Cadillac Steel Products Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 24, 1964

149 N.L.R.B. 1045 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

CADILLAC STEEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION 1045
Cooper & Boond Plumbing Company , F. Jenny & Sons Plumb-
ing, or any other employer , where an object thereof is to force or
require Leipzig to cease doing business with Modern Electric
Service.
Los ANGELES BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION
TRADES COUNCIL,
Labor Organization.
Dated------ ---------- By-------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date of post-
ing, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other
material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional
Office, Eastern Columbia Building, 849 South Broadway, Los
Angeles, California , Telephone No. 688-5204 , if they have any ques-
tions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
Cadillac Steel Products Corporation and United Steelworkers
of America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 21-CA-5759. November
1964
DECISION AND ORDER
24,
On July 30 , 1964, Trial Examiner James R. Webster issued his
Decision in the above -entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision . Thereafter , the Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision
and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed cross-excep-
tions. Both the Respondent and the General Counsel filed answer-
ing briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act , the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and
Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner 's Decision , the exceptions and briefs , and the entire record
149 NLRB No. 103.
1046 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the additions noted below.
- The General Counsel excepts to the failure of the Trial Examiner
to find that the Respondent's refusal to furnish the Union a list of
existing job classifications and corresponding hourly rates of pay, as
requested by the Union, constituted a separate violation of Section
8(a) (5), and to the Trial Examiner's failure to recommend, as a
remedy, that the Respondent furnish the Union the above informa-
tion upon request. We find merit in these exceptions. The record
shows that proper allegations dealing with the subject matter were
set forth in the General Counsel's complaint. In its answer, the
Respondent admitted its failure to furnish the requested information.
In view of its objections to conduct affecting the results of the elec-
tion, the Respondent denied that such failure constituted an'unlawful
refusal to bargain., However, it did not challenge the relevancy of
the information sought by the Union. Accordingly, we sustain the
General Counsel's exceptions and find that the Respondent's refusal
to furnish the Union a list of existing job classifications and corre-
sponding hourly rates of pay, as requested, constitutes a refusal to
bargain in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act. We shall
therefore include in our order a provision directing the Respondent,
upon request, to furnish the Union the aforementioned information.
See Morganton Full Fashioned Hosiery Company, 115 NLRB 1267.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order -recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that the Respondent, its
officers , agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth
in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, with the following
modifications :
1. Add the following as a new paragraph 1(b) and renumber the
former paragraph 1(b) as 1(c) :
"Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as,the exclusive
representative of all employees in the appropriate unit by refusing
to furnish the Union a list of existing job classifications and
corresponding hourly rates of pay, as requested by said labor
organization."
1 We do not place reliance upon any implication in the Trial Examiner's Decision that,
in determining whether or not the Regional Director acted arbitrarily and capriciously
under the consent-election agreement in overruling the Respondent 's objections to the elec-
tion without a hearing , it was necessary for him to determine whether the Respondent's
objections and proffered evidence raised substantial and material issues of fact General
Tube Company, 141 NLRB 441; Howard Rippee et al., d/b /a Pacific Multi forms com-
pany, 138 NLRB 796; Summer Sand & Gravel Company, 128 NLRB 1368 , affd. 293 F. 2d
754 (C.A. 9).
CADILLAC STEEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION 1047
2. Delete the period and insert a comma at the end of paragraph
2(a), and add: "and if an agreement is reached, embody such agree-
ment in a signed contract."
3. Add the following paragraph as paragraph 2(b) :
"Upon request, promptly furnish the Union a list of existing job
classifications and corresponding hourly rates of pay."
And reletter former paragraphs 2(b) and (c) as 2(c) and (d)
respectively.
4. Add the following to the Appendix to the Trial Examiner's
Decision as its second indented paragraph :
WE WILL, upon request, promptly furnish United Steelworkers
of America, AFL-CIO, a list of existing job classifications and
corresponding hourly rates' of pay.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION -
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, with all parties represented, was heard before Trial Examiner
James R. Webster in Los Angeles, California, on April 22, 1964, on complaint of the
General Counsel and answer of Cadillac Steel Products Corporation, herein called the-
Respondent. The complaint, issued March 6, 1964, on charges filed February 4, 1964,
alleges that Respondent refused to bargain collectively with the United Steelworkers
of America, AFL-CIO, within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.
In his answer Respondent admits that he has refused to recognize and bargain with
the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union,
but alleges that because of election irregularities, the Union has not been selected as
the bargaining representative of a majority of his employees in the unit involved, and
that he had and now has a good-faith doubt that the Union at any time materially
herein represented or now represents a majority of employees in the bargaining unit.
On June 18, 1964, Respondent, with his brief herein, filed with the Trial Examiner a
motion to amend answer to allege as an affirmative defense, in addition to that
alleged in the original answer, that the certification by the Regional Director of the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees is invalid and of
no legal force or effect in that the Regional Director failed to act in conformity with
the Board's policy and the requirements of the Act by overruling, without a hearing,
Respondent 's objections in paragraphs Nos. VI and VIII of his objections to conduct
of election, and by failing to find that said objections furnish sufficient grounds to set
the election aside. Copy of the motion to amend the answer was duly served on the
counsel for the General Counsel and the Charging Party. Since the motion is based
on facts already of record and constitutes primarily a position or defense with refer-
ence to these facts, and there being no objections to the motion, I therefore and
hereby grant the motion to amend Respondent's answer, pursuant to Section 102.25 of
the Board 's Rules and Regulations , as amended.
Upon consideration of the entire record in this case, including the briefs of the
parties, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
The Respondent is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing steel
products. In the course and conduct of this business, Respondent annually purchases
and receives goods, materials, and supplies valued in excess of $50,000 at its plant in
Huntington Park, California, which goods, materials, and supplies are transported to
the Respondent's Huntington Park plant directly from States outside the State of
California. I find that Respondent is engaged in interstate commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
1048 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The representation proceedings
On August 30, 1963, Respondent and the Union entered into an agreement for
consent election in Case No. 21-RC-8523, providing for an election in a bargaining
unit including all production and maintenance employees including shipping and
receiving employees and truckdrivers and excluding office clerical employees, guards,
professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. The election'was con-
ducted on September 6, 1963, from 3:15 to 3:45 p.m., with 24 votes being cast for
the Union and 23 votes being cast against the Union. There were no challenged
ballots. On September 11, 1963, Respondent filed objections to the conduct of the
election and request for a new election; on October 8, 1963, the Regional Director for
Region 21 issued his report on objections and certification of representatives, over-
ruling the objections of .Respondent and certifying the Union as the bargaining
representative of the employees in the above-named appropriate unit. Respondent
then filed with the Board in Washington; D.C., exceptions to Regional Director's
report on Employer's objections. On October 31, 1963, George A. Leet, Associate
Executive Secretary of the Board, notified the parties that the Board would not con-
sider the exceptions to the Regional Director's report and would not intervene for the
reason that the election was held pursuant to an agreement for consent election pro-
viding that "The determination of the Regional Director shall be final and binding
upon any question . . . raised by any party hereto relating in any manner to the
election...."
B. The refusal to bargain
By letters dated October 31, 1963, and January 8, 1964, the Union requested
Respondent to meet for bargaining negotiations, and by letter dated January 10, 1964,
the Union requested the Respondent to submit a list of the various job classifications
in existence and the hourly rates of pay for these classifications for use in negotiations.
By letter dated February 3, 1964, the Respondent declined to engage in bargaining
negotiations with the Union, and declined to furnish the requested list of job classifica-
tions and hourly rates of pay. The Respondent asserted as grounds for this position
that the Union is not the properly certified bargaining agent of the employees as the
election was improperly conducted, and that the Union does not represent a majority
of the employees in the bargaining unit involved.
C. Issues
Was the Regional Director's action arbitrary and capricious in overruling Respond-
ent's objections to the conduct of the election without a hearing thereon, in determin-
ing that the election was properly conducted and in certifying the Union as the
collective-bargaining representative?
There is no statutory authority for any claim that a party is entitled, as a matter of
right, to a postelection hearing. Under the Board's Rules, and consistent with its
longstanding practice, as is stated by the Respondent herein, postelection hearings on
objections are conducted where "substantial and material factual issues exist which
can be resolved only after a hearing." 1 This policy offers the obvious advantage of
avoiding lengthy and unnecessary hearings, thereby comporting with the requirement
that questions preliminary to the establishment of the bargaining relation by expedi-
tiously resolved, while at the same time safeguarding the basic constitutional require-
ment of due process. Where a party, seeking to overturn a representation determina-
tion, fails to raise substantial and material issues of fact, he "has no cause or complaint
when and if [his] demand for a hearing is denied." 2
In determining in the instant case whether the Regional Director acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in overruling Respondent's objections without a hearing, it will be
necessary to determine whether or not Respondent's objections and proffered evidence
raise "substantial and material issues of fact." Respondent contends that they do.3
1 Section 102.69(c), Rules and Regulations of the Board, Series 8, as amended. See
also J. R Simplot Company, 138 NLRB 172, 176.
2 N.L R B. v. O.S. Van Storage, Inc, 297 F. 2d 74, 76 (C A. 5).
3 A fact is substantial and material if it could change or modify a decision in a case.
As stated by the Board in J. it. Simplot Company (supra), "the party excepting to the
'Report on Objections' must supply specific evidence which prima facie would warrant
the Board rejecting the Report."
CADILLAC STEEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION' 1049
The Respondent contends, and the Regional Director's report on objections shows,
that one employee, Ray Patino, did not vote in the election. Since the vote was 24
for the Union and 23 against the Union, the vote of Ray Patino could have changed
the result of the election by causing a tie vote; with a tie vote the Union would not
have received a majority of the votes and therefore could not have been certified as
the representative of the employees. The Respondent contends that Patino did not
vote in the election due to an inadvertence or mistake caused wholly or in part by the
manner in which the Board's agent conducted the election.
The Regional Director concluded that there was no irregularity in the conduct of
the election which raised a material issue as to the integrity and secrecy of the election,
and he concluded that the election was fairly conducted and that it produced a repre-
sentative vote. Did the Regional Director, in reaching these conclusions, resolve any
substantial and material factual issues; in other words, has the Respondent presented
any evidence which, if credited, would warrant a determination contrary to that made
by the Regional Director?
To properly consider this issue, it will be necessary to consider and evaluate the
evidence contained in Respondent's offer of proof. Respondent offered evidence that
the election was improperly conducted; the counsel for General Counsel objected to
this evidence on the grounds that the Respondent was attempting to relitigate in this
complaint proceeding, matters foreclosed by the Regional Director's final determina-
tion in the related representation case; the Trial Examiner sustained the objection
and Respondent made an offer of proof. As I see the issue now, it is not primarily
whether the election was properly or improperly conducted, but it is whether the
Regional Director acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Respondent a hearing
on allegedly substantial and material factual issues. I therefore reverse my ruling
denying the offer of proof and now accept Respondent's offer of proof which consists
of the affidavits of Ray Patino and the two election observers, Augustine Crespin and
Frank Yeo, which are a part of Respondent's Exhibit No. 1.4
D. Respondent's objections to the conduct of the election
The objections raised by Respondent to the conduct of the election are as follows:
(1) Respondent objected to the conduct of the election on the ground that four
employees could not read, write or understand the English language contained in the
notices and on the ballot, and that said employees were therefore not duly notified of
the election or apprised of its nature.
(2) Respondent objected to the conduct of the election on the ground that three
employees were not able to vote because of illness.
(3) Respondent objected to the conduct of the election on the ground that: The
observer appointed by the Company was not able to ascertain who voted and who did
not vote; said observer was prevented from observing the ballot box at all times during
the course of the voting; insufficient time was allotted for the votes to be cast; during
the course of the balloting and at the instance and request of the Board agent, said
observer went into the factory, and away from the voting area, to request that the
employees cast their votes; during these absences of the company observer from the
voting area, the Board agent did not know the men who were voting and could not
adequately observe the entire voting area including the polls and the ballot box.
(4) Respondent objected to the conduct of the election on the ground that one
employee did not receive notice of the election by reason of the fact that he was on
vacation.
(5) Respondent objected to the conduct of the election on the ground that: One
employee (Patino) did not vote due to his own inadvertence and mistake and also that
of the observers present and of the Board agent; said employee was under the impres-
sion that he was not entitled to vote because he held a supervisory position, although in
fact he does not hold such a position; the observers noted his presence around the
polling area but did not request that he vote because they did not know whether or
not he had voted.
In his brief Respondent urges impropriety only as to objections (3) and (5) as
listed above (being paragraphs VI and VIII of Respondent's objections).
4I realize that by accepting this offer of proof at this time, the counsel for the General
Counsel is denied the opportunity of cross-examination of these witnesses and of offering
evidence to refute their testimony; but in view of the fact that I hereinafter find that
this proffered testimony does not raise a substantial and material factual issue, the
counsel for the General Counsel is not prejudiced by this ruling.
1050 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
E. Regional Director's report on objections
The Regional Director in his report overruled each of the five objections of
Respondent to the conduct of the election. As to objections Nos. (1), (2), and (4),
there is no dispute as to the facts, and in his brief Respondent does not charge that a
hearing should be conducted on these objections. Furthermore, he does not contend
that the Regional Director's decision in overruling these three objections was arbitrary
or capricious. Objections Nos. (3) and (5) (paragraph VI and VIII of Respondent's
objections) were overruled by the Regional Director based on the following findings
of facts and conclusions.
The Regional Director's report indicates that the observers were not away from the
polling place while any of the employees were voting. It states that "a few minutes
before the polls opened, the observers walked through the shop and announced that
the polls were open and were back at 3:15 p m., when the polling of employees com-
menced, as scheduled Approximately 5 minutes before the polls were scheduled to
close, there were no employees waiting to vote, although several names had not been
checked. It was agreed that it would be a good idea for the observers to make a final
announcement that the polls were still open. The observers walked into the shop and
called out that the polls were still open. No voters appeared to vote while they were
gone, and the observers on their return, cast their own ballots which appeared to be the
only votes cast during the closing minutes of the election."
As to Patino, the Regional Director stated in his report that "Even if, as stated in
the objection, Patino may have failed to vote on the mistaken belief that he was not on
the list of eligibles, it would not raise any material issue because, if interested in voting,
it would have been incumbent on him at least to check with the Board Agent ... In
fact, the evidence shows and Patino admits that during the election he even got in line
to vote but left " The Regional Director presumed in his report that Patino left
because he became impatient at having to wait his turn, and he concluded that Patino's
failure to vote was occasioned by his own lack of diligence and interest, and that his
failure to vote therefore raised no issue.
The Regional Director also concluded that the election schedule, which was in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, did allow sufficient time for all eligible
voters who wished to vote to present themselves at the polls and do so. It was pointed
out that no employees were waiting in line to vote at the time of the closing of the polls
nor showed up shortly thereafter in an attempt to vote. The ballot box was at all
times under the observation and in the care of the Board agent although at the begin-
ning and at the conclusion of the balloting, the observers were not present.
F. Testimony contained in Respondent's offer of proof
Patino's affidavit sets forth that on the day of the election he waited in line for
about 30 minutes. He also states that "I was waiting to be called and saw Augie
Crespin and Frank Yeo [the election observers] running in and out of the plant during
the election and each of them saw me. While waiting to be called, as they were
calling all the others, I did not hear my name called and went to talk to Augie about
my vote and he then told me that the election was over and that it was too late for
me to vote " He also stated that he was going to vote against the Union.
The affidavits of the two observers at the election are the same, and as set forth in
Respondent's brief, state that:
(1) "All of the voters that were in the plant had to be rounded up"; that the
two observers "would go back and forth to the plant and send out men to the
voting booth and when we got back we would not be certain as to who voted
or not."
(2) That the checkoff of voters was incomplete; that the Board Agent, not
being familiar with the men, was not in a position to identify the voters; and that
towards the end of the election the checkoff of names was completely abandoned;
(3) That they saw Ray Patino with a group of men who were standing in line
to vote; and that "from time to time , we were calling off names to vote"; that
neither of the observers called Mr. Patino's name, that shortly after the election
the observers spoke to Patino, and he asked them why they had not called his
name to vote. They replied that they thought he had voted while they were in
the factory looking for eligible voters.
The affidavits of the two observers were apparently furnished to the Regional
Director since he quotes from these affidavits in his report on objections. He makes
no reference to the affidavit of Patino which was taken on the same date as the affidavit
of the two observers; and this affidavit may not have been furnished to the Regional
Director, since in Respondent's objections to conduct of election in paragraph VIII,
CADILLAC STEEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION 1051
Respondent objected to the election on the ground that one employee "whose name
will be furnished on request ," did not vote "due to his own inadvertence and mistake
and also that of the observers present and the AGENT." In any regard , the Regional
Director 's report makes reference to an affidavit of Patino ; therefore information was
obtained from him.5
G. Conclusions
The affidavits of the observers suggest that it was possible that some employees may
have voted while they (the observers) were absent from the polling place; G but there
is no evidence that any did, and the report of the Regional Director (section E herein)
states that none did.
Assuming (1) that some had voted while the observers were absent, and (2) that,
therefore, the Board agent, not being familiar with the men, was not in a position to
identify the voters, and (3) that names of voters were not checked off the voting list,
this conduct is certainly not proper election procedure; but in the absence of proof
that an ineligible person voted, or that an ineligible employee's name (whom one of
the parties may have wanted to challenge) was on the voting list, then these irregu-
larities would not affect the results of the election and would not warrant setting an
election aside.?
As to Patino, Respondent's offer of proof shows that (1) the observers from time
to time were calling off names to vote and did not call Patino; (2) Patino was waiting
to be called to vote as he apparently thought "they were calling all the others"; and
(3) the checkoff of voters on the voting list was incomplete and later abandoned and
that therefore the observers did not know exactly which employees voted and which
had not (particularly Patino).
There is no obligation on the part of the agent or the observer to call any employee
to vote, although employees may be informed that the polls are open. Whether or
not an employee votes is his own choice, although an election is representative of the
desires of the employees in proportion to the number of eligible employees that
participate.
The purpose of the election is to permit all eligible voters to cast their ballot in
secret if they choose to vote. This was done, and certainly Patino had the opportunity
to vote. No doubt if an accurate checklist of voters had been kept, as is normally
done, the observers would have noted that Patino had not voted. But to vote or not
to vote is his privilege. The law does not require all eligible voters to vote. Even if
Patino did not vote under the belief that he thought he was to be called to vote, based
on the fact that he thought "they were calling all the others," I do not believe this his
misconception or misunderstanding in this regard would warrant a new election. It
was a misunderstanding on his part; he was standing in line and could have voted had
he remained in line. I cannot help but conclude, in agreement with the Regional
Director, and after fully considering Respondent's offer of proof, that Patino's lack
of interest and diligence contributed significantly to his failure to vote.
I find that Respondent's objections to the conduct of the election and his offer of
proof in connection therewith do not raise substantial and material factual issues, and
I therefore conclude that the Regional Director's action in issuing a report on Respond-
ent's objections, denying the objections without a hearing thereon, does not constitute
conduct that is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the Union being the certified bar-
6 In his objections to the conduct of the election, Respondent also claims that Patino
was under the impression that lie was not entitled to vote because he held a supervisory
position There is no evidence to support this assertion in Respondent's offer of proof.
The Regional Director deals with this assertion in his report and quotes from an affidavit
of Patino wherein he stated he was told by a foreman, Johnnie Galea, that he was eligible
to vote and that he saw the'notice of election before the election and "knew what time the
voting was taking place." According to Respondent's objection, his name was on the
eligibility list.
6 The observers stated that they "would go back and forth to the plant and send out
men to the voting booth and when we got back we would not be certain as to who voted
or not "
7In the Holmes d Barnes, Ltd . case, 114 NLRB 630, the investigation of objections to
an election disclosed that "some voters had their names checked off the eligibility list in
groups of 2 and 3 before receiving their ballots and without their names being asked by
the agent, and that one picked up his own ballot." The Board held that the election
should not be set aside and stated that "This, of course, is not in strict accordance with
the Board's instructions to its election agents and the decorum it strives to enforce.
But the investigation also disclosed that this informal method of identification . . did
not result in any ineligible voter receiving a ballot and participating in the election."
1052 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
gaining representative of an appropriate unit of employees of Respondent, and
Respondent having on February 3, 1964, refused to recognize or bargain with the
Union as the bargaining representative of employees of Respondent in an appropriate
unit , I find that by this conduct the Respondent has violated Section 8 (a)(5) of the
Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent, set forth in section III of this Decision, occurring in
connection with its business operations as set forth in section I of this Decision, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes, burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent refused to bargain collectively with the
Union, it will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to bargain with the Union
upon request as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit
concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. All production and maintenance employees including shipping and receiving
employees and truckdrivers at Respondent's Huntington Park plant, exclusive of office
clerical employees, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the
Act, constitute at all times material herein, a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. The Union at all times since October 8, 1963, and at all times material herein,
has been and is now the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the
appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing to bargain collectively, and by interfering with, restraining, and
coercing employees thereby, in the exercise of their right under Section 7 of the Act,
Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of
the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon
the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, it is recom-
mended that the Respondent, Cadillac Steel Products Corporation, its officers, agents,
successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all its employees
in the appropriate unit.
(b) In any manner interfering with the efforts of the above-named Union to bar-
gain collectively with Respondent.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Upon request bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit,
including all production and maintenance employees including shipping and receiving
employees and truckdrivers at Respondent's Huntington Park plant, exclusive of
office clerical employees, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined
in the Act.
(b) Post at its plant in Huntington Park, California, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
8In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order"
TELESERVICE CO. OF WYOMING VALLEY, ETC. 1053
for Region 21, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative be
posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for at least 60
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent
to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of
this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.9
It is finally recommended that unless on or before 20 days from the date of receipt
of this Decision the Respondent notify said Regional Director in writing that it will
comply with the terms hereof, the Board issue an order requiring it to take such action.
9 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, In writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bar-
gaining unit described below:
All production and maintenance employees including shipping and receiv-
ing employees and truckdrivers at our Huntington Park plant , exclusive of
office clerical employees , eua;ds, professional employees , and supervisors
as defined in the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of the above-named
Union to bargain collectively on behalf of the employees in the above-described
unit.
CADILLAC STEEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 849 S.
Broadway, Los Angeles, California, Telephone No. 688-5206, if they have any ques-
tions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
Teleservice Co. of Wyoming Valley, John Walsonavich t/a Serv-
ice Electric Company, Service Electric TV Cable Company,
Inc., Tamaqua TV Cable Company , Inc., and Service Electric
Cable T.V. Inc. ' and United Industrial Workers of North
America of the Seafarers International Union of North Amer-
ica, Atlantic , Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District, AFL-
CIO. Case No. 4-CA-3150. November 24, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 28, 1964, Trial Examiner George L. Powell issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
1 The name of Respondent appears as amended at the hearing.
149 NLRB No. 101.