documents
entitled "Daily Time Sheet," "Reporting Absence," and
"Absentee Calendar."
(b) Post at its Sandwich, Massachusetts, facility copies of
the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 1, after being duly signed by Respondent or its repre-
sentative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon
receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writing,
within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
l0 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48
of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become ts
findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
" In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of
the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board."
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