Campo Slacks, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 7, 1980

250 N.L.R.B. 420 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Campo Slacks, Inc. and J & E Sportswear, Inc. and
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC. Case 6-CA-10905
July 7, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENEI.LO AND TRUESDALE
On March 13, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
Josephine H. Klein issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondents filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed a brief in opposition to Respondents'
exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt her recommended Order, as
modified herein. 3
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
' Respondents have excepted to certain credibility findings made by
the Administrative Lasw Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to
overrule an administrative lasw judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Stundard Dry Wall Product.
Inc., 91 NI.RB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir 1951). We have
carefully examined the record and find no basis foir reversing her find-
ings.
I The Administrative L aw Judge ordered Respondents Io make em-
ployees of the cutting department in Madera, Pennsylvania, whole "by
paying all insurance and similar contributions as required by the Campo
Slacks. Inc., bargaining agreement . to [the] extent that such contrihu-
tions have not been made or that the employees have not otherwise been
made whole for their ensuing experiences . - To the extent that em-
ployees may have paid to third-party insurance companies money for
medical or dental coverage or employees may have paid directly to
health care providers for medical or dental services that the contractual
policies would have covered, we shall order Respondents to make said
employees whole, and modify the Order accordingly. See Ihe Saloon,
Inc., 247 NLRB No. 156 (1980): Ferrn Mechanical Corp.. 249 NLRB No.
83 (1980)
Because the provisions of employee benefit fund agreements are vari-
able and complex. the Board does not provide at the adjudicatory stage
of a proceeding for the addition of interest at a fixed rate on unlawfully
withheld fund payments We leave to the compliance stage the question
whether Respondent must pay any additional amounts into the benefit
funds in order to, satisfy our "make-whole" remedy These additional
amounts may be determined, depending upon the circumstances of each
case, by reference to provisions in the documents governing the funds at
issue and, where there are no governing provisions. tio evidence of any
loss directly attributable to the unlaswful withholding action, which might
include the loss of return on investment if the portion iof funds withheld,
additional administrative colsts, etc. but not collateral losses
fled below, and hereby orders that the Respond-
ents, Campo Slacks, Inc., Houtzdale and Madera,
Pennsylvania, and J & E Sportswear, Inc., Clear-
field, Pennsylvania, their officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the said recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(g):
"(g) Make whole the employees of the cutting
department in Madera, Pennsylvania, by paying all
insurance and similar contributions as required by
the Campo Slacks, Inc., bargaining agreement that
expired on September 2, 1979, to the extent that
such contributions have not been made or that the
employees have not otherwise been made whole
for their ensuing expenses; provided that Respond-
ent is not required to rescind or cancel any substi-
tute or new insurance program or plan it may have
instituted, unless the Union so requests. This make-
whole requirement shall include reimbursing em-
ployees for any medical or dental bills they them-
selves may have paid directly to health care pro-
viders that the contractual policies would have
covered, as well as any premiums that they may
have paid to third-party insurance companies to
continue medical and dental coverage in the ab-
sence of Respondents' required contributions."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
WE WILL NOT threaten to close any plant or
facility because our employees engage in union
activities or continue to choose to continue
being represented by Amalgamated Clothing
and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC.
WE WILL NOT threaten that we will refuse
to recognize Amalgamated Clothing and Tex-
tile Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, or take
unilateral action concerning wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of employment
without bargaining with the Union named
above.
WE WILL. NOT threaten employees with loss
of unemployment compensation if they contin-
250 NLRB No. 57
420
CANMP() SLACKS. INC(
ue to support the above-named Union or
engage in union activities.
WE. WII NOT solicit any employees to initi-
ate or sponsor a decertification petition aimed
at removing the Union as collective-bargaining
agent of our employees in the following appro-
priate bargaining units:
All employees employed by Campo Slacks,
Inc., at its Houtzdale, Pennsylvania, facility,
and all cutting department employees at our
Madera, Pennsylvania, facility; excluding
office clerical employees, executives, admin-
istrative employees and guards professional
employees and supervisors as defined in the
Act:
and
All employees employed by J & E Sports-
wear, Inc., at our Clearfield, Pennsylvania,
facility; excluding office clerical employees,
executives, administrative employees and
guards, professional employees and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act.
WE WILl NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WI l, upon request, bargain with the
above-named Union as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the employees
in the bargaining units described above.
WE WILL comply with requests for informa-
tion needed by the Union in order fully and
properly to protect and further the interests of
the employees in the bargaining units de-
scribed above and to negotiate and thereafter
administer and enforce collective-bargaining
agreements on behalf of the employees.
WE WILL make whole our employees in the
cutting department in Madera, Pennsylvania,
by paying all insurance and similar contribu-
tions as required by the Campo Slacks, Inc.,
bargaining agreement that expired on Septem-
ber 2, 1979, to the extent that such contribu-
tions have not been made or that the employ-
ees have not otherwise been made whole for
their ensuing expenses; provided that we are
not required to rescind or cancel any substitute
or new insurance program or plan we may
have instituted, unless the Union so requests.
This make-whole requirement shall include re-
imbursing employees for any medical or dental
bills they themselves may have paid directly to
health care providers that the contractual poli-
cies would have covered, as well as any pre-
miums that they have paid to third-party insur-
ance companies to continue medical and dental
coverage in the absence of Respondents' re-
quired contributions.
Wl wli. offer Marie Greenaway full rein-
statement to her former job, or if that job no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without prejudice to her seniority and
other rights and privileges; and wi. wi t com-
pensate Marie Greenaway for any loss she has
suffered because of her discharge or layoff on
January 3, 1978, with interest.
All our employees are free to become or remain,
or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members
of Amaglamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other labor organi-
zation, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring union member-
ship, as authorized by the proviso in Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act.
CAMPO SL.ACKS, INC.
J & E SPORTSWEAR, INC.
DECISION
JOSF.PHINEt H. Ki.EIN, Administrative Law Judge: Pur-
suant to a charge filed on January 30, 1978, and served
on Respondent on February 22, 1978,' by Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC
(hereafter called the Union), a complaint was issued and
served on April 28, 1978, against Campo Slacks, Inc.,
and J & E Sportswear (hereafter referred to as Campo
and/or J & E, or collectively as Respondent), alleging
that, in the latter part of 1977 and the early months of
1978, Respondent engaged in various acts of interference,
restraint, and coercion of employees. in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act;2 on or about January 3, 1978, it
laid off employee Marie Greenaway in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and since November 1977
it has refused to recognize and bargain with the Union in
specified manners, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act. In its answer, filed on May 9, 1978, and
amended on September 7, 1979, :3 Respondent admits
some of the allegations of the complaint, denies others,
and asserts affirmative defenses, as specifically discussed
below where pertinent.
Upon due notice, a hearing was held before me on
September 17 and 18, 1979, in Clearfield, Pennsylvania.
All parties were represented and were provided full op-
portunity to present written and oral evidence and argu-
ment, and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. At
' Amended charges were filed o,n March 16. 1978 (ser.ed on April 3
1478). and April 27, 1978
National l.ahor Relilllon, Act, i. anenided. 29 [I S C § 150). ,ir eq.
' 1 he hearing A a, oiriginall scheduled for September 19. 1978 Himt-
exer, It was postponed at the request of Ihe lnilon hbecause of ettlemenl
negoiiaions. On January IS. 1979. the hearing was indefinitely postlponed
nl the Utnioll ' staliment that a settlemenl agreemerle had heen rTeached
Hlrrwexcr, for reasons nol sho.rrn inl Ihe record, Ihe miltletr as rcched-
ulid fior hearing h5 an order istucd oin Jul, 2). 14797
421
I)ECISIO()NS 1: NA FIONAF IAIB)R R Fi A' IONS ()f: ()R I ()ARI)
the conclusion of the hearing, the parties waived oral ar-
gument. A post-trial brief has been filed on behalf of the
General Counsel. 4
Upon the basis of the whole record, as well as careful
observation of the witnesses and consideration of the
General Counsel's brief, I make the following:
FINI)IN(;S 01: F:A(I
I. PRIUI IMINARY I INI)INGS
A. Respondent Campo, a Pennsylvania corporation
with facilities located in Houtzdale and Madera," Penn-
sylvania, is engaged in the manufacture and nonretail sale
of clothing. During the year preceding the issuance of
the complaint, Campo sold and shipped goods and mate-
rials valued in excess of $50,000 from its Pennsylvania
facilities directly to points outside Pennsylvania. During
the same period. Campo purchased goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside
Pennsylvania for use at its Pennsylvania facilities.
Respondent J & E, a Pennsylvania corporation with a
facility located in Clearfield, Pennsylvania, is engaged in
the manufacture and nonretail sale of clothing. During
the year preceding the issuance of the complaint, J & E
sold and shipped goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 from its Pennsylvania facility directly to points
outside Pennsylvania. During the same period, J & E
purchased goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside Pennsylvania for use
at its Pennsylvania facility.
The complaint alleges and the answer admits that at all
times material herein, Campo and J & E have been affili-
ated business enterprises with common ownership and
control of labor relations policies and constitute a single
business enterprise and/or are joint employers.
Respondents are now, and were at all times material
herein, employers (or an employer) engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
B. The Union is now, and was at all times material
herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE At I.I ECI) UNI AIR l ABOR PRACT ICL S
A. The Background
Campo and J & E are two of a larger group of affili-
ated companies basically constituting one enterprise
owned and managed by Joseph J. Campolong, Srii
4 Although Respondent's counsel stated that he would file a brief. io{1
such brief has been received To Ihe extent possible, Respondent's posi-
lion has been gleaned from its original anld amended answers ito the com-
plaint. counsel's opening statement anid oral motion to dismiss, arid .oUtl-
sel's examination of tilnesses
I This Finding is based on an express admiission in Respondenl's ansrt. r
to the complaint Horwever, as discussed hbelow. 1i he course of the hear-
ing Respondenlt ciunsel aipparerlily corltended hat Campo had 1(m ern-
ployees in Madera
6 The record does not( disclolse precisely the nuniher of separale tiilic
or the extenl ,of Campolong' ownllership liowever. the existence o i a
Ihird company. named JRIC of Madera, Ic (hereinalfter called JHC) I is
'shown. Campolong apparently maintains hli. principa;l office and I'clilitie,
in Madera used by JtIC JItC aippears Ilo thIhe parenil corporati;on. ith
Campo and J & F as subslidiaries II alIo appciar% that sages. ail leasi
Joseph J. Campolong, Jr., is vice president of both
Campo and J & E and plant manager of Campo.
Since around 1969 or 1970, the Union has represented
employees of' Campo and J & E, L ocal No. 727A repre-
senling Campo employees and Local No. 72713 represent-
ing J & E employees. There have been separate but iden-
tical collective-bargaining agreements for the two coni-
panics. The latest contracts, as extended, expired on Sep-
tember 2, 1979, after unsuccessful negotiations for a re-
newal contract.
The Campo bargaining agreement defines the bargain-
ing unit as "all of the employees of the Employer wher-
ever employed," with the usual exclusions. When the
agreement was executed. Campo had around 70 employ-
ees, principally sewing machine operators, in Houtzdale,
and 4 or 5 cutters7 in Madera. J & E had around 40 to
50 employees in Clearfield. At the same time, JBC had
about 70 or 80 production employees working in a build-
ing across the road from the cutters in Madera.a At an
unspecified date in November 1977, the J13C employees
were moved across the road into the same building with
the cutters. JBC employees were not represented by any
union.
At the hearing, Respondent's counsel maintained that,
when the J13C employees moved ito the building occu-
pied by the Campo cutters, somehow the definition of
the bargaining unit contained in the Campo agreement
became improper and the cutters were thereupon ex-
cluded from the Campo bargaining unit. '
B. Section 8(a)(?I
In the fall of 1977 Respondent was delinquent in insur-
ance payments provided in the Campo collective-bar-
gaining agreement. Campolong resisted the Union's de-
mands. Greenaway credibly testified that Campolong.
Jr., told her "that his dad was going to like close the
plant over the hassle from the girls over the insurance."
Marion (Grace Braniff, union president and chairlady,
testified that in 1977 Campolong complained that Nicko-
las Reale, a representative of the Union's national office,
was demanding a wage increase of 25 cents per hour,
while Campolong would pay only 15 cents. Braniff testi-
fied that, in the course of his complaints, Campolong
said that the employees were "trying to run him out of
business and bankrupt him." She further testified that at
that time Campolong, Jr., referring to the requested
wage increase, said that if the employees did not "give it
a twirl," operating on Respondent's terms, Campolong,
Sr., would "close the plant down." Braniff further testi-
fied that, in talking with the six union officers concern-
ing Respondent's substituting an Aetna insurance pro-
gram for the program provided in the collective-bargain-
Iowst tf 'a;rimpo
's
mplo)tes. ire paid bh check, drisliin i the I;lne ,of
JtiC. uhich files. W 2 forms as Ihe emploer.
l7 e ssiord "ctlltcr" is used tII Inchlde "spreadlrs." who are in tihC
'tlt tlllg deCrirli i iell
N Respolndelt's origilla aii,%sef il tile o pInpnll. t bi add mitted tle ap-
prulpriiirerless ,, th1e ciltrilac liills &ellll bilragilillnig nit }thli.escr. luess
coulnsel lilter anlended the an.is er f1 dtell "tlil cult tllilg depa rtinlellit cnl
plouccs Ii'plo cd at Madcitf , I etllcii ,saJi.i. ol i ll , H IISItIi i f p airil r all ipprll-
priale Illli " ilall ciiillisel opinied lthal Responlllet's origillnal LOu. tisl did
nlol uillderstland "'lte itmporl o thai t aidlissil "
422
C(AMI'() SI.ACKS. INC(_
ing agreement. Campolong, Sr., said the employees
'"would have to give it a twirl" or he "would close the
plant down '." Although Braniffs testimony is not entirely
clear. it appears that Campolong stated the same position
concerning the method of convlertilg the plant's produc-
tion from men's wear to ladies' wear, which conversion
was made, at least in part in 1977 and early 1978.
Campolong. Jr. Respondent's only witness, did not
deny or contradict Hraniff's testimony. Thus. it stands
uncontradicted and is credited in substance. However,
Braniff was confused as to dates. After considerable
questioning by counsel for the General Counsel, she said
she "imagined" that the wage dispute occurred "more
around February and March" 1977. But other evidence
establishes that it undoubtedly occurred early in Septem-
ber 1977. Braniff testified that "there was one time Nick
Reale and [she] . . . wanted a rate on ladies' operation,"
Reale testified that in connection with a wage increase
due in Septeniber 1977, the parties disagreed as to
whether it should be computed on an hourly rate or a
piece work basis. Also, according to Reale, Campolong
wanted to compute the increase from a base of $3 per
hour, whereas Reale maintained that $3 was not the ex-
isting average wage in the shop. When no agreement
was reached in a meeting on September 6, Campolong
presented Reale a letter, already prepared, reading, in
part:
For the past twelve months, Campo has suffered
great losses. Now your demands for pension contri-
butions, and increased hourly rates that will in-
crease our losses. Competition will not allow us
these increases. It is the decision of the Board of
Directors of Campo that thirty days from this date
that Campo will cease doing business.
So far as appears, Respondent never offered to provide
economic data in support of Campolong's claim that Re-
spondent had suffered losses. And no such evidence was
forthcoming at the present hearing. Nor does it appear
that Campo ceased operating in accordance with the
letter.
On the basis of the General Counsel's uncontradicted
evidence, I find that, to discourage support of the Union
and to avoid having to deal with it, Respondent threat-
ened plant closure. It has long been recognized that such
threats are among the most serious forms of coercion,
violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See, e.g., Hanover
House Industries, Inc., 233 NLRB 164 (1977); Guardian
Ambulance Service, 228 NLRB 1127, 1128, 1132 (1977).
Cf. Ste-Mel Signs. Inc., 246 NLRB No. 177 (1979); Donn
Products, Inc. v. i.L.R.B., 103 LRRM 2338, 2341 (6th
Cir. 1980).
Greenaway testified that in the fall of 1977 Campo-
long, Jr., told her that "his dad would do what he
wanted to about the union, whether the union liked it or
not." The complaint alleges that such statement consti-
tuted an unlawful threat to take unilateral action in dero-
gation of Respondent's obligation to bargain with the
Union. The statement must be appraised in the light of
the surrounding circumstances. Among such circum-
stances are statements made to union representatives at
or about the same time. Business Agent (ialto testified
that Campolong, Sr., stated that "he had no problems
wkith" his nonunion shops and suggested that he would
prefer dealing with the Teamsters Union or with the In-
ternlitional Ladies Garment Workers Union rather than
the Amalgamated. And, as previously found. at or about
the same time the Campolongs were threatening to close
the Campo plant if the employees refused to accept Re-
spondent's unilaterally imposed terms of employment.
Considering all the evidence, I find that, as alleged, Re-
spondent threatened to take unlawful unilateral action.
The complaint also alleges that Respondent unlawfuill
threatened to deprive employees of unemployment com-
pensation if they engaged in union activities. That allega-
tion is supported by Greenaway's testimony concerning
her discharge or "permanent layoff' on January 3, 1978.
She testified that about 2 weeks after the "layoff' she in-
quired of Campolong, Jr., concerning her entitlement to
unemployment compensation. He replied that if she
"didn't give him a hassle he would let [her] sign up" for
unemployment compensation. Although Campolong. Jr..
testified thereafter, he neither denied Greenawray's testi-
mony nor sought to clarify or explain w hat sort of
"hassle" by Cireenaway he might have feared or antici-
palted
At the hearing, in moving to dismiss the complaint at
the close of the General Counsel's case, Respondent's
counsel argued that Greenaway's testimony did not con-
nect Campolong's reference to a "hassle" to any union
activity. But, as the General Counsel observes. there is
no suggestion of what "hassle" Campolong might have
anticipated other than union or other concerted activity.
Greenaway was apparently the only union officer then
working for Respondent. She had been actively pursuing
grievances. On the very day of the "layoff' she had
called on the Union for assistance because the plant was
unheated and very cold In the absence of any explana-
tion or clarification by Respondent, one can reasonably
infer that Campolong was threatening to oppose
Greenaway's receipt of unemployment compensation if
she invoked the contractual grievance procedure in
regard to her "layoff' and/or if she continued her activi-
ties as a union officer and acting chairlady.9 The threat
obviously violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
The final independent violation of Section 8(a)( I) al-
leged in the complaint is Respondent's solicitation of a
decertification petition. In this connection Greenaway
testified that in the summer of 1977 Campolong. Jr.,
"asked [her] if [she] knew how to get the union out of
the factory." When she replied in the negative "he pro-
ceeded to tell [her] you'd get a petition and get half the
girls to sign the petition and the union would no longer
be there." Greenaway then testified that Campolong. Jr.,
asked her to start such a petition.
Again., Campolong was not examined concerning this
matter and therefore Greenaway's testimony stands un-
disputed and is credited. In cross-examining Greenaway,
Respondent's counsel attempted, unsuccessfully. to elicit
" A' di',-ul,..lC helto,. II t Fchruar li an ld lMairh 1978, Rc'plndcnl re-
futlctl Ii c;ccpt nllil Irii tntimdfrom he inll.g. Iin. g a gTrl¢,illCC tin h alf of
(rctlilA am 5
423
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LAIBOR RELATIONS BOARD
an opinion that Campolong had been joking when he
suggested her initiating a decertification petition. Obvi-
ously counsel's suggestion is not testimony and cannot
support a finding. o There is nothing in the record to
suggest that the Campolongs found anything related to
the Union to be a source of or occasion for humor. The
evidence establishes that, at or about the time Campo-
long spoke to Greenaway about decertification, he was
having trouble with the Union about insurance and ex-
pressed Respondent's desire to "get rid of' Gatto and
Reale, the Union's business agent and national repre-
sentative, who were then servicing the collective-bar-
gaining agreement. Manifestly, nothing would please Re-
spondent more than decertification of the Union.
On all the evidence, I find and conclude that, as al-
leged in the complaint, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) by threatening plant closure if the employees con-
tinued their support of the Union; by threatening to de-
prive Greenaway of unemployment compensation bene-
fits if she continued to exercise her rights under Section
7 of the Act; by threatening to take action unilaterally in
derogation of its duty to recognize and bargain with the
Union as the duly authorized representative of its em-
ployees; and by soliciting Greenaway to initiate a peti-
tion to have the Union decertified.
C. Section 8(a)(3)
Braniff had started to work for Campo in Houtzdale
around 1969. She was union president and shop chair-
lady from around November 1975 until October 1978.
During the latter part of her employment she was sub-
ject to several layoffs and discharge, to wit, she was dis-
charged on January 13, 1977, but returned on February
5, as the result of a grievance; she was then laid off on
April 1, 1977, and returned in August 1977; and then she
was laid off in October 1977 and recalled on June 26,
1978, as part of an agreement settling a strike that oc-
curred in May 1978.
Marie Greenaway started to work for Campo in April
1975. Toward the end of 1976, she became vice president
of Local 727A. In Braniff's absences, Greenaway served
as acting shop chairlady for the Union.
During 1975 and most of 1976, Campo was producing
men's slacks. Originally Greenaway's work was sewing
pockets. However, apparently toward the end of 1976,
the demand for men's slacks declined and the Company
started to change to production of ladies' slacks. The
production of men's slacks is somewhat more complicat-
ed than making women's slacks. A major difference in
production of the two involves sewing the seams. On
men's slacks, one operator sews inner seams and another
operator sews outer seams; on women's slacks one opera-
tor sews both the inner and outer seams, the whole proc-
ess being called "out-seam/in-seam."
When the conversion from men's to ladies' wear
began, there were four employees engaged in sewing
seams. These employees, with their dates of original hire,
'0 It is perhaps unnecessary to add that. while counsel's suggestions in
leading questions are noi substitute for testimony. aidnmissirns by counsel
are binding on his client.
were: Elizabeth Zakutney, March 11, 1968;'1 Alberta
Lamison, October 27, 1969; Sandra Bungo, May 9, 1972;
Greenaway, April 2, 1975.
On January 3, 1978, a very cold day., the plant was un-
heated. Greenaway went to the office, from which she
telephoned Business Agent Gatto. Gatto instructed her
to have the employees continue working, if possible, and
said he would call her back. Shortly thereafter the plant
doors were locked so that the employees could not leave
and none of them could enter the office portion of the
building.
Later that day Greenaway was "laid off." It appears
that two or three of the other seam sewers were laid off
at the same time. However, they were recalled within a
very few' days, whereas Greenaway was not then re-
called.
About the middle of January, not having heard from
Campolong but having heard rumors that she had been
fired, Greenaway telephoned Campolong to ask if she
"was fired or laid off or what was going on." According
to Greenaway, Campolong said that she had been fired
for the "poor quality of work" and should come into the
plant to pick up her belongings. 2 Greenaway further
testified that Campolong said that he would not interfere
with her receiving unemployment compensation "as long
as [she] didn't give him a hassle." Greenaway was out of
work from January 3 until some time in June, when she
was recalled as part of a general agreement settling a
strike that occurred in May. However, the three other
employees sewing seams were laid off for a maximum of
around 12 days between the beginning of January and
the early part of April.
During Greenaway's "permanent layoff' of three of
four new employees were hired to do "serging," Only
one of those new employees had had any experience.
Campolong testified that the serging machines are some-
what more complicated than the sewing machines, but
he conceded that Greenaway would have been compe-
tent to do serging. Campolong testified that Greenaway
was not called to do serging because she was being held
for recall as a sewer when needed. This explanation is to-
tally incredible. First, Campolong never indicated that
Greenaway's "permanent" layoff had been converted to
"temporary." Second, he made no attempt to recall her
until he was required to as part of a strike settlement.
Third, he conceded that employees sometimes were
transferred from job to job, so there is no apparent
reason why Greenaway could not have been hired as a
serger and later transferred to sewing when and if she
was needed. Finally, as discussed below, the collective-
bargaining agreement calls for equalization of work
among employees.
t Zakulncy's serliority mray ha'e been broken xhien she slas ,on sick
lcav'e for an extended period Ito w"ever. Greenllawly; cceded Ihat. for
the purpose the issue here pres'ented. Zakutno had ilmore seniority than
did Grectnaway
H2 er pretrial affidavit read: "[Canmpoloig Jr] said he icould ha',e
fired me because of the qualit) of my work hut he ga.ce me a permanent
layoff instead. hut that if I give him antl hasle he w'ould slop me from
signitlg up. so I should keep mx moulh shult 'henl I picked up my stuff
a fe' days later, Joe. Jr told me tIlt io glse him any hassles "
424
CAMP() SIACKS. INC
At the hearing neither Joseph Campolong, Jr., Re-
spondent's only witness, nor Respondent's counsel in his
opening statement or in cross-examining the General
Counsel's witnesses, indicated that Greenaway had been
discharged or laid off because her work was poor. Re-
spondent's only position concerning Greenaway's
"layoff" was that she was chosen strictly by seniority
when there was a slowdown in production. The evi-
dence does not support Respondent's contention in any
respect.
There is considerable confusion in the record concern-
ing seniority. The collective-bargaining agreement pro-
vides:
ARTICLE IX - EQUAL DIVISION OF WORK
In the event the Employer should not have
enough work to keep all his employees working full
time, then such work as may be available shall be
equally divided among the employees, as far as is
practicable. In the event that it is necessary that an
employee be laid off then said layoff is to be done
in accord with the employees' seniority on their re-
spective operations.
It seems to have been generally agreed at the present
hearing that "operations," as used in the contract, refers
to particular jobs; e.g., in-seaming, out-seaming, or in-
seaming/out-seaming. However, among the documents
placed in evidence by the General Counsel is an arbitra-
tor's award concerning the discharge of Bertha Kapsick,
a cutting department employee. That award construes
the quoted contractual language as basing seniority on
"job classification" rather than on the particular oper-
ation performed by the employee.'3 In the present case,
however, no reference was ever made to job titles or job
classifications, and the wage schedules apparently at-
tached to the collective-bargaining agreements were not
put in evidence.
For a period of time, apparently through the first sev-
eral months of 1978, Campo was producing both men's
and women's slacks. Union Business Agent Gatto testi-
fied as follows concerning an agreement reached as to
the method of assigning work during the changeover
period:
A problem did arise of who would be on the job
of ladies and who would be on the job of men's
and, in order to stick to the collective-bargaining
agreement which states that a person has seniority
on their own job, it was suggested at that time that
'a The arbitrator's decision reads, in part:
The question devolves to one of considering what was the job of
grievant and [another employee ] The record makes clear that it was
"general worker II As part of that job, one can be a fitter or a
sobar machine operator, but these functions are not separate job
titles
When the contract speaks of lay offs to be made according to
operational seniority, the practice in industry is that lay offs will be
first given to those with less seniority in the job title One's operation
is his job description and all included therein, not an assignment
given for a certain time as part of that job. Thus in this case senior-
ity as"general 'worker 11" is the key, not how long an employee has
been assigned to a mere part of her total duties
we try to stick to the agreement as much as possible
under the circumstances and the people with the
more seniority, the most seniority on their own op-
erations stay on the men's and the ones with the less
seniority that were needed we put on women's.
Gatto's testimony that the more senior employees were
left on production of men's slacks was corroborated by
Greenaway and Campolong, Jr., However, while cor-
roborating Gatto's testimony at one point, Campolong,
Jr., inconsistently testified that, in order to avoid senior-
ity problems, all the seam sewers were assigned to the
same work on a day-to-day basis; i.e., they would all be
shifted between men's and women's wear at the same
time.
The agreement described by Gatto and Greenaway
(and at one point by Campolong) appears somewhat
strange, in that it would result in giving higher seniority
to junior employees than to the more experienced em-
ployees if seniority was measured by "the employees' se-
niority on their respective operations." That result would
follow from having the senior employees remain on pro-
duction of men's slacks after junior employees were
transferred to ladies' wear, which was to become the
plant's only production.
Campolong's testimony was basically incredible. For
example, he testified that Zakutney, Lamison, and Bungo
had all been hired before Greenaway and each of the
three had always performed the out-seam/in-seam oper-
ation. But, as noted above, that combined operation was
limited to ladies' slacks, while Campo had previously
produced only men's slacks.
Greenaway's position was consistent with the evidence
as a whole. She testified that, in accordance with the
agreement described by Gatto, she, as a junior employee,
was first transferred to production of ladies' slacks early,
while the more experienced workers remained on pro-
duction of men's wear, a more complicated and difficult
process. On those facts, manifestly Greenaway would
have seniority on the out-seam/in-seam operation. 4
In cross-examining Greenaway, Respondent's counsel
appeared to be attempting to support Respondent's posi-
tion on the basis of plant or job classification seniority, as
follows:
Q. How about Sandra Bungo, isn't it true that she
was hired originally sometime in 1972?
A. That's possible.
Q. What made you believe that you had more se-
niority than someone who was hired originally
sometime in 1972 when you were hired in 1975?
A. When they had the changeover from men's
wear to women's wear half the factory went men
and half the factory went women. If you did men's
that was your job if you were first or whatever' If
you did women's you - that was yours.
i" Greenawsay testified that Zakutney had first seniority because she
"did out-seaming and in-seaming first'" It 'as not explained how that
squared v ith the agreement in .ievw of the length of Zakutney', employ-
ment with Respondent
425
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Q. Isn't it true that Alberta Lamison was first
hired by the company some time in 1969?
A. I don't know. I don't know when Bettyls was
hired.
Q. Isn't it true that she was a long-time employ-
ee? . . . Much longer than you?
A. Yes.
Q. What made you feel that you had more se-
niority than Alberta Lamison?
A. Because I did women's wear before she start-
ed. I started women's wear before she was done
with men's wear.
Q. Isn't it true that all four of you were sewing
machine operators?
A.Yes, that's true.
In cross-examining Gatto, Respondent's counsel posed
hypothetical questions apparently designed to establish
that the Union, in accordance with trade union practice
generally, favored honoring plantwide seniority. Gatto
maintained that the hypothetical situations posited by
counsel could be resolved only by negotiation between
the Union and Respondent. While the applicability of the
governing contractual provisions to some possible cases
is not self-evident, it is clear that plantwide seniority is
not controlling. 16
As discussed below, in February and March 1978,
during Greenaway's permanent layoff, Respondent re-
fused to accept mail from the Union. Additionally, Re-
spondent denied access to its plants by representatives of
the Union. Thus, during this period, the Union was
denied the information it requested as necessary to
handle grievances involving seniority rights. The infor-
mation sought included, inter alia, dates of hire, job clas-
sifications and dates of employment in the employees'
classifications. Respondent introduced records showing
employees' dates of hire and attendance, but not contain-
ing any information whatsoever as to job classifications
or specific operations performed.
Additionally, Respondent has not supported its present
underlying position that Greenaway's layoff was an inci-
dent of a decline in business. Although Joseph Campo-
long, Jr., conceded that production records existed, Re-
spondent introduced none to support his conclusory
statement that in January and early February 1978 pro-
duction dropped from a normal of about 6,000 to 7,000
pairs of slacks in process to around 3,000 to 4,000 pairs.
During Greenaway's layoff, four serges were hired, al-
though previously there had been only two. Unex-
plained, these facts appear to be inconsistent with a de-
cline in production. In any event, as quoted above, the
contract called for equalization of available work among
the employees to the extent practicable. At the hearing,
Respondent made no effort to establish that equalization
was not practicable when Greenaway was laid off (or
discharged), although Campolong disclosed that on sev-
'i The reference to "Betty" was obviously an error "Bety" is Zakut-
ney's firsl, name while the context shows that Greenawuay a ,as talking
about Lamison.
i6 In the Kapsick arbitralion. Respondenl's position was that seniority
was based exclusively on the particular operation performed by an em-
ployee However, the arbitrator adopted the Union's vievw that job "clas-
sification" was controlling
eral occasions in March and April the remaining three
seam sewers were laid off simultaneously.
The evidence establishes that Respondent harbored
considerable animosity against the Union, which the
Campolongs believed was out to bankrupt Respondent.
Campolong made clear his hostility to Gatto and Reale,
to the point of denying them access to the plants, as pro-
vided in the contract. So far as appears at the end of
1977 Greenaway was the only union officer currently
working for Respondent. Her "permanent" layoff was in
marked contrast to the sporadic brief layoffs of her co-
workers. Shortly after Greenaway's "layoff," Respond-
ent refused to have any dealings with the Union. Thus, it
is clear that Respondent had union animus and well
knew of Greenaway's union sympathies and activities at
the time of the layoff. Upon this showing of union
animus, knowledge of Greenaway's union activities and
disparate treatment, it became incumbent on Respondent
to rebut the General Counsel's prima facie case by estab-
lishing that the "permanent layoff' was occasioned by
facts unrelated to the Union. This burden the Respond-
ent failed to meet.
On the face of it, the collective-bargaining agreement
did not permit, let alone require, Greenaway's layoff or
discharge. The testimony of Respondent's only witness
was so riddled with inconsistency as to have no proba-
tive value in explaining the layoff. And Respondent
failed to produce any documentary evidence to justify its
conduct. Indeed, the only documentary evidence intro-
duced by Respondent showed, at most, relative
plantwide seniority of the employees, with nothing re-
motely relevant to the controlling provision of the con-
tract.
In view of Respondent's failure to establish any credi-
ble nondiscriminatory explanation of Greenaway's "per-
manent layoff," the inference is inescapable that it was a
major step in Respondent's course of unlawful action de-
signed to rid itself of the Union. The "layoff" therefore
was violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
D. Section 8(a)(5)
I. The cutting department
As previously noted, the collective-bargaining agree-
ment between Campo and the Union defined the bargain-
ing unit as "all of the employees of the Employer wher-
ever employed." From the beginning of their bargaining
relationship, the parties had construed that definition as
including the four or five cutters in Madera. This con-
struction was manifested by the facts that there was a
shop steward in the cutting department; union dues were
checked off for the cutters; contributions were made on
behalf of the cutters to the contractually provided insur-
ance program; and at least one grievance concerning a
cutting department employee (Bertha Kapsick) was proc-
essed through arbitration under the contract.
The cutting department occupied a large building.
Across the road was a building containing offices, in-
cluding the principal office of Joseph Campolong, Sr.,
and some 70 to 80 production workers. Although the
record is murky as to this fact, it appears that these pro-
426
CAMPO SLACKS, INC.
duction workers were employed by JBC. Respondent
presented no evidence to clarify the corporate setup.
However, on cross-examination by Respondent's counsel,
Union Business Agent Gatto testified to his understand-
ing that JBC was the parent corporation, with Campo
and J & E as subsidiaries. Gatto also testified that "the
people in Campo Slacks, til today still get paid from
JBC." The JBC production employees have never been
unionized.
Around November 1977 the JBC production workers
were physically moved across the road, into the building
housing the cutting department. It apparently is Re-
spondent's position that, when the JBC workers were
moved to the building occupied by the cutting depart-
ment, somehow the cutting department employees ceased
being members of the Campo bargaining unit and were,
in effect, merged with the unorganized JBC employees.
Respondent apparently maintains that the change in the
bargaining unit occurred as a matter of law. Respond-
ent's original answer to the complaint had admitted that
the cutting department workers in Madera were part of
the Campo bargaining unit. Thereafter, through new
counsel, the answer was amended to deny "that cutting
department employees employed at Madera, Pennsylva-
nia, constitute part of any appropriate unit." In the
course of his opening statement at the hearing, Respond-
ent's present counsel discussed the amendment as fol-
lows:
MR. WOICIK: . . . We take the position, with this
amendment to the Answer, that the cutting depart-
ment employees employed at Madera are not a part
of any appropriate unit represented by the Union.
* * * * *
JUDGE KL.EIN: Have the parties treated the cut-
ters as part of the unit at any time?
MR. WOICIK: Not since that Answer was filed,
Ma'am.
JUDGE KI.EIN: What about before that?
MR. WOICIK: There may have been a time before
that. I believe in 1977 the cutting department was
treated as part of the Houtzdale bargaining unit.
JUDGE KLEIN: . . . Did that contract that expired
on September 2nd or thereabouts, 1979, did that
cover the cutters?
MR. WOICIK: At an earlier time, I believe it did,
Ma'am.
JUDGE KLEIN: When did it cease covering and
what caused it to cease covering them?
MR. WOICIK: I won't pinpoint the date, Ma'am,
because I can't. I think that's what will be a sub-
stantial issue.
The condition changed when this Employer transferred
these three, four orfive workers-I don't know exact-
ly how many were employed who were pertinent to
this question at that time, but he transferred them to
another company.
JUDG;E KLEIN: From what company to what
company?
MR. WVOICIK: From Campo Slacks to a company
called JBC Company.
JuDGf- KLE IN: Is that a newly organized compa-
ny?
MR. WOICIK: A newly organized business for all
purposes of this case. And had this group of four
workers in working with what later turned out to
be between 60 and 70 other workers in an un-union-
ized shop.
JuDGE Ki I IN: Were they newly hired since this
was a new company?
MR. WOICIK: I believe so. Some may have been,
some may not have been. . . . I can't say that all of
them were, Ma'am. Some may have turned out to
be employees at the other three locations. As I said,
we have four locations we're dealing with.... It
seems to me that if an Employer had four locations,
let's assume that three are unorganized by a union
and one is, and he transfers . . . the four cutting
room employees from the unionized location to the
un-unionized location;"7 their contract doesn't con-
tinue.
[7]he union contract doesn't cover individuals. it
covers work in a certain location and within the con-
text of a bargaining unit. When that bargaining unit
changes and it's no longer the original bargaining
unit and it's lost its identity, that contract doesn't go
on.
JUDGE KL EIN: Not even to its own expiration?
MR. WOICIK: Not with regard to a different bar-
gaining unit.A different location, no. [Emphasis sup-
plied.]
In support of a motion to dismiss at the conclusion of
the General Counsel's case, Respondent's counsel added
a new contention, as follows:
The evidence shows that the cutting department
employees on the basis of General Counsel's witness
have not been employed by Campo Slacks. The
contract which is in evidence runs between Campo
Slacks and the union. The evidence shows on the
basis of General Counsel's witnesses that the cutting
department employees were employed by another
company. That other company is not a party to this
proceeding.
Counsel undoubtedly refers to the testimony of Larry W.
Lecerf, who had been working in the cutting department
" It should he observed that counsel's argument hrpothecates circum-
slances opposile lo those in the present case Here employees were
moved from an "ununionized location" to a "unionized location"; ie .e, the
unorganized workers employed by JBC were mosed to the lo catiion of
the organized cutting department employees If accepted. Resp~ondenl's
hypothetical argument might suell lead to the conclusion that. ',hen they
moved. the JBC employees sere an accretion to the Campo bargaining
unit
427
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in Madera for 5 years at the time of the hearing. At the
outset of his examination, he testified as follows:
Q. (By Mr. Simpson) By whom are you em-
ployed?
A. Joe Campolong, JBC Company.
Q. How long have you worked for the Campo-
long Company?
A. Since May 27, 1957.
The examination of Lecerf then turned to whether
there had been any change of employer late in 1977. His
testimony was:
Q.... [As] far as who you were employed by,
who signed your checks and where the checks
came from. Was there any change?
A. No.
Q. Has your Employer, as far as you know,
changed the name of your Employer during all the
five years that you've worked there?
A. No, not since the five years I worked there,
no. It's always been JBC in the last five years.
The General Counsel then introduced documentary evi-
dence showing that JBC had paid Lecerf's wages in the
years 1976 through 1979, i.e., both before and after No-
vember 1977, when Respondent maintains the cutting de-
partment employees were eliminated from the Campo
bargaining unit.
Lecerf also testified that he was a member of Local
727A of the Union, which represented the employees
covered by the Campo contract. He further testified that
union dues had been deducted from his pay and he was
covered by the Union's hospitalization plan and insur-
ance payments were made on his behalf. The General
Counsel then introduced union records showing that
after October 1977 no dues were received from the cut-
ting room employees. Lecerf also credibly testified that
around that time Campolong demanded that he sign a
document for insurance coverage by Aetna in place of
the "union insurance plan" by which he had previously
been covered. He also testified, with no contradiction,
that his work had not changed in any respect when the
JBC employees moved into the building where the cut-
ting department was working.
Lecerf's testimony and the documentary evidence,
standing alone, might superficially appear to bear out Re-
spondent's contention that the cutters were employees of
JBC. However, such evidence does not stand alone. So
far as here relevant, the apparent source of wage pay-
ments is not decisive. The undisputed fact, confirmed by
Respondent's counsel, is that, since the advent of the
Union around 1969, the parties had been in agreement
that the cutters stationed in Madera were included
within the bargaining unit covered by the Campo collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. And Gatto's testimony that
Campo employees are still being paid by JBC was un-
contradicted. Thus, the source of payment and the iden-
tity of JBC as the "employer" for tax purposes do not
establish that the cutters were not members of the bar-
gaining unit covered by the Campo collective-bargaining
agreement.
Respondent's contention that the cutting department
employees were not employed by Campo is obviously an
afterthought suggested by Lecerf's inexact testimony. 18
Lecerfs testimony that he was "employed" by JBC
cannot override the concessions made by Respondent's
counsel. Lecerf is not legally trained and obviously not
knowledgeable in labor relations law. His testimony
shows that in fact he believed he was employed by Cam-
palong, with the identity of any specific corporation
having no major significance. The parties have by their
conduct agreed that for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining Campo was the "employer" of the cutters in
Madera. Cf., e.g., Northwest Publications, Inc., d/b/a San
Jose Mercury and San Jose News, 197 NLRB 213 (1972).
Otherwise stated, by its conduct in including the cutters
within the coverage of the Campo collective-bargaining
agreement, Respondent is estopped to deny that Campo
is the responsible employer of the Madera cutting depart-
ment.
If it were to be held that JBC became an employer by
the one fact that the employees were paid by checks
drawn by JBC, it would not relieve Campo of responsi-
bility as an employer also. Campo would be responsible
at least as a joint employer and a party to the collective-
bargaining agreement.
Respondent presented no evidence of any change in
the employment status of the cutting department employ-
ees when the JBC employees moved into the same build-
ing. And Respondent adduces no authority or rationale
for concluding that the cutting room employees were re-
moved from the Campo bargaining unit by the mere fact
that JBC employees came to work on the same premises.
Significantly, Respondent introduced no evidence con-
cerning the supervision of the two groups of employees.
In the absence of contrary evidence, it must be assumed
that there was no change in supervision, particularly in
the light of Lecerf's testimony that there were no
changes in his work.
In his brief, the General Counsel suggests that, if Re-
spondent in good faith actually believed that the compo-
sition of the Campo bargaining unit had changed, it
should have filed a petition for unit clarification. That, of
course, would have been possible. The Board normally
will not entertain a unit clarification petition early in the
term of a contract. See Wallace-Murry Corporation,
Schwitzer Division, 192 NLRB 1090 (1971); Arthur C.
Logan Memorial Hospital, 231 NLRB 778 (1977): San
Jose Mercury, et al., supra. The Board has recently reaf-
firmed its view that unit clarification petitions will not be
entertained during the early part of contract terms be-
cause "they would be disruptive of voluntarily continued
bargaining relationships." Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 247
NLRB No. 143 (1980). It is not clear whether the Board
might apply a different rule where the petitioner claims
that changed circumstances require a change in the defi-
nition of the bargaining unit. Cf. San Jose Mercury, 200
NLRB 105 (1972). Whether or not the Board would
have entertained a unit clarification petition based on Re-
spondent's claim of changed circumstances, Respondent
i" Unfortunately, Lecerfs equating the source of his pay to his "em-
ployer" ras induced by the wording of the General Counsel's questions
428
CAMI'() SI.ACKS, INC
certainly was not at liberty to change the bargaining unit
unilaterally. Such conduct would be in contravention of
Section 8(d) of the Act.
On the foregoing considerations, I find that the cutting
room employees were part of the Campo bargaining unit
at all times material herein. Accordingly, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it with-
drew recognition of the Union as the bargaining agent of
the cutting room employees and stopped honoring the
Campo collective-bargaining agreement with respect to
those employees. Specifically, the discontinuance of
union dues checkoff and the purported change in insur-
ance coverage were violative of the Act.
2. Denial of Access
Union Representatives Gatto and Reale both testified
that in January and March 1978 they were denied access
to any of Respondent's plants. Greenaway also quoted
Campolong, Jr., as having said he did not want Gatto
and Reale in the plants and that Campolong, Sr. "would
like to get rid of them." None of this testimony was
denied and is credited.
The collective-bargaining agreements covering J & E
and Campo both provide:
The duly authorized officer or representative of
the Union shall have the right to visit the shop of
the Employer at all reasonable hours for the pur-
pose of ascertaining whether the provisions of this
agreement are being fully complied with. .... 9
So far as appears, before January 1978 the union repre-
sentatives were freely permitted to visit Respondent's
premises. With this practice established, Respondent's
withdrawal of the right to access constituted a refusal to
bargain violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
See R.C. Cobb, Inc., 231 NLRB 99, 104 (1977).
Although Respondent has not stated any specific de-
fense to this allegation, its original answer to the com-
plaint said that "the Board is without jurisdiction in
regard to any of [the 8(a)(5)] averments as the collective-
bargaining agreement provides for cumpulsory arbitra-
tion and the Union's right, if any, would be under Sec-
tion 301 of the Act." But it is clear that proceedings
before the Board, arbitration, and judicial proceedings
for breaches of contract are not mutually exclusive. Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. (1967). It has specifically been held
that an employer's refusal to grant union representatives
access to the work premises, as provided in a collective-
bargaining agreement, is violative of the Act. Harveys
Resort Hotel, 236 NLRB 1670, 1680 (1978). 2 0
igTherefollows the caveat [B]ut the right hereby granted shall be so ex-
ercised as to avoid any interruption of the work in said shops." Respond-
ent does not suggest that Gatto or Reale violated this restriction
:n In Harvey's Resort Hotel the denial of access was held to violate Sec
8(a(). , with no specific finding made under Sec. 8(a)(5) It appears clear
that denial of access is substantially the same as refusal to provide rele-
vant information upon request Since the refusal to honor a union's re-
quest for relevant infirmation consiltutes a refusal Io bargain in violation
of Sec. 8(a)(51, I reach the same conclusion as to the denial of access to
the plants In any event. any such distinction would have little, if any.
practical effect. since the remedial order to he recommended is the same
whichever subsection of Sec. 8 is vsilated
3. Refusal to provide information or consider
grievances
After Respondent denied Gatto and Reale access to its
premises, they necessarily resorted to w'ritten communi-
cation. Under date of February 14, 1978, Gatto wrote to
Respondent requesting specific information relevant to
layoffs and insurance coverage in Campo and J & E. As
stated in the letter of request, the information sought was
relevant and necessary to the Union's ability to "enforce
[its] collective-bargaining agreement and process any
grievance!; which may arise thereunder." Gatto's letter
ended with the statement that, unless a reply was re-
ceived within 5 days, he would "be forced to consider
[Campolong's] silence a refusal to comply with [Gatto's]
request. The letter was addressed to "Mr. Joseph Cam-
polong, J.B.C. Co." and copies wvere sent by certified
mail to Campolong at JBC in Madera, at J & E in Clear-
field, and at Campo in Houtzdale. All three copies were
returned to Gatto, having been refused by the addressee.
Another copy was sent by regular mail to Respondent's
counsel. That letter was not returned to the sender.
However, no reply was ever made.
Under date of March 20, 1978, Gatto sent seven griev-
ances to Campolong. As he had done in February, he
sent copies by certified mail to Campolong at Campo in
Houtzdale, at J & E in Clearfield, and at JBC in Madera.
Again all three copies were returned, "unclaimed." So
far as appears, no copy of that communication was sent
to Respondent's counsel. The grievances concerned four
layoffs, discharges, and/or refusals to recall employees at
Campo and J & E; refusal to check off union dues of the
cutting department employees; unilateral change in insur-
ance benefits of the cutting department; and the method
of converting production from men's to ladies' wear by
both corporations. The documentary evidence is clear
and Respondent presented no evidence in contradiction
or explanation of its refusal to accept communications by
the Union 21
Respondent has not indicated the nature of its defense,
if any, to the allegation that it refused to process griev-
ances. One might conjecture that Respondent would
contend that Gatto's letter relieved Respondent of any
obligation until the Union initiated arbitration. Such
claim might conceivably be based on the conclusion of
Gatto's covering letter, which reads:
Please contact me at my office with your response
to these grievances. If you do not respond, you are
to assume that the grievances enclosed are ad-
vanced to the appropriate step. We will serve you
with a notice to arbitrate once sufficient time has
elapsed for all steps to have been theoretically or
actually processed.
21 In its original answser 1to the complaint. Respondcllnt said that "in fact
as recently as April 5, 1978. the Company participated il griesance pro-
cedure, under the Collectlise tlargaininig Agreement " The relerence ap-
parently is lo the arbilratiionl of the Ka:lpick griesance, which aas heard
on April 5. 1978. 'siih brief, filed thereafter by both the Lnioln aiId the
Company Since Kapsick wat laid off in July 1977. the grie'ancl uln-
doubtedly ,as ill process before Respondent broke off conlmlllltaliionis
i1n any eCenil the arbitraltion f one grie.aiice is no, defent e to a tfiliurc to
recelxe illiLd act on olher griesainces
429
DI)lCISI()NS ()F NA 'I()NAI. I.A3()R RI.A'I'IONS B()ARI)
Instead of taking the grievances to arbitration the Union
filed charges w ith the' oard. Having refused to accept
Gatto's communication, Respondent is hardly in any po-
sition to rely on its contents. Respondent rejected the
communications at its peril and cannot rely on self-in-
duced ignorance.
The collective-bargaining agreements set forth the
steps in the grievance procedure and contained manda-
tory requirements for Respondent's action at each step.
Respondent obviously cannot escape its obligations
under the grievance procedure by the simple expedient
of refusing to accept mail from the Union.
There is nothing in the agreements or in the Act
which would require the Union to proceed to arbitration
or forfeit the employees' right of recourse to the Board.
Whatever the present scope of the Board's Collyer
rule,22 manifestly the Union is not required to pursue a
procedure which Respondent has repudiated. The Union
had asserted its statutory right to information necessary
for the processing of grievances. That right is properly
vindicated in a Board proceeding. See International Ilar-
vester Company, 241 NLRB 600 (1979); St. Joseph ilospi-
tal (Our Lady of Providentce Unit), 233 NLRB I11I6, 1119
(1977).
On the undisputed evidence, I find and conclude that,
as alleged in the complaint, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act by refusing to receive and
process grievances filed pursuant to the governing col-
lective-bargaining agreements and by refusing to receive
and honor the Union's requests for information relevant
to its proper administration and enforcement of the
agreements.
CONCI.USIONS OF LAW
1. Campo Slacks, Inc., and J & E Sportswear, Inc., are
individually and jointly employers engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union,
AFL-CIO-CLC, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening to
close its plants if its employees seek continuing represen-
tation by the Union; by threatening to take unilateral
action in derogation of its obligation to recognize and
bargain with the Union as the duly authorized bargaining
representative of Respondent's employees in appropriate
units; by threatening to withdraw recognition of the
Union as the collective-bargaining representative of Re-
spondent's employees; by threatening an employee with
denial of unemployment compensation benefits if she
continues to assert her rights protected by Section 7 of
the Act; and by soliciting an employee to initiate a peti-
tion to have the Union decertified as the duly authorized
bargaining representative of the appropriate units of Re-
spondent's employees.
4. Respondent engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
by discharging or "permanently laying off" employee
21 C'ollyer bInul/acd tirc, I'12 NI RIH 837 (I1711.
Marie Greenaway on January 3, 1978, and thereafter fail-
ing to recall her for a substantial period of time.
5. Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the purview of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act
by withdrawing recognition of the Union as the bargain-
ing representative of Respondent's employees in its cut-
ting department in Madera, Pennsylvania: by denying
union representatives access to Respondent's plants in
Clearfield, Houtzdale, and Madera, Pennsylvania; by re-
fusing to accept communications from the Union; by fail-
ing to process grievances as required by its collective-
bargaining agreements with the Union; by failing and re-
fusing to honor the Union's requests for relevant infor-
mation necessary for administration and enforcement of
the collective-bargaining agreements between Respond-
ent and the Union; by unilaterally changing insurance
benefits for the employees in Respondent's cutting de-
partment in Madera. Pennsylvania; and by failing and re-
fusing to check off union dues of employees in Respond-
ent's cutting department, as required by the collective-
bargaining agreements.
Til RilM I)\
Since it has been found that Respondent has commit-
ted unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that
Respondent he ordered to cease and desist therefrom and
take certain action necessary to effectuate the purposes
of the Act. Citing Ohio Power Company, 215 NLRB 165
(1974) and Brad's Machine Products Inc., 191 NLRB 274
(1971), the General Counsel requests that a broad cease-
and-desist order be issued. The cited cases involved dis-
criminatory discharges in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and
were decided when the Board's practice was uniformly
to issue broad orders in such cases. However, in Hick-
molt Foods., Inc., 242 NLRB No. 177 (1979), the Board
abandoned its prior view that discriminatory discharges
necessarily call for broad cease-and-desist orders. So far
as appears, the present Respondent had been dealing
with the Union for some 7 years without incident before
the events here involved. The most recent unfair labor
practices alleged in the present case occurred about 2
years ago. Greenaway has been reinstated and the parties
apparently resolved their differences in a strike settle-
ment reached around May 1978. While Respondent did
commit serious violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5),
it appears that a large part of the difficulty arose out of a
clash of personalities between the Campolongs and the
union representatives. Gatto and Reale have since been
replaced and relations between the parties appear to have
improved. The record then does not establish a procliv-
ity on Respondent's part to violate the Act. Under all
the circumstances, I conclude that a broad cease-and-
desist order is not called for in this case.
Although it appears that Marie Greenaway was rein-
stated after the strike of May 1979, the record does not
affirmatively establish that the reinstatement was com-
plete; i.e., that she was restored to her former position
without prejudice to her seniority and other rights and
privileges. Accordingly, it will be recommended that, to
the extent it has not already done so, Respondent be re-
quired to offer Marie Greenaway immediate and full re-
430
CAMP() SLACKS, INC
instatement to her former job or, if such position no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job without
prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges,
and to make her whole for any loss she may have suf-
fered by reason of her layoff and/or discharge on Janu-
ary 3, 1978, such compensation to be computed in ac-
cordance with F: W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289
(1950), with interest computed in accordance with Flor-
ida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).2:1
Respondent will also be required to make the Union
and/or the employees whole for any losses suffered by
reason of the Respondent's failure or refusal to check off
union dues and make payments to insurance and benefit
funds as provided in the collective-bargaining agreements
which expired on September 2, 1979.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and the entire record, and in accordance
with Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the follow-
ing recommended:
ORDER24
The Respondents, Campo Slacks, Inc., Houtzdale and
Madera, Pennsylvania, and J & E Sportswear, Inc.,
Clearfield, Pennsylvania, their officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees with plant closure because
of their union sympathies and activities.
(b) Threatening to withdraw and/or withhold recogni-
tion from Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union, AFL-CIO-CLC, as the duly authorized collec-
tive-bargaining representative of Respondent's produc-
tion and maintenance workers in Houtzdale, Madera, and
Clearfield, Pennsylvania.
(c) Threatening employees with deprivation of unem-
ployment compensation benefits because of their union
activities.
(d) Soliciting employees to initiate and circulate a peti-
tion to decertify the above-named Union as the collec-
tive-bargaining agent of Respondents' employees.
(e) Laying off and/or discharging any employees for
engaging in union activities and to discourage union
membership.
(0 Failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with
the aforenamed Union as the representative of Respond-
ents' employees in the following appropriate bargaining
units:
All employees employed by Campo Slacks, Inc., at
its Houtzdale, Pennsylvania, facility, and all cutting
department employees at its Madera, Pennsylvania,
facility; excluding office clerical employees, execu-
tives, administrative employees and guards, profes-
sional employees and supervisors as defined in the
Act;
13 See., generally. Iis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
24 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall..as provided
in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings. conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes
and
All employees by J & E Sportswear. Inc., at its
Clearfield, Pennsylvania, facility; excluding office
clerical employees, executives, administrative em-
ployees and guards, professional employees and su-
pervisors as defined in the Act.
(g) Failing and refusing, on request, to provide the
Union with information relevant and necessary to enable
the Union to perform its obligations as bargaining repre-
sentative of the employees in the bargaining units de-
scribed above.
(h) Failing or refusing to permit union representatives
to visit Respondents' facilities at reasonable times to
make observations and investigations necessary to meet
their obligations to represent the employees in bargaining
units described above.
(i) Failing and refusing to check off and transmit dues
to the Union on behalf of the employees in the cutting
department in Madera, Pennsylvania, to the extent re-
quired under the collective-bargaining agreement of
Campo Slacks, Inc.
(j) Failing and refusing to make payments on behalf of
the employees of the cutting department in Madera,
Pennsylvania, pursuant to agreements and declarations of
trust as provided in the collective-bargaining agreement
of Campo Slacks, Inc.
(k) Unilaterally discontinuing contributions to insur-
ance and similar trust funds as provided in the governing
collective-bargaining agreements, and unilaterally' insti-
tuting any new insurance or similar plan or program.
(I) Laying off, discharging, or otherwise terminating
any employees for supporting the aforenamed Union.
(m) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) To the extent that Respondents have not already
done so, offer Marie Greenaway immediate and full rein-
statement to her former position or, if such position no
longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job, without
prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges,
and make her whole for any loss of earnings suffered by
her as a result of her layoff or termination on January 3,
1978, in the manner set forth in the section herein enti-
tled "The Remedy," said backpay to be a joint and sev-
eral liability of the two respondent corporations.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other rec-
ords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(c) Recognize and, upon request, bargain with the
aforenamed Union as the representative of Respondents'
employees in the two bargaining units described above.
(d) Upon request, furnish to the aforenamed Union rel-
evant information necessary to enable the Union to per-
form its obligation as bargaining representative of the
employees in the bargaining units described above.
41
I)tCISIONS ()F NATIONAL. IABOR REI ATIONS ()ARD
(e) Grant to representatives of the above-named Union
reasonable access to Respondents' facilities for the pur-
poses of observation and investigation as necessary to
enable the Union properly to represent the employees in
the above-described bargaining units.
(f) Compensate the above-named Union for union dues
which Campo Slacks, Inc., failed to check off and trans-
mit to the Union on behalf of employees of the cutting
department in Madera, Pennsylvania, as required under
the Campo Slacks, Inc., collective-bargaining agreement
that expired on September 2, 1979.
(g) Make the employees of the cutting department in
Madera, Pennsylvania, whole by paying all insurance
and similar contributions as required by the Campo
Slacks, Inc., bargaining agreement that expired on Sep-
tember 2, 1979, to the extent that such contributions
have not been made or that the employees have not oth-
erwise been made whole for their ensuing expenses; pro-
vided that Repondent is not required to rescind or cancel
any substitute or new insurance program or plan it may
have instituted, unless the Union so requests.
(h) Post at their offices and places of business in
Houtzdale, Madera, and Clearfield, Pennsylvania, copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 25 Copies of
said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 6, after being duly signed by Respondent's
authorized representative(s), shall be maintained by it for
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Respondents shall take reasonable steps
to assure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(i) Notify the Regional Director for Region 6, in writ-
ing, within 20 days of this Order, what steps Respond-
ents have taken to comply herewith.
12 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court ot Appeals Enforcing an
Order of ihe National Labor Relations Board "
432