Campero International Limited and Campero Inc.v.Marcelo Paolo Dicunta Servellon and Giovanna Lucrecia Dicunta Servellon

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 8, 2015

No. 91199515 (T.T.A.B. Jul. 8, 2015)

This Opinion is not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Mailed: July 8, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

Campero International Limited
and Campero Inc.

v.

Marcelo Paolo Dicunta Servellon and
Giovanna Lucrecia Dicunta Servellon
_____

Opposition No. 91199515
to application Serial No. 85083063
filed on July 13, 2010
and application Serial No. 85089611
filed on July 21, 2010

_____

Patrick J. O’Connor and Patricia M. Hernández-O’Connor of Harper Meyer Perez
Hagen O’Connor Albert & Dribin LLP for Campero International Limited.

Albert Bordas of Albert Bordas, P.A. for Marcelo Paolo Dicunta Servellon and
Giovanna Lucrecia Dicunta Servellon.
_____

Before Seeherman, Cataldo and Masiello,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Seeherman, Administrative Trademark Judge:
Marcelo Paolo Dicunta Servellon and Giovanna Lucrecia Dicunta Servellon
(“Applicants”) have applied to register POLLO CAMPESINO in standard
Opposition No. 91199515
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characters1 and POLLO CAMPESINO and design, as shown below, for “fast-food
restaurants.”2 Both applications state that the English translation of “POLLO
CAMPESINO” is “Chicken farmer”; POLLO has been disclaimed. The design mark
includes the description, “The mark consists of a depiction of a rooster with a hat.
The words ‘pollo campesino’ on top.”

Campero International Limited and Campero, Inc. (collectively, “Opposer”)3 have
opposed Applicants’ registration of the marks on three grounds: likelihood of
confusion, fraud and lack of a bona fide intent to use the marks in commerce. In
particular, Opposer has alleged that it is the owner of several trademark
registrations for marks consisting of or containing the words POLLO CAMPERO for
restaurant services, restaurant franchising, cooked poultry, and various food,
beverage and clothing items; that it has been a leading Latin-American chicken
restaurant chain for more than 35 years and has used the mark POLLO CAMPERO

1 Application Serial No. 85083063, filed July 13, 2010, based on Section 1(b) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (intent-to-use).
2 Application Serial No. 85089611, filed July 21, 2010. The application was filed pursuant to
Section 44(e) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e), based on a Honduras registration.
3 The notice of opposition was initially filed by Campero International Limited. On
January 14, 2014, Campero International Limited moved to join Campero, Inc. as a party
because Opposer’s pleaded registrations were assigned to Campero, Inc. The Board granted
this motion on May 2, 2014.
Opposition No. 91199515
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or some variation thereof since its inception in Guatemala in 1971; that since as
early as 1991 Opposer has established common law rights to the POLLO
CAMPERO and POLLO CAMPERO and design marks for restaurant services in the
United States; that Applicants had knowledge of the use of POLLO CAMPERO and
POLLO CAMPERO and design in one or more Latin American countries prior to
filing their U.S. applications; that Applicants’ marks so resemble Opposer’s marks,
and their services are virtually identical or related to Opposer’s services and goods,
as to be likely to cause the public to be confused, mistaken or deceived; that
Applicants have committed fraud on the USPTO in connection with the prosecution
of their applications by falsely representing that the translation of “POLLO
CAMPESINO” is “chicken farmer” rather than “country chicken” or “chicken of or
from the country,” in order to avoid a refusal of their applications based on
Opposer’s POLLO CAMPERO marks, since “pollo campero” means “country
chicken”; and that Applicants did not have, and have never had, a bona fide
intention to use the applied-for marks in U.S. commerce.
Applicants have admitted, inter alia, that “Applicants had knowledge of the
existence and continuous use of POLLO CAMPERO and POLLO CAMPERO & Logo
in one or more of the foregoing countries [Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Belize and Honduras] prior to filing their U.S. Applications for
the marks POLLO CAMPESINO and POLLO CAMPESINO & Logo” (¶ 13); that
“Applicants had knowledge of the existence and continuous use of POLLO
CAMPERO and POLLO CAMPERO & Logo in the United States prior to filing their
Opposition No. 91199515
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U.S. Applications for the marks POLLO CAMPESINO and POLLO CAMPESINO &
Logo” (¶ 14); and that “Applicants represented in the application forms filed with
the USPTO that the translation of the ‘POLLO CAMPESINO’ was ‘chicken farmer.’
This representation was made pursuant to Applicants’ sworn declaration under 18
U.S.C. § 1001 that all statements in the application forms were true” (¶ 28).
Applicants otherwise denied the salient allegations in the notice of opposition.
The record includes the pleadings; the file of the opposed applications; and the
testimony, with exhibits, of Opposer’s witness, Roberto Denegri, and of Applicants’
witnesses Severino Broz and Marcelo Paolo Dicunta Servellon. Opposer also
submitted under a notice of reliance Applicants’ discovery responses. Applicants
submitted under a notice of reliance Opposer’s discovery responses and third-party
registrations.4 Opposer also made of record, under a rebuttal notice of reliance, the
files of four abandoned third-party applications.
The record shows that Opposer first opened a restaurant under the mark
POLLO CAMPERO in Guatemala in 1971, and quickly expanded to El Salvador. By
1999, the restaurants were operating in Honduras as well. In 2002 it opened

4 Opposer and Applicants have stated in their notices of reliance that they are relying on
exhibits that were part of the witnesses’ testimony depositions, and Applicant not only
stated they were relying on the testimony and exhibits of Opposer’s witness, but submitted
a copy of the transcript and exhibits with their notice of reliance. Normally it is not
necessary to assert this in a notice of reliance, or to resubmit a testimony deposition,
because the trial testimony and exhibits thereto form part of the record in any event, see
Trademark Rule 2.123(h). To the extent that any of the exhibits to the testimony
depositions were not properly authenticated by the respective witnesses, we treat the
notices of reliance as properly making of record those exhibits which would otherwise have
been acceptable under a notice of reliance, and otherwise as stipulations to their being
properly of record.
Opposition No. 91199515
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restaurants in Los Angeles and Houston, and at about the same time in the
Washington, DC area. Opposer Campero, Inc. owns the following U.S. registrations:
Mark Goods/Services Registration No.
POLLO CAMPERO (typed drawing,
POLLO disclaimed)
Restaurant services,
namely, preparing and
serving fried chicken
17830435
POLLO CAMPERO (typed drawing) Restaurant services 25982816
POLLO CAMPERO
(standard characters)
Restaurant franchising 30059327

Poultry, cole slaw,
processed potatoes,
processed beans, French
fried potatoes, entrees
consisting of poultry;
Restaurant services
29673598

(POLLO disclaimed with respect to
cooked poultry;
Cooked poultry;
Restaurant franchising;
Restaurant services
35085539

5 Issued July 20, 1993; Section 8 & 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged; renewed
twice. The registration includes the translation statement that POLLO CAMPERO is
Spanish for COUNTRY CHICKEN.
6 Issued July 23, 2002; Section 8 & 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged; renewed. The
registration includes the translation statement that POLLO CAMPERO is Spanish for
COUNTRY CHICKEN.
7 Issued October 11, 2005; Section 8 & 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged. The
registration includes the translation statement that the English translation of POLLO
CAMPERO is COUNTRY CHICKEN.
8 Issued July 12, 2005; Section 8 & 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged for the listed
goods. The registration originally also included goods in Classes 26, 30 and 32, but they
were subsequently cancelled from the registration under Section 8. The registration
includes the translation statement that CAMPERO is Spanish for COUNTRY.
9 Issued September 30, 2008; Section 8 & 15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged. The
registration includes the translation statement that the English translation of POLLO
CAMPERO is COUNTRY CHICKEN.
Opposition No. 91199515
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Acquired distinctiveness (Section 2(f)
claimed as to POLLO for restaurant
services)

The colors yellow, brown, burnt
orange, white, and gold are claimed
as a feature of the mark. The mark
consists of the bust and arms of a
yellow rooster outlined in brown
having a burnt orange beak, white
mouth, burnt orange tongue, white
eyes and irises outlined in brown,
and brown eyebrows wearing a
white shirt and burnt orange
bandana and hat all outlined in
brown, positioned next to yellow
stylized letters spelling POLLO
CAMPERO with a stylized
horizontal yellow line under the
letters AMPERO on a brown
background. The letters and
horizontal line have a three-
dimensional aspect created by gold
shading on all right and lower edges.
The rooster’s arms, hands, neck, face
and topknot contain gold and brown
shading. The rooster’s bandana and
hat have brown shading and both
dark and light tones of burnt orange.

Applicants are a brother and sister; their family owns POLLO CAMPESINO
restaurants in Honduras. The mark POLLO CAMPESINO was first used in 1991
for a restaurant in Honduras, and at this point they have 21 restaurants, all in
Honduras. They use, in addition to the word mark, the word and design mark that
is the subject of their opposed application No. 85089611.
Opposition No. 91199515
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Standing
Opposer has demonstrated its standing by its ownership of and use of the
trademarks POLLO CAMPERO and POLLO CAMPERO and rooster design.
Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55 USPQ2d 1842 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Lipton Industries, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 213 USPQ 185 (CCPA
1982).
Likelihood of Confusion
The first of the grounds for opposition we consider is that of likelihood of
confusion. There are two elements to this ground, priority and likelihood of
confusion. Because Opposer has made its pleaded registrations of record, priority is
not in issue as to the marks and goods and/or services identified thereby. King
Candy Company v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108
(CCPA 1974). In determining the issue of likelihood of confusion, we consider all of
the probative facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set forth in In re E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also, In
re Majestic Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Opposer contends that its mark POLLO CAMPERO is famous. Fame, if it exists,
plays a dominant role in the likelihood of confusion analysis. Kenner Parker Toys
Inc. v. Rose Art Industries Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 22 USPQ2d 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir.
1992). Therefore, we consider this factor first.
Opposer’s evidence regarding the fame of its mark primarily concerns its
reputation and efforts in Guatemala and the rest of Central America. In its brief,
Opposition No. 91199515
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Opposer cites to Mr. Denegri’s testimony that Pollo Campero is “the strongest brand
in Guatemala and El Salvador,” and “one of the strongest names in the region.” 57
TTABVUE 29, citing 49 TTABVUE 18-19. However, the factor of fame relates to the
fame of the mark in the United States, not in another country. In terms of evidence
to show that POLLO CAMPERO is a famous mark in the United States, we have
Mr. Denegri’s testimony that, in 2014, Opposer had 54 POLLO CAMPERO
restaurants in the United States, and over $80 million in annual sales. 49
TTABVUE 20. There is no evidence regarding the years, other than 2014, in which
Opposer had this annual sales volume, or how long these 54 restaurants have been
in existence. Nor is there any evidence whatsoever about Opposer’s advertising
expenditures or type of advertising, except for Mr. Denegri’s statement that people
from Central America “knew that we were opening [in the United States] because
we ran some PR efforts.” Id. at 16. Mr. Denegri gave no further details about what
the PR efforts were. Mr. Denegri did testify that Opposer’s chicken was so popular
among the Central American population in the United States that people coming
from Guatemala and El Salvador would bring boxes of chicken they bought at the
airport restaurants to the United States, and would distribute or even sell the
chicken to friends, family and others living in the United States. Id. at 13. It was
because of these major airport restaurant sales that Opposer decided to open
restaurants in the United States. Id. at 14. And when Opposer opened its first U.S.
location, in Los Angeles, people lined up around the block. Id. at 16. The same thing
Opposition No. 91199515
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happened when Opposer opened restaurants in Houston and Washington, DC.
during this time frame. Id. at 18.
We cannot conclude, based on the evidence of record, that POLLO CAMPERO is
a famous mark in the United States, as fame has been interpreted under the case
law. Even Mr. Denegri’s testimony falls short of stating that the mark is famous:
Q: Well, let’s take the United States generally. How well recognized is
the brand Pollo Campero among all consumers in the United States?

A; It is recognized. I mean, is it recognized among all consumers, but
go to Wichita, you know, and people will know what Pollo Campero is,
no.

Id. at 19.

What we can conclude, however, is that the mark POLLO CAMPERO has a
strong recognition among the expatriate Central American community, and with
the relatives and friends of people who live in Central America, and have spent time
visiting them there or have been visited by them in the United States. To this
extent, the fifth du Pont factor favors Opposer, although we do not accord the
POLLO CAMPERO mark the broad scope of protection given to a mark found to be
famous in the United States.
The next factor we consider is the similarity or dissimilarity of the services.
Applicants’ services are identified as “fast-food restaurants”; Opposer’s services are
identified as “restaurant services” in, inter alia, Registration No. 2598281 for
POLLO CAMPERO in typed form and Registration No. 3508553 for POLLO
CAMPERO and rooster design. The “restaurant services” as identified in Opposer’s
registrations encompass Applicant’s identified “fast-food restaurants,” and therefore
Opposition No. 91199515
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the services are legally identical. Moreover, the record shows that Opposer’s
restaurant services are in fact fast-food restaurant services, although Opposer
prefers the term “quick service restaurants” (“quick service restaurant” is “a
sophisticated way of saying fast food”, 49 TTABVUE 16). This du Pont factor favors
Opposer.
Moreover, because the services are legally identical, they are presumed to travel
in the same channels of trade. Opposer’s services are, in fact, directed to the general
public, with its core customers currently being the people that know the brand from
“back home,” primarily Guatemalans, Salvadorians and Hondurans, 49 TTABVUE
18. Applicant’s services, as identified, are not restricted, and therefore they must be
deemed to be offered in this same channel of trade to the same classes of consumers.
Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253,
1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011). This du Pont factor also favors Opposer.
We turn next to the du Pont factor of the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks
in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.
In assessing this factor, we keep in mind that when marks would appear on
virtually identical goods or services, as they do here, the degree of similarity
necessary to support a conclusion of likely confusion declines. Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed.
Cir. 1992). Further, the “marks ‘must be considered … in light of the fallibility of
memory’ and ‘not on the basis of side-by-side comparison.’” In re St. Helena Hosp.,
774 F.3d 747, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014), quoting San Fernando Elec.
Opposition No. 91199515
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Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elecs. Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1 (CCPA 1977).
We first consider Applicants’ word mark POLLO CAMPESINO. Applicants have
applied for it in standard characters, and therefore it is not limited to any particular
font, size, style or color. The same is true for Opposer’s Registration No. 2598281,
which is for the mark POLLO CAMPERO in typed form. See In re Viterra Inc., 671
F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Citigroup Inc., 98 USPQ2d at
1259.10 Therefore, in appearance the marks both consist of the identical initial
word, POLLO, and both are followed by a word that begins with the letters CAMPE
and ends in O. In fact, the only difference in appearance of the marks is that
CAMPESINO has the letters “SIN” where CAMPERO has the letter “R”. Because
these differences are embedded within the words, basically at their center, they do
not stand out. As for the sound of the marks, the similarities in the letters also
create similarities in pronunciation. POLLO CAMPESINO and POLLO CAMPERO
do have some differences, most notably that CAMPESINO is a four-syllable word
and CAMPERO has three syllables, but the overall similarities in pronunciation far
outweigh the differences.
It is when we come to the connotation of the words that the analysis becomes
somewhat complicated. To non-Spanish speakers, the marks will not have any
meaning, except to suggest that they are Spanish words, or at least words in
another language. To such customers, the marks cannot be distinguished on the

10 “Standard character” marks were formerly known as “typed” marks; the preferred
nomenclature was changed in 2003 to conform to the Madrid Protocol. Viterra, 101 USPQ2d
at 1909, n. 2.
Opposition No. 91199515
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basis of meaning, and would convey the same commercial impression. There are
also consumers who are not fluent in Spanish, but may have been exposed to
enough Spanish to understand that POLLO means “chicken” in Spanish. In this
regard, in comparing the marks it is appropriate for us to give less weight to this
common feature. See In re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (there is nothing improper in stating that, for rational reasons,
more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the
ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their entireties). While
the inclusion of the word POLLO in both marks would not, alone, be a sufficient
basis for finding the marks similar, that is not the only point of similarity. The
marks share not only the descriptive term POLLO, but another term that is, as
discussed, very similar in appearance and similar in pronunciation. For non-
Spanish speakers who are not familiar with the meaning of CAMPERO and
CAMPESINO, these words are not sufficiently different to distinguish the marks.
Such consumers would not be likely to clearly remember these unfamiliar words,
and will retain only the general impression of a Spanish-sounding word that begins
with CAMPE and ends with O.
The final group of consumers is what Opposer has described as its core
customers, namely, people from Central America who are now in the United States.
These consumers are fluent in Spanish, and will readily understand the meaning of
the words CAMPERO and CAMPESINO. However, even here, we cannot say that
the meanings of these words are so distinct that consumers will distinguish the
Opposition No. 91199515
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marks based on them. There has been a great deal of testimony and discussion
about the meanings of the words, due in large part to Opposer’s claim that the
translation of the mark provided by Applicants constitutes fraud on the Office.
There seems to be agreement by the parties that CAMPERO as an adjective means
“country, rural.” See Opposer’s Exhibit 11, 49 TTABVUE 200, of a translation taken
from the Concise Oxford Spanish Dictionary (2000); Applicant’s Exhibit 40, 52
TTABVUE 174, of a translation taken from the Merriam-Webster dictionary. There
is, however, an issue about the meaning of CAMPESINO. Opposer has submitted a
definition from WordReference.com showing that the Concise Oxford Spanish
Dictionary translates “campesino” as an adjective meaning “rural, country” when it
comes before a noun, with a second definition, without any reference to placement,
as “peasant-like”. Exhibit 12, 49 TTABVUE 201. WordReference.com also lists
translations from Diccionario Espasa concise inglés-español showing “campesino”
means “peasant,” “countryman” and, as an adjective, “rural, peasant-like.” Id.
Applicants, on the other hand, point to the translation of “campesino” in Oxford
Dictionaries Online as a noun meaning “a peasant farmer,” Exhibit 40, 52
TTABVUE 174, and also point to the meanings of CAMPESINO given in the
translation statements for several third-party trademark registrations, including
two in which “campesino” is translated as “peasant” (Exhibit 41 for CAMPESINO,
52 TTABVUE 175 and Exhibit 43 for JAMONETA CAMPESINO and design, 52
TTABVUE 177) and one in which “campesino” is translated as “farmer” (Exhibit 42
for CAMPESINO ESTATE COFFEE, 52 TTABVUE 176.
Opposition No. 91199515
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We need not, for purposes of determining the likelihood of confusion issue, and
more specifically the question of the similarity of the marks, get involved in a
discussion of whether the direct translation of CAMPESINO is COUNTRY, or
whether the mark POLLO CAMPESINO would be translated as “country chicken.”
Suffice it to say that CAMPERO and CAMPESINO are related in meaning, both
having general connotations of something rural. As a result, fluent Spanish
speakers are likely to consider the marks to have related or similar meanings, and
when used in connection with identical restaurant services, they are likely to view
them as variations of each other, indicating a single source for the services.
Accordingly, whether we consider the potential consumers for the parties’
restaurant services as being fluent in Spanish, knowing no Spanish at all, or having
a basic knowledge of Spanish, each group will understand the marks as conveying
highly similar commercial impressions.
We find that the du Pont factor of the similarity of the word marks favors
Opposer.
Applicants have also applied to register the following POLLO CAMPESINO and
design mark:

Opposition No. 91199515
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As a general rule, if a mark comprises both a word and a design, the verbal portion
of the mark likely will be the dominant portion, since this portion will be spoken
when the services are referred to by consumers. See In re Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at
1911. That principle applies in this case; despite the large rooster design that is
part of the mark, we consider the word portion to be dominant. Our previous
discussion regarding the similarity between Opposer’s word mark and the words
POLLO CAMPESINO applies here as well, with the added point that, because
Opposer’s word mark is registered in typed form, it may use the same font for its
mark as the words are shown in Applicants’ mark.
Further, even if we were to consider the design portion of Applicants’ mark to be
equal in source-indicating significance to the word portion, Opposer also uses design
elements with POLLO CAMPERO, specifically in its registered marks
and .
The design portion of Applicants’ mark is remarkably similar to the designs in
Opposer’s marks, in that all depict an anthropomorphic rooster wearing a large,
broad-brimmed hat. As previously noted, the test is not whether the marks can be
distinguished upon a side-by-side viewing, but whether they convey the same
commercial impression. We find that Applicants’ mark conveys the same impression
as Opposer’s marks; to the extent that consumers would note the differences in the
stance of the rooster or the amount of the body that is depicted in Applicants’ mark,
Opposition No. 91199515
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they would not ascribe these dissimilarities to differences in the source of the
restaurant services, but would see them as merely another variation of Opposer’s
rooster designs.
It must also be remembered that the restaurant services involved are fast food,
and therefore, by definition, inexpensive and subject to impulse purchase. This du
Pont factor, too, favors Opposer. Consumers are not likely to study the marks in
order to determine whether there are any differences between them. As a result, a
consumer who is familiar with POLLO CAMPERO restaurants is likely, upon
encountering the similar mark POLLO CAMPESINO for a restaurant, particularly
a restaurant that specializes in the same type of food, to simply “read” POLLO
CAMPESINO as POLLO CAMPERO. The same is true for Applicant’s POLLO
CAMPESINO and design mark; consumers will simply consider the rooster design
to be one that they are familiar with from Opposer’s marks.
Applicants have addressed, in their brief, the du Pont factor of the number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods. However, the only evidence they
point to consists of various third-party registrations, and such registrations are not
evidence of actual use of the marks shown therein. San Fernando Elec. Mfg. Co.,
196 USPQ at 2; In re The Clorox Co., 578 F2d 305, 198 USPQ 337, 342-343 (CCPA
1978). Even if they were, Applicants appear to be relying on them to show that the
colors red, yellow and white appear in several trademarks. However, our finding
that Applicants’ marks are similar to Opposer’s marks is not based on a similarity
of the colors that are used in the marks. We also point out that Applicants have not
Opposition No. 91199515
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claimed color as a feature of their POLLO CAMPESINO and design mark, and their
word mark is in standard characters, without limitation to any particular color or
colors. Nor is Opposer’s typed word mark limited to any particular color, or its
registration for CAMPERO and design. This du Pont factor is neutral.
Applicants also make the statements that they use the colors yellow, blue and
red in their restaurants, while Opposer’s restaurants have the dominant colors
yellow and brown. To the extent that Applicants are contending that confusion is
not likely because the overall look of the parties’ restaurants is different, that issue
is not before us. We must determine likelihood of confusion based on the involved
marks for the identified services. Opposer may use its registered marks for its
restaurants without any limitation as to the décor of the restaurants, and if
Applicants were to obtain registrations, they could use their marks for restaurant
services without any limitation to the décor either.
The final du Pont factors discussed by either party are the extent of any actual
confusion and the length of time during which there has been concurrent use
without evidence of actual confusion. There is no evidence of any actual confusion,
but that is not surprising in view of the fact that Applicants have not begun to use
their marks in the United States. Applicants have attempted to rely on the
concurrent use by the parties of their marks for restaurants in Honduras, but we
find this evidence of little probative value in terms of whether confusion is likely to
occur in the United States. Purchasing conditions are not necessarily the same and,
most importantly, the number of consumers who are fluent in Spanish in the United
Opposition No. 91199515
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States is substantially different from the number of consumers in Honduras who
are fluent in Spanish. Therefore, we treat both of these factors as neutral.
After considering all of the evidence and arguments on the relevant du Pont
factors, we find that Opposer has proved its case that Applicants’ marks for
restaurant services are likely to cause confusion with Opposer’s marks for its
services.
In view of our finding on the ground of likelihood of confusion, we need not
determine the other two grounds asserted by Opposer, fraud and lack of bona fide
intent to use the mark in commerce.
Decision: The opposition is sustained as to both applications on the ground of
likelihood of confusion.