Cachet Financial Solutions Inc.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 12, 2013

No. 77950367re (T.T.A.B. Apr. 12, 2013)

THIS OPINION IS NOT A
PRECEDENT OF THE TTAB

Mailed:
April 12, 2013

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

In re Cachet Financial Solutions Inc.
_____

Serial No. 77950367
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Request for Reconsideration
_____
Daniel A. Rosenberg of Briggs and Morgan, P.A. for Cachet Financial Solutions Inc.
Christopher L. Buongiorno, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 102 (Karen
M. Strzyz, Managing Attorney).
_____

Before Zervas, Wolfson and Shaw, Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Wolfson, Administrative Trademark Judge:
On March 21, 2013, Cachet Financial Solutions Inc. (“applicant”) filed a
request for reconsideration of our final decision in this proceeding, mailed on
February 21, 2013, affirming the refusal to register the mark shown below for the
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Serial No. 77950367

3

As for the marks, applicant argues that registrant’s mark contains a double
meaning, i.e., that it “tells the world that [registrant] is an ACH processor,”
whereas applicant’s mark lacks this connotation. The Board previously considered
this argument and found that despite the possible double meaning in the cited
mark, the dominant feature of both marks is the word CACHET, and this similarity
outweighs any differences in the marks’ visual impressions. Consumers will
pronounce registrant’s mark as “cachet,” and not ACH, and will recall the mark as
“cachet.” Further, the meaning of registrant’s mark is the same as that of the
dominant portion of applicant’s mark, that of suggesting a desirable quality, or
“cachet” that makes people want to use the services. Thus, the marks are
confusingly similar in their overall commercial impressions.
As for the services, applicant essentially reargues that the two services are
“actually incompatible with each other,” Applicant’s Request for Reconsideration, p.
4. Applicant contends that registrant’s customers, i.e., payroll processors, would not
use remote deposit capture (“RDC”) to process payroll, but would instead use direct
deposit; while applicant’s customers, i.e., banks (for example) use RDC to convert
checks to digital format and would not process payroll deposits using RDC. Despite
the argument, however, the evidence shows that a single source may provide both
types of services. Moreover, applicant’s services are not directed to any particular
segment within the financial industry, so that the limitation in the registration to
the “payroll service industry” does not insulate the services from each other.
Finally, applicant reargues the sophistication of the purchasers, stating that, “To
Serial No. 77950367

4

the extent that lay persons might confuse the two services, and evidence in the case
warns that this is possible, consumers of the actual services in question would not
confuse the source of the services because they will understand that the services are
actually incompatible with each other.” While the evidence suggests the purchasers
are sophisticated, even sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source
confusion. In re Wilson, 57 USPQ2d 1863, 1865-66 (TTAB 2001); In re Decombe, 9
USPQ2d 1812, 1814-1815 (TTAB 1988) (“Being knowledgeable and/or sophisticated
in a particular field does not necessarily endow one with knowledge and
sophistication in connection with the use of trademarks.”).
The Board duly considered the relevant DuPont factors in making its
determination of likelihood of confusion in this case. Any remaining doubt has been
resolved, as it must be, in favor of registrant. Accordingly, applicant’s request for
reconsideration is denied, and the Board’s February 21, 2013 decision stands.